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THE CANADIAN FORCES' INEFFECTIVE COMMAND OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTED PERSONNEL: WILL THE CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY PERPETUATE OR SOLVE THE PROBLEM?

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The Canadian Forces' ineffective command of civilian contracted personnel: Will the Canada First Defence Strategy perpetuate or solve the problem?

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List of Acronyms

ADF	Australian Defence Force
ASD	Alternative Service Delivery
BCATP	British Commonwealth Air Training Program
BCE	Balanced Command Envelope
BGen	Brigadier General
CAE	Canadian Aerospace Industries
CANCAP	Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program
CAR	Command, Authority, Responsibility
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CFDS	Canada First Defence Strategy
CFFTS	Canadian Forces Flying Training School
CFTSP	Contracted Flight Training and Support Program
COP	Contingency Operation Plan
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
DND	Department of National Defence
EW	Electronic Warfare
FAC	Forward Air Controller
HR	Human Resources
iCATS	interim Contracted Airborne Training Services
LGen	Lieutenant General
LOGCAS	Logistics Contractor Augmentation Support
MND	Minister of National Defence
NDA	National Defence Act
NFTC	NATO Flying Training in Canada
OGD	Other Government Department
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders
SCONDVA	Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WWII	World War II

Literature Review

Research for this paper included consultation of official government documents such as the 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). It included a review of historical documents, such as the Official History of the Naval Services of Canada, and uses facts and figures located on various government websites such as the Veterans Affairs Canada, the Department of National Defence (DND), and the Canadian Forces (CF) websites. Finally, the opinions and research of other military and civilian personnel found in various research papers and articles was consulted and is referred to in this paper.

Abstract

The training and sustainment of a military force are endeavours that have seldom been undertaken by military personnel alone. In almost every conflict, military forces are accompanied and aided by civilians. Civilians have played various roles in conflict throughout the ages. During World War II (WWII), Canada made use of millions of civilians to support the war effort. Civilians made uniforms, worked in munitions factories, acted as instructors to military personnel, and even transported men and equipment through areas patrolled by enemy forces. Canada was at war, and civilians worked and risked their lives knowing that Canada itself was at risk if their mission failed. As the threat to Canada changed over the years, the contribution made by civilians since WWII has ranged from civilians risking their lives during a wartime crisis, to present-day multinational corporations turning a profit from continued world instability.

Despite the differences in motivation, there are still many similarities between civilian support provided to Canada's military during WWII and that provided today. Canada currently uses civilians to train, sustain, and support its forces in domestic and deployed environments.

This paper will examine the civilian contribution to Canada's military capability focusing mainly on the periods of WWII and from the 1990s onward. It will introduce the concept of the "peace dividend" and show how a wave of budget and manpower cuts during the 1990s, also known as the decade of darkness, drove the CF to the verge of collapse. Discussion will focus on the 1994 White Paper on Defence and the introduction of Alternate Service Delivery (ASD). The White Paper provided government direction for DND and the CF to cut costs and focus resources through the increased use of civilian contracted personnel. ASD programs compelled the CF to seek support from civilian contracted personnel in positions that were traditionally held by military personnel. ASD directed military resources from training, logistics and service support positions, and redistributed them into more combat-oriented trades. This reduced the CF's ability to support its forces and repair its own high-technology equipment, and has led to dependency on civilian support. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), which is the Canadian Government's latest "comprehensive strategy for DND and the CF"[1], outlines a plan to acquire even more high-technology equipment and to continue support for international operations. The plan outlined in this document suggests that civilian contracted support for the military is here to stay.

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[1] Department of National Defence, “Canada First Defence Strategy.”(Ottawa: 2008) Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/index-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 15 February 2011.

A discussion of benefits and disadvantages that civilian contractors have brought to the CF in the two principle areas of military training, and logistics and service support, will show that command and control (C2) of civilian contracted personnel is problematic. Although tools were provided to commanders in WWII that allowed them to compel civilian personnel to carry out dangerous tasks, no such authority exists today. This leaves current commanders at a disadvantage and may put missions and lives at risk. This research paper will show that current CF commanders do not have the training and resources required to be effective commanders of civilian contracted personnel. The application of Pigeau and McCann's Competency, Authority and Responsibility (CAR) model to ASD will show that it is the more than just a lack of authority, but also deficiencies in Human Resource training for commanders and poor contract management that are at the heart of the C2 problems. The research concludes that although the CFDS implies that civilians support to the CF will continue, other support promises for increased resources and manning levels made in the CFDS may prove to be the key to solving the current C2 issues associated with commanding civilian contracted personnel.

Chapter 1 World War II and the Merchant Marine

Chapter 1 will discuss the contributions made by civilians to Canada's war effort throughout WWII. It will detail some of the risks and the hardships endured by civilians in the support of the Canadian war effort and will show some of the motivation for civilian participation in the conflict. The bulk of the discussion will focus on civilians acting as instructors for military personnel and highlight the contributions made by the merchant marine. It will discuss C2 issues related to the employment of civilian personnel and the tools that were made available to commanders to overcome these issues.

1.1 World War II and Civilian Support

> During the winter of '42-'43, when sinkings were at their worst… I could see that they knew very well…that anything up to 25 per cent of them would probably not arrive in the U.K. in their own ships, and that probably half of that number would not arrive in the U.K. at all. But there was never a waver in their resolve. - Admiral Leonard Murray, RCN[2]

The circumstances that compelled nearly thirty percent of the Canadian civilian population to join in the war effort were very particular. Depression and drought ravaged Canada and demoralized much of its population in the 1930s. German submarines lurked off the Canadian coast and in the St. Lawrence and targeted military and civilian ships alike. The Veterans Affairs Canada website states that, "By early October [1942], seven U-boats had sunk 19 merchant ships and two naval escorts in the St. Lawrence." The sinking of the civilian ferry, Caribou, on October 14 1942, killed 136 civilians that were

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[2] Juno Beach website, "The Merchant Navy of Canada." Available from http://www.junobeach.org/e/4/can-tac-e.htm; Internet; accessed 16 April 2011.

enroute from Cape Breton Island to Newfoundland.[3] Although the ground war raged thousands of miles from Canada, the ruthless and expansionist enemies in Europe and the Pacific posed a very real threat to Canada and its civilian population.

The amount of personnel and resources required for Canada and its allies to carry out the war was enormous. Over a million men and women joined the Canadian military during WWII.[4] Due to the vast number of Canadian soldiers that were deployed or involved in training, there was a requirement to involve a large portion of the remaining Canadian population to support the war effort. Out of a total Canadian wartime population of 11.3 million, 2.1 million civilians[5] worked full time to produce food and other items that were necessary for the war effort. A further 1,049,876 civilian men and women were engaged in "essential war industries".[6] This included the production of weapons, ammunition, ships, vehicles, and airplanes.

Civilians also supported the war effort by training military personnel. One of the most important training roles supported the production of Allied airmen. The British Commonwealth Air Training Program (BCATP) brought Allied aircrew to Canada to conduct their training in relative safety far from the front lines of the air war. According to a display at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, "The plan trained more than

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[3] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Valour at Sea: The Battle of the Gulf of St. Lawrence." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/other/sea/secondlawrence; Internet; accessed 17 April 2011.

[4] Juno Beach website, "The Merchant Navy of Canada . . ., n.p.

[5] The word "civilian" will be used to denote a person who is not a member of the military or police force.

[6] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Canada's Industries Gear up for War." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/secondwar/fact_sheets/industry; Internet; accessed 19 February 2011.

131,500 flying personnel in Canada for the Allied air forces, including bombers, gunners, navigators, wireless operators, and pilots."[7] The ambitious program required roughly 33,000 military and 6000 civilian personnel to produce a planned output of 544 pilots, 340 navigators, and 580 wireless operators/gunners for each four-week period.[8] According to the Veterans Affairs Canada website, most civilians gained employment " . . . as mechanics, cooks, clerks, engineers, and labourers at BCATP aerodromes." Some civilians made a more direct contribution to the war effort by acting as flight instructors, both on the ground and in the air.[9] Although civilians were carrying out instruction, the military was ultimately responsible for the product of the schools. Mr. Murton Seymour, a civilian involved with the BCATP, said, " . . . notwithstanding all of the advantages which . . . there are in civilian operation of elementary training, it is necessary to remember that the final responsibility for this training and for the quality of the training, rests upon the Service."[10] The plan was so successful that in 1943 it prompted American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt write a letter to the Canadian Prime Minister in which he called Canada the "Aerodrome of Democracy."[11] The success of the program, however, did not come without a cost. Hundreds of students and instructors, both

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[7] Information from WWII display found at Canada's War Museum in Ottawa, 23 March 2011.

[8] Juno Beach Centre website, "British Commonwealth Air Training Plan." Available from http://www.junobeach.org/e/4/can-tac-air-bca-e.htm; Internet; Accessed 20 February 2011.

[9] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/secondWar/bcatp/page7; Internet; accessed 19 February 2011.

[10] Hatch, F.J., "The Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan 1939-1945." Department of National Defence Directorate of History (Ottawa: 1983), 138.

military and civilian, were injured or killed in training accidents throughout the course of the war.[12]

Although most of their work was done in the relative safety of Canada, some civilian workers took greater risk by venturing overseas and being closer to the front lines. Civilian medical personnel, for example, travelled to Europe to act as assistants to nurses or ambulance drivers. Canadian firefighters traveled to Britain to help fight fires caused by German bombing.[13] Other civilians transported roughly 10,000 airplanes from factories in Canada to the United Kingdom. This was dangerous work, and there was a casualty rate of nearly 20% due to accidents or enemy action.[14]

1.2 The Merchant Marine

Civilians also contributed to the war effort on the sea. In 1939, the Canadian Government enlisted the use of all Canadian-registered civilian merchant ships, mainly freighters and tankers, to support the war effort. Canada started the war with only 38 ocean-going merchant ships.[15] The ships became property of a Crown corporation[16] called

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[11] Hatch, F.J., "The Aerodrome of Democracy . . ., iv.

[12] Information from WWII display found at Canada's War Museum in Ottawa, 23 March 2011.

[13] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Canada's Industries Gear up for War . . ., n.p.

[14] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Civilian Support to the Armed Forces." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/secondwar/fact_sheets/industry; Internet; accessed 19 February 2011.

[15] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Canada's Industries Gear up for War . . ., n.p.

[16] Crown Corporation, wholly owned federal or provincial organization, structured like private or independent enterprises. Established to carry out regulatory, advisory, administrative, financial or other

the Park Steamship Company Limited. The Park Company contracted out the operation of the ships to private steamship companies who then became responsible for the ships and their crews. An Order in Council was passed on August 26, 1939 that brought all Canadian-registered vessels under the control of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).[17] The RCN decided where and when the ships would sail.[18] The merchant ships traveled in convoys across the Atlantic and were under the control of a small number of RCN ships that acted as convoy escorts. The RCN, which did not have sufficient trained personnel to provide crews for both its navy ships and the merchant ships, posted small numbers of navy personnel and light defensive weapons on just a handful of the merchant ships. Many of the merchant ships were crewed entirely by civilians and carried little or no defences.

It is possible that Canada's merchant mariners carried out the most dangerous type of civilian support tasks during the war. The merchant ships carried essential war supplies and troops across the Atlantic to allies in Europe and to other areas of the globe. Merchant ships were laden with fuel or explosives and were therefore prime targets for German U-boats. Once the Germans defeated both France and Norway in 1940, their ability to build and launch U-boats directly into the Atlantic increased. The ability for Germany to operate closer to the main sea-supply routes between North America to

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services or to provide goods and services, crown corporations generally enjoy greater freedom from direct political control than government departments.

[17] Tucker, Gilbert Norman. "The Naval Service of Canada – Its Official History Volume II: Activities on Shore During the Second World War." Available from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/Canada/RCN/II-OnShore/Naval_Svc_vol2_e.txt; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

[18] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "Valour at Sea: The Park Ships." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/other/sea/secondpark; Internet; accessed 17 April 2011.

Britain, and in greater numbers, dramatically increased the danger to the convoys. The U-boats hunted either alone or in murderous "wolf packs" in which numerous U-boats conducted coordinated attacks. With such volatile cargo, the chance of survival was slim if a ship was disabled or sunk, and many men were directly lost as a result of such attacks. Other ships could not stop to pick up survivors during an attack, as they would themselves become an easy target. As a result, the frigid North Atlantic claimed many more lives.

The sacrifice made by the civilian merchant mariners was substantial. A total of 72[19] merchant ships were lost during over 25,000 merchant ship voyages between North America and Britain.[20] Out of a total of 12,000 merchant mariners that served from 1939 to 1945, 1,451 of them lost their lives on Canadian-flagged ships.[21] In recognition of their contribution, Commander-in-Chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic, Canadian Rear Admiral Leonard Murray said in 1945 that, "The Battle of the Atlantic was not won by any Navy or Air Force, it was won by the courage, fortitude and determination of the British and Allied Merchant Navy."[22]

The bravery shown by many sailors from the navy and the merchant marine was undeniable, however commanders, when trying to get the men to do their jobs, experienced some difficulty. All officers and non-commissioned members of the military

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[19] Various documents also claim the number was as low as 58.

[20] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "The Historic Contribution of Canada's Merchant Navy." Available from http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/sub.cfm?source=history/other/merchant/hist; Internet; accessed 17 April 2011.

[21] Veterans Affairs Canada website, "The Historic Contribution of . . ., n.p.

[22] Ridler, Jason DR., "Nothing But Hope and Courage: Canada's Merchant Navy in the Second World War," Historica Dominion Institute webpage, Historywire article. Available from http://historywire.ca/en/article/21178; Internet, accessed 18 April 2011.

are required by law to carry out lawful orders, even those which may lead to serious injury or death.[23] The escort missions were very dangerous, yet, because of their obligation to follow lawful military orders, military members did not have the ability to refuse to comply with a lawful order. If they did refuse, the punishment could be severe.[24] Unlike members of the RCN, civilian merchant mariners were not legally obligated to carry out these dangerous voyages. The civilian ships were under the control of the RCN, but since civilian merchant mariners did not fall under the military chain of command, if the refusal to work did not put the mission at risk, they could simply refuse to sail and only risk losing his job. Delaying or canceling the departure of a ship could have serious consequences for the safety of the convoy. If the refusal of a merchant mariner to carry out his duty threatened to delay the departure of the ship with a convoy, the navy had a means to compel merchant mariners to carry out their job. An RCN naval officer accompanied by an R.C.M.P. officer would visit ships in port prior to their departure. Any person that, in their opinion, was causing or likely to cause a delay could be forcefully removed from the ship. Under the Merchant Seaman Order of 1941, this person could be detained and held for a period of up to nine months.[25] As Dr. Gilbert Norman Tucker says in his official history of the Naval Service of Canada, "the Merchant

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[23] National Defence and the Canadian Forces website, "QR&Os: Volume I – article 19.015." Available from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qro-orf/vol-01/chapter-chapitre-019-eng.asp#cha-019-015; Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.

[24] Depending on the offence, punishment ranged from reprimands all the way up to death by hanging if the offence was considered an act of mutiny.

[25] Tucker, Gilbert Norman. "The Naval Service of Canada – Its Official History Volume II: Activities on Shore During the Second World War." Available from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/Canada/RCN/II-OnShore/Naval_Svc_vol2_e.txt; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

Seaman Order was designed not only as a deterrent to trouble-makers, but also to protect the ninety-five percent or more of the seamen who wanted to get on with the job.[26]

Chapter 1 discussed the civilian contribution to the Canadian military during WWII. Hobbled by hard economic times, almost thirty percent of Canada's civilians took jobs that directly contributed to the war effort. The participation ranged from workers producing food and ammunition, to civilian pilots training military aircrew how to fly. Some participation even put civilians at direct risk to enemy attack. Nearly 20 percent of civilians that transported aircraft from Canada to Europe fell victim to accidents or enemy action. In carrying out what was possibly the most dangerous civilian job during the war, close to 1500 merchant mariners were killed ferrying troops and supplies across the Atlantic.

Despite the negative aspects that came with WWII, the industries and opportunities that were created to support the allied effort gave both employment and a noble cause to unify much of the disheartened Canadian population. The success that was achieved by using civilians to support the military in a time of crisis guaranteed that their support would be considered for most future operations.

Although the contribution of civilians cannot be denied, the C2 of civilians in times of crisis proved to be difficult for military commanders. Naval convoy commanders were responsible to ensure the safe transit of essential war supplies across the dangerous Atlantic. The commander's task was made more difficult by the fact that he had civilian merchant mariners working with him that were not in the military chain of command. As a member of the merchant marine, one of the most dangerous civilian jobs

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[26] Tucker, Gilbert Norman. "The Naval Service of Canada . . ., n.p.

during the war, sailors faced imprisonment if their refusal to do their duty put the convoy at risk. The Merchant Seaman Order was a means for a military commander to compel civilian merchant mariners to carry out their jobs if their actions threatened the military mission.

Although unpleasant, the measures were necessary and gave the commander the authority to ensure that the mission, for which the commander was responsible, proceeded as planned. This C2[27] issue, where a military commander has a responsibility to carry out a mission, but does not have the authority to force civilian workers to comply with his wishes, is a problem that is still faced by the CF today. Later discussion will show that a high level of authority is necessary for a commander to effectively command civilian personnel.

Chapter 2 Boom and Bust

Canada and other nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, build and reduce their forces based on real or perceived military and economic threats. When there is no longer a clear military threat to a country, there is an incentive for the government to reduce the size of its military forces. The rationale is that it is wasteful to spend money on a large military force if there is no clear reason to have one. This reduction of military strength, which allows military funding to be spent on other

[27] Office of the Auditor General of Canada website, "National Defence - C4ISR Initiative in Support of Command and Control," Glossary, C2 definition. Available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/osh_20050421_e_23427.html; Internet; accessed 09 April 2011. The exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the force's mission. The functions of C2 are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

government priorities, is known as the "peace dividend". A government may also choose to reduce the size and capability of their forces due to political or financial pressures. The end of WWII signaled the end of a significant military threat to Canada and its allies, and the military forces of these countries were reduced accordingly. Years later, the end of the Cold War saw the defeat of the Soviet threat, and the military forces of Canada and its allies were again reduced as a result. The unexpected increase in the number of smaller conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War actually increased the workload for the Canadian military while the size of its force was being reduced. This chapter will highlight that although there was no direct military threat to Canada, the post-Cold War peace dividend, combined with an increased operational tempo and bleak economic situation, once again forced Canada to once again seek out civilian support for their military operations.

2.1 The Peace Dividend

From WWII until the 1990s, Canada has undergone many cycles of increased and decreased military spending based on perceived threats. At the end of each period of threat, the size and capability of the Canadian military has been cut. At the end of WWII, the Royal Canadian Air Force, for example, was cut from a wartime peak of 215,000 personnel in 1944 to just 11,569 officers and men by the end of 1947.[28] This is not a

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communications, facilities, and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning, directing, co-ordinating, and controlling forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

[28] Royal Canadian Air Force History webpage, "The History of Canada's Air Force: The Cold War," http://www.rcaf.com/history/coldwar.php; Internet; accessed 01 March 2011.

unique Canadian experience. The United States made similar cuts to defence spending at the end of WWII, decreasing from a wartime high 38.7 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to 3.2 percent by 1948.[29] Canada once again bolstered the size of its military to participate in the Korean War. Between 1950 and 1955, Canada doubled the size of its military and tripled its defence spending as a percentage of gross domestic product.[30] Forces were once again reduced after the Korean War. Canada increased the size of its military during the Cold War, and the total reached upwards of 120,000 Regular and Reserve Force personnel in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union sparked another series of cuts, and the Canadian military strength was reduced by about 33 percent during the 1990s.

There is a risk involved with drastically reducing the size and capability of a military force. In making cuts during times of uncertainty, Canada balances the financial benefit gained by making cuts to the military with the risk of not being entirely prepared for a future conflict. The experience that goes out the door with departing soldiers takes years to accumulate, and the loss of this experience puts militaries at a disadvantage in the early stages of any potential new conflict. It is relatively easy to add soldiers and equipment to a military in a time of crisis, but experience and knowhow does not come as quickly. Canada's successful use of civilians throughout WWII suggests that in times of crisis, the government can call upon the civilian population to help make up for the initial lack of military capability. This success may have conditioned Canadians to think that civilians can easily replace military personnel at all stages of a conflict, not just the

[29] Congress of the United States, "After the Cold War: Living with Lower Defense Spending", Office of Technology Assessment (February 1992), 6. Available from www.fas.org/ota/reports/9202.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

beginning. This can be a double-edged sword, as we will see in a later chapter, since some civilian companies that are contracted to provide support to the military seek to hire people with previous military experience and can therefore be an influence that actually reduces the current military experience level.

2.2 The Decade of Darkness

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of the Cold War. Believing that the imminent military threat to Canada was over, the Canadian government attempted, once again, to reap the benefits of a peace dividend. The post-Cold War peace dividend, combined with a severe economic downturn in Canada,[31] was used as justification for freezes or cuts to military spending in the 1990s.[32] At the same time, the Somalia Inquiry into the Canadian military's infamous deployment to Somalia revealed a bloated and complex command structure within National Defence Headquarters. The embarrassment caused to the government by the military's actions in Somalia in 1993 may have also given the government reason to gut the CF.[33]

The proposed cuts were laid out in Canada's 1994 White Paper on Defence. The White Paper makes clear reference to large public sector debts. It states that in order to

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[30] Information from WWII display found at Canada's War Museum in Ottawa, 23 March 2011.

[31] Human Resources and Skills Development Canada website, "Overview of Evolution of the Canadian Labour Market from 1940 to the Present – November 2000", section 5.1.1 The 1990s Recession. Available from http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/cs/sp/hrsd/prc/publications/research/2000-002533/page08.shtml; Internet; accessed 08 March 2011.

[32] Inge, Joseph R. and Eric A. Findley. "North American Defense and Security after 9/11," *North American Defense and Security*, Issue 40, 1st quarter (2006), 23.

[33] Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry website, "The Chain of Command: Military Command, Discipline and Leadership" Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/vol0/v0s11e.htm; Internet; accessed 08 March 2011.

bring the deficit and debt under control, the government had to cut expenditures.[34] In the few years leading up to the White Paper, the military had already suffered significant cuts and had made a large contribution to the government's attempts to reduce the debt, yet further cuts were scheduled.[35] Few areas were safe from cuts. The White Paper made it clear by stating that "Most areas of defence will be cut - staff, infrastructure, equipment, training, operations - some substantially more than others."[36]

The reduction of the military budget forced the CF to cut personnel and equipment. At the end of the Cold War, the CF Regular Force numbered around 89,000 personnel.[37] The 1994 White Paper stated that the Regular Force should be reduced to 60,000 personnel to by 1999.[38] One of the initiatives that were introduced to reduce the number of personnel in the CF was called the Force Reduction Program (FRP). Through the FRP, approximately 14,000 CF personnel took early release or retirement.[39]

The resulting reduction in capability came at the same time that the CF was experiencing a high operational tempo due to deployments to failed and failing states in

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[34] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper on Defence", Chapter 2, Domestic Considerations. Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence.htm; Internet; accessed 21 February 2011.

[35] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 2.

[36] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[37] Government of Canada News Centre Web Page, "Recruiting and Retention in the Canadian Forces" (05 May 2009) Available from http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?m=/index&nid=448289; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

[38] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[39] Government of Canada News Centre Web Page, "Recruiting and Retention . . ., n.p.

Africa, Haiti, and the Balkans.[40] In his research paper entitled "Civilian Contractors on Deployed Operations: An Enabler for the CF", Major J.R. Jensen says that, "In the 41 years between 1948 and 1989, the Forces were involved in 25 operations; in the 1990s it was involved in 65 operations."[41] While speaking before a Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs (SCONDVA) committee in 2006, LGen Andrew Leslie made reference to the 1990s: " . . . for a number of years, the Army maintained a very high operational tempo with an insufficient number of soldiers."[42] Reducing the number of military personnel while maintaining or increasing the number of tasks meant a heavier workload and more frequent deployments for those that remained in uniform. The higher stress and workload certainly compelled other members to leave the CF, thereby worsening the problem for those that remained.[43] In an interview with Legion magazine in 1999, director of Air Force Strategic Policy, Colonel Joe Sharpe, stated that aircrew " . . . leave for a lot of reasons. With downsizing, the people we have left are working a lot harder and their chances of promotion are restricted."[44]

The reductions imposed by budgets, and outlined in the 1994 White Paper, were

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[40] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail to Recruit more Teeth: Privatized Logistics and its Implication for CF Force Posture", Paper prepared for the Prairie Political Science Association Annual Convention, n.d., 16. Available from www.umanitoba.ca/arts/ppsa/papers/Perry.PPSA.2010.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 November 2010.

[41] Major J.R. Jensen, "Civilian Contractors on Deployed Operations: An Enabler for the Canadian Forces" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College CSC 32 paper, 2006), 3.

[42] Standing Committee on National Defence minutes, NDDN ● NUMBER 023 ● 1st SESSION ● 39th PARLIAMENT (20 November 2006).

[43] This statement is not based on personal experience and no external sources were researched to support the claim.

[44] Dick, Ray. "The Canadian Forces Today: Part 3 of 4 – An Air Force in Transition" *Legion Magazine Article* (01 March 1999) Available from http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/1999/03/the-canada-forces-today-part-3-of-4-an-air-force-in-transition/; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

demoralizing, and soldiers began to burn out as a result of conducting repeated tours into challenging areas. A Veterans Affairs Canada survey given to 2,700 current and former military members in 2000 showed that 28 percent of them suffered symptoms of major depression.[45] While speaking before the annual seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations in early 2007, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier said, " . . . the negative impact of the defence expenditure reductions from 1994 . . . have now led to some deep wounds in the department and to the CF over this past what I would call a decade of darkness."[46] Besides being a low point in terms of morale and capability for the CF, the decade of darkness acted as a catalyst that sparked Canada's current reliance on civilian contractors in jobs that were formerly carried out by military members.

At the end of WWII, like at the end of most conflicts, the lack of a distinct threat to Canada gave the Canadian government an excuse to cut the size of the military and reduce the number of civilians required to support it. The cuts that came at the end of the Cold War were particularly damaging to the Canada's military because they came at a time when the CF had an abnormally high operational tempo. The problem of soldiers becoming burned out in the 1990s highlighted the fact that the number of soldiers in the military was insufficient for the number and type of tasks that were being asked of them. This period was so difficult for the CF that the Chief of Defence Staff labelled it as the decade of darkness. As chapter 3 will show, the response was to once again turn to civilians to support Canadian soldiers at home and on deployed operations.

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[45] Adams, Sharon. "Minds at War: Operational Stress Injuries" *Legion Magazine Article* (04 Dec 2009*)* Accessed from http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2009/12/minds-at-war-operational-stress-injuries/; Internet; accessed 18 April 2011.

Chapter 3 Civilian Stopgap

Faced with a high operational tempo and decreasing resources, the CF of the 1990s was stretched to the limit. As was the case during WWII, the Canadian military once again required the support of civilians to help them through the crisis. Chapter 3 will briefly discuss the civilian support that is provided to the CF by DND and the relationship between DND and the CF. The bulk of the chapter will discuss the 1994 White Paper on Defence and will introduce the concept of ASD. Two of the principal areas of civilian support that have been prevalent since the 1990s; training, and logistics and service support, will also be discussed. Each area will be examined separately and subjectively in order to highlight the positive and negative outcomes that can occur with each type of support. The recurring problem with C2 of civilian personnel will be highlighted and following chapters will suggest mitigating measures to allow for more effective C2 of civilian contracted personnel during current and future CF operations.

3.1 DND needs to rethink Civilian Support

The CF receives constant support from civilians, not only during times of crisis. This civilian support comes from DND. DND is a federal government department and is headed by the Deputy Minister of National Defence. According to the National Defence and CF webpage, within DND there are, " . . . civilian finance and policy experts, information management and technology specialists, requirements analysts, program

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[46] Diplomat Online webpage, "For the Record: Excerpt from General Hillier speech on 16 Feb 2007", *Diplomatica Magazine.* Available from

managers . . . " and various other experts that do such things as define defence policy, establish and coordinate departmental plans and priorities, and administer the Defence Budget.[47] DND staffers do everything from helping to procure new equipment for the military to establishing support contracts for the CF with other civilian agencies. The support given by DND is mostly administrative in nature and will not be discussed in depth.

The CF, while supported by civilian members of DND, is also under civilian control. The Deputy Minister, a civilian, " . . . has responsibility for policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations . . . . " while the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a military officer, " . . . has responsibility for command, control, and administration of the CF and military strategy, plans and requirements."[48] Both the Deputy Minister and CDS report directly to the Minister of National Defence (MND), also a civilian. The MND is then responsible to the Prime Minister of Canada.[49] The issue of C2 is clear at this level. When orders are given to the CDS from his civilian masters, there is no question that the orders are to be followed. As will be discussed later, C2 becomes more difficult at lower levels where civilians are under the command of military personnel.

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www.diplomatonline.com/pdf_files/Diplomat%20MAR%20R4.pdf; Internet; accessed 02 March 2011.

[47] National Defence and the Canadian Forces webpage, "What is the Department of National Defence?" Available from http://www.dndjobs.forces.gc.ca/working-travailler/wdnd-qmdn-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 08 March 2011.

[48] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Mobile Version webpage, "What is the relationship between DND and the Canadian Forces?" Available from www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/adnd-amdn-eng.asp; Internet, accessed 01 April 2011.

[49] National Defence and the Canadian Forces webpage, "What is the relationship between DND and the Canadian Forces", Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/index-eng.asp; Internet: accessed 08 March 2011.

DND was not immune to the budget and personnel cuts of the 1990s. The Auditor General's report from 2000 shows that between 1994 and 1999, DND personnel were reduced from 32,000 to roughly 20,000 employees.[50] Brigadier-General (BGen) Peter Gartenburg, then Director General, Management Renewal Services at DND, stated before a SCONDVA committee in 1998 that during the 1990s, " . . . we reduced our defence expenditures by cutting military and civilian personnel, closing down installations and eliminating components with military potential that are no longer needed . . . . "[51] He emphasized the direness of the situation when he stated that the strain on the CF and DND in the 1990s was such that " . . . we have reached the point where we can no longer meet our budgetary targets solely by reducing capabilities or closing installations."[52] In order to prevent the total collapse of the CF and DND, a reorganization of resources and priorities was required.

DND and the CF had to find innovative ways to meet the challenges caused by an unprecedented rate of deployment while dealing with a shrinking budget and reduced pool of manpower from which to draw. The direction outlined in the White Paper was for the CF to remain within the bounds of a reduced budget and still maintain the ability to deploy a flexible and combat-capable force.[53] Since further cuts were not a viable option, DND was forced to rethink the way it delivered services to the CF. Using the White

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[50] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "2000 December Report of the Auditor General of Canada", Para 32.8. Available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200012_32_e_11219.html; Internet; accessed 07 April 2011.

[51] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts - Wednesday, April 1, 1998" Available from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/scondva-cpdnac/tra-tem/1998/01041998-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

[52] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts - Wednesday, April 1, 1998 . . ., n.p.

Paper as a guide, the Defence Team[54] undertook several initiatives that were intended to refocus resources to maximize operational capability. Certain support functions would be farmed out to civilian contractors while resources and military personnel would be drawn from support roles and re-assigned to essential or "core" military tasks.[55] It is ironic that after having to rely on civilians during WWII because of a clear threat to Canada and its allies, Canada's current reliance on civilian contractors can be attributed to cutbacks that resulted from the lack of a distinct military threat to Canada in the 1990s.

3.2 Alternate Service Delivery

The most notable initiative to emerge from the decade of darkness is called ASD. The 1994 White Paper stated that where there is a " . . . demonstrated potential for increased cost effectiveness, support activities currently conducted in house[56] will be transferred completely to Canadian industry or shared with private industry under various partnership arrangements."[57] DND and other government departments have embraced ASD, however, the discussion in this paper will be restricted to ASD activities in support of the CF.

The first step in implementing ASD was to determine which military functions or

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[53] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[54] Defence Team is a term used to describe the team consisting of both DND and the CF.

[55] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 3.

[56] The term "in house" is understood to describe those support activities conducted by both the CF and DND.

[57] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

support services within the CF that could be replaced by a civilian[58] provider and which functions could be done away with completely. When speaking about the ASD program in 1998, stated that the term "support" included tasks such as " . . . vehicle maintenance, building maintenance, plowing runways, driving buses, accommodation and feeding . . . and not flying airplanes, sailing ships or [leading] battalions on manoeuvre, which are all military operations."[59] The White Paper stated that "The CF will reduce military staff in certain occupations and trades as functions are contracted out or reassigned to civilian employees."[60] The services provided by Air Force cooks on a base in Canada, for example, could easily be taken over by a civilian contracted cooking company since there is no real military aspect to the job. The military position occupied by the cook could then be transferred to an occupation that was deemed to be a core capability that was in need of resources. Although the definition of core capability varies depending on the threat environment faced by a military,[61] according to Gartenburg, two of the core military tasks within the CF were Combat and Combat Support.[62] The definition of Combat is self-explanatory. In Joint Publication 1-02, dated 12 April 2001, the term Combat Support is defined as "fire support and operational assistance provided to combat

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[58] Civilian will be used to describe anyone that is from the private sector or is part of private industry. It is not in reference to members of the public sector, to include DND or other government departments.

[59] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts - Wednesday, April 1, 1998 . . ., n.p.

[60] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[61] The CF thought that tanks and the ability to operate them was no longer required and began phasing them out of the inventory until they proved useful in Afghanistan. Now they are once again considered a core capability.

elements."[63] This should not be confused with Combat Service Support (CSS), which the U.S. Army CSS Field Manual 4-0 defines as " . . . the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces . . . it includes . . . aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services . . . . "[64] BGen Gartenburg made the clear distinction between actual warfighting, which includes Combat and Combat Support, and the CSS functions that enable such combat operations. Interpretation of direction provided by the White Paper and statements made by BGen Gartenburg make it clear that the CF saw that Combat and Combat Support functions should remain with the military, while CSS functions could be considered for civilian contracted support.

Based on the above definitions, it would be hard to determine whether a merchant mariner who was transporting supplies, while facing an enemy threat, would be defined as carrying out a Combat Support or a CSS function. Further discussion in a later chapter will show that support provided by some civilians today is very close to the "warfighting" role that Gartenburg suggested should remain in the domain of Canadian soldiers, and as a result, problems with C2 could have very grave results.

In keeping with the White Paper's theme of increased cost effectiveness, the goal of ASD was to reduce support costs to the military by contracting out services to

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[62] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts - Wednesday, April 1, 1998 . . ., n.p.

[63] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 17 September 2006)." *Joint Publication 1-02*. Available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_**pub**s/jp**1_02**.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.

[64] U.S. Department of the Army, "Combat Service Support", *Field Manual 4-0*, Chapter 1, (29 August 2003). Available from http://www.tsg3.us/tnsg_lib/unit_dig_lib/**fm4_0**.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.

civilians, while still providing essential support to military operations.[65] LGen Leslie, then Chief of the Land Staff, echoed his support for ASD in 2006 when he said, "With regard to privatization of certain activities within the military, when . . . it's only a function of money, then I am absolutely in favour of it, so that we can free up soldiers to do the soldier activities for which they're trained."[66] This statement supports the idea that the contracting out of support services to civilians was to concentrate remaining military resources to warfighting tasks. Although Leslie mentions money, it appears to be in the sense that cost was not the driving factor, and that the priority was the reallocation of soldiers to soldiers' activities.

The White Paper mentions that ASD would transfer resources " . . . to where they are most needed - mainly to land combat and combat support forces - in response to the added emphasis being placed on multilateral activities, and particularly peace and stability operations."[67] The redirection of resources was meant to reduce the number trades that do not directly contribute to operations and redirect the soldiers from these positions into jobs that contributed directly to core operations. Reducing the number of trades would also ensure more depth in these positions,[68] meaning less frequent deployments for CF members and hopefully less burnout.

Repeated deployments during the 1990s took their toll on CF members, especially

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[65] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts - Wednesday, April 1, 1998 . . ., n.p.

[66] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts – 20 Nov 2006 . . ., n.p.

[67] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[68] Reducing the number of trades, while maintaining the same number of people in the military would increase the number of people available in each trade.

on support trades personnel.[69] Direction provided by the 1994 White Paper suggested that ASD was the way for the CF to cut costs while enhancing its warfighting capability. As a result, the CF began looking to privatize areas of support that had once been the purview of military personnel in hopes that it would save money and focus military resources on warfighting or core capabilities. Although the initial goal of ASD was cost savings, LGen Leslie's comments suggest that a more effective fighting force may have been the priority. Later discussion will show that cost savings are questionable and that other factors such as respecting government-imposed troop ceilings, or seeking to leverage advanced technology in a rapid manner, are also current catalysts for seeking support from civilian contracted personnel.

Although the intent of the military was to limit civilian contracted support to CSS trades and non-warfighting tasks, there are instances, such as with the merchant marine in WWII, where the lines between support and warfighting cannot be clearly defined. The following chapter will explore two main areas where civilians provide contracted support and highlight both the positive and negative aspects that ASD has brought to the CF since the decade of darkness.

Chapter 4 ASD Through the Years

The 1994 White Paper provided government direction for the CF to pursue cost savings and focus resources through the ASD process. The CF has followed government direction and has sought civilian contracted support for the training of military personnel

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[69] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail . . ., 16.

and in the provision of logistics and service support. In this chapter, these two areas of support will be examined separately, using examples of past and current contracts in order to highlight the benefits and drawbacks that have resulted from civilianization of these former military responsibilities.[70]

The chapter will show that despite certain benefits that have resulted from ASD, the CF has become dependent on civilian contractors at home and abroad, especially in the servicing of high technology equipment. These issues are important because the latest government direction to the CF, in the form of the CFDS, has clearly stated that the CF will continue to carry out domestic and international operations and receive billions of dollars worth of high technology equipment in the coming years. This means that the CF's dependence on civilians is likely to increase in the future. The goal of this chapter is to highlight the difficulty in exercising C2 over civilian contractors, which limits the ability of a commander to effectively carry out his mission, especially on deployed operations. This is an issue that was mitigated to some degree during WWII, but remains a problem with both areas of ASD-inspired civilian contracted support.

4.1 Civilian training of military personnel

During the 1990s, Canada's military once again turned to civilians for support in the process of training their pilots. As was discussed in Chapter 1, Canada made use of civilian instructors as part of the BCATP during WWII. At 3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School (3 CFFTS) in Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, the task of conducting initial

flying training for new Air Force pilots has been conducted by military instructors flying military-owned and maintained aircraft since the end of WWII.[71] In 1992, Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Portage la Prairie was closed and all base support functions, infrastructure, aircraft, and maintenance at 3 CFFTS were handed over to a civilian contractor under the Contracted Flight Training and Support Program (CFTSP). Under the training and support contract, civilian pilots were hired and upgraded aircraft were purchased by the service provider to carry out the training of new military pilots.[72] The military provided a pilot to the school for quality control and to ensure that military flying standards were maintained, but the entire syllabus, from teaching ground school lessons to the administering of the final flying test, was implemented by civilian instructors.

Apart from serving as the location where military pilots conduct their first phase of flying training, Portage is also home to the basic helicopter and basic multi-engine school. These courses teach more advanced flying techniques to CF pilots who have already received their pilot wings. Civilian instructors are only involved during the initial flying training phase. The more advanced helicopter and multi-engine courses are still conducted using military instructors, but the aircraft are owned and maintained by the civilian service provider under CFTSP. This program was revisited in 2005, when a CDN $1.77 billion dollar, 22-year contract was signed with the Allied Wings consortium. As with the previous contract, the civilian contractor retained responsibility for all airport

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[70] Although the areas will be discussed individually, there will be some overlap and similarities between some of the benefits and drawbacks that are determined for each area of support.

[71] BCATP training took place in Portage from 1940-1942 when the school was called No. 14 Elementary Flying Training School.

[72] Canada's Air Force Webpage, Available from http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/17w-17e/schools-ecoles/page-eng.asp?id=459;, Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

facilities, aircraft ownership and maintenance, food provision, lodging and air traffic control services. As part of the improvements that came with the latest contract, all aircraft were upgraded, and new flight simulator and hangar facilities were built.[73]

The transition from military-owned to civilian-owned aircraft in Portage la Prairie was a precursor to an evolution that occurred with the Basic Flying Training Course at 2 CFFTS in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Moose Jaw is home the military's Basic Flying Training course. This is the second phase of military flight training that immediately follows the initial flying phase in Portage, but precedes the post-wings course back in Portage. When the first civilian training and support contract was introduced in Portage, the military still owned, maintained, and flew their own CT-114 Tutor aircraft in Moose Jaw. In 2000, the Tutor was retired as a training aircraft. It was replaced by the Harvard II aircraft under the NATO Flying in Training in Canada (NFTC) program.[74] The British Aerospace Hawk, a jet aircraft, was also provided under the contract for Fighter Lead in Training, which is the precursor to training on the F-18 fighter aircraft.

NFTC is similar to the BCATP in that it allows student pilots from allied countries to conduct their military flying training in Canada. While military instructor pilots fly the training sorties, just as they do for the helicopter and multi-engine courses in Portage, the aircraft, maintenance, and airport facilities are under civilian control.

Civilian aircraft and pilots have been contracted by DND and the CF to do more than just instruct military aircrew. Civilian contracted aircraft and crews perform support services for the CF by acting as training aids for military personnel. CF aircraft were

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[73] Canada's Air Force Webpage, Available from http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/17w-17e/schools-ecoles/page-eng.asp?id=459;, Internet; accessed 20 March 2011.

historically used to conduct airborne training support for other military units. In this training role, CF aircraft and crews were used to train Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel by simulating hostile aircraft, by towing targets, by conducting training with Army forward air controllers (FAC), and by conducting electronic warfare (EW) training.[75] Air Force combat support squadrons, along with fighter squadrons, performed these airborne training tasks along with their other defence-related duties. In 1999, the decision was made to contract out many of these training tasks. The CT-133 T-Bird aircraft that were used to conduct the majority of this training were retired, and in 2005 a contract was awarded to a company called Top Aces under the interim Contracted Airborne Training Services (iCATS) project.[76] Top Aces is a civilian-owned and operated company that uses Alpha Jet aircraft to provide essential airborne training services in the three main areas of target support,[77] target towing, and EW.[78]

4.1.1 Benefits

There are multiple benefits that can be gained by allowing civilian contractors to take over military training facilities and support services. In both Portage and Moose Jaw, there has been a reduced requirement for the military to provide resources for

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[74] The first version of the Harvard was the principal aircraft that was used during the BCATP.

[75] Canadian American Strategic Review webpage, "Interim Contracted Airborne Training Services: Filling the Gaps for CATS" *DND/CF News release*. Available from http://www.casr.ca/doc-dnd-ew-training-icats.htm; Internet; accessed 25 March 2011.

[76] Lesley Craig. "Top Aces Train Forces" *The Maple Leaf*, Vol. 12, No. 6 (11 Feb 2009), 3.

[77] Target support includes simulating hostile aircraft and FAC training.

training of students and the administration and maintenance of numerous buildings and aircraft. Private ownership and provision of services allows for military members to be treated as clients and removes many administration-related stresses for military personnel. This allows the military personnel to focus on the production of top-notch graduates as opposed to being distracted by such things performing maintenance on accommodations. The entire costs associated with the services contracts provided to the CF have been disclosed, however it is not clear how much money is being saved compared to if the CF were to provide the services. In his paper, Colonel Glynne Hines stated that, "Over its 20-year life, this contract [NFTC] has a value in excess of CDN $2.8 billion. This is a DND corporate account that does not form part of the Air Force's operating budget baseline."[79] Although it is not clear if the entire cost of the CDN $1.77 billion contract in Portage is also covered entirely by DND, the fact that the cost of some training does not come out of the CF's budget still equates to a substantial reduction in overhead for the military.

Another benefit gleaned by contracting out training services is an increased access to more recent technology. With the introduction of the Harvard II and Hawk aircraft to replace the Tutor, the CF went from 1960s technology to 1990s technology. According to the Canadian Air Force webpage, "NFTC is enabling the CF to take a multi-generation leap in the technology of undergraduate pilot training without any capital investment."[80]

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[78] Canadian American Strategic Review webpage, “Interim Contracted . . ., n.p.

[79] Colonel Glynne Hines, “Alternate Service Delivery: Managing to get it done right.” Toronto: Canadian Forces College, National Security Studies Course 4 paper, n.d.), 7.

[80] National Defence, NATO Flying Training in Canada, Canada’s Air Force Webpage. Available from http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/15w-15e/page-eng.asp?id=357; Internet; accessed 10 February 2011.

As was already mentioned, the training contract with Allied Wings in Portage brought with it new hangars, state of the art simulators, as well as new or upgraded aircraft. Having access to high technology without having to invest in its development is a great advantage. Taking proven off the shelf[81] technology in a "key in hand" fashion allows the military to avoid contentious issues such as development delays that are often associated with new and unproven technologies. The acquisition of off the shelf technology is also in keeping with direction provided by the 1994 White Paper which stated that the Department (DND) was to " . . . increase the procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology which meets essential military specifications . . . ."[82]

By contracting out maintenance services, the requirement for the CF to provide military technicians to perform maintenance on training aircraft is also reduced. Training aircraft are small and specialized fleets that are not normally used at operational squadrons or on deployments. Allowing military technicians to remain at operational squadrons and to focus their attention on the repair of operational aircraft, as opposed to training fleets, reduces training requirements and focuses energy on the pointy end of operations.

Finally, military contracts can bring regional economic benefits to Canadians and stimulate Canadian industry to be innovative and competitive on the world stage. This can have positive outcomes for the CF. A good example of one such company is Canadian Aerospace Industries (CAE). CAE recently won the contract to provide flight simulators and instruction courseware for the new fleet of fifteen Boeing Chinook

[81] Off the shelf refers to technology that already exists and is available for purchase. It bypasses the requirement for the buyer to develop the technology on their own, thereby allowing for a rapid procurement process.

helicopters that are scheduled for delivery to Canada in 2013. CAE, a Canadian company that is headquartered in Montreal, is a world-renowned simulator company that currently provides comprehensive flight and technical training via simulators and other means in more than 20 countries around the world.[83] Leveraging the technical and training experience of such a company would certainly enhance the quality of training received by CF members. Besides the obvious benefit to the CF, contracting support from a Canadian company builds confidence in Canadian industry and provides economic benefits to Canadians, just as it did in WWII.

4.1.2 Negatives

Although a military commander is responsible for the training mission and must produce a graduating class on a pre-determined date, he does not have the authority required to ensure that the civilian contracted personnel do what is required to accomplish this mission. Civilian workers cannot be compelled to work outside of the time and risk limitations stipulated in their contracts. A commander at NFTC, for example, may not order civilians to provide him with services since they are not in the military chain of command. A commander may suggest that a civilian do something, but the civilian is not obliged to comply. This reduces flexibility and can tie the hands of the military commander that is trying to keep a course on schedule. At the beginning of the NFTC program, the contractor was required to produce seventeen serviceable Harvard II aircraft

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[82] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., Chapter 7.

[83] CAE website, "Military Training and Services." Available from http://www.cae.com/en/military/training.support.services.asp; Internet, accessed 28 March 2011.

per day to meet the planned number of training flights. During the first two years of the program the contractor only produced fourteen and-a-half aircraft per day. As a result, the average course time went from five to seven months to nine to ten months. Delays in training were caused by late delivery of aircraft and flight simulators, as well as mechanical problems and slow turn-around times between aircraft launches.[84] If students fall behind schedule due to weather or maintenance-related reasons, for example, military personnel can be ordered to work longer days and on weekends in order to catch up and bring the course back on schedule. This is not the case for civilians. As a result, the ability to surge in times of crisis is reduced, which could lead to mission failure for the commander. During the first two years of NFTC, the CF expected to graduate 216 pilots from the basic Harvard II course, however due to delays and course cancellations, only 61 Canadian students were produced in this time period.[85] This obviously caused delays and course cancellations for other training units that were waiting to receive the students once they graduated.

Delays caused an enormous backlog of untrained pilots. In September 2001, there were 161 students awaiting basic flying training and the average amount of time spent waiting was between 18 and 22 months. By July 2002, this had decreased to 131 pilots and an average wait time of 14 months. It was an improvement, but still unacceptable. A second lieutenant in the CF today makes over $4000 dollars per month.[86] If the salaries

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[84] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "2002 September Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada", Chapter 4-National Defence-NATO Flying Training in Canada, Sections 4.23-4.25. Available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200209_04_e_12389.html; Internet, accessed 20 April 2011.

[85] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "2002 September . . ., Section 4.19.

of these untrained pilots were calculated, taking into account inflation and pay increases over the years, the added cost to the CF for these delays would be in the millions of dollars.

The ultimate goal of private industry is to make a profit. Unlike military members, there is little sense amongst private contracted support personnel of a common goal or mission that would drive them to want to work longer hours, or under more difficult circumstances, without increased compensation. Anything over and above what is stipulated in the contract can only be accomplished at extra cost to the CF, or not at all. Even services that are supposed to be provided to the CF may not materialize if the contract is poorly written. According to the 1999 November Report of the Auditor General of Canada, in reference to the NFTC program, " . . . inflexible contract arrangements resulted in payments for unused training capacity." [87] Reference is also made to the flying training arrangement in Portage, where the initial training contract worth $165 million dollars " . . . was substantially underutilized during the first six years."[88] The 2002 September Status Report of the Auditor General stated that " during the first two years of the (NFTC) program . . . National Defence paid about $65 million for training that it did not use."[89] Due to poor contract development on the part of DND

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[86] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "DGCB – CBI Chapter 204 – Pay of Officers and Non-commissioned members," Available from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/pub/cbi-dra/204-eng.asp; internet; accessed 07 April 2011.

[87] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "1999 September Report of the Auditor General of Canada," Chapter 27 – National Defence – Alternate Service Delivery, Main Points, Para 27.4. Available from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_199911_27_e_10156.html; Internet; accessed 20 February 2011.

[88] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "1999 September . . ., Para 27.4.

[89] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "2002 September . . ., Para 4.42.

and the CF, payments were made to the service provider based on schedules rather than performance milestones. Inflexibility of the civilian contractor once the contract was signed, and the fact that the CF had already discontinued training on the Tutor, meant that the CF was stuck with no other option than to stay with the contract or risk further delays.[90] The same Auditor General's Status Report suggested that for all future NFTC-like contracts have payments tied to performance and value received, however, since the NFTC contract is in effect until 2020, there is not much that the CF can do with this particular contract in the meantime.

Hiring a civilian company to save costs, to help focus military resources on core capabilities, and to reduce the workload for the CF looks good on paper, yet it may end up exacerbating the personnel shortage that helped prompt the requirement for ASD in the first place. The work conditions and compensation associated with working for civilian contractors are sometimes very tempting to serving military members. A perfect example of this is Top Aces, which provides airborne training support to the CF. Top Aces was formed in 2000 by three former CF fighter pilots.[91] Top Aces hires former military fighter pilots almost exclusively. In an interview with The Maple Leaf magazine, Top Aces president Didier Toussaint said, "We've hired some of the best recently-retired fighter pilots we could find."[92] He does not suggest that military members are courted while they are still in the military, but this is certainly the case for some civilian contractors. Military members may leave the military to become employees of civilian contractors and this can worsen the manpower and experience

[90] Office of the Auditor General of Canada webpage, "2002 September . . ., Para 4.42.

[91] Lesley Craig. "Top Aces Train Forces" *The Maple Leaf*, Vol. 12, No. 6, (11 Feb 2009), 3.

shortfalls in the CF. When soldiers leave the military, it increases the relative workload for remaining soldiers. An overworked member is then more likely to leave the military, thus necessitating the recruitment of new and inexperienced soldiers, or the hiring of more civilians to make up for the further decrease in military personnel. Growth in the civilian contractor industry based on increased demand by the military will only increase the pressure on experienced military personnel to leave the CF. In effect, by engaging civilian contractors that hire former military members, the CF enters into a vicious cycle where there is the potential for the military to become a "self-licking ice cream cone."

4.2 Logistics and Service Support

One of the first instances of contracted logistics support for the CF was the direct result of anticipated computer problems associated with the changeover from the year 1999 to the year 2000. In the late 1990s, there was a general fear that computer systems would crash at midnight on New Year's Eve of 1999 and cause mayhem throughout the world. In preparation for the potential computer-based disaster, the CF developed Contingency Operations Plan (COP) ABACUS. According to Major Dan Villeneuve, who studied the COP ABACUS planning process, DND/CF's mission during COP ABACUS was to " . . . be prepared to assist federal and provincial authorities in mitigating the impact of the Year 2000 problem on essential services, while continuing to

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[92] Lesley Craig. “Top Aces Train . . ., 3.

fulfill essential national and international defense tasks."[93] On top of having to be prepared to help other government authorities within Canada, the CF also had to ensure that its own operational capability was not crippled by computer problems. To help ensure the success of COP ABACUS, the CF signed the Logistics Contractor Augmentation Support (LOGCAS) contract with Edmonton-based civilian contractor ATCO/Frontec. Under LOGCAS, the company ATCO/Frontec would provide logistics support, including " . . . food, fuel, and accommodations . . ." to the CF in the case that the anticipated crisis did materialize.[94] Luckily, the changeover to the new millennium occurred without many of the anticipated problems. Although the LOGCAS contract turned out to be largely unnecessary, the CF continued to increase its reliance on civilian contracted support services.

The direction provided by the 1994 White Paper was for DND and the CF to focus resources on core capabilities. Logistics and CSS were obviously not considered to be core capabilities as these areas were cut significantly. In his testimony before a SCONDVA committee on October 4, 2006, MGen Daniel Benjamin stated that during the budget and personnel reductions of the 1990s, the CF " . . . cut about 30% to 50% of the support capabilities on different bases and wings."[95] Based on the amount of cuts in the area of service support, there appears to have been a belief amongst decision-makers that logisticians would be easier and quicker to train than combat arms soldiers in a time of

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[93] Major Daniel Villeneuve**, "**The Operation Abacus Planning Process: A Study," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Volume 5, No. 1 (Spring 2002)

[94] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail . . ., 11.

[95] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts – 4 October 2006 . . ., n.p.

crisis. As David Perry said in his article, "The decision to apportion the most significant force reduction to the support units was based on a calculation that combat forces would be harder to regenerate quickly, and should therefore be prioritized."[96] As a result of the personnel reductions in the service support trades, remaining support personnel and specialists, such as medical personnel, engineers, and logisticians were particularly stressed from the high operational tempo of the 1990s.[97] While cutting positions from logistics and service support trades and reallocating them to front-line units may have increased military capability in the short term, the core capabilities still required logistics and support. According to a DND/CF news release from July 2004, the CF was under the impression that, " . . . contractor augmentation would allow the CF to focus on its core roles, would improve the quality of life for CF members, and would ultimately provide the CF with additional operational flexibility."[98] Discussion in the next chapter will attempt to determine if contracted civilian personnel actually enhances or hinders a military commander's flexibility and ability to command effectively.

The level of support provided by civilian-contracted logistics and service support has evolved and increased over the years, both at home and during major deployments. In September of 2000, the CF once again turned to ATCO/Frontec to provide support for operations. According to Richard Bray's comments in a Summit Magazine article from 2004, their task was to " . . . provide a wide range of services . . . from laundry to logistics

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[96] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail . . ., 16.

[97] Ibid., 16.

[98] National Defence and the Canadian Forces website, "Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program," *DND/CF News release* (14 July 2004) Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=03&id=1409; Internet; accessed 10 March 2011.

[and] from foodservice to fuel supplies . . ." for CF deployed in Bosnia.[99] Montreal-based SNC Lavalin/PAE, under the Canadian Forces Contractor Augmentation Program (CANCAP), took over the support contract in Bosnia in 2002 and was awarded another contract for support for CF conducting Operation ATHENA in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Bray says that CANCAP provides such things as " . . . accommodation, engineering services, power supply and distribution, water supply, roads and ground, fire services and environmental management."[100]

The deployment of CF personnel to Afghanistan has been significantly more dangerous than most peacekeeping and peacemaking deployments undertaken by Canada since the 1990s.[101] The increased level of danger has subsequently increased the negative consequences of not being able counter and defeat emerging threats in a timely manner. As LGen Leslie said before a SCONDVA committee in 2006, "In today's strategic environment, speed and flexibility are paramount."[102] In order to mitigate the danger posed by changes in enemy tactics, and advances in enemy technology, the requirement has been for the CF to introduce off the shelf vehicles and weapons on very short timelines. LGen Leslie stated that the amount of time between the requirements for the M-777 155 mm artillery gun being identified by the Army, and when it first saw action in

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[99] Bray, Richard, "Bosnia: not quite business as usual – DND and ATCO/Frontec join forces to supply Canadian troops in Bosnia" *Summit Magazine*. Available from http://www.summitconnects.com/Articles_Columns/Summit_Articles/2001/0301/0301_Bosnia.htm; Internet; accessed 20 April 2011.

[100] Bray, Richard, "Side by Side – Outsourced Supply at work in Bosnia", *Summit Magazine*, Volume 7, Issue 2, (March 2004), 8.

[101] 155 members of the Canadian Forces have been killed in Afghanistan since 2002, as opposed to 23 that lost their lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-2005.

[102] National Defence and Canadian Forces webpage, "SCONDVA Transcripts – 20 Nov 2006 . . ., n.p.

Afghanistan, was on the order of four months.[103] The rapid procurement of the M-777, using off the shelf technology, is in line with the 1994 White Paper that directed the CF " . . . to explore innovative ways to acquire and maintain equipment."[104] In 2008, the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, commonly referred to as the "Manley Report", stated that in order for Canadian troops to continue their mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian Government had to " . . . secure medium helicopter lift capacity and high-performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)."[105] Since Canada did not already possess this equipment at the time of the report, it had to once again purchase off the shelf technology.

Rapid procurement of high technology items creates an issue for military operators and maintainers. In his research paper concerning civilians on military operations, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Campbell says that because the speed at which some equipment is being procured for operations, "Often, [military] operators and maintainers first see equipment that they are required to use and maintain when they arrive in theatre."[106] As for maintenance of this equipment, due to the high technology involved, the amount of time required to train military personnel to be experts in maintaining this new equipment would be substantial. In her 2008 paper detailing issues when employing civilians in support of international operations, Maria Rey said, "The complexity of

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[103] Ibid., n.p.

[104] National Defence and the Canadian Forces Website, "1994 White Paper . . ., n.p.

[105] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, 38. Available from http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait.../FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

[106] Lieutenant Colonel Scott Campbell. "Civilians on Operations – Can Canada Learn From the Past?" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College JCSP 36 paper, 2008), 62.

weapons systems used by modern militaries is so high that maintenance tasks are shifting from military personnel to civilian contractors who have the unique expertise and training required to keep the equipment running.[107] In order to field the equipment as quickly as possible, the CF has focused its resources on training the soldiers and airmen how to operate this technology on the battlefield and has left the responsibility for most maintenance of these items to civilian contractors.

4.2.1 Benefits

Although the cost of contracting out logistical and service support to civilians appears expensive, the introduction of CFDS promises to cover much of the costs. It has been estimated that sending a civilian to theatre costs on the order of ten times what it would cost to send a military person for the same amount of time.[108] During conflicts where civilians provide logistical and service support over many years, as is the case with CANCAP in Afghanistan, the cost for civilian support can reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars.[109] Although expensive, the benefit to the CF can be seen when the funding promise made by CFDS is taken into account. Unveiled in 2008, CFDS is a new strategic vision for the CF, created by the Government of Canada, and promises that " . . . the Government is committed to separately fund incremental costs for major

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[107] Rey, Maria. "Civilians Accompanying the . . ., 58.

[108] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail . . ., 20.

[109] SNC-Lavalin webpage, "Press Release 20 December 2002," *SNC-Lavalin News Centre*. Available from http://www.snclavalin.com/news.php?lang=en&id=48; Internet; accessed 30 March 2011.

operations."[110] According to DND, an incremental cost is " . . . the cost incurred by DND over and above what would have been spent on personnel and equipment if troops had not been deployed."[111] DND figures state that the full cost for the Afghanistan mission from 2002 to 2009 was CDN $11.4 billion dollars. Of that figure, CDN $4.8 billion dollars, or 42% of the total cost, was determined to fall under the category of incremental cost. Since the cost associated with contracts such as CANCAP on deployed operations are over and above what would be spent if the troops had not been deployed, they must be counted as an incremental cost, and would therefore not be paid for out of the CF's operating budget. This means that the CF, at least while on major operations, will benefit from civilian logistics and service support at practically no cost to their operating budget. Although a 42% increase in budget does not necessarily equal a 42% increase in capability, it does represent improved capabilities at little monetary cost to the CF.

Another of the benefits of using civilian contractors is that it allows the CF to augment their capability on deployed operations without increasing the number of deployed troops. While on deployed operations, the CF often has an upper limit on the number of uniformed personnel that are allowed to be in theatre at any one time. This number is known as a troop ceiling, and is usually imposed by government. A lower troop ceiling is more palatable for the Canadian public as it gives the impression that fewer troops are being put at risk and that the cost of the mission to taxpayers will be less. Convincing the government that the troop ceiling should be raised can be very difficult for a military commander. This means that if a commander wants to introduce a new

[110] Department of National Defence, “Canada First . . ., 13.

capability to theatre, he will most likely have to remove one of the existing capabilities from theatre to make room for the new one. As an example, imagine a theatre where a commander has reached his troop ceiling by using only ground assets such as tanks, artillery and infantry. If the commander wants to introduce a helicopter squadron consisting of 300 military personnel into theatre, he must then remove 300 military personnel from the units already in theatre if he does not want to go over the troop ceiling. The addition of civilian contractors, however, does not count towards the troop ceiling and therefore adds capability while being invisible to the Canadian public.

Since a lower troop ceiling equates to a lower number of deployed military personnel, there are savings in terms of human costs to the CF. For each soldier in theatre, there is a requirement to have at least three soldiers at home at various stages of readiness. There should be one soldier who has just returned home from theatre and another that is training deploy. There should also be a third soldier that is resting, working on career courses, or teaching what they have learned in theatre to a soldier that is about to deploy. The CFDS, suggests that there could be even more soldiers involved than just the 3:1 ratio described above, when it states that in order to maintain a force of 2,500 soldiers in Afghanistan, a pool of over 12,500 soldiers, or a 4:1 ratio, is required.[112] If a civilian can replace one soldier's position in theatre, it gives the commander the flexibility to use all soldiers in that readiness cycle for other high-priority tasks. It also potentially saves a soldier from having to go on deployment in the first place, which has

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[111] David MacDonald and Steven Staples, "The Cost of War and the End of Peacekeeping: The Impact of Extending the Afghanistan Mission," *Rideau Institute* (October: 2008), 4. Available from www.rideauinstitute.ca/file-library/costofthewar.pdf;, Internet; accessed 02 April 2011.

[112] Department of National Defence, "Canada First . . ., 15.

quality of life and mental health benefits for that soldier.[113] In an interview with Richard Bray of Summit Magazine, Colonel Ted Grant, former commanding officer of Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina, said that the goal of the contract with ATCO/Frontec in Bosnia was not to save money, but rather to free up military personnel in the CSS trades that were being overtaxed. He said that ATCO/Frontec is, " . . . freeing up about 150 people on this tour. This is not a money-saving operation. The department went into this with their eyes open, knowing it would be more expensive, but they need to free up those military people."[114] As retired BGen Ernest Beno said in an article on the subject of CANCAP, " . . . the CF has also reaped the benefits of not having to deploy highly trained soldiers . . . "[115] A DND/CF news release from August 2004, stated that during operations in Kabul, Afghanistan, "CANCAP is expected to save 80 to 100 military logistics positions in combat service support."[116] According to an SNC-Lavalin newsletter, CANCAP operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan, increased their personnel from 25 in 2006 to over 300 in 2008.[117] Based on the readiness cycle discussed earlier, such a large number of civilians would amount to a significant number of military personnel that would deploy

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[113] In comparison to earlier discussion which stated that repeated deployments caused increased stress and possible psychological problems for some soldiers.

[114] Bray, Richard, "Bosnia: not quite business as usual . . ., n.p.

[115] Vanguard website, "CANCAP: The Changing Face of Logistics Support to the Canadian Forces," *Vanguard Magazine*, n.d. Available from http://www.vanguardcanada.com/THECHANGINGFACEOFLOGISTICSUPPORTTOTHECANADIANFORCES; Internet; accessed 09 April 2011.

[116] DND, "BG–03.039f Backgrounder: Operation ATHENA: The Canadian Forces Participation in ISAF," August 27, 2004. Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=03&id=1228; Internet; accessed 15 March 2011. It is not clear whether this was meant to say that 80 to 100 military support positions would be taken over by civilians, or if 80 to 100 personnel would choose to stay in the military because of reduced operational tempo.

[117] SNC-Lavalin webpage, "SNC-Lavalin newsletter," n.d., 21. Available from http://www.snclavalin.com/pdf/investors/2008/ra-rop_fr.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 April 2011.

less often, or not at all.

4.2.2 Negatives

A commander cannot order civilian contracted personnel to carry out a task that falls outside of the time and risk parameters that are stated in the support contract. A commander can provide direction to civilian personnel and request that something is done, but anything that falls outside of the limitations of the contract must be negotiated and the details of the contract changed. In her U.S. Army War College strategy research project, Ronda Urey stated that civilians are only required to do what is specifically stated in their contracts. They are not commanded and controlled in the military sense, they are, " . . . managed, through the management mechanism of the contract itself. . . [and] to change the performance requirements, changes to the terms and conditions of the contract must be made."[118] This is a time-consuming process that happens at levels higher than the commander and the contracted personnel. Unlike during WWII, where a naval commander had the power to imprison civilian merchantmen if they refused to carry out dangerous tasks, commanders of today have no such coercive power. The fact that civilian contracted logistics and service support personnel are not required to follow military orders leaves commanders at a distinct disadvantage and increases the risk of mission failure.

The use of civilian contracted support personnel degrades the ability for CF

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[118] Colonel Ronda Urey. "Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield," (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005), 10.

members to conduct logistics and support operations in challenging or hostile environments. This is contrary to one of the original intents of the White Paper, which was to turn the CF into a more focused and capable fighting force. Perry says that while ASD may have proven helpful to the CF by replacing logisticians domestically and funnelling the positions to warfighting trades in combat units, it created a shortage of work positions where combat logisticians could learn their trade.[119] This means that on top of reducing the number of people in the logistician trade, the skill and experience level of those military personnel that remain in the trade has arguably decreased. This creates a vicious cycle where as the corporate memory of the combat logistician skill fades within the CF, the only personnel with relevant logistics experience are the civilian contractors. The degradation has further decreased the pool of logisticians in the CF that have the skills required to deploy into hostile areas, and this could pressure the CF into bringing civilian contracted personnel along in support of combat operations. In 2005, Brigadier-General Mike Ward, Director General of Land Capability Development, stated that he expected that " . . . contractors are becoming irrevocably linked to operational capabilities . . . "[120] This trend definitely decreases the commander's capability to deploy and be effective in threat areas.

Civilian logistics and service support contractors cannot deploy to hostile areas, at least not without having significant amounts of protection dedicated to them.[121] David

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[119] Perry, David. "Contracting Tail . . ., 24-25.

[120] LCol Al Morrow, "CANACAP The Changing Face of Logistic Support to the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 8.2 (Summer 2005), 74-85.

[121] There are private contractors that are armed and trained to operate in hostile environments, however companies like CANCAP and ATCO/Frontec which are the main support providers for the CF are not part of this group.

Perry said in his article "Contracting Tail to Recruit more Teeth", that civilian contractors are meant only to operate in stable areas, such as a mature peace-support theatre where there is very little risk.[122] In his paper, "Outsourcing: A Future Reality for Combat Support", BGen Dwayne Lucas used the example of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) deployment to East Timor in the 1990s to show that civilian contractors are not suited for combat areas. The Australians, like Canada, have contracted out much of their logistical support to civilians. In East Timor, the ADF was initially unable to deploy these civilians due to the armed threat and lack of infrastructure. This forced the ADF to use combat soldiers to perform logistics and support tasks for which they were not trained, which, as Lucas said, " . . . is contrary to the original objective to reduce support personnel to augment combat troops."[123] Even in relatively stable areas, the situation can become violent very quickly. In such a situation, if civilian contracted personnel were present, combat resources would have to be drawn away from the fight in order to provide protection for civilian contracted personnel. In any type of threat environment civilians become a liability rather than a force multiplier. Canada should have learned the lesson from the Australians that deploying without integral military logistics and support capability puts both the contracted personnel and the military force at risk, yet this is exactly what Canada did in 2003 when it used CANCAP personnel to construct Canadian bases in Kabul. The CF and the contractors took an enormous risk as this area was far from being considered stable. If things had become violent, military personnel would have had to focus on defending the contractors rather than defending themselves. The

[122] Perry, David. “Contracting Tail . . ., 18.

fact that such a risk was taken only proved that Canada did not possess the ability to do such a job with integral military personnel.

LGen Leslie's statement that speed and flexibility are paramount in today's strategic environment highlights the requirement for a commander to be able to act decisively in both domestic and deployed operations. The military chain of command, unlimited liability, and the requirement for military members to follow legal orders, allows for this speed and flexibility. As C.S. Earl said in his Canadian Forces College research paper, even if personnel are contractually obliged to do something, they, " . . . can never be truly commanded into harm's way . . . as very little prevents a contractor from abdicating their responsibilities and departing if the risk is too great or the monetary reward not sufficient."[124] In his paper on the subject of civilian contractors on deployed operations, J.R. Jensen gives the example of an upsurge of violence against civilian contractors in Iraq in 2004, causing civilian firms to suspend and even cancel operations because they found it too dangerous.[125] Earl cites an instance where the U.S. military, which makes extensive use of civilian contracted personnel in support of its military operations, suffered the consequences of a civilian contractor that refused to operate in certain areas of Iraq, thereby leaving soldiers in these areas without adequate food and water for over a month.[126] Although this refusal to work did not have tragic

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[123] BGen Dwayne Lucas. "Outsourcing: A Future Reality for Combat Support," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College paper, n.d.) Available from www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/otherpublications/31_lucas.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 March 2011.

[124] LCdr C.S. Earl, "Old problems in new packaging: The need for proactive Private Security Contractor management" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Masters of Defence Studies Research Project, 2008)

[125] Jensen, J.R., "Civilian Contractors . . ., n.p.

[126] LCdr C.S. Earl, "Old problems . . ., n.p.

consequences, deployed operations often contain life and death situations where speed and flexibility, and the ability to take risks, are critical to mission success, especially when lives are in danger. To avoid the problems faced by the U.S. and the Australians, CF commanders must ensure that they have military forces capable of taking over for the civilian contracted logistics and service support personnel should they refuse or be unable to do their job. The problem with the way that ASD has been applied in the CF is that in cases such as the construction of bases in Kabul, instead of civilians being used as a force to augment existing military capabilities, they have become the only capability, and the military equivalent no longer exists.

Chapter 4 discussed the positive and negative aspects that have resulted from the use of civilian contracted personnel in the training of military personnel and in the provision of logistic and service support to the CF. While the use of civilians does allow the CF to have access to high technology vehicles and equipment, and reduces the human cost associated with deployments, civilians cannot surge and take risks as was the case for the military personnel they have replaced. The CF's dependence on civilians, and a military commander's limited ability to command and control them, has increased the risk to both contracted personnel and the military forces they accompany. While the discussion in this chapter has been mostly subjective in nature, the following chapter will apply the CAR model to ASD to show that when using civilian contracted personnel, military commanders do not possess the resources and skills required to command effectively.

Chapter 5 CAR Model Applied to ASD

C2 within the CF is based on the chain of command. The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry contains a large section dedicated to defining the chain of command. The report states that, "The chain of command in the CF, beginning with the CDS, is composed of commanders who have different degrees of authority."[127] The CDS issues direction to his subordinate by giving lawful commands and orders, and subordinate commanders are compelled to obey.[128] Commanders also have the legal authority to order their subordinates into harm's way when required by the mission. Commanders may delegate authority to subordinates, however commanders always remain responsible for their subordinates' actions and welfare. Members of the military are required by law to carry out lawful orders, even those which may lead to serious injury or death. Members join the CF knowing that their lives may be put at risk in order to accomplish a mission.

Issues arise with this C2 relationship when military members have civilian contracted personnel under their command. One negative aspect of ASD that has been highlighted in the previous chapters is the inability for military commanders to order civilian contracted personnel to operate outside of the limitations stated in their contracts. Subjective analysis in the previous chapter showed that because civilian personnel are not subject to the legal orders issued by the military chain of command, and are not subject to unlimited liability, they may in fact prove to be a hindrance to the commander rather than

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[127] Report of the Somalia Commission . . ., n.p.

[128] Report of the Somalia Commission . . ., n.p.

an enabler. The intent of this chapter is to apply the CAR model to ASD to allow for a more objective analysis of whether or not commanders in the CF are properly trained and equipped to effectively command when civilian contracted personnel are present. The use of the CAR will show what aspects of the relationship between a commander and civilian contracted personnel need to be modified to allow for more effective command. Discussion will focus on the relationships between military commanders and civilian contracted personnel during the provision of training services to military personnel, and the provision of logistical and support services during domestic and deployed operations. Using the results of this analysis, recommendations for possible changes to training for CF commanders and changes to the resources made available to commanders within the CF will be discussed.

5.1 What is Command?

Discussion in previous chapters has shown that although civilian contracted personnel provide benefits to the CF, military commanders are unable to compel civilians to carry out their orders. This raises questions about whether a commander is able to effectively command all of the resources that are placed at his disposal. In order to examine the effectiveness of a commander, one must first define the concept of command. In the CF College textbook "Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations", it states that command is, " . . . the purposeful exercise of authority – over structures, resources, people and activities . . ." and that the essence of command is human will.[129]

In their research paper, "Re-conceptualizing Command and Control", defence researchers, Dr. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann define command as being " . . . the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission."[130] According to Pigeau and McCann, for human will to be expressed, it is not sufficient for a commander to only have the motivation to accomplish a mission. They argue that a person who is in a position of command may not achieve mission success if they lack the resources required to carry out the mission and the freedom to act creatively.[131] This suggests that for a commander to be effective, they must have both the means and the opportunity to express their creativity.

5.2 The CAR Model

The research of Pigeau and McCann has led to a framework called the "CAR" model that can be used to evaluate the command capability (the potential for the creative expression of human will) of a commander, while taking into account external influences and factors that affect the commander's command environment.[132] As Troy Richard says in his paper, "The Politics of Failure", the CAR model recognizes the commander as an element within an organizational structure. The CAR model maintains a focus on the human dimension of command, yet it highlights gaps or shortcomings in the organization

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[129] Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PA-005-000/AP-04 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. (Kingston: DND Canada, 2005), 8.

[130] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control." *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002), 56.

[131] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control . . ., 57.

that can adversely affect the commander and the command environment.[133] This framework, which takes into account both the commander's inherent capabilities and external influences, will be used to evaluate the potential effectiveness of commanders that have civilian contracted employees under their command.

Pigeau and McCann state that command capability is measured in three dimensions. The CAR model defines the three dimensions of command capability to be competency, authority, and responsibility.[134] Using a military commander as the subject of evaluation, each dimension is explored separately for a given command situation. The resulting scores for each dimension, rated from low to high, are then compared against one another. As Richard says, it is important to remember that the rating given for each dimension is in comparison to what would theoretically be required to command effectively in the specific command position and command environment.[135] Pigeau and McCann suggest that if the dimensions are determined to be in balance, the commander has a greater chance of success than when there is an imbalance in the dimensions.

The CAR model measures each of the three dimensions and maps them in an abstract three-dimensional space known as the command space. The command space represents the command potential of all military personnel. An optimal balance is achieved when a commander has the requisite levels in each dimension that is demanded by the command environment. This is represented in the command space as a generally

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[132] Ibid., 57.

[133] Richard, Troy D. "The Politics of Failure – A Command Environment Analysis of Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire and UNAMIR." (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Master of Defence Studies Research Project, 2010), 34.

[134] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control . . ., 57.

[135] Richard, Troy D. "The Politics of Failure . . ., 39.

linear relationship and is known as the Balanced Command Envelope (BCE). Young or inexperienced commanders may have a low rating in each of the three dimensions, but this is sufficient for them to command effectively in a position requiring low levels of competency, authority and responsibility. As an individual gains experience and rank, the ratings should increase accordingly as positions become more demanding and require higher levels of competency, authority and responsibility. If a commander is too high or too low for what the command environment requires in any dimension, the resulting imbalance leads to what is known as a compromised command capability. Basically, the commander will be ineffective. According to Pigeau and McCann, an example of such an imbalance would be when an individual has a high levels of legal authority yet accepts a relatively low level of responsibility. This could lead to an abuse of power and could lead to mission failure. Ideally, military organizations should ensure that when choosing and equipping a commander for a given position, the commander falls within the BCE.[136] For the purposes of this discussion, the example of a commander on deployed operations in a hostile environment will be used as a baseline for the requisite levels in each dimension. Such a commander, which is arguably the most challenging scenario any commander could face, would require high levels of competence, authority and responsibility.

5.3 Competency

The first dimension of command capability is competency. Pigeau and McCann have determined that there are four main elements that constitute a military commander's

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[136] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control . . ., 60-61.

overall competency: physical competency, intellectual competency, emotional competency, and interpersonal competency.[137]

Physical competency consists of being physically fit and robust enough to command. Physical fitness is the responsibility of each member of the CF and is assessed on a yearly basis. For the purpose of this paper physical competency is assumed to be adequate for commanders in all situations.

Emotional competency speaks to a commander's ability to be effective under stressful situations. It is impossible to predict how an individual will react to a traumatic or stressful event until the event has occurred. Leadership training for members of the CF often involves placing an individual under stress and assessing the results. Since military leaders normally undergo such training throughout their career before being placed in a command position, the emotional competency of commanders is also assumed to be adequate for commanders in all situations where civilian contracted personnel are involved.

Intellectual competency speaks to a commander's knowledge and intelligence. Although military commanders can be assumed to be sufficiently intelligent to command either military or civilian personnel, they may not have the requisite knowledge to effectively command civilians. In her paper, Maria Rey noted that, "No published guidelines to commanders on the proper employment of civilians in support of deployed operations appear to exist."[138] Therefore, if a commander wanted to equip himself with

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[137] Physical and emotional competency has little bearing over a commander's ability to influence civilian personnel as opposed to military personnel. There is a question about whether or not a commander is given suitable knowledge and training to effectively command civilians, so this will be the focus of the discussion.

[138] Rey, Maria. "Civilians Accompanying . . ., 39.

knowledge on how to better command civilians, the knowledge will have to be gained through personal experience or by seeking out lessons learned from others that have also learned for themselves. In his paper on the subject of ASD in the CF, Glynn Hines said that this lack of knowledge, " . . . leaves commanders in the field unable to exercise significant control over the outcomes for which they are responsible . . . since they have to spend a significant amount of time just familiarizing themselves with the terms of the contract that they are responsible for.[139] This is true for both domestic and deployed commanders. The only difference being that commanders in a domestic role are in a relatively easier position than their deployed counterparts because they do not have to deal with the complex moral and legal issues associated with potentially employing civilians in a combat zone.[140] In either case, the CF does not provide proper training to ensure that commanders are intellectually competent as commanders of civilian contracted personnel. For this reason, the intellectual competence of commanders with respect to civilian contracted personnel is assessed as low.

Interpersonal competence allows a commander to interact and communicate effectively with others. Throughout their careers, military commanders are subject to training that prepares them to interact with and command other military personnel. Military personnel are taught the importance of respecting the chain of command and commanders know that even if their interpersonal skills are lacking, they can still order

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[139] Colonel Glynne Hines, "Alternate Service . . ., 12.

[140] Although not discussed in this paper, there are many grey areas concerning the legal status of civilians supporting military forces in a combat zone.

subordinates to carry on with a task.[141] This approach does not work with civilians since they have to be persuaded rather than ordered. As Bernard Van-Vianen said in his paper about managing civilians in the CF, for military members, " . . . the majority of their Human Resource (HR) training is focused on managing military personnel. In essence, the CF prepares officers to command military personnel and has traditionally treated issues such as civilian HR management as a sidebar discussion."[142] Courses like the Joint Command and Staff Programme teach future CF commanders to consider civilians from Other Government Departments (OGD) in their planning, however little attention is paid to preparing officers to command civilian contracted personnel. It is not uncommon that the first time a military officer interacts with civilian contracted personnel is when that officer is placed in a command position. As Van-Vianen said in his paper, "The CF is riddled with leaders who are placed in positions of authority over civilians without the training required to manage them . . . the training they receive throughout their career does not prepare them for the world of unions and collective agreements."[143] This is definitely the case for commanders interacting with CANCAP in Afghanistan, for example. In reference to civilian support in Bosnia, Hines said that six month rotations by military personnel was an insufficient amount of time for commanders to become proficient in dealing with the contractors.[144] Because the military training system prepares commanders to interact with other military members rather than civilians, the

[141] Issues may also arise where military members have difficulty in respecting the opinions or suggestions of civilians because they are not part of the chain of command.

[142] LCol Bernard E. Van-Vianen, "Managing Civilians in the Canadian Forces" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College JCSP 33 paper, 2007), 7.

[143] LCol Bernard E. Van-Vianen, "Managing Civilians . . ., 7.

interpersonal competency of military commanders with respect to civilian contracted personnel is assessed as low.

Out of the four competency elements, physical and emotional competencies were assumed to be adequate for a commander to command civilian contracted personnel. Intellectual and interpersonal competencies were determined to be low. This is not to say that this score will not increase with time and experience, however for the majority of CF commanders who have not yet gained this personal experience, their training and preparation is inadequate. Therefore, for the competency dimension of command capability, the score for CF commanders is determined to be low.

5.4 Authority

The second dimension of command capability is authority. Authority refers to the degree to which a commander is empowered to act either through formal legal authority or personal authority. Legal authority is formal power and is established through regulations and laws. Pigeau and McCann state that, "Legal authority assigns command resources and personnel and gives the right to use them in the accomplishment of a mission. Furthermore, it allocates special powers . . . [such as] . . . the authority to enforce obedience." [145] Legal authority also takes into account whether the resources given to a commander are appropriate for the mission. Personal authority is earned through interaction with others. Those who display courage and integrity, for example,

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[144] Colonel Glynne Hines, "Alternate Service . . ., 11.

[145] Carol McCann & Ross Pigeau, "Clarifying the Concepts of Control and of Command" Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, 8.

often gain a reputation that allows them to influence and motivate others without having any formal authority over them.[146] This is considered to be personal authority. The question of personal authority will be treated first as it is directly related to the previous discussion on interpersonal competency.

Personal authority is earned through interaction with others and allows a commander to influence actions based on nothing more than his likeability and reputation. If a commander has poor interpersonal skills, then it is unlikely that they would be able to communicate in such a way as to convince a subordinate to carry out a task. Since the interpersonal competence of commanders has already been evaluated as low, then the part of personal authority that comes from interpersonal skills can also be assumed to be low. The same commander may, however, be able to communicate through their actions and set an example that inspires those around him to act. This level of personal authority may be adequate for a commander that works only with other military personnel because they fall under the same chain of command and should be legally authorized to carry out the same tasks as their commander does. Civilians may be inspired by the actions of a commander, but because they are not members of the military, they are not required to act or may not be allowed to act. A civilian's actions are restricted by what is stated in their contract. Inspiration that comes from personal interaction with the commander, or from observed actions of the commander, has little bearing on the ultimate actions of that civilian. For these reasons, the personal authority of a commander in relation to civilians is assessed as low.

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[146] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control . . ., 58-59.

Legal authority is formal power that is established through regulations and laws, and includes the resources that have been placed at the disposal of a commander. A commander's legal authority over military personnel comes from the NDA and is established in the Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O). They establish that the chain of command is to be respected, and that those who do not follow the legal orders of a superior commander are liable to punishment. Section 83 of the NDA states that, "Every person who disobeys a lawful command of a superior officer is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to imprisonment for life or to less punishment."[147] Civilian contracted personnel are considered as persons accompanying the CF under section 61(2) of the NDA. This means that they are liable to punishment if they commit a crime that is considered a service offence, [148] yet this does not oblige them to carry out orders given by a military commander. Section 62(1) states that, "Every person to whom subsection 61(2) or (3) applies shall, for the purposes of the Code of Service Discipline,[149] be deemed to be under the command of the commanding officer of the unit or other element of the CF that the person accompanies."[150] Although the NDA states that civilian contracted personnel are under the command of the commanding officer, the commanding officer does not possess the legal authority to compel civilian personnel to follow legal orders. Civilians are only legally bound to do what is stated in their contract, and as stated earlier, contracts

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[147] Department of Justice Canada website, "Disobedience of a Lawful Command," National Defence Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5), Section 83. Available from http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/page-36.html#h-57; Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.

[148] Sections 73-132 of the NDA detail what are considered to be service offences.

[149] 61(2) is in Part III of the NDA. Part III is known as The Code of Service Discipline.

have not prevented private contractors from refusing to work if they deem that the compensation is too little or that the situation too dangerous for them to operate. A commander on deployed operations in a hostile environment requires forces that offer speed, flexibility and that can take risks. Since a commander does not have the legal authority to compel civilian contracted personnel to carry out tasks or missions, all of the resources at his disposal are not adequate for mission success, and the degree to which a commander is empowered to act is low. For these reasons, the legal authority of commanders that command civilians is assessed as low.

The personal and legal authority for commanders in charge of civilian contracted personnel have been assessed as low, therefore in the command capability dimension of authority, the overall level is assessed as low.

5.5 Responsibility

The third dimension of command capability is responsibility. Responsibility is broken into both extrinsic and intrinsic responsibility and refers to the degree to which an individual accepts the legal and moral liability of command. Extrinsic responsibility implies accountability up the chain of command and refers to the willingness of an individual to take responsibility and be held accountable for the resources and the legal authority that comes with the position of command. In accepting this responsibility of command, the commander indicates that they are committed to using their power and resources wisely. Intrinsic responsibility is the degree to which an individual feels

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[150] National Defence and the Canadian Forces website, "National Defence Act, Part III: Code of Service Discipline" Available from www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/**CodeofServiceDiscipline**.pdf;

obligated to the military mission. It is based on such concepts as honour, duty and ethics, and is the source of a commander's commitment, motivation, and will to see the mission succeed.[151]

It is logical to say that military commanders, like most people in leadership positions, are motivated and committed to achieving mission success in everything they do. For these reasons, the intrinsic responsibility element of responsibility is assumed to be high for military commanders in command of civilians.

Determining extrinsic responsibility is more challenging. The fact that officers are legally responsible and accountable to their superiors for the conduct of their duties is well established in military regulations. QR&O section 4.01 states that, "An officer is responsible to his immediate superior for the proper and efficient performance of his duties." A commanding officer is also responsible and accountable for his subordinates. Section 4.20, paragraph 1, states that, "A commanding officer is responsible for the whole of the organization and safety of the commanding officer's base, unit or element . . . "[152] When a commander accepts command of military members, he knows the legal authority that he holds over them. He also has an expectation, based on a shared training and ethos, of how they will behave in certain circumstances. Due to the aforementioned lack of training and familiarity with civilian contracted personnel, a commander may be less aware of civilian capabilities, be less aware of his responsibilities to them, and be less aware of the level of authority he holds over civilian contracted personnel. If a

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Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.

[151] Pigeau, Ross and Carol McCann. “Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control . . ., 59-60.

commander does not know these things, they may be less willing to accept responsibility and accountability for civilians under his command. Though no examples could be found of commanders refusing a command position in the CF because it involved being responsible for civilian contracted personnel, such a scenario is plausible. The acceptance of command of civilians does speak to a level of risk that is being accepted by commanders since they will be held responsible for personnel and resources over which they really have little authority. If a commander accepts to be placed in a position of command, they also explicitly accept that they are responsible for civilian contracted personnel and all the other resources under that command, whether they like it or not. For this reason, the extrinsic level of responsibility of a commander is assessed as high.

A high level of intrinsic responsibility combined with a high level of extrinsic responsibility suggests that in the responsibility dimension of command capability, commanders are assessed as having a high level of responsibility.

5.6 ASD Commanders in the Command Space

When compared to what would theoretically be required for a military commander to command civilian contracted personnel effectively, the command capability dimensions of competency and authority were assessed to be low, while the dimension of responsibility was assessed to be high. According to the CAR model, when these three results are compared against each other in the command space, this leads to a situation of unbalanced command capability. Placing a commander in a situation where he has a high

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[152] National Defence and the Canadian Forces website, "Duties and Responsibilities of Officers" QR&Os: Volume I – Chapter 4. Available from http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qro-orf/vol-01/chapter-

level or responsibility, without the authority and competency to carry out the task effectively, places the commander in an unfair situation. The end result is that the commander does not have the resources required to do the job, and his ability to command the resources that he does have at his disposal is compromised.

5.7 Recommendations

The CAR model has highlighted that commanders do not have the competency required to effectively command civilian contracted personnel. The areas of intellectual and interpersonal competency are specifically lacking. In order to better prepare commanders for the command of civilians, additional training is required. In order to tackle the intellectual shortcomings, the key lies in making commanders aware of the capabilities and limitations of civilian contracted personnel. As Rey mentioned, no published guidelines on the proper employment of civilians on deployed operations exist. Commanders must be made aware of their responsibilities to the civilians in their care and what responsibilities are owed to the commander by the civilians. Major J.R. Jensen recommended that increased emphasis be placed on making future leaders aware of issued that arise when working with contractors, and suggested that civilian contracting be added as a subject in the CF's professional development program.[153] Since support contracts such as for NFTC and CANCAP have existed for many years, case studies, using these existing contracts as examples, could be used to increase the awareness of

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chapitre-004-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 21 April 2011.

[153] Major J.R. Jensen, "Civilian Contractors . . ., 22.

future commanders of the potential issues they could face. Campbell suggested that increased opportunities must be given to commanders to train with civilian contracted personnel prior to deployment.[154] Knowledge about what a contractor can and cannot do is essential information for a commander. As Rey said, knowing the risks associated with placing civilian personnel in mission-essential positions will better prepare commanders to plan operations and manage risks.[155]

In order to overcome the interpersonal issues faced by commanders, increased Human Resources (HR) training is required. Van-Vianen pointed out that the majority of HR training in the CF focuses on preparing commanders to command other military personnel, not civilians. The whole-of-government approach to meeting Canada's security requirements is mentioned in the CFDS and is already in practice today in Afghanistan.[156] The Canadian Government has made it clear that the CF will continue to be required to operate with civilians from OGDs over which they hold no command authority. A commander's ability to effectively interact with and influence people outside of their chain of command is of the utmost importance to mission success. This applies to interactions with OGDs and civilian contracted personnel alike. Rey said that commanders have to effectively integrate personnel that have differences in entitlements and responsibilities. If improperly managed, this can create problems with morale and can adversely affect the cohesiveness of the unit.[157] Increased emphasis must be placed on civilian HR in the CF's professional development program. Civilian HR training for CF

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[154] Lieutenant Colonel Scott Campbell. "Civilians on Operations . . ., 69.

[155] Rey, Maria. "Civilians Accompanying . . ., 26.

[156] Department of National Defence, "Canada First . . ., 4.

[157] Rey, Maria. "Civilians Accompanying . . ., 54.

commanders must change from what Van-Vianen said is currently just a sidebar discussion.[158]

The CAR model showed that commanders' personal and legal authority were lower than what is required to effectively command civilian contracted personnel. The above-mentioned training would go a long way in increasing commanders' personal authority over civilians, however it will do little to increase a commander's legal authority. Changes are required in the types of resources that are made available to a commander, and the commander's authority to task those resources. It is unreasonable to think that commanders will have the same levels of authority as they did during WWII where they could compel civilians to risk their lives and threaten them with imprisonment if they put the mission at risk. Although the delegation of such drastic powers is unlikely, changes to the current contract structures could prove beneficial. Hines said that contracted service flexibility is hampered by, " . . . a proliferation of decision levels in the hierarchy that tends to diffuse responsibility, slow up decisions and lead to perceptions of unresponsiveness."[159] Hines suggests that ASD contracts may be optimized for the strategic level of command, where results are expected after months or years after decisions are made. The commander that is responsible for the outcomes at the operational and tactical level requires the ability to act in real-time, and the current framework does not allow for this.[160] Commanders should be given the legal authority to modify contracts and compensation incentives at the tactical level, where speed and flexibility are most critical. The structure of all support contracts should be changed so

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[158] LCol Bernard E. Van-Vianen, "Managing Civilians . . ., 7.

[159] Colonel Glynne Hines, "Alternate Service . . ., 23.

that payments and other incentives are tied to contractor performance. The current NFTC contract is based on scheduled payments to the contractor regardless of whether or not the contractor lives up to their contractual obligations. This is clearly wasteful and does not compel the civilian contractors to commit themselves to ensuring mission success.

In terms of resources, the CF must ensure that if civilians are placed in mission-critical positions, that there are competent and capable military personnel available to replace them if the need arises. The experience of Canadian allies have proven that civilian contractors are either unable to work in hostile environments, or may quit working if they believe that the risk levels are too high. The CF needs to reverse the trend of cutting CSS positions and must commit resources to ensure that the ability exists for the CF to deploy and operate effectively in hostile areas using only military personnel. This would ensure that commanders are not distracted by the requirement to protect civilians and have resources that can respond when and how the commander requires. The government's commitment in the CFDS to provide stable and increased funding to the CF, as well as the intention to boost the Regular Force by 6000 personnel and the Reserve Force by 4000 personnel in the upcoming years, should allow for the required growth in the CF's combat support and combat service support trades. Although future governments are not guaranteed to follow the vision outlined in CFDS, an awareness within the CF that positive changes are required will help to ensure that when resources do become available, they will be put to where they will be most effective.

The CAR model showed that while commanders explicitly accept that they will be held responsible and accountable for the personnel and resources under their command,

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[160] Ibid., 34.

there might be some reluctance for commanders to accept command of civilian contracted personnel. The basis of this potential unwillingness is the commander's lack of familiarity and lack of authority while working with civilians. The above-mentioned HR and professional development training, which is directed at increasing a commander's competency dimension, and suggested changes to a commander's authority, should also serve to increase a commander's willingness to accept responsibility for civilian contracted personnel.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

The Canadian military employed civilians in various support roles during WWII. Many civilians, especially the members of the merchant marine, risked their lives to carry out their work in support of the war effort. If merchant mariners refused to carry out their job, it could delay a convoy or cause the trip to be cancelled. Such a refusal put lives in danger both in the convoy itself and at the convoy's destination where people were waiting for the much-needed supplies. To help ensure mission success, commanders were given tools under the Merchant Seaman Order of 1941 that allowed them to compel civilian sailors to carry out their job or be punished with up to nine months in jail.

In the years since WWII, the size of the military has fluctuated depending on the perceived threat to Canada. In recent years, the CF's use of civilians, both domestically and on deployed operations, has been increasing rather than decreasing since the government introduced the concept of ASD in the 1994 White Paper. CFDS promises to ensure that civilian support will be a permanent fixture in the CF.

A subjective analysis of ASD showed that there are both benefits and drawbacks to having civilian contracted personnel supporting military operations. Benefits range from allowing the CF rapid access to high technology items, to reducing the number of Canadian soldiers on deployed operations. Negatives include the fact that commanders are not able to compel civilian workers to perform anything that is not clearly stated in their service contract. This C2 issue has created delays and cancellations of courses under the NFTC contract and, as our Allies have learned, can put lives at risk on deployed operations.

Canada has become dependent on civilian contracted personnel. New support contracts for equipment purchases outlined in the CFDS, such as the 20-year support plan for Boeing Chinook aircraft, will also include civilian contracted personnel. Commanding civilian contracted personnel is a reality for current and future CF commanders. Knowing that the C2 problem for commanders is not going to go away, an objective analysis of ASD, using the CAR model, was performed to determine what improvements could be made within the CF to allow commanders to command civilian contracted personnel more effectively. The analysis determined that commanders are lacking in the three command capability dimensions of competency, authority and responsibility. In order to ensure that commanders have the requisite levels in all three dimensions, several suggestions for improvement were brought forward. To increase the competency of commanders, changes are required in the CF professional development training program to increase HR skills and increase awareness of civilian contractor capabilities and limitations. To increase the authority of commanders, the CF must devolve authority to commanders to allow them to make changes to contract requirements and incentives. The CF must also ensure that future contracts include performance

incentives to compel contracted personnel to achieve mission success. Finally, new resources that are promised under the CFDS must be allocated to CS and CSS trades to ensure that commanders have the tools required to perform missions effectively in hostile environments. The above-mentioned changes should also increase the responsibility dimension of command capability, as it will ensure that commanders' familiarity with civilian personnel as well as their authority over these personnel is increased.

The proposed changes would require a reprioritization of training and resources, yet would be a step towards ensuring that CF commanders have the resources and the skill required to command effectively in the most challenging of circumstances. No discussion in this paper was directed at determining what existing training could be changed or replaced to allow for any of the proposed training. Future research could focus on how to restructure the CF's professional development program to improve commanders' competency in dealing with civilian contracted personnel. Future research could also focus on how to better restructure support contracts in order to allow commanders the flexibility to make changes to the contracts. Finally, future discussion could focus on the issues surrounding increasing the capability of the CS and CSS trades within the CF. Would this adversely affect other trades or are there trades that have not been considered in this paper that are in more desperate need of augmentation and support?

Civilians have shown that they can enable military operations in times of crisis. The fact that civilians do not fall under the military chain of command, however, creates potentially dangerous C2 issues for commanders. While the vision for the CF outlined in the CFDS ensures that civilian contracted personnel are here to stay, the additional funding and resources that are promised within CFDS may prove to be the key to

ensuring that commanders are given the tools and skills they require to command effectively, and ensure that the CF can operate when and where it is required.

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