

The impact of migration on the people of Papua, Indonesia

A historical demographic analysis

Stuart Upton

Department of History and Philosophy
University of New South Wales

January 2009

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

'I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.'

Signed

.....

Stuart Upton

Acknowledgements

I have received a great deal of assistance in this project from my supervisor, Associate-Professor Jean Gelman Taylor, who has been very forgiving of my many failings as a student. I very much appreciate all the detailed, rigorous academic attention she has provided to enable this thesis to be completed.

I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Professor David Reeve, who inspired me to start this project, for his wealth of humour and encouragement. Thanks also to my supervisor following David's retirement, Dr Rochayah Machali, for her language support and assistance with materials, along with her helpful knowledge of Indonesian society.

This project would not have been possible without the support of my father, Graham Upton, and my step-mother, Bebe Speed. They have generously provided the grant that has enabled me to live outside poverty for the time it has taken to complete this work. There has also been a great deal of wise advice given to me (not all of it accepted gracefully) and much proof-reading help.

Thanks to my mother, Jenny Joynt, for her constant encouragement and last-minute proof-reading.

My children, Toby and Beatrice, have had to wait a great deal for time with their father during the time of this research and I wish them to know I appreciate their patience.

And finally to Victoria Oettel, for without her this thesis would have been impossible. Thanks for always supporting me and putting up with me in the many difficult times I've faced during this seemingly endless process.

Abstract

Since Papua became part of Indonesia in 1963, hundreds of thousands of people have migrated there from other parts of the nation. By 2000, over a third of the province's residents were non-indigenous people, with the great majority of these immigrants living in the more developed urban areas along the coast. This mass movement has transformed the territory's society, altering the social, cultural and economic position and opportunities of the indigenous inhabitants. This thesis uses statistical data from Indonesian government publications to describe the development of these changes to the province's population from 1963 to the early part of the 21st century. While it is acknowledged that the military presence and actions in the territory have played a crucial role in creating distrust of the Indonesian government among the indigenous people, this material supports the thesis that the mass movement of people to the region has developed an identification among the indigenous peoples of the territory of being part of a single Papuan community, a Papuan nationalism. This migration has also limited the educational and employment opportunities of indigenous people, creating hostility towards the newcomers among indigenous people and resulting in an alienation from the Indonesian nation. It will be argued that the patterns of settlement, employment and perceptions of ethnic difference between indigenous and migrant groups reflect a form of internal colonialism that has resulted from this immigration. While independence is a popular aspiration among indigenous Papuans, an evaluation of the national political situation suggests that this event is unlikely in the foreseeable future. If Papuans are to be incorporated fully into the nation of Indonesia, an understanding of the impact of migration on the province's people is vital. This material also suggests that while there have been negative consequences of the Indonesian rule of the territory, claims that the indigenous population has suffered from genocide perpetrated by Indonesian forces are not supported by the statistical data.

Table of contents

Chapter	Page number
List of charts	8
List of tables	11
List of maps	13
1. Introduction	14
a. Unity in diversity?	
2. Migration theory and methodology review	27
a. Theories of migration	
b. Methodologies of migration studies	
3. The literature on ethnicity	46
a. Theories of ethnicity	
b. Ethnic conflict	
c. Ethnicity in Indonesia	
d. Ethnicity in the Indonesian census	
e. Conclusion	
4. West New Guinea before 1962	73
a. Pre-history	
b. The Europeans	
c. The Pacific War	
d. Post-war isolation	
e. Conclusion	
5. The history of Irian Jaya from 1962	143
a. The UNTEA period	
b. The 26 th province	
c. Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule	
d. The Act of Free Choice	
e. Resumption of hostilities	
f. Conclusion	
6. National representations – the depictions of Papua and its peoples in museums and texts	179
a. Writings on museums	
b. Representations within educational materials	
c. Conclusion	

7.	The Papuan population	222
	a. Population figures	
	b. Sex and age composition of the population	
	c. Religion	
	d. Education	
	e. Employment	
	f. Migration	
	g. Other information	
	h. Conclusion	
8.	The effects of migration on Jayapura regency	324
	a. The Dutch period and before	
	b. The Indonesian period	
	c. Language	
	d. Religion	
	e. Education	
	f. Literacy	
	g. Employment	
	h. Conclusion	
9.	The effects of migration on Jayawijaya regency	382
	a. Population figures	
	b. Language	
	c. Religion	
	d. Education	
	e. Employment	
	f. Ethnicity	
	g. Other information	
	h. Conclusion	
10.	Conclusion	434
	a. Education	
	b. Employment	
	c. Religion	
	d. Language	
	e. Representations	
	f. Ethnicity	
	g. Genocide	
	h. The colonial past	
	i. Colonialism	
	Appendix A: Names and naming	488
	Bibliography	498

List of charts

Chart number	Chart title	Page number
7.1	Population of Papua province, urban and rural, 1971-2000	227
7.2	Population growth, 1971-2000, urban and rural	228
7.3	Sex ratio, males per 100 females by age groups, 1971	232
7.4	Sex ratio, Papua province, urban and rural, 1980	235
7.5	Sex ratio by age group, 1961-2000	239
7.6	Populations of 1961 and 2000 by sex and age groups, male and female, as percentages	243
7.7	Papuan and non-Papuan populations by age group as percentages, 1971	244
7.8	Sex ratios by age group, Urban and rural, 1990	245
7.9	Sex ratios by age group, Urban and rural, 2000	247
7.10	Muslim population by age group and percentage of whole population of this age group, 1971	251
7.11	Religious affiliation, 1980-2000	253
7.12	Population by regency and religion, 1980	254
7.13	Population by regency and religion, 2000	254
7.14	Indigenous population by regency and religion, 2000	258
7.15	Non-indigenous population by regency and religion, 2000	258
7.16	Educational attainments by place of birth, Papua, 1971	264
7.17	Population of urban and rural areas, by educational attainment, 1980	266
7.18	Educational attainments, urban and rural, 1990	269
7.19	Indigenous and non-indigenous population by age groups and educational attainment, 2000	271
7.20	Population by educational attainment, Indigenous and non-indigenous residents, Urban and Rural, 2000	272
7.21	Urban population by educational attainment by percentage, Papua and selected other	276

	provinces, 2000	
7.22	Urban population by education attainment by percentage, Papua and selected other provinces, 2000	276
7.23	Economically active population of Papua and Indonesia by industry, 1971	281
7.24	Employment by industry, indigenous and non-indigenous residents, urban and rural, 2000	290
7.25	Sample population of Bandiyono & Suharto survey by place of origin, Sorong, 1990, by percentage	297
7.26	Percentage of migrants by regency, 2000	298
7.27	Population by migration status, by regency and percentage, 2000	299
7.28	Transmigrant family numbers to Irian Jaya, 1965-1984	303
7.29	Household items owned by percentage, urban and rural, 1990	310
7.30	Residents by recent migration status, by area of origin as percentages, selected areas, 1995	315
7.31	Urban residents by recent migration status, by area of origin as percentages, selected areas, 1995	316
8.1	Population of Jayapura, 1971-2000	347
8.2	Language used at home as a percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban and Rural, 1980	350
8.3	Mother tongue, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban and Rural, 1990	351
8.4	Religion by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban areas, 1971	353
8.5	Religion by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1980	355
8.6	Religious affiliation by district by percentage, Jayapura regency, 1980	356
8.7	Religion in Jayapura, indigenous and non-indigenous residents, 2000	358
8.8	Religion in Jayapura, all residents, 2000	359
8.9	Religion in Jayapura, Indigenous residents, 2000	360
8.10	Religion in Jayapura, Non-indigenous	360

	residents, 2000	
8.11	Muslim residents of Jayapura, 1971-2000	361
8.12	Education levels by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1971	362
8.13	Percentage of those people with particular educational levels in Irian Jaya who reside in Jayapura regency, 1971	363
8.14	Educational attainments, Urban and rural, Jayapura regency, 1980	364
8.15	Education level, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, urban and rural, 1990	365
8.16	Indigenous and non-indigenous education levels, Jayapura regency, 2000	366
8.17	Jayapura regency education levels comparison, 1971-2000	367
8.18	Illiteracy as a percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1980	371
8.19	Employment by sector as a percentage, Jayapura urban, 1990	373
8.20	Employment by sector as a percentage, Jayapura rural, 1990	373
8.21	Indigenous and non-indigenous employment by industry as a percentage, Jayapura, 2000	375
9.1	Urban population as a percentage of the area's population, Jayawijaya and Papua, 1971-2000	398
9.2	Jayawijaya regency, Education level, Urban and rural, 1990	408
9.3	Indigenous education levels, urban and rural, 2000	410
9.4	Educational attainment, Indigenous and non-indigenous, 2000	411
9.5	Ethnicity as a percentage, Jayawijaya regency, Urban and rural, 2000	418
9.6	Place of residence in Papua for citizens born in Jayawijaya, Male and female, 2000	422
9.7	Age group pyramid, urban and rural, for Dani/Ndani, Lani, Yali and Ngalum residents, Jayawijaya, 2000	424

List of tables

Table number	Table title	Page number
4.1	School and pupil numbers, Dutch New Guinea, 1949	122
4.2	Indigenous people under Dutch rule or in contact with the Dutch colonial government, 1947-1960	124
7.1	Sex ratio by year, Males per 100 females	230
7.2	Population of canvassed areas by sex ratio, 1960-62	231
7.3	Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 1971	233
7.4	Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 1990	236
7.5	Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 2000	237
7.6	Sex ratios for Papua New Guinea, 1980-2000	238
7.7	People born in Papua who were resident in other provinces of Indonesia	240
7.8	Estimated life expectancy at time of birth by province, for selected provinces of Indonesia, 1971-1995	242
7.9	Migrants to Fak-Fak, Mimika, Sorong and Sorong Municipality by province of residence 5 years earlier, 2000	256
7.10	Percentage of villages able to access village schools	261
7.11	Number of students by year, 1964-1971	262
7.12	Male population 10 years of age and over by place of birth and educational attainment, grouped by highest number of those with tertiary education, 1971	265
7.13	Education attainment levels, Urban and Rural, Papua and Indonesia, 2000	271
7.14	Migrants by duration of residence in the province as a percentage of the migrant population, 1971	293
7.15	Residents of Papua by province of previous residence and duration of residence, 1971	295
7.16	Transmigrants to Papua, 1964-1971/2	301

8.1	Hollandia residents by origin, 1960	340
8.2	Population by age group and sex ratio, 1980	347
8.3	Number and percentage of people in Jayapura regency and municipality by their place of residence five years previously, 2000	348
9.1	Population figures and sex ratio, Jayawijaya regency, 1971	392
9.2	Aircraft passenger arrivals and departures, Jayawijaya regency, 1987-1990	396
9.3	Annual growth rate in Jayawijaya regency and the province of Papua, Urban and rural, 1971-2000	399
9.4	Student to teacher ratio, primary schools, Districts in Jayawijaya regency, 1990	409
9.5	Population of Papua working in the previous week, by educational attainment, as percentages, 2000	416
9.6	Population of Jayawijaya by ethnicity, Urban and rural, 2000	417
9.7	Population of Papua province and Jayawijaya regency, migrants and non-migrants, urban and rural, 2000	419
9.8	Number and percentage of people in Jayawijaya regency by their place of residence five years previously, 2000	420
9.9	Household items owned as a percentage of households, Jayawijaya, urban and rural, 1990	426

List of maps

Map number	Map title	Page number
1	Regional map of the island of New Guinea	73
2	Dutch colonial map of New Guinea	95
3	Basic map of Papua	223
4	Administrative map of Papua	326

Chapter 1: Introduction

*Unity in diversity?*¹



It's Carnival time – the costumes are bright, the dancers gyrating, the music lively. However, this is not the famous Rio Carnival, or even the Notting Hill Carnival in London (which had Unity and Diversity as the 2005 theme)², but the Wamena Carnival in Papua. This town in the highlands of Indonesia's easternmost province is celebrating its diversity with a parade through the town. The costumes are traditional dress from the different ethnic groups that make up the area's population – indigenous Dani and Lani, Javanese, Bugis, Torajan, even a lone girl from Timor. The dancers include two Papuan boys dressed only in penis gourds doing sexy gyrations on top of a mini-bus to the blaring dangdut music³. Is this an exhibition of the cultural exchange occurring in this distant outpost, the multicultural nation in action? A celebration of the diversity in the unity?

¹ Photos taken by author, Wamena Festival, August 2005

² 'Millions expected for Notting Hill Carnival', *Daily Telegraph*, 29th August 2005, accessed from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/28/ucarnival.xml&DCMP=OTC-AutoInlnk> in November 2007

³ Dangdut is a popular style of music indigenous to Indonesia, especially from the island of Java.

This is actually the second parade. The first was rather more simple, but perhaps more significant. As the crowd waited patiently for the main parade to start, the police cleared the crowd back to the sides of the road. Suddenly, a long line of trucks, vans and cars drive past at speed, full of soldiers and police – apparently a reminder of the government and military power in the province.

Once the parade is over, I decide to eat. The nearby cheap restaurant is run by a migrant from Sulawesi. A quick stop at the internet café (Sundanese owner), before going back to my hotel (owner also from Sulawesi). The next day I take a becak (cycle rickshaw) to the terminal (Dani driver) and bus along the valley (West Sumatran driver). Out of these workers, the only job not taken by a migrant is poorly paid, low status and hard labour. The divide between migrants and indigenous people in the province is hard to miss on the ground.

Since the handover of power from the Dutch to Indonesia (via the United Nations) in 1962/3, Papua has been a destination region for migration from the rest of the nation of Indonesia. Migration has been both by people moved here through the transmigration program, and by those moving to Papua with no government assistance, so called spontaneous migrants. The western half of this island has a comparatively low population density in a nation with some of the most densely populated regions of the world. This has made Papua an attractive destination, both for spontaneous migrants and for the planners and administrators of the transmigration program. The higher rates of pay that have existed in this province throughout this period have also been a pull factor for migrants, with a rapid expansion of the economy partially as a result of the resource extraction boom that has occurred.

Migration to the province has led to a demographic change in the composition of the population. While in 1971 22.5% of the urban population were born

outside the province,⁴ there were only 33,923 migrants in total. The number of migrants had increased by more than twenty times by 2000, with just over a third of the total provincial population classified as ethnically non-indigenous in the 2000 census.⁵

This migration has primarily been an urban phenomenon, with non-indigenous people making up two out of every three urban residents in that year.⁶ These areas are primarily coastal areas, with the inland, and especially the highland areas, remaining predominantly indigenous. Such levels of migration have caused anxiety among the indigenous population, with the threat to Papuan culture and society being remarked upon repeatedly by Papuan people during the author's visit to the province in 2005.

There has been a huge quantity of literature produced on the province, from academic and activist writers, along with journalists. Much of the writing on Papua (both academic and popular) has focussed on the role of the military in the province, with suggestions that there has been a genocidal campaign against the indigenous people of the province by the Indonesian authorities,⁸ as well as on the legality of Indonesia's rule over it, particularly the Act of Free

⁴ *Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya*, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974, Table 23: Population by place of residence and place of birth, pp.101-102

⁵ *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua : tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province : main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 01, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3

⁶ *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 01, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3

⁸ See for example Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004; Wing, John with Peter King, *Genocide in Papua? - the role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua, August 2005; Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002; Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005

Choice vote.⁹ There has also been a great deal of literature from the anthropological angle.¹⁰ The divide between migrants and indigenous residents has been noted by many writers, with several authors conducting small-scale research into the issue.¹¹ The excellent paper by Rodd McGibbon¹² focused on the impact of migration on the indigenous population, but this work was principally based on the statistics from the 2000 census. There has been no detailed assessment of the effects of this migration on the people of Papua historically throughout the period of Indonesian sovereignty.

This study will look at the effects of migration to the province of Papua from 1962 to 2000 (along with limited commentary on the phenomenon up to 2005), primarily through an analysis of the statistical materials produced by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. This research will further detail the impact of migration on the people of Papua by an examination of the phenomenon both at the provincial level and at the regency level through scrutiny of the data on two specific regencies, Jayapura and Jayawijaya. There are concerns with the accuracy of the data obtained from censuses and this issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁹ See for example Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed May 2006 at http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html; Saltford, John, *The United Nations and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: the anatomy of betrayal*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003; Drooglever, Pieter Joost, *Een daad van vrije keuze : de Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2005; Penders, C.L.M., *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002

¹⁰ See for example Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003; Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/_phd.html August 2007;

¹¹ See for example Howard, Michael C. and Naffi Sanggenafa (eds), *Indigenous peoples and migrants of Northern Papua*, Indonesia, Bangkok, White Lotus, 2005; Lautenbach, Hendrika, *Demographic survey research in Irian Jaya*, Thela Thesis, 1999

¹² McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural society in peril: migration, economic change and the Papua conflict*, East-West Center Washington, 2004, accessed from www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications in September 2005

The territory included in this study will be the western half of the island of New Guinea, along with the adjacent islands. This is the region that was called Dutch New Guinea by the European colonialists. Initially, it was named Irian Barat by Indonesia, being changed to Irian Jaya in the Suharto period in 1973.¹³ The name was changed again in 2000 to Papua. In 2007 this area includes the two provinces of West Papua and Papua.¹⁴ The province of West Papua (the province's name was changed from West Irian Jaya in early 2007¹⁵) that was formed in 2003¹⁶ will be included in the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, direct comparison with earlier data would be less informative without the inclusion of the data on the whole of the western half of the island, with much earlier data not being divisible into separate data for the two provinces. The West Irian Jaya area has experienced high levels of migration which has impacted on people in this region just as much (if not more in some cases) as it has on people in what is now the rump province of Papua.

Additionally, this provincial division has not been supported by many indigenous people, with claims that the split was a political decision by the central government intended to weaken the separatist movement.¹⁷ The legality of this decision was also questioned, with the courts deciding that the establishment of this separate province was not legal, but that the de facto existence of the state by the time of the decision meant that the province should not be re-integrated

¹³ Indonesia – Irian Jaya: Welcome to Jayawijaya and Merauke regencies, Tourism Division Level 1 Region, Irian Jaya, 1985, p.1

¹⁴ See Appendix A: Names and naming for a more thorough examination of the changes to names in the area.

¹⁵ See 'Irian Jaya Barat Berubah Nama Menjadi Papua Barat' (West Irian Jaya changes its name to West Papua), 13th February 2007, accessed from <http://www.infopapua.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=4447&mode=thead&order=0&thold=0> in January 2008

¹⁶ See provincial website for West Papua province, 'Penonpang Utama Pemekaran', accessed <http://www.ijbprov.go.id/penopang.html> in January 2008

¹⁷ See for example International Crisis Group (ICG), *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, Asia Briefing N°47, 23 March 2006, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4042&l=1> in March 2006

with the province of Papua.¹⁸ The creation of a separate administration for West Irian Jaya (West Papua) has been slow, with its provincial level judicial system continuing to be based in the capital of Papua province for example.¹⁹ These considerations suggest that it is essential to include the two new provinces in this study to provide a complete picture of the impact on this region.

The theories of migration will be covered in chapter 2 of this study, along with the methodological considerations of researching migration raised in the literature. There are factors in relation to almost all studies that are beyond the control of the researcher. These factors enforce a different structure on the research than that which would be taken if these complications were not present. In the case of Papua, issues relating to the political situation in the province and the nation have limited the ways in which this study could be conducted.²⁰

Studies on migration use a variety of approaches, from the use of statistical materials from such sources as the census; smaller-scale surveys, often with more detailed questioning of respondents; and qualitative interviews of migrants. The political situation in Indonesia towards Papua is very sensitive. For a number of years, the province was completely closed off to researchers and journalists. In recent years, there have been variations in these rules, with some researchers being able to obtain research permits from the authorities. The military still appears to have a great influence on the outcome of permit

¹⁸ 'Indonesian court annuls establishment of new province in Papua', *Asian Political News*, 15th November 2004, accessed from

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2004_Nov_15/ai_n6368152 in January 2008

¹⁹ 'Golkar's Yorrays challenges Irian Jaya Barat results', *Papua Prospects*, 28th March 2006, accessed from http://indonesianewguinea.blogspot.com/2006_03_01_archive.html in January 2008. While the provinces were nominally separate, the High Court in Jayapura was called on to adjudicate on the validity of the elections in Irian Jaya Barat.

²⁰ See Butt (1998), pp.38-47 for a lengthy discussion of the difficulties faced by the researcher into Papuan society.

applications, and appear to be able to block permission for much less sensitive research projects than on migration would be.²¹ While interviews and surveys of migrants and non-migrants in the province would have been the author's preferred method of research for this project (along with analysis of the census data), it was unfortunately decided that there was no likelihood of obtaining a research visa for such a political topic at this time. If political considerations allowed for such methods of research within the province in the future, this would give more complexity in the conclusions that could be drawn on the effects of this phenomenon. The current research will primarily draw on a thorough examination of the census figures on the province, in order to discern the migration patterns that can be discerned from this data.

These materials are mainly published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan/Biro Pusat Statistik), the national statistical organisation, though other materials produced by the provincial and regency level statistical bodies also contain significant information. The majority of the data is that contained in the censuses that have been conducted in the province and the nation as a whole on a ten-yearly basis. While there have been concerns with the accuracy of this information, the census data has been used by a number of researchers such as Terrence Hull, Leo Suryadinata and Graeme Hugo.²²

Ethnically, Papuan peoples are on the margins of the nation. As well as involving ethnicity, migration to Papua is bound up with race. While race is not seen as a

²¹ The influence of the military in the province is illustrated by the difficulties faced by US Congressman Faleomavaega on a visit to Papua in November 2007. Despite having received authorisation to visit the province from President Yudhuyono himself, the congressman's visit was postponed, shortened, he was not allowed to visit Jayapura, prominent Papuans were not allowed to meet him, and the military presence was 'overpowering'. According to the congressman "I knew that the military had no intention of honoring the commitment that President SBY and I had made in Jakarta in July of this year." 'Faleomavaega disappointed with his visit to Biak and Manokwari Papua, Indonesia', News Release, Congressman Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, Territory of American Samoa, U.S. House of Representatives, 17th December, 2007.

²² See Chapter 7 for more discussion on the materials used in this study.

valid concept by social scientists at this time, the issues surrounding migration and the politics of the province are framed by indigenous Papuans and other Indonesians using such terms, with such differences as skin colour and hair type being seen as innate and symbolic of a cultural and individual divide between indigenous and migrant people.²³ The topographical characteristics of the island's geography, its environmental constraints, and cultural factors have resulted in a huge number of ethnic groups, with the hundreds of languages in Papua reflecting this ethnic diversity. The creation of a widespread identification with a supra-ethnic Papuan identity appears to have come about only within the last half of the 20th century, with more extensive interactions with those from outside the island. It will be argued that this effect has arisen partly as a response to the effects of migration on the indigenous populace. Chapter 3 will cover the literature on the topic of ethnicity, in the international literature, in the literature covering Indonesia and on ethnicity in the writings of Indonesian writers.

While there has been a great deal of animosity expressed by indigenous people towards migrants during personal conversations with the author there has not been large-scale, inter-ethnic violence –the ethnic tensions that have degenerated into violence in other provinces such as Maluku, West Kalimantan and parts of Sulawesi. Such violence has not eventuated in Papua, although the highlands violence of 2000 was severe enough to cause thousands of migrants to leave these areas and the province. This study will attempt to establish an understanding of the complexities of ethnic relations in the province, and its relationship to the wider, national issues of ethnicity.

²³ See Chapter 6, pp.173-176 and Chapter 3, pp.48-49 for more discussion on this topic.

Papua is on the edges of the nation of Indonesia geographically and ethnically as noted above. Papua has also been separated from the rest of the nation historically. While it was part of the Dutch colony, people in this area were not involved in the fight for a new independent nation in the late 1940s. It was also separated from the rest of the archipelago from the time that independence was granted to the new nation of Indonesia until its incorporation into that nation in the 1960s. This period, as well as the pre-war period, was important in the development of a Papuan identity and patterns of interactions with non-Papuans. This means that it is vital to examine the history of the region prior to 1962. Chapter 4 will examine the history of the area before the period of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory, with these background descriptions illustrating the continuity and change between the Dutch and Indonesian periods. The pre-history of the area will also be described, focussing on the cultural and economic links to the surrounding region, as well as the peculiarities of Papuan people's history.

Chapter 5 will continue this history through the period of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory, with a brief introduction to the history of the province during the decades after the transfer of power. This section will provide a background to the chapters that examine the social changes that occurred in Papua, primarily through statistical data.

The attitudes of those in the Centre towards the outlying regions of the archipelago, in this case Papua, are important in decisions regarding these areas. The attitudes of those who migrate to these outlying regions affect their relations towards the indigenous populations, especially for those who move to these outer areas and become government officials and business people. Chapter 6 of this study will examine the representations of the province and its indigenous peoples in such national forums as museums, school and university

textbooks, and other reference books that cover the history and culture of the province. These representations will be taken to reflect the official understanding of the province's peoples, particularly as these materials were designed specifically to present these official understandings to the public and students.

The attitudes of migrants to the province towards the indigenous peoples are also important, and might be somewhat different to the official conceptualisation embodied in these texts. If the political situation were to allow it, a study involving interviews with migrants resident in the province, as well as with indigenous Papuans, would give greater insight into the issues involved in the interactions of Papuans and migrants.

The statistical information of migration to Papua will be analysed in three parts. Firstly, the migration patterns to the island as a whole will be examined in chapter 7. This chapter will focus on the figures directly related to migration to the province and the population changes in size, age and sex. Data on religion, education, literacy and employment will be presented in order to assess the extent and effects of migration, with a focus on migration's impact on the ability of indigenous people to join the paid workforce.

Chapters 8 and 9 will cover the data at the regency level, specifically for the regencies of Jayapura²⁵ and Jayawijaya. Jayapura, the capital of the province, was selected as a representative of the coastal area. These areas have the largest urban areas, with higher levels of economic growth and higher levels of migration, inter- and intra-provincial. These areas are those with the highest

²⁵ The data on Jayapura is split in later materials into two, with Jayapura being split administratively, and hence for statistical purposes, into two sections – Jayapura regency and Jayapura municipality. In most cases, the data from more recent resources which include figures on these areas separately will be combined in order to compare the later figures with those from earlier sources which are not split in this way.

levels of social change caused by the demographic change associated with these high levels of migration, with changes to the religious affiliation of the population. The coastal areas are also those with the highest levels of educational attainment, with most tertiary institutions being in these areas.

Jayawijaya was selected as the second regency to be evaluated for the impact of migration as a representative of the inland region of the province. The highlands area continues to be a very isolated region, with infrastructure development being slight, and the primary (often only) transportation from these regencies to coastal areas is by plane. Partially as a result of this isolation, the highland regions have experienced much lower rates of migration, with large rural populations which continue to practise small-scale, subsistence agriculture, primarily relying on sweet potato cultivation. These areas have experienced much smaller growth of their money economies, with much higher rates of illiteracy, lower rates of educational attainment, and relatively little change in religious composition of the population. However, while there were smaller numbers of migrants in these areas, this does not imply that their effect on the highland regency has not been significant.

This study will not examine the effects of the movement of army personnel to the province, other than as residents who are counted in the national census. The effect of such a large number of military personnel in the province has been discussed widely in the literature, mainly in relation to human rights abuses in the territory, along with issues of corruption in relation to resource extraction.²⁶ While these are important issues, the topic is too large to be included in the present study.

²⁶ See for example the flawed report by Brundige et al (2004); Wing & King (2005); Sharp, Nonie, *The rule of the sword: the story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, 1977; Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985

The transmigration program had a major impact on the number of migrants to Papua, along with the pattern of migration. While the majority of migrants to the province have been spontaneous migrants, the transmigration program has moved many migrants to rural areas that would not have been settled by such large numbers of other migrants. This pattern of migration has meant these transmigrants being in contact with indigenous peoples in different contexts and different locations than would have happened with other migrants.

Additionally, the sites chosen for transmigration are often close to mining or forestry projects, echoing the system practised under the Dutch. There are many sites near Sorong, an area which already had many fish- and log-processing plants before the transmigrant sites were placed in this area.²⁷ There are other sites around Timika, which is close to the giant Grasberg mine operated by Freeport. This interaction works to the advantage both of the mine and the transmigrants. There is a greater pool for the mine operators and additional employment possibilities for the settlers. Also, the food produced by the transmigrants can be sold to the mining company, which saves money on flying produce in to the more remote areas such as Timika.

Transmigration sites have not lived up to the expectations of the participants of these programs, with some sites having high rates of transmigrants abandoning their new homes. This was not true for all sites, however, with Hal Hill claiming in 1991 that only 10-15% of transmigrants had left their settlements.²⁸ In those sites which were not successful in retaining migrants, many transmigrants migrated on to nearby towns and cities rather than returning to their areas of origin. These ex-transmigrants then originate patterns of chain migration

²⁷ Aditjondro, George, 'Why People Flock to Sorong', *Kabar dari Kampung*, No.20, April 1986 in *Indonesia Reports*, Culture and Society Supplement, No.21, June 1987, p.2

²⁸ Hall Hill (Ed.), *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970*, OUP, Singapore, 1991, p.100

through the arrival of family, friends and neighbours from their areas of origin. The transmigration program has had a profound impact on the characteristics of migration to the province. Unfortunately, this study will only be able to cover the topic of transmigration in brief. This is partially due to the large scope of this topic, along with the impossibility of conducting research in situ.

The essential aim of the research is to assess the political, social and economic changes that have come about through the large-scale migration to the province during the period of Indonesian sovereignty. The influx of migrants has blocked the advancement of indigenous people in the political, social and economic fields, creating jealousy and distrust of the newcomers. It appears that this mixing of people has not created the unity in diversity – the national identification beyond the ethnic pieces – that the earlier photographs from the carnival suggest. There has been the formation of a pan-ethnic consciousness among the indigenous populace, along with a feeling of difference from the ‘Other’ –the non-indigenous migrants who give definition to a Papuan identity.

Chapter 2: Migration theory and methodology review

Historians are concerned with the temporal sequence of events, and since people change their locations in time, along with their governments and their customs, migrations are a proper subject for historical study. ...their interest is not confined to the explanation of events that occur in time and space, but extends to their consequences for the physical or social world as well.¹

Migration has become an important topic of study in recent years, connected partly with the increasing arrival of illegal migrants to developed countries. There is concern in many of these countries about this new wave of arrivals, with public fears of a deluge of humanity soon to sweep away our peace and prosperity, a rise in ultra-nationalism and xenophobia, and changes to the ways in which refugees are viewed and treated. The issue of terrorism has heightened distrust of foreigners in many countries also.

This has also led to an increasing academic concern with international migration, especially illegal migration. This has become more important, replacing to some extent the earlier focus during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s on rural to urban migration, especially in 'developing' countries. This concern may also have been motivated by fear of the results of the apparent population bomb in these countries. This fear has abated somewhat as birth rates decrease faster than predicted in developing countries and concerns of worldwide famine have largely abated until the recent trepidation around global food supply. However, while there has been much interest in the recent phenomena of mass

¹ Berliner, Joseph S., 'Internal migration: a comparative disciplinary view' in Brown, A.A. & Egon Neugerger, *Internal migration: a comparative perspective*, Academic Press, New York, 1977, p.444

international migration, Castles suggests that the “centrality of migration is not adequately reflected in prevailing views on the past.”²

This study attempts to rectify this deficiency, taking a historical view on migration to Papua throughout the period of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. This chapter will examine the academic literature on migration, including the discourse on Indonesia and by Indonesian authors. There will also be a discussion of the characteristics of the methods of research, with a focus on the use of census documents, as these form the basis of the current study.

My work on Papua looks at internal migration, from more populated areas of Indonesia to a less populated region. Internal migration to less developed areas has received less attention from writers. Though there is still a great deal of writing on the theory and research methodology of migration that is applicable to this topic, there has been a great emphasis on examining the characteristics of those who migrate, their reasons for migrating and the effects of this relocation on the migrants themselves. When this migration is fairly large-scale in relation to the population of the receiving area(s), this concern is understandable. For Papua, the small population in comparison to the total population of Indonesia has meant that the migration from other regions to Papua (a relatively minor demographic shift for Java especially) has had dramatic effects on Papua.

As has been previously mentioned, the main limitation on this study has been the inability to gain permission to conduct research in the province and carry out qualitative investigation of this migration through interviews or questionnaires. As Leslie Butt discusses in relation to anthropological research

² Castles, Stephen & Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, p.50

in Papua, the research on Papua is limited by the political climate.³ The importance of the issue to the people of Papua, along with the enduring nature of the restrictions on research, has led me to conduct this study without such materials. However, the census figures contain significant information to the ways in which migration has changed the population of the territory. It is hoped that the analysis of this material in this study can contribute to the understanding of the complexities of immigration on the people of the province.

³ Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, <http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/ phd.html> August 2007, pp.37-39

Theories of migration

While earlier authors such as Malthus had looked at the issue of migration, the scientific study of migration is often assumed to begin from the modelling of migration by Ravenstein, in his law of migration.⁴ This 19th century theory, as indicated by the use of the word 'law', tried to apply the scientific approach to a social issue. It conceptualised migration as a form of gravity, with people moving from areas of lower opportunity to areas of higher opportunity, with the effect reducing over distance. He also sought to describe patterns of migration, with migration being to closer towns first, with subsequent moves being to further, larger urban areas.

There have been a number of theorists who have updated this model from an economic theory perspective, one of which being the Lewis-Fei-Ranis concept of "migration as an equilibrating mechanism which, through transfer of labour from the labour-surplus sector to the labour-deficit sector, brings about equality between the two sectors."⁵

This theory has many similarities to neo-classical economic theory on which it is based,⁶ being an explanation of a general phenomenon through the action of individuals. As in classic economic theory, these individuals are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the risks and rewards of the decision to migrate or not. It has been criticised for its ahistorical and individualistic approach to migration. It assumes that the individual has complete awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of relocation. Castles and Miller suggest that the empirical evidence does not support this theoretical approach. According to these

⁴ Oberai, A.S. & Manmohan Singh, H.K., *Causes and consequences of internal migration: A study in the Indian Punjab*, OUP, Delhi, 1983, p.25

⁵ Oberai & Singh (1983), p.26

⁶ Castles & Miller (2003), p.22

authors, the economic-based migration theory cannot explain why particular groups move to particular destination areas, for example Turkish people migrate to Germany, while Algerian people move to France.⁷

Sjaastad⁸ brought non-economic factors into his theory of migration, seeing the decision to migrate as an investment with both economic and non-fiscal returns. According to this theory, the migrant decides to move if these expected returns outweigh the expected costs of the move. This differs from the earlier economic models, which assumed the perfect, rational economic actor making a choice based on all the evidence. However, there is still an assumption of the individual migrant as autonomous actor. This is a culturally biased assumption, with the focus on the individual and the belief that such decisions as migration are not made in consultation with others. Hugo's research on migration in Asia has shown that the "family and community are crucial in migration networks....migration decisions are usually made not by individuals but by families."⁹

This approach was developed further by Todaro in 1976.¹⁰ Todaro included the risk of unemployment in the destination area in the calculations made by the prospective migrant. He emphasised that the decision to migrate was made on the basis of expected financial benefit. However, the theories developed by Todaro still assume that potential migrants have complete knowledge of their prospects of finding employment, that migrants are homogenous in terms of knowledge and skills, and that non-economic factors do not play an important role. As pointed out by Oberai and Manmohan Singh, these theories also neglect structural macro-economic forces which operate to cause economic

⁷ Castles & Miller (2003), pp.23-24. See p.33 for other explanations of such patterns of migration.

⁸ Oberai & Singh (1983), p.28

⁹ Castles & Miller (2003), p.27

¹⁰ Oberai & Singh (1983), p.28

disparities between areas which lead to the differences in income and employment in the first place.¹¹

Papastergiadis sees two models of migration as having prevailed from the 1960s to the early 1980s.¹² Firstly, there was the voluntarist perspective, which saw migration as being caused by an internal push out and an external pull mentioned above. Secondly, there was the structuralist political-economy viewpoint that saw a global division between rich North and peasant South. Papastergiadis suggests that both of these approaches have limitations; the voluntarist perspective over-emphasises the individual's role, with the individual deciding alone with full knowledge of the risks and benefits of migration. The structuralist approach is overly focused on class, neglecting the individual's or group's motivations and roles in this process and the importance of ethnicity and gender.¹³

Papastergiadis suggests there is a lack of a new general theory of migration, and perceives studies of migration as being either simply empirical or a mix of the two theories above.¹⁴ However, other authors see this more pragmatic approach as a positive development. Castles and Miller state that the migration systems theory has arisen from consideration of the failings of the two methods above. According to these authors, migration systems theory "suggests that movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonization, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties."¹⁵ It is the interaction between macro-structures (such as the world economy) and micro-structures (such as the migrants' social

¹¹ Oberai & Singh (1983), p.28

¹² Papastergiadis, Nikos, *The turbulence of migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity, Polity*, Cornwall, 2000, p.17

¹³ Papastergiadis (2000), p.17

¹⁴ Papastergiadis (2000), p.17

¹⁵ Castles & Miller (2003), p.26

structures) that result in the decision to migrate, mediated by such meso-structures as migration agents and lawyers.

The theories mentioned above focus on the decision to migrate and the factors that migrants take into account when making their choice. There has been relatively little theoretical examination of or research into the consequences of the results of their choice to migrate on the destination area, especially non-fiscal outcomes. What research there has been on this area varies depending on the approach of authors, with a clear divergence in method between researchers from different disciplines, according to Berliner.¹⁶ While most research claims to have some interest in the effects of migration, the vast majority of migration study has been done on the effects on the participants in this migration, the migrants themselves.

Migrants have particular attributes such as sex, age, family status, occupation, intelligence, educational attainment, capital for investment, social and cultural attributes, language and religious affiliation. Migration thus redistributes these attributes in the origin and destination societies. This is interactive, with the migration process also changing the migrant. The migrant's attitudes, occupation, family status and social status can all be affected.¹⁷ The historical-structural approach sees migration as contributing to global inequality, with rich, Western countries benefiting from the migration of cheap, educated labour while labour exporters lose some of the most educated section of their population.¹⁸

¹⁶ Berliner, Joseph S., 'Internal migration: a comparative disciplinary view' in Brown (1977), p.445-446

¹⁷ White & Woods, 'The foundations of migration study', pp.1-20 in White, Paul and Robert Woods, *The geographical impact of migration*, Longman, London, 1980

¹⁸ Castles & Miller (2003), p.25

These personal attributes of the migrants have been the focus of much modern writings on migration. Castles and Miller suggest that information about the destination, the ability to organise and adapt to the new situation (collectively dubbed cultural capital) are important for initiating and maintaining migration.¹⁹ Social capital is another new term for the social linkages between individuals, family and wider community.²⁰ These linkages are crucial to the migrants' success in settling in the destination region.²¹

Today many authors emphasize the role of information and 'cultural capital' in starting and sustaining migratory movements. Informal networks include personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendships and community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters. Such links provide vital resources for individuals and groups, and may be referred to as 'social capital'. Informal networks bind "migrants and non-migrants together in a complex web of social roles and interpersonal relationship".²²

There has been examination of the effects of migration on wages and unemployment. While the widely-held view is that migration leads to a lowering of wages and unemployment, this does not appear to be the case. According to Oberai and Manmohan Singh, there is no definite outcome of migration economically, with positive and negative results for the receiving area being possible. They state that the "net economic impact of migration on the urban areas largely depends on the types of migrants involved, and on their characteristics."²³ This is essentially an individualistic view of the phenomenon.

¹⁹ Castles & Miller (2003), p.27

²⁰ Castles & Miller (2003), p.27

²¹ Castles & Miller (2003), p.27

²² Castles & Miller (2003), p.27

²³ Oberai & Singh (1983), p.45

Despite this apparent variability in outcome, economists in general are positive about the effects of migration. Simon details the results of surveys done on top economists and other social scientists on the effects of immigration on the US.²⁴ While the economists surveyed were very positive about the effect of immigration, other social scientists were less so. The social scientists were, however, positive about the effect of immigration on such things as the 'social fabric' and the 'culture' of the country. Both groups were more positive than the general public in the US about all aspects of immigration.

Almost without exception the behavioural characteristics of immigrants are conducive to economic advancement for the community as well as for the immigrants themselves. Compared to natives of the same sex and age, immigrants work harder, save more, have a higher propensity to start new businesses, and are more likely to innovate. Two frequent negative allegations – that immigrants are more disposed to crime, and that they have large numbers of children which are a burden upon the native community – have no basis in fact.²⁵

Papastergiadis sees the push-pull theory of migration as over-emphasising the individual's calculations of economic opportunity and asserts that this theory has been mainly discredited by current theorists. One of its limitations is that it only looks at economic issues and presupposes the labour market is free – migrants simply calculate their best financial options and make a rational economic choice based on this. However, the choices made by migrants do not correspond to this model. Also, it does not take into account such factors as historical links that can lead to migration, e.g. Indians who migrate to Britain rather than other European countries and Algerians to France. It seems clear that these patterns of migration are connected to the links that developed

²⁴ Simon, Julian L., *The economic consequences of immigration*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp. 357-359

²⁵ Simon (1989), pp.103-104

through the colonial past, but the push-pull theory has no way to explain these characteristics. This model is also blind to gender and cultural issues.²⁶

Papastergiadis states that structuralism portrays these movements as explicable through models imported from political economy. Migration was explained in terms of global economic differentials, with patterns of migration being determined by “the linkage between state-driven immigration policies and the structural forces of capitalist expansion.”²⁷ This model also sees the state as acting in the interests of capital, with migration serving to provide labour from the periphery and perpetuating the dependency of the margins on the Centre.²⁸ This analysis can be seen as an extension of the ‘reserve army of labour’ concept.²⁹

Another critique of the study of migration is the extent of the role of economics, and theories utilising the methods and methodologies of economics. Papastergiadis sees this analysis as tending to neglect social and cultural factors.³⁰

According to Papastergiadis, Michael Piore sees models which stress the importance of economic factors as having three limitations.

1. The skills of the majority of migrants do not correspond with the demands for migrant labour.
2. Since there is a huge income gap between countries, why isn't there more pressure to migrate?

²⁶ Papastergiadis (2000), pp.31-32

²⁷ Papastergiadis (2000), p.32

²⁸ Papastergiadis (2000), p.33

²⁹ See Papastergiadis for a further discussion of this theory.

³⁰ Papastergiadis (2000), p.33

3. When the receiving country is in recession or its economy is stagnant, how can it still attract and absorb further migrant arrivals?³¹

Another critique is that of White and Woods. They suggest that migrations have been seen more as 'events' than as 'structures'. This has neglected the fact that migrations are "continuous phenomena which are embedded in the social and economic framework of human organisation."³²

According to White and Woods, there are 5 basic questions to ask concerning migration:

1. Why does migration occur?
2. Who migrates?
3. What are the patterns of origins and destinations and of the flows between them?
4. What are the effects of migration on the areas, communities or societies that the migrants come from?
5. What are the effects of migration on the areas, communities or societies of destination?³³

There is a degree of homogeneity in the characteristics of migrants that are examined by most researchers. The main factors that are considered important are varied to some extent but always include age and sex. Other commonly included characteristics of migrants include occupation, educational attainment, family status, ethnicity, place of origin, migration history, social and cultural attributes, language and religious affiliation.

³¹ Papastergiadis (2000), p.34

³² White and Woods, 'The geographical impact of migration', in White & Woods (1980), p.42

³³ White & Woods, 'The foundations of migration study' in White & Woods (1980), pp.1-20

Methodologies of migration study

There are three main ways of estimating migration: through population registers, surveys and population censuses.³⁴ Of these three methods, population censuses are the most common source of data on internal migration. According to Zachariah the census data is the main data source for internal migration patterns used across the world.³⁵ Censuses are limited by only being conducted every 5 or 10 years, and the fact that there are only a few questions relating to migration, but Zachariah says that: "These limitations of census as a source of migration data are more than compensated for by the enormous potential for preparing detailed cross-classification of migration data with other demographic and socio-economic characteristics normally obtained in censuses."³⁶

Spengler and Myers suggest that when looking at migration, it is important to look both at the short-term and long-term advantages and costs, as well as how the migrants are perceived. Also, environmental and socio-structural effects need to be examined.³⁷

Simmons and fellow authors suggest a range of desirable characteristics of research on internal migration. They suggest that good research needs to be interdisciplinary and focus on national systems. It should also have an extensive use of models based on a core-periphery paradigm and be explicitly comparative, especially in terms of having a cross-cultural focus. Migration's nature as a dynamic process should be emphasised, examining process and

³⁴ Arriaga , Eduardo E., 'Some aspects of measuring internal migration', pp.103-120 in Brown & Neugerger (1977), p.104

³⁵ Zachariah, K.C., 'Measurement of internal migration from census data', pp.121-134 in Brown & Neugerger (1977), p.121

³⁶ Zachariah in Brown & Neugerger (1977), p.121

³⁷ Spengler, Joseph J. & George C. Myers, 'Migration and socioeconomic development: today and yesterday', in Brown & Neugerger (1977), pp.11-37

change in patterns. These authors also point to the centrality of the analysis of government policy, with urbanisation studies tied back into national development and spatial integration, a systems approach to this field.³⁸

Further, when looking at the consequences of migration, it is impossible to ignore the characteristics of the migrant and the larger socio-economic framework in which this migration is taking place. Douglass suggests that the individual migrant's character is of primary concern, for both the origin and pattern of this movement, since "the character of the migrant is of overwhelming importance in migration impact study for he is the agent of change – the actor and the reactor."³⁹

These theoretical aspects indicate that in order to understand the changes that have occurred in Outer Island societies due to the migration of people from Java and Madura, a paradigmatic study would examine the characteristics of the people who migrated, why they chose to migrate and the socio-economic situation both within Papua and Indonesia as a whole.

Unfortunately, the political situation within Indonesia means that such a study is impossible to conduct for a foreign researcher such as myself. The loss of East Timor from the republic has strengthened the resolve within the political and (especially) the military establishments to preserve the nation from further disintegration. This sensitivity is one factor in the continuance of the quarantining of the province from observation by foreign researchers and journalists.

³⁸ Simmons, Alan, Sergio Diaz-Briquets & Aprodicio A. Laguian, *Social change and internal migration: a review of research findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 1977, p.69

³⁹ Quoted Douglass in White and Woods, 'The geographical impact of migration', in White & Woods (1980), p.55

The data from the census that have been carried out by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics in the province during the last four decades includes a number of questions, many of which are of limited use to the current research. The questions varied slightly from census to census, with different information published in national and provincial census volumes, along with the yearly provincial and regency figures published by the provincial statistics bureau. I have decided to focus primarily on the figures covering the population size, age and sex characteristics, religion, language, education and employment. There were also figures on the possessions owned by residents, though the particular questions varied from census to census and were not included in each census. The later chapters focus on the province as a whole (Chapter 7), the Jayapura regency (Chapter 8) and the Jayawijaya regency (Chapter 9). These chapters detail the information that was analysed by the author from this material.

Census methodology justification

There are issues with using census data from Indonesia, with the main concern being the potential for inaccuracies with the data. Ballard suggests that the statistics on population in the province have errors. He quotes the local district head as saying that: "The village heads lie to me, I lie to the Regent, the Regent lies to the Governor, and the Governor lies to the President."⁴⁰ Ballard also notes that the census enumerators had not visited the area in which he was working in Papua, thus making their population estimates speculative.⁴¹

McGibbon also notes the complete coverage of the province during the 2000 census. He states that: "Fieldwork for the 2000 census was undertaken at the height of pro-independence mobilization and census takers encountered much suspicion in local communities. Indeed in some areas locals refused to provide census information."⁴²

The lack of good statistical data is not new for researchers on the topic. Aditjondro discusses the difficulty of estimating accurately the number of migrants resident in the province when he was writing in the mid-1980s. Different officials had given him different figures of between 100,000 and 300,000 migrants.⁴³ While this does indicate that Indonesian government figures are not completely reliable, it also suggests that other sources of information on population numbers outside the census are even more prone to error. It should also be remembered that the 2000 census was the most comprehensive in its attempts to detail information on the populace, including a

⁴⁰ Ballard, Chris, 'Paradise betrayed: correspondence', *Quarterly Essay*, 8, pp.94-100, 2002, p.95

⁴¹ Ballard (2002), pp.95-96

⁴² McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural society in peril: migration, economic change and the Papua conflict*, East-West Center Washington, 2004, accessed from [www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in September 2005](http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in_September_2005), p.6

⁴³ Aditjondro, George, "*Datang Dengan Kapal, Tidur di Pasar, Buang Air di Kali, Pulang Naik Pesawat*": Suatu telaah tentang dampak migrasi suku-suku bangsa dari Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara ke Irian Jaya sejak tahun 1962, (*Arrive by Ship, Sleep in the Market, Piss in the River, Leave by Plane*), YPMD, Jayapura, 1986, p.71

question on ethnicity among other changes – the first census since 1930 to include a question on ethnicity.⁴⁴ This was the also the first census in which all the questions included were asked of the population as a whole. Previous censuses had relied on enumeration samples to ascertain numbers for questions such as those related to educational attainment, religion, migration status and place of birth.⁴⁵ These enumeration samples had only covered 3.7% of the population in 1971, and had increased to 5.8% in both the 1980 and 1990 censuses.⁴⁶

However, the reliability of the 2000 census seems to have decreased compared to earlier censuses as a result of the changes to Indonesian society in the wake of the fall of Suharto. A lack of trust in government and the less organised state of the administration meant that there appears to be more doubt about the accuracy of these figures than for the earlier censuses which were conducted by the New Order government.⁴⁷ There were also security problems in some areas of the country, including the highland area of Jayawijaya in Papua, which prohibited a proper count in these areas and figures for these regions are estimates only.⁴⁸ According to Suryadinata and colleagues “there were 209,104 people or 9.45% of the total population of Papua who could not be accessed and, hence, they must be estimated. Furthermore, there were 306,743 non-responses or 13.86% of the total population.”⁴⁹

While these issues cast doubt on the accuracy of the results that are reported in the current research, it is an unfortunate fact that there is no other large-scale

⁴⁴ Suryadinata et al. (2003), p.XX

⁴⁵ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.XXI

⁴⁶ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.XXI

⁴⁷ Hull, Terence H., ‘First results from the 2000 population census’, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol.37, No.1, 2001, 103-111, pp.103-105

⁴⁸ Hull (2001), p.105

⁴⁹ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.161

statistical evidence that is currently available on the area. In order to confirm the data corresponds with the reality of the situation in the province, the current study will supplement the analysis of the census data with the information provided from the excellent small-scale surveys that have been conducted during this period. These include research by Jan Broekhuijse in 1960, Michael Rumbiak in the early 1980s, Suko Bandiyono and Makmuri Suharto in the early 1990s and Hendrika Lautenbach in the late 1990s.⁵⁰ These studies are more qualitative than the census data and reveals valuable data on intra-provincial migration, the motivation for migration and so on – information that is not covered by the larger-scale studies conducted by the government.

A better picture of the effects of migration would have been obtained if interviews with migrants and with indigenous people inside Papua had been possible. The importance of the character of the migrant is an aspect of migration that cannot be discovered through this form of investigation. Since this present research focus is on the large-scale impact of migration, the lack of such qualitative data will be replaced by research into the understanding of Papua illustrated in materials such as museums, and school and university textbooks. These are materials which reflect officially acceptable conceptions of the province and its people, and convey these ideas to the general public.

The census data does include vast amounts of data on the social and economic conditions of the province. Its strength in comparison to such methods as interviews is the opportunity it provides for historical analysis. The information that can be analysed from this data illustrates the changes that have occurred throughout the decades of this ongoing phenomenon and the consequences of migration to the province can be seen in the patterns of settlement, education

⁵⁰ Lautenbach, Hendrika, *Demographic survey research in Irian Jaya*, Thela Thesis, 1999. This is a small scale survey but with detailed information that does not show up in the larger scale BPS data.

and employment of the province's residents. The use of a historical demographical methodology partially negates the inaccuracies that are evident in the data. The current research will provide indications of some of the socio-demographic trends that have occurred, with the emphasis being on the trends that can be seen to have developed during this period. Utilising the data from these four censuses, along with data from the intercensal surveys, the figures on migration and fertility, and the *Papua/Irian Jaya dalam angka* series of publications gives a larger statistical basis than using the material from one of these publications alone. The greater quantity of data diminishes the impact of the statistical inaccuracies of each material alone and while the data inaccuracies of the latest census are troubling, this should not be seen as negating the underlying validity of these trends. As noted researcher on Indonesian demography Terence Hull suggests, the difficulties in data collection surrounding the 2000 census are not serious and the figures are reasonably accurate and can be used fairly confidently.⁵¹

The advantage of using the census data, despite the potential inaccuracies it contains is the opportunity to gain a broader perspective of the province-wide changes that have occurred. There is little trust among most Papuans for the central government. This may limit the chances of convincing indigenous people that the results reached in the current research are accurate. Without independent research, the feelings among the indigenous population that they are being marginalised, even wiped out, are unlikely to be affected by the results of data based on the Indonesian government census. The difficulties for foreign researchers of conducting more rigorous studies on such a sensitive topic as migration has meant that an independent, large-scale study of its impact on the ground has not been conducted. It is to be hoped that the

⁵¹ Hull (2001), p.108

political mood changes such that this will be possible in the future in order to give a more accurate and credible picture of the demographic situation in this territory.

Chapter 3: The literature on ethnicity

Migration to Papua involves the interaction of people from different islands of the archipelago. That these peoples belong to a number of ethnic groups is often emphasised by those from both migrant and indigenous groups. In attempting to deal with the complexities of this situation and the ways in which ethnicity is important to those involved, it will be vital to look at theories of ethnicity and explore some of the wider discourse on ethnicity, both within and outside Indonesia.

Rather than withering away as predicted by both liberal and socialist theorists¹, ethnic identities have become important forms of identification. As Rutherford notes, it should not be assumed (as she says Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm and Smith do) that simply contact with modernity will change people's self-identification, that "railroads, schools and markets automatically and irreversibly turn 'peasants into Frenchmen'."² This increasing ethnic identification has been mirrored in the rise of ethnicity as an area of interest within academic discourse. Ryan suggests a number of reasons for the earlier lack of attention to the issue including the cosmopolitan, rootless nature of academics who are unlikely to have strong ethnic identifications and so not look for this factor in the situations they research.³ The major political ideologies of the 20th century, Marxism and liberalism, both predicted that ethnic affiliation would wither away, with identification to nationalist and class identity

¹ See the discussion of this issue in Magenda, Burhan D., 'Ethnicity and state-building in Indonesia: the cultural base of the New Order', in Guidieri et al (eds.), *Ethnicities and nations: processes of interethnic relations in Latin America, southeast Asia, and the Pacific*, Rothko Chapel, Houston, 1988, pp.346-347

² Rutherford, Danilyn, *Raiding the land of the foreigners*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003, p.10

³ Ryan, Stephen, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995, pp.16-19

supplanting them. These theories discouraged research into ethnicity as it was seen as nothing but a temporary phase.⁴

Theories of ethnicity

One theme in the literature on ethnicity is the division between the primordial view and the structural or instrumental view of ethnicity.⁵ Stavenhagen suggests that primordialism sees genetic links between people as the main defining characteristic of ethnicity.⁶ From this viewpoint, ethnicity is a fixed, inborn attribute of each individual. This approach does not hold up under the scrutiny of more recent developments in the science of genetics, with DNA testing and the Human Genome Diversity Project showing that “people are too closely related—and have mixed too much throughout history—to differ in fundamental ways.”⁷ However, the primordialist approach to ethnicity has been, and continues to be, a very widely held view of ethnicity held by those outside academic circles.⁸

In contrast to this view is the approach of those writers who see ethnicity as a form of political organisation rather than an inherent genetic trait. One of these writers, Abner Cohen, argues that the main focus on ethnicity should be on its form and function rather than on any cultural elements of this ethnic group.

⁴ Ryan (1995), pp.16-19

⁵ However, Fenton, Steve, *Ethnicity: racism, class and culture*, Macmillan, 1999, pp.102-105, argues that the use of the word ‘primordialism’ arises from a misreading of Geertz’s original use of this term.

⁶ Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*, Macmillan, Great Britain, 1996, pp.18-22

⁷ Olson, Steve, The genetic archaeology of race, *The Atlantic Monthly*, April 2001, <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/04/olson-p3.htm>, accessed November 2003

⁸ The press release by an American Samoan congressman, Eni Faleomavaega, exemplifies this view. The congressman has called for African nations to support West Papua due to a purported genetic connection. His press release states that “native West Papua New Guineans differ linguistically and racially from the majority of Indonesians. The Papuans are Melanesian and believed to be of African descent while the majority of Indonesians are of Javanese descent.” From ‘Faleomavaega and Congressman Donald Payne call upon African nations to request UN review of West Papua’, US House of Representatives Press Release, 16th December 2005, accessed August 2007, http://www.house.gov/list/press/as00_faleomavaega/westpapuadec16.html

Eriksen questions this, suggesting that Cohen's work does not adequately explain why particular symbols and ethnic configurations are possible and enduring in preference to others.⁹ Since it does not seem possible to completely manipulate identity, Eriksen suggests that there must be an element of identity that is not simply instrumental.

That both structural and 'primordial' factors play a dual role in the construction and maintenance of ethnic identification has been put forward by Roosens. He suggests that while socio-economic motives are important factors in the (re-) formation of an ethnic identity, the strength of these factors relies on "profound affective factors related to origin, such as sharing 'the same blood' and being faithful to a tradition handed down from one generation to the other."¹⁰

Attempts to define an ethnic group or ethnic identity go back to Weber. He took a subjective approach to ethnicity, defining an ethnic group as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation or migration."¹¹ This attitude towards groups is commonly expressed by Papuans. The following quote is one that has been used a number of times by Benny Giay, the theologian and human rights activist.

Papuans are different to Javanese, and different to other people too. God gave Papua to Papuans as a home, so they could eat sago and sweet potatoes there. God gave them a penis gourd (koteka) and loincloth (cawat) for clothes. God gave them curly hair and black skin. Papuans are Papuans. They can never be turned into Javanese or Sumatrans, nor vice versa. The Javanese were given Java. Tahu [tofu] and tempe is their food. Their skin is light and

⁹ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, *Ethnicity and nationalism*, 2nd edition, Pluto Press, Chippenham, 2002, p.54

¹⁰ Roosens, Eugen E., *Creating ethnicity: the process of ethnogenesis*, Sage, Newbury Park, 1989, p.15

¹¹ Guibernau, Montserrat & John Rex, *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997, p.2.

their hair straight. The real problem is that those in power in this republic have tried as best they could to make Papuans talk, think, look and behave like Javanese (or Sumatrans), and that goes against the order of God's creation. That is where the conflict comes from.¹²

A similar example of this tendency was noted during my visit to the province in August 2005. During a Papuan Cultural festival held outside Jayapura, the presenter claimed that “We are one; we are different to the Indonesians; we have black skin and curly hair; we will not be divided; we are all Papuans.”¹³ This was applauded enthusiastically by the audience.

While this view is held by many in Papua, such conceptions can be considered overly simplistic, with writers on migration having sought to more closely delineate the concept. Michael Brown presents six criteria a group needs to meet in order to be considered an ethnic group. The group must have a name for themselves, a belief in a common ancestry, shared historical memories or myths, a shared culture, an attachment to a particular territory and must think of themselves as a group.¹⁴ This subjective acceptance of the ethnic identity by those outside the group validates the subjective conception, as “ethnicity is almost always some combination of self-identification and a label imposed by others.”¹⁵

This conception of ethnicity as a subjective phenomenon held by the authors mentioned above has been challenged by other writers. Fenton, for example, critiques the view he sees as being espoused by Eriksen that ethnicity is simply a

¹² English translation from Giay, Benny, ‘Towards a New Papua’, *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2001, accessed from <http://insideindonesia.org/edit67/giay.htm> in August 2007. Original Indonesian in Giay, Benny, *Menuju Papua Baru: eberapa pokok pikiran sekitar emansipasi orang Papua*, Deiyai, Jayapura, 2000, pp.4-5

¹³ August 22nd 2005, Pesta Budaya Papua, Waena. Author’s translation from Indonesian.

¹⁴ Brown, Michael E., ‘Causes and implications of ethnic conflict’ in Guibernau & Rex (1997), pp.80-99

¹⁵ Goldscheider, Calvin (ed.), *Population, ethnicity and nation-building*, Westview, Boulder, 1995, p.3

reflection of how people 'see themselves'.¹⁶ He suggests this neglects the ways in which ethnicity can be inherent within a social system, negating the power of individuals to choose their own ethnic identity. Fenton states that: "Systems of ethnic classification are, therefore, as with all social behaviour, compounds of constraint and choice."¹⁷ Fenton lists three characteristics of situations in which the ethnic dimension is important in group interaction, as defined by John Rex:

1. Differentiation or inequality between groups
2. The possibility of distinguishing between groups by physical or cultural cues
3. Justification of this discrimination through a theory, often biological.¹⁸

Eriksen suggests this division between the subjective and the objective points to the more fundamental division in approaches within the social sciences between the macro-level study of social structures and systems and the micro-level of individuals and their behaviour and choices.¹⁹ According to Eriksen, Anthony Giddens tries to reconcile these two views in his work, suggesting that social life be seen as "fundamentally dual, comprising both agency and structure simultaneously: both freedom and constraint, if one prefers."²⁰

There has been much thought devoted to the reasons for the (re-) emergence of ethnicity as an important form of identity. Geertz among others has pointed out that ethnicity is a product of modern societies rather than of pre-modern social structures. He states that: "A simple, coherent, broadly defined ethnic structure,

¹⁶ Fenton (1999), p.19. It should be noted that Fenton's characterisation of Eriksen's views do not appear to adequately reflect those of Eriksen himself. See Eriksen (2002) and below in this chapter for more details on this.

¹⁷ Fenton (1999), p.19

¹⁸ Fenton (1999), p.22

¹⁹ Holy and Stuchlik, quoted in Eriksen (2002), p.55

²⁰ Eriksen (2002), p.55

such as is found in most industrial societies, is not an un-dissolved residue of traditionalism but an earmark of modernity.”²¹

It has also been suggested that the rise in the power of ethnic identity comes from a decline in other forms of authority and social structure. As people move to urban areas away from the authority structures of their rural village society, with attachment to the nation often not a strong identification, ethnic identification gives security. This security is especially important when people come into contact with others with different lifestyles and beliefs.²² This suggests that there would be an increase in ethnic identification among migrants, as they would be likely to be in more contact with those with habits and values that differ from their own. This theory is validated by the importance of ethnicity to those in urban areas of Papua – areas in which there are migrants from many parts of the archipelago, along with indigenous rural-urban migrants.

Fenton advocates the importance of examining how ethnicity is manifested in differing ways at various strata of society; the macro, meso and micro levels. Macro-social formations are such areas as the political and economic scale of the state. The meso-structures are structures which mediate between the state and individuals such as schools and universities. Eriksen sees these meso-structures more broadly as including organisations that represent the interests of a particular ethnic group in the larger socio-political system. The micro-social level is that of interpersonal personal interactions.²³

One condition for conflict between ethnic groups is contact between them. More than this, ethnicity as a concept has no reality without one or more other ethnic groups, the ‘Other’ which is the contrast that provides definition to the

²¹ Geertz, Clifford, *The interpretation of cultures*, Hutchinson, London, 1975, p.308

²² Geertz (1975), p.308

²³ Fenton (1999), p.13

conception. Eriksen claims that contact with other groups is a pre-requisite for ethnicity to occur at all, as well as the belief among these groups that the other is culturally different to them.²⁴ As mentioned above, ethnicity involves the boundaries between groups, the liminal areas. Boundaries between groups is a focus of the work of Fredrik Barth. For Barth, the maintenance of group boundaries is a problematic area and he suggests that “the main task for the anthropological study of ethnicity consists in accounting for the maintenance and consequences of ethnic boundaries.”²⁵

While Barth sees ethnicity as a type of social organisation, as was noted above Cohen conceives of it as a form of political organisation. According to Eriksen, Cohen’s study shows ethnicity as “an instrument for competition over scarce resources, which is nevertheless circumscribed by ideologies of shared culture, shared origins and metaphoric kinship.”²⁶

Ethnic connections are strengthened and sustained by economic interests, such as ethnic networks for employment and trade. Ethnicity serves to fulfil a function for its members in regard to labour and resource acquisition. Cohen suggests that ethnicity is created through contact between groups and their competition for resources within the framework of a state, competition for employment, political power, education and so on. Abner Cohen claims that: “In many places the possibilities of capturing these new sources of power have been different for different ethnic groups, so that very often the emerging cleavages have been on ethnic lines.”²⁷

²⁴ Eriksen, (2002), p.12

²⁵ Eriksen, (2002), p.37

²⁶ Eriksen, (2002), p.45

²⁷ Cohen, Abner, *Two-dimensional man*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, p.96

This ethnicity is a new cultural arrangement, a reworking of pre-modern customs and beliefs. According to Cohen, ethnicity is not simply a primordialist attachment, but “an essentially new social system in which men [sic] articulate their new roles under traditional tribal symbols.”²⁸ This can certainly be noted within the Papuan context at the district level, with power structures within the local government administration being connected to the ethnic affiliations of the district heads.²⁹ This issue will be covered in more detail in later chapters.

Eriksen identifies three social and five cognitive characteristics which tend to be present in most situations where a politics of ethnic identity exists. The three social features are: competition over scarce resources; modernisation which actualises differences and triggers conflict; and groups being largely self-recruiting. The five cognitive attributes are: cultural similarity overrules social equality (i.e. ethnicity above class); images of past suffering and injustice are invoked; the political symbolism and rhetoric evokes personal experiences; first-comers are contrasted with invaders; and the social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrasts.³⁰

The work of Baumann discriminates between two types of discourse on ethnicity; the dominant and the popular.³¹ His work shows ways in which the popular discourse “is more flexible and complex” than the segmented nature of ethnicity expressed within the dominant discourse. Nevertheless, due to the

²⁸ Cohen (1974), p.96

²⁹ See for example International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesian Papua: A local perspective on the conflict*, Update Briefing, Asia Briefing #66, Jakarta/Brussels, 19th July 2007, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4945&l=1> in February 2008

³⁰ Eriksen (2002), pp.159-60

³¹ Eriksen (2002), p.150

control over resources by the state, through various channels “people have no choice but to present their claims in ethnic or religious terms.”³²

It is easy to overstate the importance of ethnic identity and perceive all interactions within a multi-ethnic environment as occurring within an ethnically charged environment. While ethnicity may be an important aspect of interaction in some contexts, in other communications the importance of ethnicity may be relatively minor in comparison to other factors. As Fenton notes, “ethnicity as an element of individual consciousness and action varies in intensity and import depending on the context of action.”³³ This point was made by a speaker during a conference on Papua by an indigenous labour activist, Frans Pigome.³⁴ Pigome suggested that while his organisation was purportedly established in order to promote the rights of Papuan workers at the Freeport mine, he felt that it was very important that there be fairness for all workers, migrant and indigenous workers alike, with justice and fairness being the over-riding aim.³⁵

There are various degrees of ethnic incorporation, with not all ethnic groups being as important to its constituents or as tightly bound together as a group. Eriksen suggests a typology, going from more loosely to more closely integrated.

1. Ethnic category – these groups are seen and see themselves as part of a group

³² Eriksen (2002), p.150

³³ Fenton (1999), p.21

³⁴ Pigome Frans, ‘Paths to Justice and Prosperity: West Papua 2007’, organised by Indonesian Solidarity in association with the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), University of Sydney, and The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Technology, August 9th 2007, Sydney, Australia

³⁵ Author’s translation of response given by Frans Pigome to audience questions at the conference mentioned in footnote 31 above

2. Ethnic network – regular interactions, distribute resources among members, decentralised
3. Ethnic association – have structures in place that can lobby for the group, plus factors above
4. Ethnic community – as above plus a territory³⁶

Eriksen examines Mauritian society in order to describe these different levels of affiliation. For the first category above, he uses the Creole ethnic group as an example, for the ethnic network concept he suggests the Franco-Mauritian community, Hindus qualify as an ethnic association, while Sino-Mauritians are an ethnic community.

As research in the province itself that could examine this issue is not possible in the current Indonesian political climate, how this concept applies to the Papuan situation is not clear. Certainly some Papuans believe that many migrant ethnic groups would qualify as being in at least the ethnic network category. According to Frans Pigome, employment and promotion are distributed by superiors dependant on ethnic identity.³⁷ This also accords with the informal data garnered from conversation with and observation of migrants and indigenous Papuans during my visit to the province.³⁸ Both migrants and indigenous people suggested that people were employed due to their ethnic group, with some migrants having been given jobs and brought over from their home province by migrants who had previously settled in Papua.

³⁶ Eriksen (2002), p.42

³⁷ See footnote 31.

³⁸ Observations from author's visit to the province, August 2005

Ethnic conflict

Brown examines some of the factors involved in ethnic conflict. He suggests two essential prerequisites for this: the two groups must reside close to one another and the state authorities must be too weak to ensure security.³⁹ According to Brown, weak states are unable to address the concerns of their constituents and cannot guarantee equal citizenship based on law, so people resort to ethnic affiliations. Democratisation can be problematic in multi-ethnic societies as it exacerbates existing ethnic tensions. This applies to Papua – and other areas such as Kalimantan and Maluku – with ethnic relations in some regions becoming major conflicts once the societal control exerted by the Suharto New Order administration was removed.

Brown also suggests a range of possible causes for ethnic tensions. He states that ethnic tensions are more likely to arise if “the old regime exacerbated ethnic problems by engaging in forced assimilation, forced relocation, ethnic expulsion or extermination campaigns, then the democratization process is likely to be both highly problematic and emotionally charged; many ethnic problems will be on the agenda.”⁴⁰ This appears to be the situation in Papua, with the transmigration program moving a significant number of people to the province, and this, along with mining programs, has led to the forced removal of indigenous people from their land. The program instigated by the Suharto government that required highland people to wear clothes is an example of forced assimilation.

Brown claims that if one ethnic group dominates there may be neglect or repression of the issues of the minority. He also asserts that another factor is

³⁹ Brown, ‘Causes and implications of ethnic conflict’, in Guibernau & Rex (1997), pp.88-89

⁴⁰ Brown, ‘Causes and implications of ethnic conflict’, in Guibernau & Rex (1997), p.86

whether the old regime's interests reflected the interests of one ethnic group. While the Javanese ethnic group is often posited as being the dominant group, Magenda suggests that it is the *priyayi*⁴¹ who have this role, and that their dominance was cemented by the New Order's rise to power.⁴² Additionally, Brown suggests that ethnic tensions are intensified if the military is loyal to one ethnic group. Again, Magenda suggests that the military are strong supporters of the *priyayi*'s dominant position, stating that: "The victory of the *priyayi* over other groups and classes originated from its control over the new Indonesian Army".⁴³

Brown's next factor is that ethnic tensions are likely if ethnic problems are neglected during the fall of the old order. This also applies to Indonesia, with the point made earlier in this chapter that ethnicity was suppressed as an identification under the New Order, with national affiliation being encouraged.

Brown's final points concern political organisation, with ethnic tensions worsened if parties are organised along ethnic lines and if there is scapegoating of ethnic groups by politicians. Political parties are not able to base themselves on ethnic groups, with regulations (both in the New Order period and new rules that were devised following Suharto's fall) ensuring that parties were national rather than regional.⁴⁴ Benjamin Reilly claims that "it is virtually impossible for a party to get its name on the ballot in Indonesia today unless it can demonstrate

⁴¹ The *priyayi* are the aristocratic elite of pre-colonial times who were transformed during the colonial era into the bureaucratic elite under the Dutch.

⁴² Magenda in Guidieri et al (1988), p.350. See following pages for discussion of this issue. Also, the representations of Papua within Indonesian institutions and textbook material examined later in this chapter suggest that while there may not be one dominant ethnic group, it appears that the administration consider the 'Papuan' ethnic group as group(s) at a lower level than western Indonesian groups. See chapter 6 for more details on the representation of Papuans nationally.

⁴³ Magenda in Guidieri et al (1988), p.350

⁴⁴ See Reilly, Benjamin, 'Electoral and Political Party Reform', *Indonesia Update Conference 2006*, accessed from http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/activities/2006-07/D_P/2006_09_FA_INDO_THAI_Updates_Reilly_paper_INDO.pdf in January 2008, pp.14-16

a level of national support that is likely to be beyond the reach of even the most well-organized regional movement.”⁴⁵ The issue of scapegoating is too broad to cover in any detail in this study, but there has certainly been the suggestion from a number of politicians from Ali Murtopo onwards that the indigenous people of Papua were not important to the Indonesian state.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Reilly (2006), p.16

⁴⁶ See quote in chapter 6, p.217

Ethnicity in Indonesia

The analysis above examined the theories that have been advanced in regard to ethnic identity, interactions and conflict in general. The following section will be more specifically focussed on writing on ethnicity within Indonesia and during the Dutch colonial period.

A discussion of ethnicity in what is now Indonesia would be incomplete without reference to the writings of J.S. Furnivall who wrote on what he called the plural society in the pre-war period. The plural society was his term for a society with a number of ethnic groups. However, Furnivall regarded societies as “being composed of groups which were socially and culturally discrete.”⁴⁷ Furnivall viewed the plural society as inherently unstable as it lacks social bonds between differing groups and states that “...in Netherlands India, the European, Chinaman and Native are linked vitally as Siamese twins and, if rent asunder, every element of the union must dissolve in anarchy”.⁴⁸ However, as Bruner points out, the anarchy predicted by this theory has not occurred in the new nation following the departure of one of Furnivall’s pillars of plural societies, the European.⁴⁹

This theory neglects to differentiate between any indigenous groups within the colony, these Other are simply ‘Natives’. With his claim that the Chinese in Indonesia are more ‘apt’ for business than Natives (or Europeans), along with his insistence that the colony would fall into anarchy without the European,⁵⁰ we have a view that appears to reflect the colonial mindset. Furnivall’s

⁴⁷ Eriksen (2002), p.48

⁴⁸ Furnivall, J.S., *Netherlands India: A study of plural economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944, p.447

⁴⁹ Bruner, Edward M., ‘The expression of ethnicity in Indonesia’, pp.251-280 in Cohen, Abner (Ed.), *Urban ethnicity*, Tavistock, London, 1974a, quote on pp.254-5 taken from Furnivall (1944), p.447

⁵⁰ Furnivall (1944), p.447

approach, later further developed by M.G. Smith, has been critiqued for its static view of ethnic groups and culture.⁵¹ However, Furnivall's rejection of essentialist thinking in this regard is shown by his arguments that the 'Natives' in Netherlands India had become much more economically astute, a view at odds with Dutch analysts of the time. Furnivall argues that social pressures are responsible for such apparently essential character traits, claiming that "the history of their social environment provides a sufficient explanation, without attributing this defect to the character of the Native, as Native."⁵² This perspective on ethnic identity in practice agrees more with the views of Eriksen, with these authors' theories pointing to a weakness in the exclusively socio-political concerns of Cohen and Barth mentioned earlier in this chapter.⁵³

Another important contributor to the study of ethnicity in Indonesia is Clifford Geertz.⁵⁴ Geertz lists factors which can be important in ethnic tensions or conflicts: assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom. He suggests that language has not been an area of conflict within Indonesia, while custom has been. He suggests that differences in custom are most important in "those cases in which an intellectually and/or artistically rather sophisticated group sees itself as the bearer of a 'civilization' amid a largely barbarian population that would be well advised to model itself upon it"⁵⁵. He claims this as the case in Indonesia, with the Javanese being the group which sees itself as civilising the rest of the archipelago.

This perspective on the role that is played by the Javanese within Indonesian society is challenged by Burhan Magenda. Magenda suggests that there is no

⁵¹ Eriksen (2002), pp.48-49

⁵² Furnivall (1944), pp.456-457

⁵³ For the similar issues were raised by Eriksen, see p.2 above.

⁵⁴ Geertz published many influential books and articles on Indonesia (and many other subjects) from the early 1960s onwards.

⁵⁵ Geertz (1975), p.263

one ethnic group that can be associated with the state. So while the Javanese are dominant, they are only the first among many, and as such have a role in “unifying the ethnic polities”.⁵⁶ Instead he suggests that it is the *priyayi* that are the cultural foundation of the New Order. According to Magenda, the *priyayi* “combine the notions of cultural sphere, social class, and bureaucratic power in a single group that can be seen as the main controller of Indonesian politics.”⁵⁷ He sees the state as being controlled by this *priyayi* which formed strong links with Outer Island aristocracies through shared values such as an antipathy to ideologies such as Marxism and puritanical Islam. Magenda suggests that the ideology of the New Order is that of the traditional *priyayi* culture.⁵⁸

Magenda also suggests that Javanese cultural appropriation of the dominant position is supported by the use of marriage as a method of bringing threats from outside into the Javanese cultural camp. An example of this is the marriage of important non-Javanese men to Javanese women. It would be useful to study how inter-ethnic marriage serves to integrate (or otherwise) ethnic groups within Papua, and the resulting issues of identification and affiliation for all members of these families.⁵⁹

Further thoughts on the role of the Javanese ethnic group within the nation are to be found in the work of Edward M. Bruner. He agrees with Geertz’s argument that the Javanese see themselves as the most culturally refined group and judge others in terms of their proximity to Javanese aristocratic notions of culture. This socio-cultural assessment is in contrast to ethnicity in the political field, which Bruner sees as “confusing to the Javanese who point out that members of

⁵⁶ Magenda in Guidieri et al (1988), p.347

⁵⁷ Magenda in Guidieri et al (1988), pp.347-8

⁵⁸ Magenda in Guidieri et al (1988), p.347

⁵⁹ This topic is not possible in the current political climate within Indonesia as research visas for such topics in Papua are unobtainable.

all ethnic groups in Indonesia have high positions in the government, that all have equal opportunity, that considerable economic development occurs in the outer islands, and that they have never imposed Javanese language or culture on the national scene.”⁶⁰ This he claims is partly due to the Javanese being the majority ethnic group, “they are the WASPs of Indonesia”⁶¹ – the group who see themselves as being without an ethnicity.

While groups such as the Javanese appear to view the nation as a legitimate unit, non-Indonesian writers have often been sceptical of this claim. According to Rutherford:

Smith and Hobsbawm, despite their myriad differences, concur in the opinion that Indonesia is not really a nation at all. Citing the strains caused by ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity, both scholars place Indonesia in the category of ‘newly emerged states claiming a natural homogeneity they do not possess’.⁶²

Bruner’s work on ethnicity within Medan and Bandung confirms the role ethnicity has within Indonesia in regard to competition. His research contains many examples of employment opportunities being given to those of the same ethnic group as the employees or managers. However, Bruner found striking differences in the expression of Batak identity between these two cities. Bruner’s conclusion is that ethnic relations are not the same across the archipelago, with interactions between groups being influenced by the social system in that city and in the nation as a whole. “Migrants take a position in the urban system with reference to the dominant culture group and they occupy economic niches made available to them or left vacant by the dominant

⁶⁰ Bruner in Cohen (1974), p.276

⁶¹ Bruner in Cohen (1974), p.275

⁶² Rutherford (2003), p.8

group.”⁶³ The situation with regard to employment is especially relevant to Papua, with competition between migrants and indigenous Papuans a major source of tension between these groups and will be examined in more details in later chapters.⁶⁴

It is also important to note that ethnicity is not a fixed identity for many people in Indonesia as a whole, and certainly in Papua. Identification with ethnic group is one kind of commonly held identity, with national identification being important in other contexts. Religious affiliation can also be an important identity. Farhadian notes that “Dani may identify as Indonesians, Christians or Melanesians dependent on the context.”⁶⁵

While the writings on ethnicity within Indonesia mentioned above are certainly known to Indonesian academics who study ethnicity, it appears that there are some writers who either have not encountered the recent discourse on ethnicity, or who do not accept the validity of the application of such theories to the Indonesian case. One officially sanctioned understanding of ethnicity during the New Order period can be found in the series of ten books produced under the auspices of *Yayasan Harapan Kita* (a foundation established by President Suharto) along with *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (the museum/theme park established by Suharto’s wife, Ibu Tien).⁶⁶ The political nature of these books extends to their compilation, with the chairman of the team that compiled the books being the very influential politician, Harmoko. However, it seems likely that his role was purely politically symbolic.

⁶³ Bruner in Cohen (1974), p.258

⁶⁴ See chapters 7-9

⁶⁵ Farhadian, Charles , *Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.6

⁶⁶ See chapter 6 for more information on this museum.

This first volume espouses views of ethnicity and race that are very different to those held by most contemporary writers on ethnicity in the West. Firstly, the book divides the population of Indonesia into three cultures or civilisations (*kebudayaan*); namely Malay, Javanese, and an 'other' group, described as being non-Malay and non-Javanese culture.⁶⁷ The use of a negative designation for all those peoples in the nation who are not included in the two majority groups is notable in a book designed to examining the culture(s) of the nation.⁶⁸

In examining the inclusion of these two groups as the dominant ethnicities in Indonesia, it is clear that the Javanese ethnic group is by far the largest in the nation, composing over 40% of the population.⁶⁹ However, according to the 2000 census, only 3.5% of the population self-identified as Malay. This means the Malay group makes up a far smaller component of the populace than Sundanese (15%). Even though there are more than four times as many people who self-identify as Sundanese than as Malay nationally, the authors of this book categorise the Sundanese such that they are not viewed as constituting a major part of Indonesian society. These authors claim that the Sundanese are simply "one example of an ethnic group that can't be classified in the Malay culture or the Javanese culture."⁷⁰

Even more surprisingly, the book utilises the concept of race to explain differences between groups across the archipelago.⁷¹ The authors claim that the

⁶⁷ 'Kebudayaan non-Melayu dan non-Jawa', *Indonesia Indah*, Yayasan Harapan Kita / BP3 Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Jakarta, 1995-1998, series of 10 volumes, Vol. 1, p.167

⁶⁸ *Indonesia Indah* (1995), Vol. 1, p.vi

⁶⁹ The census figures in this paragraph are taken from census analysis in Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, pp.7-9

⁷⁰ *Indonesia Indah* (1995), Vol. 1, p.181. "Orang Sunda dapat dijadikan salah satu contoh sukubangsa yang tidak dapat digolongkan dalam kebudayaan Melayu atau kebudayaan Jawa." Translation by the author.

⁷¹ This conception of ethnic groups as 'races' does not accord with currently accepted theories on the subject, but more closely with those held in the colonial period. See, for example, Graves, Joseph L., Jr.,

Malay 'race' can be understood to be characterised as those with brown skin. The authors then go on to claim that "the Malay race constitutes the result of a mix of the Mongol race that is yellow skinned, the Dravidian race that is black skinned, and the Aryan race that is white skinned."⁷² More specifically about Papua, the authors suggest that the Dani ethnic group is part of the "negroid race".⁷³ This claim is certainly not supported by currently accepted genetic or linguistic evidence⁷⁴ and suggests a delineation of the population into groups that is largely determined by skin colour.⁷⁵

This primordialist view of ethnicity is also widely held among Papuans. Benny Giay⁷⁶ claims that such factors as skin colour, hair type and diet are intrinsic, inherent characteristics of the peoples of Papua.

In the Papuan mind, Papuans are Papuans. You cannot turn Papuans into Indonesians. Every Papuan, no matter who they are, believes that Indonesians and Papuans are different. This is borne out by experience.⁷⁷

This description of Papuans and non-Papuans fulfils Rex's three characteristics for ethnicity to impact on group interactions mentioned previously.⁷⁸ The

'What We Know and What We Don't Know: Human Genetic Variation and the Social Construction of Race', accessed from <http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Graves/> in July 2007. This is a collection of academic articles illustrating the current scientific debate concerning this topic

⁷² Indonesia Indah (1995), Vol. 1, p.168. Translation by the author.

⁷³ Indonesia Indah (1995), Vol. 1, caption to picture, p.10. Translation by author.

⁷⁴ See Chapter 4 for more details on this. Also see Diamond, Jared, *Guns, germs and steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years*, Vintage, Surrey, 1998; Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003; Bellwood, Peter, *Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian archipelago*, Academic Press, Orlando, 1985 and Bellwood, Fox and Tryon, *The Austronesians: historical and comparative perspectives*, ANU, Canberra, 1995

⁷⁵ It is also illuminating to compare the approach to the topic of the 'Negroid race' on the English and Indonesian Wikipedia sites, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negroid#_note-2 and http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ras_manusia respectively, accessed May 2007. The English site states that "Negroid is a largely-archaic term used to describe one of the 'three races of man', a view now mostly regarded as an over-simplification of the spectrum of human diversity. The Indonesian site however, suggests that this is the view of humanity suggested by unspecified 'experts' (*para pakar*).

⁷⁶ Dr. Benny Giay is a prominent Papuan minister and academic who has been active in the political and human rights spheres.

⁷⁷ Giay (2001)

justification for the group discrimination is not explicated by Giay among many others with this view, but the implication is that the ethnic differences are biological, with even dietary choices being biological in origin.⁷⁹

The first, introductory volume of the series has understandings of race and ethnicity that seem outdated or offensive from a modern Western perspective. However, the other volumes in the series offer a very different conception of these issues, one more in line with current academic theories. The second volume suggests the Papuan population can be divided into two groups – namely Melanesian and Papuan peoples. This concurs with the results of anthropological and population genetic writing on the topic.⁸⁰ This volume also includes information on various ethnic groups within Papua, with sections on different ethnic groups such as the Asmat, Dani, Biak-Namfor, Marind-Anim, Sentani and Muyu. This book has a standard anthropological /sociological orientation, in tone and content, with no mention of race or skin colour. There is no suggestion that some ethnic groups are superior to other groups, and the section on Papua appears no different in content to those on other provinces.

This academic approach is also present in the tenth book in the series on traditional clothing.⁸¹ The first illustration was of cloth from Sentani, with pictures on the following pages of Dani people, including a picture of a man wearing a penis gourd (koteka).⁸² The volume devotes a long section on Papua, including information on clothing worn by different ethnic groups. The length of this section seems commensurate with the large number of ethnic groups

⁷⁸ See p.45 above

⁷⁹ Giay (2001)

⁸⁰ See for example Bellwood (1985), Bellwood (1995), Diamond (1998), Moore (2003)

⁸¹ Indonesia Indah (1998), Vol. 10

⁸² Indonesia Indah (1998), Vol. 10

within Papua.⁸³ The contrasting styles of the volumes, as well as the political nature of the project and its backers, suggest that the first volume reflects closely the ideology of the New Order administration in regards to ethnicity and the nation, while the other volumes appear to emanate from the Indonesian academic discourse that is more informed by more widespread understandings of these concepts.

⁸³ The latest census recognized 1,022 ethnic groups in the nation. It is not clear from published materials how many ethnic groups are recognized in Papua, but many sources claim there are between 200 and 300. (Suryadinata (2003), p.XXII, Chauvel, Richard, 'Divide and who rules?: Ethnic nationalism under siege in West Papua', *Inside Indonesia*, April-June 2004

Ethnicity in the Indonesian census

Ethnicity was included in the first modern census conducted in their colony by the Dutch in 1930.⁸⁴ This was an isolated event, however, and the next census was not to happen until after the declaration of Indonesian independence. By 1960, there were no questions related to ethnicity included in the census. This reflected the sensitivity of this topic under both the Old and New Orders.⁸⁵ With a nation building project underway, the administration presumably did not wish to admit to any differences between those who had now become Indonesians.

This omission of ethnic group questions in the census by the Bureau of Statistics was to continue in the following censuses until the latest census in 2000. With the fall of the New Order and the ethnic conflicts in provinces such as Maluku, Sulawesi and West Kalimantan, the official line on ethnicity appeared to change. This was underlined by the decentralisation of power that the regional autonomy legislation entailed. It seems no coincidence that a question on ethnicity was included in the 2000 census following this change in zeitgeist within the nation. Altogether, this census included 1,072 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. The Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik – BPS) only publishes a list of the eight largest groups in each provincial publication, and in the compiled national tables.⁸⁶

The issue of ethnicity is also complicated by how people were classified into particular ethnicities. According to Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, self-identification by the respondent was used to determine ethnicity. However, for those who did not specify an ethnic group, the classification was done by the

⁸⁴ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.XXII

⁸⁵ Suryadinata et al (2003), pp.XX-XXI

⁸⁶ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.XXII

census takers, who classified respondents according to their father's ethnicity.⁸⁷ This reliance on the father's ethnicity will lead to people being classified in ways that may not reflect ethnic classifications assigned to them by others in their society. Siegfried Zollner suggests that inter-racial marriages are on the rise in Papua, with seemingly little objection to these marriages from the families of those who marry.⁸⁸ My conversations in Papua also lead me to this conclusion.

The book by Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta mentioned above challenges the approach taken by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS) of using self-identification in this question. As the authors are prominent demographers on Indonesia, their view represents an important alternate understanding of ethnicity within the nation. These authors claim that the situational view of ethnicity does not apply to the majority of people within Indonesia, with every person having a "major or dominant ethnic identity".⁸⁹ They state that there are many levels of ethnic identity: self-identification, an individual's ethnicity as determined by the perception of others, as well as state-defined identity which they suggest has an important role in this classification. They then claim that there is a 'real' ethnic identity that may or may not be that which the respondent claims to be, though there is no definite indication in their writing of how they think this 'real' ethnicity could or should be determined.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.6

⁸⁸ Zollner, Siegfried, 'The culture of the Papuans in transition: The threat posed by modernization – Javanization and discrimination' in Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005, p.60

⁸⁹ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.6

⁹⁰ Suryadinata et al (2003), pp.6-9

Conclusion

To take the historical and contextual nature of ethnicity seriously necessarily runs counter to any attempt to create a universal theory of ethnic relations. Attention to historical and societal context requires us to entertain the contrary thought: that, in studying 'ethnicity', we are studying collective identity and organisation which differ significantly in accordance with their historically specific origins.⁹¹

It was predicted by socialist and liberal theory that this form of identity would fade away in the (post-) modern world. However, ethnicity has risen to prominence as a form of identity in recent years. The conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kalimantan and Maluku attest to the importance that people in these areas of the world place on this form of identity. The situation in Papua has luckily not reached this level of hostility, but many indigenous people in the province feel the migrants represent a threat to the ethnic identity of Papuans as a whole. On the other hand, in recent years, many activists have commented that they are not against migrants *per se*, but are against the injustices of the Indonesian rule of the province.⁹² The Second Papuan Congress held in 2000 included as part of the resolutions an article in support of minority groups in the province, apparently in support of migrant ethnic groups.

The Second Papuan Congress 2000 calls upon the Papuan people to respect and guarantee the civil rights of all inhabitants living in Papua, including minorities.⁹³

The theories on ethnicity have a number of divisions: primordialism versus structural, self-identification versus external label, a modern or traditional

⁹¹ Fenton (1999), p.28

⁹² Comments to the author by John Rumbiak, personal interview, Sydney, June 2004. See also, for example, the comments by Frans Pigome, footnote 31 above.

⁹³ An English translation of the resolutions passed by this congress is available from the Free West Papua website, accessed at <http://www.freewestpapua.org/docs/congressII.htm> in August 2007.

construct, social or political organisation. Through necessity, the majority of this study will be based on data produced by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. As their basis for ethnic identity is respondent self-identification, it follows that this definition of ethnicity will be used indirectly within this study. As the quote from Benny Giay earlier suggests, ethnic self-identification in this province is strongly influenced by physical characteristics. However, those with straight hair and light skin are not considered Papuans by others, even if they are second or third generation residents and self-identify as Papuan.⁹⁴ A bus driver suggested to me that he was Papuan, an unusual claim for a person who appeared to be ethnically non-Papuan. He was quick to add that his family was from a different part of the nation, but that he considered himself Papuan since he had been born and had grown up in the province. It would appear that most indigenous Papuans would not accept this person as Papuan, although such an attitude in countries such as Australia would be considered racist. It is unfortunate that this aspect of ethnic relations cannot be investigated formally as the restrictions on research by foreigners in Papua means that research into inter-ethnic interactions and prejudice is not possible at present.

An understanding of self as part of an ethnic group appears to pre-date encounters with Western people and social structures, as evidenced by the strong identification with group apparent among indigenous people in reports by such early Western residents of the interior as Jean Victor de Bruijn.⁹⁵ However, the identification as Papuan is not an identification that was held by

⁹⁴ Views noted by author during conversations with residents of Sentani and Jayapura region, August 2005

⁹⁵ See Rhys, Lloyd, *Jungle Pimpernel: The story of a district officer in Central Netherlands New Guinea*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1947, p.126 for an illustration of ethnic identification by people who had very recently encountered Western people


people in this area before the arrival of Europeans,⁹⁶ supporting Geertz. In many cases, this study will use data that divides people within the province into two groups, indigenous Papuan and migrant as this is the categorisation made by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. This division is one now held by most within the province, Papuans and migrants alike.

Fenton suggested that studies on ethnicity should examine the macro, meso and micro levels of societies to understand the ways ethnic affiliation and interaction was manifested in different contexts. Unfortunately, the present study is unable to examine the micro level in the current climate of suspicion of foreign researchers. However, the macro and meso levels will be examined through statistical data in chapters 7,8 and 9.

⁹⁶ Rhys (1947), p.126 comments on the strong negative feelings towards the term (and other groups in the territory) felt by Ekari people in the 1940s. It is clear that the feelings of belonging to a supra-ethnic Papuan identity were not felt by these people at that time.

Chapter 4: West New Guinea before 1962¹

Map 1: 'Regional map of the island of New Guinea'



The focus of this thesis is the movement of peoples to the western half of the island of New Guinea from other parts of Indonesia since it became part of Indonesia in 1962.² To understand this fully some background history of the people in this area is necessary. The following is a history of West New Guinea from the beginning of human migration to the island up to the Indonesian takeover, concentrating mostly on contacts with people from outside the island,

¹ 'Peta Pulau New Guinea' ('Regional Map of the Island of New Guinea'). Accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/p-pwb/ng-35k.gif> in February 2008. Map used with the permission of PapuaWeb and according to their conditions of use which are available from <http://www.papuaweb.org/info/disclaimer.html>

² While the territory was nominally under UN administration until from October 1962 to May 1963, the Indonesian authorities immediately assumed de facto control from the UN, see Osborne (1985), p.31

socio-economic development during pre-history and the colonial period and processes that had a major impact on 'Papuan' societies.³

Covering such a vast time period, this writing will leave out many important events in the history of this region. There will be little commentary on political aspects of the history such as the negotiations and political manoeuvring between the governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia prior to the transfer of sovereignty in 1963. While politically vital to the then colony, a focus on diplomacy highlights a particular facet of history at the expense of others. The outcome of the process, the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, had huge consequences for all Papuans. The convoluted political process itself involved only a small number of diplomats and politicians and has been covered extensively elsewhere.⁴

The political division between the two halves of the island is a colonial division, arising from the actions of European countries described below. The borders were an artificial construct, cutting across the lands occupied by ethnic groups on either side. Also, those groups close to the borders had more connections with neighbours who now live on the other side of this border than with distant groups who are now on the same side of this line. The artificial, colonial division has become a reality. While politically many on the west side hope for help from those on the east side, there is a wide gulf in politics, economics, and society

³ See below for more details on this point. Also Ploeg, Anton, 'De Papoea': What's in a Name?, *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology (TAPJA)*, Vol. 33(3), pp.75-101, 2002 discusses the history of this epithet.

⁴ There is a large body of writing covering the political machinations surrounding the transfer of power from the Dutch to the UNTEA and then to Indonesia, as well as the 1969 Act of Free Choice. See for example Saltford, John, *The United Nations and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: the anatomy of betrayal*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003; Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988; Henderson, W, *West New Guinea: The dispute and its settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, USA, 1973; Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985; Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002; Chauvel, Richard, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation*, Policy Studies 14, East-West Center, Washington, 2005

between life on either side.⁵ Indonesian Papuans who had lived in PNG related to the author that they believed the two societies to be disparate, with lifestyles and attitudes on the other side of the border being completely different to their own and those of others in the west side of the island.⁶

A major constraint in describing the history of the territory before 1963 is the lack of any indigenous writings on this time. There are no first-hand accounts written by indigenous people covering this period so this history has to be based on the writings of immigrant groups such as the Dutch and the Indonesians. We are left with a history of a creeping expansion of outside control, moving inland from the coast to the highlands, some areas only coming into our story in the 1950s and 1960s, with migrants as the main protagonists. This issue arises in the writing of the histories of much of Oceania. Kirch states that “In the Pacific, [history] generally coincides with the expansion of the West and the modern World System, though the agency of explorers, missionaries, and entrepreneurs.”⁷

It is easy to be misled into imagining these first contacts as bringing these peoples into being, their incorporation into the global narrative creating them. Obviously, this is not the case. Many of the indigenous ethnic groups had inhabited this region for thousands of years. There were hundreds of these groups⁸, each with complex societies living in shifting relation to one another.⁹ As Knauft says: “migration and diffusion, economic and political change, and

⁵ Personal accounts told to the author confirm this social division, August 2005.

⁶ Observations made to the author during a visit to the province, August 2005.

⁷ Kirch, Patrick Vinton, *The Lapita Peoples: Ancestors of the Oceanic World*, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 1997, p.258

⁸ There are still large numbers of ethnic groups in Papua. See for example Munro, Catharine, ‘Count reveals 312 tribes in Indonesian province’, *Joyo Indonesia News*, AAP Newsfeed, July 16, 2002

⁹ For an example of a society that was studied extensively by anthropologists soon after it was discovered by Westerners, see Heider, Karl, *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*, Third Edition, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, 1997.

changing dimensions of cultural value have been indigenous to Melanesia for thousands of years.”¹⁰

The names of places and peoples are often a contested and problematic issue.¹¹ Prior to the latter half of the 20th century, few (if any) Papuans would have identified themselves with a supra-ethnic identity, but instead with their particular ethnic group. There are certainly similarities in the issues confronting these indigenous peoples in their contact with the new political and economic spheres brought by the immigrants. The arrival of the Europeans and their eventual dominance over the island brought differences between the three (and eventually two) parts of the island. It becomes clumsy to repeatedly use the expression ‘those people living in the western half of the island of New Guinea’, even though this is a more accurate description.

I have decided to use the term Papua to describe this area and the term Papuan as a collective term for its inhabitants during the period of Indonesian administration from 1963 onwards.¹² For the pre-Indonesian period, I will use the term West New Guinea. Since my thesis is focussed on the people in the western half, in many cases, the term New Guinea will be used to refer to this region rather than the eastern half of the island.

¹⁰ Knauff, Bruce M., *From primitive to postcolonial in Melanesia and anthropology*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1999, p.13

¹¹ See Appendix A for a discussion of names and naming in the province.

¹² See ‘Re: Name Change to West Papua’, input to reg.westpapua mailing list, 19 December 1999, accessed from http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/Re_NameChangeWP.html in April 2006

Pre-history

The first people probably came to the island of New Guinea more than 40,000 years ago, with figures of 60,000 years or more having been suggested.¹³ There has been human habitation of the upland valleys for example for at least 33,000 years, with evidence of fire from this time in the Baliem Valley area.¹⁴

The next wave of arrivals to travel along the archipelago to the island was the Austronesian peoples. These peoples are often associated with the Lapita culture after the place where the distinctive pottery associated with these peoples was first found.¹⁶ Two main theories have been advanced to explain this population dispersal – the Express Train to Polynesia theory and the Indigenous Melanesian Origins.¹⁷

The island has the greatest density of language diversity of any region of the world, with over 1,000 languages in over 20 families.¹⁸ This linguistic diversity appears to correlate with the great length of human settlement. According to Pawley of these linguistic families, only one is a newcomer, Austronesian, which appears to have arrived in the region around 1500-1300BCE.¹⁹

¹³ A contentious figure, with Moore giving 40,000 and Swadling giving 50,000 years ago. (Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003; Swadling, Pamela, *Plumes from paradise: trade cycles in southeast Asia and their impact on New Guinea and nearby islands until 1920*, PNG National Museum and Robert Brown, Hong Kong, 1996) The more recent suggestions that indigenous Australians arrived as long as 100,000 years ago would indicate that New Guinea may have been populated for a longer time than has been suggested to date. Bellwood suggests a date of 60,000 years. (Bellwood, Peter, *Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian archipelago*, Academic Press, Orlando, 1985, p.128)

¹⁴ Geoffrey Hope & Simon Haberle, The history of the human landscapes of New Guinea, pp.541-554, in Pawley, Andrew, Robert Attenborough, Jack Golson and Robin Hide (eds), *Papuan Past: cultural, linguistic and biological histories of Papuan-speaking peoples*, ANU, Canberra, 2005, pp.541-544

¹⁶ Diamond (1998), p.347

¹⁷ See Kirch (1997) for a detailed exposition on the Lapita people. Discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹⁸ Andrew Pawley, The chequered history of the Trans New Guinea hypothesis: recent research and its implications, pp.67-97 in Pawley et al (2005), p.95

¹⁹ Pawley in Pawley et al (2005), p.95

However, these linguistic differences²⁰, are not reflected in the genetic record in a precise way. On the coastal strip, many different language families are spoken, with language divisions not being reflected in genetic or social differentiation greater than between any two tribes.²¹ However, there are distinct genetic differences between mountain populations and lowland/coastal populations. Genetic testing has determined that highland populations are almost entirely non-Austronesian, while coastal populations have some genes associated with Austronesian people. Diamond claims that people on the north coast of New Guinea are genetically closely related to highland people, being 85% genetically linked, and about 15% linked to Austronesian people.²² Unlike the other islands to the west, the indigenous peoples of New Guinea survived the arrival of the Austronesian migrants. Bellwood and colleagues write that: “As on the mainland of Southeast Asia, so in New Guinea and western Melanesia the Austronesian colonists also met a major level of resistance – biological, cultural and linguistic.”²³

Whether groups speak Austronesian languages or non-Austronesian languages is independent of their genetics, with Jared Diamond commenting on the apparent discontinuity of peoples along the north coast and nearby islands, with people in adjoining villages using Austronesian and non-Austronesian languages. He claims that while there are significant linguistic differences between neighbouring ethnic groups, the language boundaries do not reflect genetic differences between these peoples.²⁴ Communication between ethnic groups is

²⁰ For maps which illustrate the complexities of the patterns of language use in the province, see images produced by the Australian National University and available at <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/pl/index.html> accessed in February 2008

²¹ Diamond (1998), p.346.

²² Diamond (1998), p.346

²³ Bellwood, Fox and Tryon, *The Austronesians: historical and comparative perspectives*, ANU, Canberra, 1995, p.106

²⁴ Diamond (1998), p.346

now often conducted using the Indonesian language, especially in urban areas. Even though some multi-lingual individuals can speak with members of other ethnic groups using the other group's language, there is usually code switching between this language and Indonesian.²⁵

With the end of the last Ice Age, sea levels rose, the link to Australia disappeared and the highlands warmed. The megafauna had already disappeared by this time, possibly through human intervention. Drainage systems for vegetable cultivation had been built in the fertile highland valleys by between 6,000 and 9,000 years ago.²⁶ According to Golson there is evidence of cultivation in the Baliem area of the highlands by 8,000-7,500 years ago.²⁷ Maintaining these structures would have needed cooperation between groups.²⁸

From pre-history, most people lived in small villages, a situation that was to continue until modern times. Even as late as 1957, Dutch demographic figures show that there were only 7 villages with more than 1,000 inhabitants in the whole colony.²⁹ This conforms with patterns of settlement in Melanesian societies, with Knauff suggesting that "decentralised residence in villages or dispersed hamlets" is a characteristic found across the region.³⁰

Population densities varied greatly across the island. Highland areas were (and are) densely populated by agricultural communities. In fact, according to Diamond, "the New Guinea highlands supported some of the densest

²⁵ Author's observations from visit to Papua, August 2005.

²⁶ Moore (2003), p.20

²⁷ Golson, Jack The middle reaches of New Guinea history, pp.451-591, in Pawley et al (2005), p.483

²⁸ Moore (2003), p.20

²⁹ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs, *Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1961*, The Hague, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961, pp.7-8

³⁰ Knauff (1999), pp.9-10

populations of Stone Age people anywhere in the modern world.”³¹ Lowland areas are much less densely populated, with swidden agriculture practised in some areas and nomadic hunter-gathering in the swamp areas of southern New Guinea.³² While it was long thought that domesticated plants were brought into New Guinea from the Asian mainland, Diamond contends that this was one of the few areas in the world in which people independently domesticated plants.³³ Bellwood and colleagues claim that the independent development of agriculture here is no longer a disputed issue.³⁴

While agriculture developed early in New Guinea, the people of the island did not go on to develop the type of complex societies that followed the agricultural revolution in such places as the Middle East, South America and China. Diamond suggests several reasons for the stable nature of human societies here. One reason was the limited areas in which agriculture was possible. He suggests that “the mid-montane zone between 4,000 and 9,000 feet [1,200 and 2,750 metres] was the sole altitudinal zone in New Guinea suitable for intensive food production.”³⁵

That food was only produced in similar environments meant there was much less trade in different types of agricultural products than there was in areas in which agricultural communities in different environments were in contact with each other. There were many fewer people involved in agriculture, fragmented by the rugged terrain compared to the other areas mentioned above, reducing the size of the non-working class necessary for this development. There were also no potential domesticated beasts of burden in the island, and the crops

³¹ Diamond, (1998), p.350

³² Diamond, (1998), pp.304-305

³³ Diamond (1988), pp. 303-304

³⁴ Bellwood et al (1995), p.106

³⁵ Diamond (1998), p.306

grown have low protein contents. These factors are theorised to have inhibited the development of more advanced technology and social organisation by the island's indigenous people.³⁶

Shells were being traded to these valleys from the coast from about 10,000 years ago. This trade continued to serve as currency until modern times, with early Dutch posts having supplies of shells flown in from the coast to pay for labour and supplies³⁷ and highland people still value these items highly, especially the baler and cowrie shells.³⁸ By 5,000 years ago New Guinea was part of a trade network with items such as bird of paradise skins being traded as far as the Middle East.³⁹ Diamond even suggests that trading goes back much further, being not simply an Austronesian innovation. He claims that "a trade in obsidian (a volcanic stone suitable for making sharp tools) was thriving in the Bismarcks at least 18,000 years before the Austronesians arrived."⁴⁰ This suggests that sailing was being practised by the inhabitants of New Guinea before the arrival of the Austronesians. However, the existing peoples were not quite as proficient as the Austronesians, the great navigators.⁴¹

Along with the outward trade, new goods were being obtained from Southeast Asia, with evidence of betel nuts by about 5,800 years ago, pigs by 5,000 years ago and pottery around the same time. These imports had been assumed to have arrived with the Austronesians, but more recent writers such as Stephen

³⁶ Diamond (1998), pp.305-306

³⁷ See Rhys, Lloyd, *Jungle Pimpernel: The story of a district officer in Central Netherlands New Guinea*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1947 for a description of the early Dutch administration of the highlands region.

³⁸ Personal observation by the writer, August 2005. While these symbolically important objects are always assumed to have been traded from the coast, indigenous people themselves report that the shells that are found in caves in the highland regions are of a different appearance to shells from the coast.

³⁹ Swadling (1996), p.15

⁴⁰ Diamond (1988), pp. 350-351

⁴¹ Bellwood et al (1995), p.106

Oppenheimer have suggested that the dates of recent finds point to pre-Lapita use. He claims that far from being an animal imported by Lapita people as was assumed, pig remains from 5,000-8,000 years ago in the highlands of New Guinea and in New Ireland demonstrate their existence prior to the arrival of the Austronesians.⁴² However, Matthew Spriggs states that these arguments have now been largely discredited with advances in dating techniques which suggest that pigs were indeed brought by Austronesian-speaking peoples.⁴³ Across island Southeast Asia including New Guinea, pottery began to be made at a similar time. Swadling suggests that the simultaneous introduction of ceramics indicates a trade network spread across Southeast Asia as early as 5,000 years ago.⁴⁴

According to Leonard Andaya, the relationship between Papua and Maluku stretches back for between 10,000 and 15,000 years.⁴⁵ This relationship is evident in the languages spoken in Halmahera and Morotai which belong to the Trans New Guinea phylum. Similarly, the movement of people between the islands in the region is shown by the use of non-Austronesian languages in Timor, Alor and Pantar.⁴⁶

By 2,000 years ago, specialist traders began to dominate inter-island trade, taking over from the chain trade networks that were present before this point.⁴⁷ There was a boom in trade from about 2,000 years ago which lasted until about 250 C.E. when “spices and aromatic barks and woods displaced plumes as prime

⁴² Oppenheimer, Stephen, *Eden in the east: the drowned continent of southeast Asia*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998, p.96

⁴³ Spriggs, Matthew, The Lapita Culture and Austronesian pre-history in Oceania, pp.119-142, in Bellwood, Fox and Tryon, pp.130-131

⁴⁴ Swadling (1996), pp.51-3

⁴⁵ Andaya, Leonard Y., *The world of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the early modern period*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1993a, p.104

⁴⁶ Andaya (1993a), p.104

⁴⁷ Swadling (1996), p.15 & p.269

luxuries in Asia.”⁴⁸ From this point, New Guinea then became more isolated though trade still continued at a much lower level. There was a great deal of disruption of trade during the 3rd century, with both the Chinese and Roman empires collapsing after epidemic disease.⁴⁹ With other trade routes such as that between India and Europe being cut, it appears that New Guinea’s trade situation was affected by global factors.⁵⁰ Swadling suggests that the decline of the Dong Son culture in present-day China led to this downturn in the plume trade.⁵¹

Moore suggests that movement in pre-colonial societies in New Guinea was linked to trade. Traders from outside New Guinea established residences in the different areas in which they conducted business. With the itinerant nature of such traders and their need to integrate into the local communities in which they conducted their business, it can be expected that there would have been marriage between groups.⁵² The relatively low level of trade in the period after 250 C.E., along with the ethno-linguistic diversity of New Guinea, is often taken to indicate that there was little or no contact within the territory, as well as with the outside world.

Europeans thought that Melanesians lacked regular government and depicted the small-scale societies as each isolated from the other. They failed to realise that Melanesian society was constructed on the basis of close relationships between descent, language and territory, and reciprocal exchange “roads” and “passages”, rather than on large and permanent territorial entities.⁵³

⁴⁸ Swadling (1996), p.16

⁴⁹ Foss, Daniel A., ‘Third and sixth century crises east and west’, 1996, accessed from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/046.html> in March 2005

⁵⁰ Smitha, Frank E., ‘Rome’s Decline and Christianity’s Ascent, to 306 CE’, accessed from <http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch23.htm> in March 2005

⁵¹ Swadling (1996), p.59

⁵² Moore (2003), p.11

⁵³ Moore (2003), p.11

Another important group of incomers to West New Guinea prior to the 20th century were people from what is now Sulawesi. Moore refers to the large number of Makassar *perahus* coming annually to northern Australia, perhaps as many as 60 ships, beginning between 1650 and 1750.⁵⁴ Since the New Guinea coast is far closer to Sulawesi than the north coast of Australia, it seems probable there were also ships coming to New Guinea. Moore claims that traders and fishermen from both China and the Malay Peninsula visited the west coast of New Guinea prior to the arrival of Europeans.⁵⁵

The Kingdom of Tidore had contact mostly with coastal inhabitants, especially those in the Bird's Head region.⁵⁶ This contact enabled people in these regions to obtain iron items including weapons. This technology gave the coastal leaders the ability to dominate those living inland. This contact also aided the Tidorese in establishing relationships with groups further to the east. There were "interlocking worlds of relationships" which led to a network of trade between New Guinea, the Raja Empat islands, East Seram and Halmahera.⁵⁷

While Majapahit documents⁵⁸ refer to the areas now known as Onin and Kowiai in around 1365 C.E., there is little to support any direct Javanese sway over any parts of this area. Seram and other islands to the west and north of the mainland are thought to have had more influence on people living in the Bird's Head peninsula and the close-lying islands. This relationship was not one-way.

⁵⁴ Moore (2003), p.66. Moore claims that radiocarbon dating has suggested these voyages may have even begun earlier than the dates given above.

⁵⁵ Moore (2003), p.67

⁵⁶ Moore (2003), pp.61-62

⁵⁷ Andaya (1993a), pp.108-9

⁵⁸ Van der Veur, Paul W., *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*, ANU, Canberra, 1966, p.6

The mythical ancestor of the rulers of the Raja Empat islands was apparently a Biak hero named Gura-besi.⁵⁹

Moore takes the position that New Guinea can be partitioned according to his 'cultural sphere' concept. He divides New Guinea into "lowland, mid-altitude, and Highland [sic] spheres, separated by frontiers rather than hard boundaries, each with core and fringe areas".⁶⁰ This division of the island and its peoples by altitude reflects the writings on other regions of the archipelago such as the writings of Barbara Andaya on Sumatran peoples, the division between upstream (*ulu*) and downstream (*ilir*).⁶¹ As with that region, the coastal dwellers of New Guinea had far greater contact with outside peoples than did highlanders.

According to Moore's conception, the lowlands sphere consists of the coastal region up to an altitude of around 500 metres, such areas as the Bird's Head, the Onin Peninsula, the Lake Sentani and Humboldt Bay region and the lower Baliem Valley. Food production is chiefly connected with sago, while other staples are taro, banana and yam. These areas are centres of ritual and trade. These coastal people also utilised the food resources of the sea and were sailors. Moore states that "New Guinea's coastal people were usually maritime-focussed, subsistence traders, sailors and navigators of renown. They used small and large single-hull river canoes, and single and double-outrigger ocean-going sailing canoes, some of them multi-hulled and up to 20 metres in length."⁶²

⁵⁹ Van der Veur (1966), p.6

⁶⁰ Moore(2003), p.41

⁶¹ See Andaya, Barbara Watson, *To live as brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, University of Honolulu Press, Honolulu, 1993, pp.13-20 for a description of this division in certain Sumatran societies.

⁶² Moore (2003), p.50

The highland regions are those areas above 1,500 metres, with the Baliem Valley and the Paniai Lakes being the most important centres in West New Guinea. These areas have a high population density with low rates of disease. The sweet potato has been the main staple for the last three or four hundred years, with taro being the major crop prior to this. There is controversy over the introduction of the sweet potato to New Guinea, with different theories that it was brought by Europeans or those living in what is now Indonesia around 1500 or alternatively it was brought earlier through Polynesian peoples.⁶³ In certain parts of the island, particularly highland areas, the sweet potato replaced or was used in addition to the earlier staple, taro.⁶⁴ Pig breeding is the other main agricultural activity, with enormous cultural significance attached to the pig by many groups in this area.

The mid-altitude sphere is claimed to be high in food resources. While this appears to be true, Moore does not explain the reason for the fairly low population density in this sphere, which has only 8-16 inhabitants per square kilometre, in contrast to densities of around 16-30 for lowland regions and more than 100 for the fertile highland valleys.⁶⁵

Trade languages were widespread across coastal areas of New Guinea. A language from Sulawesi was used across the Bird's Head region, especially in Fakfak, as were languages from the Kei Islands and from islands near Seram. Biak-Numfor from the island of Biak was probably the most widely distributed of

⁶³ Terence Hays, Vernacular names for tubers in Irian Jaya; implications for agricultural pre-history, pp.625-670, in Pawley et al (2005), pp.630-631

⁶⁴ Hays in Pawley et al (2005), p.631

⁶⁵ Moore (2003), p.42

these languages, being used for trade from the Raja Empat islands as far as the Mamberamo River on the north coast of New Guinea.⁶⁶

There was also a long history of trade between highland societies. Moore suggests that stone axes were quarried and traded between highland societies by 1,500 to 2,500 years ago.⁶⁷ A Dutch administrator in the Wissel Lakes area in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Victor de Bruijn, mentions a trade route going from west of the Lakes area as far as the Baliem valley.⁶⁸ According to De Bruijn's account, the trade route was an important feature of highland life, connecting ethnic groups in the region.

Trading is a regular business with the mountain Papuans, and hundreds of people are continually moving along the trail in small groups, coming and going, buying and selling. Often they are away from their homes for eight or ten weeks or more at a time, sometimes staying at a village en route and then moving on again.⁶⁹

Hughes notes that goods were traded through chains of trade, mainly in small steps with traders not travelling far to trade.⁷⁰ He notes that: "Overall, there was a marked tendency for men involved in trade to move uphill."⁷¹ This meant that traders tended to move from lowland areas to trade with those at intermediate altitudes, with traders from these intermediate areas travelling uphill to trade with those in highland areas, while traders did not move downhill to trade. This reluctance of lowlanders to move uphill was mainly due to fears of sorcery, with higher areas being seen as dangerous by those in lower areas. While there was an active trade route along the central mountain ranges,

⁶⁶ Moore (2003), p.46

⁶⁷ Moore (2003), p.45

⁶⁸ Rhys (1947), pp.168-170

⁶⁹ Rhys (1947), p.168

⁷⁰ Hughes, Ian, *New Guinea Stone Age Trade*, ANU, Canberra, 1977, pp.203-204

⁷¹ Hughes (1977), p.204

Hughes suggests that “the dominant flows were between regions of contrasting resources, the highlands, the lowlands and the coast”.⁷² These patterns of trade changed under pressure from Europeans in the late 1930s, primarily due to a perceived increase in the safety of routes.⁷³

That there was trade between highland peoples and coastal peoples before European contact is also supported by reports from the European explorers who encountered the Mee in 1935. Mee people traded cowrie shells, glass beads and steel tools to other highland people in exchange for wood and stone tools and weapons, along with net bags.⁷⁴

The route began in the Lakes region in the western highlands and people from this region travelled as far as the Baliem Valley, a journey of several weeks. The travellers reportedly included both men and women (along with their pigs) journeying through sparsely inhabited areas as well as settlements of other ethnic groups. To communicate with speakers of other languages, De Bruijn claims that the Migani (or Moni) language was used as a lingua franca, with Ekari people often taking interpreters on these trading expeditions.⁷⁵ Another highland language also used for inter-ethnic communication was Tor.⁷⁶ This contact between highland groups supports the cultural spheres theory, with more interactions between highland groups than between highland groups and other ethnic groups at lower altitudes.⁷⁷

⁷² Hughes (1977), p.212

⁷³ Hughes (1977), pp.204-207

⁷⁴ Kirksey, S. Eben and Kiki van Bilsen, ‘A road to freedom; Mee articulations and the Trans-Papua Highway’, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)* 158-4 (2002):837-54, accessed at http://people.ucsc.edu/~skirksey/writing/Road_to_Freedom_BIJDR_published.doc in May 2007, p.839 quoting Pospisil

⁷⁵ Rhys (1947), pp.169-170. It should be noted that De Bruijn obtained most of his knowledge from the peoples of the Enarotali region.

⁷⁶ Moore (2003), p.46

⁷⁷ See pp.78-79 for more details on this theory

The trade link between highland groups is also encountered in Sumatra, with tracks between upstream (ulu) groups having huts for travellers to stay in along the route. Barbara Andaya points out that these routes were “the prime means of communication between various exchange centers.”⁷⁸

The language usage in coastal areas suggests that trading networks were primarily mediated by those from other groups. However, this is to neglect the important role played by indigenous groups such as those from Biak. Thomas Harding suggests that there were chains of trade linking areas outside New Guinea through sea trade to villages on the coast and on to hinterland communities through a series of connections.⁷⁹ It appears that trade was the main contact between communities, through this chain process.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Andaya (1993), p.19

⁷⁹ Thomas Harding, quoted in Moore (2003), p.46

⁸⁰ Moore (2003), p.47

The Europeans

While there was a great deal of trade occurring between Papua and areas of eastern Indonesia prior to the arrival of the Europeans, most accounts of these relationships come from European adventurers. There are no narratives of the contact from the Papuan side. The first Europeans to visit the island seem not to have been the eventual colonisers of the western half, the Dutch, but the Portuguese, although there is some controversy over which explorer was the first. There are suggestions that the first Europeans to find the island of New Guinea were two Portuguese mariners, Antonio d'Abreu and Francesco Serrano in 1511.⁸¹ Souter claims that Jorge de Meneses unknowingly landed in a part of the Bird's Head of New Guinea in 1526⁸², while another common suggestion is that the first known European to come to New Guinea was Ortiz de Retes in 1545. De Retes "landed on the north coast and took possession of the entire island, which he dubbed 'Nueva Guinea' in the name of the King of Spain."⁸³

This brief visit was followed by a number of explorers such as Miguel Roxo de Brito, whose writings provides us with an early account of the Bird's Head region and the islands to the north-west of New Guinea. At times this account of his adventures seems rather exaggerated, with claims of visiting an island whose king had "an entourage of four to five thousand men".⁸⁴ However, it seems clear from his narrative that there were trade links between people on the mainland of New Guinea, on the offshore islands and other areas of Eastern Indonesia, with cloth being imported to New Guinea and sandalwood, gold, *massoi* (a type

⁸¹ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs, (1961), p.4

⁸² Souter, Gavin, *New Guinea: The last unknown*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1964, p.18

⁸³ Bone, Robert C., Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, Cornell, New York, 1958, p.9

⁸⁴ Sollewijn Gelpke, J.H.F., "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram", *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde*, 150, 1994, p.129

of medicinal bark) and slaves being exported.⁸⁵ There was also warfare, with attacks and ambushes being a prominent part of his story. Other European contact probably occurred without records of this contact surviving. De Brito is told that other Europeans were living on the mainland, probably mutineers, who had married local women.⁸⁶

The earliest known image of Papuans is the engravings of people from southeast New Guinea and the Casuarina Coast of West New Guinea made in 1606 by Portuguese explorers under Torres.⁸⁷ Following the earlier Portuguese explorers, the Dutch came to the Indonesian archipelago at the beginning of the 17th century. The VOC (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* – Dutch East India Company) wanted to keep New Guinea as a barrier for their lucrative colonies in the Spice Islands, protecting their interests from other European trading companies, but were loath to administer or develop the region. From 1660 onwards, the Dutch had signed a number of treaties with the Sultan of Tidore recognising his suzerainty over West New Guinea. This served to legitimate the nominal Dutch sovereignty over this area without the colonisers having to maintain a presence on the island.

The strength of the claim by the Sultan of Tidore to have sway over New Guinea is debatable. Bone dismisses the claim, suggesting that “however much it fitted into official policy to maintain the polite fiction of Tidorese sovereignty over Western New Guinea, succeeding generations of Dutch officials cherished no illusions as to the realities of the situation.”⁸⁸ Van der Kroef also suggests that this was simply a useful fiction, stating that “...it is clear, to use the words of a

⁸⁵ Sollewijn Gelpke (1994), pp.132-133

⁸⁶ Sollewijn Gelpke (1994), p.138

⁸⁷ Ballard, Chris, Anton Ploeg and Steven Vink, *Race to the Snow: photography and the exploration of Dutch New Guinea. 1907-1936*, Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, 2001, p.7

⁸⁸ Bone (1958), p.21

Dutch official in New Guinea in 1934, that 'the greater part of the population (of New Guinea) has never heard of Tidore.' ”⁸⁹

While it is extremely unlikely that inland areas ever acknowledged the suzerainty of Tidore, Moore states that the Sultan did have a degree of influence over the coastal parts of the Bird's Head peninsula. He quotes George Rumphius's⁹⁰ description of trade between Seram and the mainland of New Guinea as early as the end of the 17th century, trade in massoi-bark and trafficking of women.

Swadling reports that the Sultan of Tidore did not even have suzerainty over the Raja Empat Islands, but rather the Sultan of Bacan, with Tidore having no power in this area.⁹¹ She suggests the Dutch decided to recognise the Tidorese claim to counter the power of Ternate, which the Dutch had had difficulty controlling.⁹² Kartodirdjo states there was piracy and anarchy along the New Guinea coast during the 17th century, even though the western half of the island was nominally under the control of Tidore.⁹³ This author also concludes that the Tidore influence over the region waned in the second half of the 18th century with its power over the north coast of West New Guinea only being effective with the support of armed force.⁹⁴

Banda was a major centre for New Guinea trade until it was sacked by the Dutch in 1621. Some residents managed to escape and fled to Seram Laut. This was already a trading centre, but now Seram Laut became involved in more

⁸⁹ Van der Kroef, Dr. J. M., *The West New Guinea Dispute*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958, p.10

⁹⁰ Rumphius was a VOC trade official and naturalist.

⁹¹ Swadling (1996), pp.109-112

⁹² Swadling (1996), p.112

⁹³ Kartodirdjo, Sartono, *Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru: 1500-1900 Dari Emporium Sampai Imperium*, Jilid (Volume) I, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1987, p.265

⁹⁴ Kartodirdjo (1987), p.266

extensive and longer-distance trade, with the commerce by these islanders rivalling that of the Dutch between 1621 and 1800.⁹⁵

By the late 18th century, more European reports on this trade are available for us. Thomas Forrest's reports from 1774 suggest that trade to Java conducted by Chinese merchants was already well established by this time.⁹⁷ Swadling suggests that Chinese traders had first started to trade with Onin and the Southwest coast of New Guinea as early as the 13th century.⁹⁸ From 1775, Chinese traders were the only ones allowed by the Dutch to deal along the north coast of New Guinea. Concerned to protect their monopoly of the nutmeg trade, the Dutch government, through the Sultan of Tidore, licensed Chinese traders to do business in this area.⁹⁹ *Massoi* was harvested from trees in the hinterland by inland groups, traded to coastal peoples, and then sold on to Chinese traders who sold the bark in Java. Goods could be traded two or three times before reaching the coast.¹⁰⁰

The trade in women mentioned by Rumphius was part of the *sosolot* exchange, a trade that involved exchange of people for cloth (*kain timur* – imported woven cloth).¹⁰¹ Similarly, there were merchants from Seram¹⁰² in the Mimika region at least as far back as the 17th century whose main trade was in slaves and *massoi*.¹⁰³ Reid suggests that "Tidore was taking slaves from the Raja Empat

⁹⁵ Swadling (1996), p.137

⁹⁷ Moore (2003), p.89

⁹⁸ Swadling (1996), p.275

⁹⁹ Swadling (1996), p.122

¹⁰⁰ Swadling (1996), pp.123-128

¹⁰¹ Moore (2003) suggests it is unhelpful to see this as slavery per se. Those traded were often fulfilling duties of obligation for their families or tribe.

¹⁰² This is the Dutch spelling. It is now commonly spelled Seram.

¹⁰³ Penders, C.L.M., *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002, pp.106-7

Islands and the New Guinea coast, also frequently in the name of tribute.”¹⁰⁴

Kartodirdjo states that slaves were also surrendered to Ternate. He states that: “according to the Rumbati Agreement (1652) several areas were to surrender slaves, among others Onin and Goram.”¹⁰⁵

The attempted to stop the slave trade in 1860, without much success in New Guinea. According to Moore slaves were exported from Onin to Bali and Java in the 1870s, with this trade continuing on the mainland until the handover of power to Indonesia in the 1960s.”¹⁰⁶

The Dutch did not take an active role in the western part of New Guinea until the 19th century. The Governor of the Moluccas, Pieter Merkus (later Dutch East Indies Governor General, 1841-1844), organised the expedition that founded the first Dutch post, a presence intended to counter the imperialist ambitions of the British. Prior to the Dutch arrival, there had been British settlers in the west of New Guinea. The British were the first European power to establish a permanent settlement on New Guinea, with Fort Coronation at Dorei Bay (near the present site of Manokwari) in the Bird’s Head region being set up in 1793. Although this settlement was nominally under the British flag, it was an unofficial, private expedition in search of spices led by Captain John Hayes. A stockade was built and settlers remained for nearly two years. The outpost was abandoned two years later due to disease and “conflict with its European rivals in Asia”.¹⁰⁷ According to Souter, the abandonment was due to the Anglo-Dutch war.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Reid, Anthony (ed.), with the assistance of Jennifer Brewster, *Slavery, bondage and dependency in Southeast Asia*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1983, p.31

¹⁰⁵ Kartodirdjo (1987), p.263. Translation by author.

¹⁰⁶ Moore (2003), p.64

¹⁰⁷ Osborne (1985), p.8

¹⁰⁸ Souter (1964), pp.20-22

The Dutch claimed possession of the western half of the island when the Dutch flag was raised over Fort de Bus at Merkusoord in Triton Bay¹⁰⁹ on 24th August 1828. The claim was for

That part of New Guinea and its interior, beginning at the 141st meridian east of Greenwich on the south coast, and from there west, north-west and northward to the Cape of Good Hope, situated on the north coast, except for the rights which the Sultan of Tidore might have on the districts of Mansary, Karongdefer, Ambarssura and Amberpon.¹¹⁰

Map 2: Dutch colonial map of New Guinea¹¹¹



This first European presence that was intended to be a permanent settlement did not survive long and Fort de Bus was abandoned in 1836, with many of the settlers dying from disease, especially malaria and beriberi.¹¹² There were also

¹⁰⁹ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), p.5

¹¹⁰ Van der Veur (1966), p.10 quoting Salomon Muller

¹¹¹ 'Perbatasan Papua dari masa ke masa' ('The borders of Papua through time'), accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/sejarah/veur-ng.jpg> in February 2008. Map used with the permission of PapuaWeb and according to their conditions of use which are available from <http://www.papuaweb.org/info/disclaimer.html>

¹¹² Souter (1964), p.21

attacks by the local population, apparently incited by traders from Seram and Goram.¹¹³ Swadling suggests that: “In the eight years before the fort was abandoned and demolished in 1836, some 10 Dutch officers, 50 Dutch and 50 Indonesian soldiers died.”¹¹⁴ There was then to be no official Dutch presence until the very end of the 19th century.

The importance of the trade network stretching through the region is exemplified by the fact that Governor Merkus thought it important that the post be sited away from those areas that traded with the islands of Seram and Goram. Merkus suggested that these traders may “fear the loss of their exclusive trade and ‘incite the population against the Government’s garrison’.”¹¹⁵ The garrison consisted of thirteen Europeans, 20 soldiers from other parts of the Dutch East Indies, and 10 Javanese convict labourers.¹¹⁶ Although the Dutch had intended the garrison to be outside the influence of Seram and Goram, it appears that this area was indeed visited by traders from Seram. According to Van der Veur, local inhabitants had some knowledge of the language of Seram, and some were Muslim.¹¹⁷

A Dutch expedition from Tidore to the Raja Empat islands in 1705 visited Salawati and Waigeu. People on both islands recognised the Sultan of Tidore as their overlord and were nominally Muslim according to the Dutch accounts. They were involved in trade with Tidore at this time, trading “slaves (especially from New Guinea), sago, tortoiseshell, ambergris, and spices”.¹¹⁸ Since followers of Islam are not permitted to enslave other Muslims, this trade would have

¹¹³ Van der Veur (1966), p.11

¹¹⁴ Swadling (1996), p.116

¹¹⁵ Van der Veur (1966), p.10

¹¹⁶ Van der Veur (1966), p.10

¹¹⁷ Van der Veur (1966), p.11

¹¹⁸ Andaya (1993a), p.101

provided non-Muslim people who could legitimately be used as slaves by Tidorese Muslims.¹¹⁹

The eastern part of the island was divided into two colonies by Germany and Britain, with effective occupation of the territory having begun in 1884.¹²⁰ This was followed by an agreement between these two powers being reached in 1885-6.¹²¹ The borders between these three colonies were drawn up to suit the interests of the colonial administrations. Straight line borders along lines of latitude and longitude neglect the geography and the existing web of links between the peoples in these regions. These factors of geography and the interrelation of people meant that the drawing of this border on colonial maps did not halt migration and trade across these artificially created boundaries. In some cases it actually led to increasing movement, with economic development in centres such as Merauke and Hollandia leading to trans-border movement by those on either side of the 141st meridian. Linguistically, there was also blurring of the borders, with the use of Malay as a lingua franca percolating back to areas not controlled by the Dutch.¹²²

Inter-group raids also continued, with the British suggesting that raids were being carried out by 'Dutch' subjects on 'British' subjects along the southern coast in 1890.¹²³ Britain proposed altering the borders in order to have a frontier that was "to the practical and working convenience of the two Colonial Governments".¹²⁴ These raids continued until 1903 and led to the establishment

¹¹⁹ See for example Ali, Kecia, 'Islam and Slavery', accessed from <http://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/Pages/islamandslavery.html> in March 2006

¹²⁰ Ballard et al (2001), p.11

¹²¹ Van der Veur (1966), p.1

¹²² Van der Veur (1966), p.5

¹²³ At this time people in these areas were only nominally Dutch or British, with many parts of the island having no colonial administrative control at this time.

¹²⁴ Sir William MacGregor, quoted in Van der Veur (1966), p.64

of the settlement of Merauke to control this movement across the Anglo-Dutch boundary.

One European writer on New Guinea in the 19th century was the Russian Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay, who stayed in various parts of New Guinea in the early 1870s. In an anthropological manner, he immersed himself in the culture of the Papuan groups with whom he lived, making several voyages to the island. He spent more than a year in a village on the northeast coast in what is now Papua New Guinea, along with two servants from 1872. He spent several months on the Onin coast in 1874 near the site of the abandoned Dutch settlement Fort de Bus. Miklouho-Maclay noted the devastating effects of the *hongji* (armed ship) raids from Tidore and Seram Laut on the Papuan communities of this region. He refers to great distrust of strangers among these groups arising from this. Many men had been killed or wounded, while women and children were taken as slaves.¹²⁶ Miklouho-Maclay also noted the use of 'Western' items to pay the bride price for marriage at this time. "Tagar bought her for a gun, the value of which is set at ten florins on the Islands of Seram; to this was added a piece of white calico, price 2.5 florins: in all 12.5 florins."¹²⁷

Apart from administrators and adventurers, the other Europeans to come to West New Guinea during the 19th century were missionaries. The first Christian missionaries to come to the island were Protestants, setting up a mission on the island of Mansinam near Manokwari in 1835.¹²⁸ Catholic missionaries arrived much later, arriving in Merauke on the south coast in 1905.¹²⁹ The Dutch divided the island into spheres of influence, with the Catholic missionaries being

¹²⁶ Miklouho-Maclay, Nikolai, *Travels to New Guinea*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p.309

¹²⁷ Miklouho-Maclay (1982), p.325

¹²⁸ Swadling states that there was Dutch missionary activity much earlier than this on the Aru Islands, near the New Guinea south-west coast. There was a base there from the early 1700s, with some missionary activity being conducted on the mainland also. Swadling (1996), p.153

¹²⁹ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), p.5

allowed to operate in the southern half of the island, while Protestant missionaries were in the northern half. This division continued until 1928, with most Catholic believers still concentrated in the southern regencies.¹³⁰ Missionaries were also important as bringers of the *lingua franca* of the Dutch colony, *Bahasa Melayu*.¹³¹ The early arrival of the Protestant church was reflected in the higher numbers of converts, with Garnaut and Manning giving figures of 50,000 Protestant and 7,100 Catholic believers in the province in 1935 and 1933 respectively.¹³²

Prior to the arrival of the Christian missionaries, there had been attempts to convert the indigenous populace by Muslim missionaries from the Moluccas. Many early accounts by European explorers report that there were converts to Islam in parts of the Bird's Head region and on the south coast.¹³³ There are still Muslim populations in this area, however Islam never spread away from the coast, and most Papuans are not followers of Indonesia's majority religion.¹³⁴

Throughout the colony, the Dutch administration was keen not to allow Christian proselytizing within Muslim areas in order to maintain social stability and thus maximise profits.¹³⁵ They did not allow Christian missions to operate within these Muslim areas and so missionaries operated in other areas, primarily those regions at the edge of the colony which had been not been reached by the spread of Islam. Although the Dutch are often portrayed as lacking zeal in converting their colonial subjects to Christianity, Moore claims

¹³⁰ Groenewegen, K and J. van de Kaa, *Resultaten van het demografisch onderzoek Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea (E.E.G.Project 11.41.002) : Results of the demographic research project Western New Guinea (E.E.C.Project 11.41.002)*, The Hague, Government Printing and Publishing Office, Pt. 1, 1964, p.113

¹³¹ Siegel, James T., *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, p.15

¹³² Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p.10

¹³³ See for example Van der Veur (1966), p.11, Andaya (1993a), p.101, Swadling (1996), p.282

¹³⁴ See chapters 7-9 for more detailed demographic information on religious affiliation.

¹³⁵ Penders (2002), p.2

that the administration actively assisted this work and that missionary work was supported by the Dutch government through stipends and the provision of transport for mission staff.¹³⁶

The first Christian mission in Biak was established in 1855, but the missionaries had little success at converting people on the island at first. When indigenous people did convert, it was often more to do with Western medicine than with any theological arguments.

The main reason for this [success] was that the missionaries, by the use of vaccination during a major outbreak of smallpox during the years 1904 and 1905, proved to have vastly superior healing powers compared to the traditional magicians.¹³⁷

Not all the missionaries who came to the region were European. There were many missionaries from other parts of the archipelago, with ministers coming from other eastern parts of the Netherlands East Indies such as the Kei Islands, the Moluccas and North Sulawesi.¹³⁸ For many Papuans away from the coastal areas, the European missionaries would have been the first white people they had encountered. De Bruijn's account of the Enarotali region in the late 1930s and early 1940s mentions missionary activity. The leading roles were filled by Europeans, with missionary teachers from Amboina (Ambon), the Kei Islands and even East Borneo running missions in the highland villages.¹³⁹

The missions also played (and still play) an important role in education. One reason for the stipends given by the government to the missions mentioned previously was to provide funds for the schools they provided. According to

¹³⁶ Moore (2003), p.123

¹³⁷ Penders (2002), p.119

¹³⁸ Hastings, Peter, *New Guinea: problems and prospects*, Cheshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1969, p.34 and Penders (2002), pp.88-89 & p.107

¹³⁹ Rhys (1947), pp.54-56

Howe and colleagues education “remained the province of the missionaries, although the Dutch government subsidised schools. By 1937 there were 15,200 pupils in mission schools.”¹⁴⁰

The Dutch attempted to establish administrative posts in 1828 and 1892, but were unsuccessful both times.¹⁴¹ The latter post was at Selerika, near present day Merauke. A fort was established there in 1892 in response to British concern over ‘cross-border’ raids. Two Europeans, ten ‘Indonesian’ soldiers and 10 convicts of unspecified origin were the personnel. Attacks by local people led to the station being closed within days of its establishment.¹⁴²

The first successful posts were set up in Manokwari and Fakfak in 1898. These two posts were designated as the capitals of divisions of the self-governing province of Tidore.¹⁴³ These posts were followed by a third settlement in Merauke in 1902, but this only lasted until 1905 when the Dutch decided the area was pacified sufficiently to do without their military presence.¹⁴⁴ The Merauke region was administratively a separate, self-governing region and not a part of the Sultanate of Tidore. During the first two decades of the 20th century, the Sultanates of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan were forced to give up much of their independence and came under the control of the colonial state.¹⁴⁵ The Dutch did not develop their control over West New Guinea over the next years

¹⁴⁰ Howe, K.H., Robert C. Kiste & Brij V. Lal (eds.), *Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the twentieth century*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1994, p.51

¹⁴¹ Lijphart (1966), p.24. The first post at Fort de Bus is discussed above.

¹⁴² Swadling (1996), p.175

¹⁴³ Lagerberg, C.S.I.J., *Years of Reconstruction: New Guinea from 1949 to 1961*, Research and Microfilm, Maryland, 1963, p.6

¹⁴⁴ Swadling (1996), pp.175-176

¹⁴⁵ Swadling (1996), pp.119-120

and Van der Kroef states that the Dutch did not have meaningful control over any parts of West New Guinea until 1910.¹⁴⁶

Prior to the Pacific War there was development but, since there was little investment by the Dutch, change was slow. Klein's comparison of the development of Australian and Dutch New Guinea from 1898 to 1934 illustrates this lack of growth on the Dutch side. Exports on the Dutch side were fairly static, with an increase of only around 10% over this period. Meanwhile, the growth on the Australian side was spectacular, with exports growing nearly 7,000% during the same time period.¹⁴⁷ It was suggested that this lack of growth was due to a lack of investment by the colonial power.

If the Dutch had put money in Dutch New Guinea in the past instead of drawing benefits from it, we might have had the same normal course of affairs, as is shown by the Australian territories.¹⁴⁸

There were also Chinese traders, whose influence was partly responsible for the Dutch expansion of interest in the 1920s. The Chinese migrants were involved in the trading of birds of paradise, crocodiles, timber, resins, sago and other natural products.¹⁴⁹ According to Cribb, there was an expansion of the trade of bird-of-paradise pelts in the mid-1830s, followed by a decline. In the second half of the 19th century, trade was conducted through people from the Moluccas, who took over from the running of the trade from indigenous hunters, although local people still did the actual hunting. The major middlemen were either

¹⁴⁶ Van der Kroef (1958), p.11

¹⁴⁷ Klein, Dr. W. C., *A comparison in colonial development: Trade in Australian and Dutch New Guinea*, Asiatic Review, London, 1937, p.15

¹⁴⁸ Klein (1937), p.16

¹⁴⁹ Penders (2002), p.107

Europeans or Chinese.¹⁵⁰ The Chinese traders were portrayed stereotypically by European writers as crafty businesspeople.

The Chinese trader in Dutch New Guinea knows how to induce the native to bring these articles to his trading stations – for instance, by advancing import trade good [sic] to him, and by keeping him in constant debt.¹⁵¹

Klein does not say specifically which import goods were used, but tobacco and cloth were important imports at this time. Floating shops run by Makassarese traders operating on KPM steamers called at the urban centres of Dutch New Guinea, with these two goods being popular.¹⁵² De Bruijn's account of the Wissel Lakes region ten years after this suggests that only colonial policy stopped these Chinese traders from moving into the hinterlands. Rhys reports him as claiming that Chinese merchants were not allowed to establish trading posts in the Wissel Lakes region.¹⁵³

While the numbers of these immigrants were small, these traders brought the modern money economy to some areas. The responses to this new economy varied greatly across the province due to the different cultures of the tribal groups. For instance, the ethnic groups in the Mimika region tried to adapt to the challenges faced with the arrival of Europeans, while still retaining their cultural values. According to Penders, “the foreign influences were simply incorporated into the existing mythologically-based view of life and reality”.¹⁵⁴ In contrast, the Muju people of the Merauke hinterlands, who came into contact with Europeans at the start of the 20th century, initially appeared to

¹⁵⁰ Cribb, Robert, 'Birds of paradise and environmental politics in colonial Indonesia, 1890-1931', pp. 379-408 in Boomgaard, Peter, Freek Colombijn and David Henley (eds), *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the environmental history of Indonesia*, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1997, pp.383-385

¹⁵¹ Klein (1937), p.4

¹⁵² Klein (1937), p.13

¹⁵³ Rhys (1947), p.56

¹⁵⁴ Penders (2002), p.108

adapt easily to the coming of the Europeans. Penders contends this was due to a cultural propensity to acquire economic wealth. When the economic benefits to the Muju did not match their expectations, a movement that aimed to provide the Muju with these benefits arose by getting rid of Chinese and 'Indonesian' immigrants and for other nations to send money to the Muju.¹⁵⁵ There were more social changes in coastal regions than in the hinterlands. According to Klein, there was little labour recruitment outside coastal areas for such employers as plantation companies.¹⁵⁶

Traders had a significant impact on the ethnic groups with which they came in contact. Swadling describes this interaction on the south coast of the island, in the region surrounding present day Merauke. Plume hunters and traders were the first foreigners encountered by indigenous people in the hinterland. The Muju account of their first meeting with foreigners mentions a "house placed on top of a boat."¹⁵⁷ Many new things were introduced to the Muju by these economic migrants. Foreign goods, the Malay language and an awareness of the outside world were among them.

A more negative import was disease. Venereal disease was spread among indigenous people of the Marind-anim area by plume hunters in the heyday of this trade. Ternate hunters in the 1920s were criticised as having "introduced alcohol, guns and disease, as well as influencing the economic balance of power in previously isolated communities."¹⁵⁸ The authorities stopped hunting in this area in 1922 in order to limit the impact of the epidemic on indigenous peoples. Hunting still continued in the neighbouring Digul and Muju areas, but hunters were required to undergo a medical examination in order to obtain a hunting

¹⁵⁵ Penders (2002), pp.110-115

¹⁵⁶ Klein (1937), p.11

¹⁵⁷ Swadling (1996), p.190

¹⁵⁸ Cribb in Boomgaard et al (1997), p.401

licence.¹⁵⁹ This illustrates one area of Dutch colonial practice that was to benefit the indigenous population greatly, the focus on control and eradication of epidemic disease, especially venereal disease and smallpox.¹⁶⁰

The arrival of these outsiders also changed the societal structure of those ethnic groups with which they had been in contact. Swadling suggests that those who had such experience would go on to become leaders in their home villages.¹⁶¹ Muju people also seem to have become dependent on foreign goods. After the plume trading stopped in this area, Muju people moved to government posts, missions or nearer to Chinese trading posts where they could obtain these goods.¹⁶²

The importance of bird of paradise skin trading to the colony is also stressed by Van der Veur. While there were bans on hunting in the British and German regions, traders from the Dutch side continued to operate on the other side of the border into the 1920s, trading iron axes for birds with villagers.¹⁶³ The trade was to continue until the 1920s, with trade dropping off sharply after 1925, although the hunting of birds-of-paradise was not completely banned until 1931.¹⁶⁴

Administratively, the province was still governed indirectly from various parts of the Moluccas for some years. There is disagreement about the date that the province became an independent residency. Lagerberg suggests this occurred in 1919,¹⁶⁵ while Bone states that it started in 1920.¹⁶⁶ Either way, this autonomy

¹⁵⁹ Swadling (1996), pp.198-199

¹⁶⁰ Howe et al (1994), p.51

¹⁶¹ Swadling (1996), p.191

¹⁶² Swadling (1996), p.191

¹⁶³ Van der Veur (1966), p.94

¹⁶⁴ Cribb in Boomgaard et al (1997), see chart p.402 and p.388

¹⁶⁵ Lagerberg (1963), p.6

¹⁶⁶ Bone (1958), pp.26-27

was not to last. The first Resident of New Guinea, Lulofs, died in 1923 and the residency was abolished. New Guinea became part of Amboina (Amboin) and did not regain its status as a separate province until after World War II.¹⁶⁷

The number of Europeans in the territory was still very small. There were only 286 Europeans recorded as living in West New Guinea in the 1930 census, making up 0.1% of the population under nominal Dutch rule at the time. In terms of immigrants, there were far more Chinese residents, with nearly 2,000 'Asiatics' registered, still composing only 0.6% of the registered populace. At this stage, the Dutch claimed an indigenous population of 328,749 as being under their rule.¹⁶⁸

The administration of the colony was headed by Dutch officials, but the lower levels were staffed by immigrants from other areas of the Netherlands East Indies. As with much of the archipelago, these officials came especially from the Moluccas. There were also administrators from the Kei Islands to the south of New Guinea. The people who came to New Guinea from these areas totally dominated employment for the government, meaning there were virtually no indigenous Papuan public servants until after the Second World War.¹⁶⁹

Additionally, those Dutch officials who were posted to this remote corner of the colony were not always the most able. As Howe and colleagues state, the Dutch "sent their least trained and least competent officials, including Indonesians, to the outpost."¹⁷⁰

During the 1920s and 1930s, West New Guinea was promoted by the Dutch government as an area that would provide a homeland for Eurasians. They were

¹⁶⁷ Lagerberg (1963), pp.6-7

¹⁶⁸ All figures from Lagerberg (1963), p.23. Figures from the 1930 census.

¹⁶⁹ Ploeg (2002), p.81

¹⁷⁰ Howe et al (1994), p.51

mostly from Java and their status was in decline as more indigenous Papuans were educated and competed with Eurasians for employment, especially within the government. The government tried through propaganda to get Eurasians to work in other professions, especially agriculture, rather than in government jobs.¹⁷¹

Eurasian colonies were initially set up in East Java and Lampung. Penders suggests that “owing to the unceasing indigenous population explosion and the constant growth of a rural proletariat, the chances for Eurasians to establish themselves as a yeoman class in their heartland of Java were very slim.”¹⁷² The colonial government then considered West New Guinea as a possible area for Eurasians to settle and set up a ‘fatherland’. Some settlements were set up in northern West New Guinea, but these settlements were not successful. The sites were badly planned, the settlers were not farmers and they were not trained or experienced in the field. Most returned to Java.¹⁷³

The region was even promoted as an area for Dutch people with campaigns to encourage settlers being run in the Netherlands. The Dutch government hoped to cope with unemployment in the Netherlands and solve the problem of development of the island at a stroke. The Netherlands government saw land that was not used for settled agriculture as being waste land. The Dutch attitude to New Guinea appears to have similarities with that of the English towards Australia, with an assumption that this land was *terra nullius*.

One might very well refer to New Guinea as ‘Netherlands Australia’...Neither the Javanese, the Acehnese, nor the inhabitants of Palembang have any right

¹⁷¹ Penders (2002), p.55-56

¹⁷² Penders (2002), p.56

¹⁷³ Penders (2002), p.56

to this 'empty' country. The Dutch were the first to occupy it, and have the right to use it for the population surplus of the Netherlands...¹⁷⁴

Many societies on both sides of the island value land extremely highly, with cultural and religious value attached to this resource. Moore suggests this (mis)understanding of the attitude of indigenous Papuans to land by Europeans was a failure (deliberate or otherwise) to understand the other different structures of the 'Other' society.¹⁷⁵

Another group came unwillingly, the political prisoners held at Boven Digul in the south of the province. The camp was in operation between 1927 and 1962, imprisoning Indonesian nationalists prior to, and Papuan political prisoners after, the Pacific War. According to Indonesian estimates, 15,000 prisoners were sent to the camp during this period.¹⁷⁶ These prisoners included such important figures as Mohammed Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir, later Vice-president and Prime Minister respectively, who were interned there from February 1935 to January 1936.¹⁷⁷ Hatta and Sjahrir were given special treatment as they were Western educated and so did not have to build their own houses or grow their own food.¹⁷⁸

Penders comments on the impact of this prison on the local population. For some of the local Muju ethnic group this was an opportunity. Penders reports that some "young Muju found employment as servants of colonial officials, soldiers and the Indonesian detainees. As a result a number of Muju were able

¹⁷⁴ Penders (2002)., p.58 quoting Winkler, P.E., *Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea: een nieuw stamland voor ons volk*, Amsterdam, 1936

¹⁷⁵ Moore (2003), p.11

¹⁷⁶ Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970, pp.199-200

¹⁷⁷ Mrázek, Rudolf, *Sjahrir: politics and exile in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y., Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994, p.140

¹⁷⁸ Mrázek, (1994), pp.140-153

to enlarge their view of the world when they accompanied their masters on their transfer to other parts of the archipelago, usually Ambon.”¹⁷⁹

Many of those imprisoned there at the time of the Japanese invasion were sent to Australia and held in Cowra, New South Wales. They were then released following information given by Hatta and Sjahrir.¹⁸⁰ It is interesting that Hatta was subsequently one of the few Indonesian nationalists to oppose the campaign to make Papua part of the republic.¹⁸¹

In later years, this prison was used by Dutch authorities to detain various political prisoners from within West New Guinea, particularly pro-Indonesian factions. According to Ryan, Boven Digul was still being used in 1969 by the Indonesian army to hold Papuan political prisoners.¹⁸² There are clear comparisons between the use of the prisoners to clear land for agriculture in Boven Digul and that in other prisons in the later republic. The prison on Buru, to which Pramoedya Ananta Toer was sent, was used similarly to that in Boven Digul, to keep political prisoners as far from the Centre as possible.

While the Dutch were slowly exploring the territory during the inter-war years, the number of Europeans in New Guinea was still very small. According to Bertrand, the European population was approximately 200 by 1938, with only 15 Dutch administrators.¹⁸³ The reduction in numbers during this time is not explained by Bertrand, but it can be assumed that the ban on hunting for birds of paradise across the whole territory in 1931 had a significant effect on the

¹⁷⁹ Penders (2002), p.112

¹⁸⁰ Ryan (1970), pp.199-200

¹⁸¹ See the later description of the political debates following World War II for more details on this issue.

¹⁸² Ryan (1970), pp.201-2

¹⁸³ Bertrand, Jacques, *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2004, p.145

number of foreigners in New Guinea.¹⁸⁴ There were other non-indigenous residents than Europeans, however, with 2,000 non-Papuans in the northern region prior to the war.¹⁸⁵ This figure includes some Europeans, but from the figures above, the majority were people from other parts of the Dutch East Indies and Chinese traders.

Although the Dutch presence was small in size, it had a profound impact on the native populace, most especially in the coastal regions. As noted above, the presence of exotic, imported goods prompted people to move closer to government posts in order to be able to obtain these objects. Those who did move close to these colonial outposts were organised into settlements and domestic arrangements that mirrored the structure of Dutch (and indeed Javanese) life. Now people were to live in “compact villages with a house for each nuclear family.”¹⁸⁶ Power hierarchies were also modelled on the incomers’ society. Now, rather than looser structures in which there were “no communal leaders other than heads of descent groups, the Dutch created ‘chiefs’ to direct the people.”¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Swadling (1996), p.62. This contrasts with Van der Veur (1966), p.81, who claims that hunting in the colony was outlawed by 1924.

¹⁸⁵ Howard, Michael C. and Naffi Sanggenafa (eds), *Indigenous peoples and migrants of Northern Papua*, Indonesia, Bangkok, White Lotus, 2005, p.20

¹⁸⁶ Howe et al (1994), p.51

¹⁸⁷ Howe et al (1994), p.51. It is interesting to note that these structural changes were re-enacted by the Indonesian administration following the handover of power in 1963, with village heads (*kepala desa*) and tribal heads (*kepala suku*) being created to provide alternative (more amenable) power structures to traditional hierarchies. See Indonesian period section for more details on this issue.

The Pacific War

Albeit slowly, the Dutch attempted to develop the regency before the Pacific War. One reason for this attempt was the increasing presence of Japan in the South Pacific region. During the Second World War, the Japanese occupied most of West New Guinea. However, the Merauke and Upper Digul areas remained unoccupied and were called "The Free Netherlands Indies".¹⁸⁸ The Japanese forces stopped at Kononaro at the border of the Mimika region, while part of the central and the whole of the southern areas remained under Allied control.¹⁸⁹

The Japanese army invaded the province in 1942, with many Europeans being killed by the invaders. According to Penders, the Eurasian settlers were also murdered by the occupying army.¹⁹⁰ Japanese policies on West New Guinea were to suppress any opposition and to obtain labour from the local population for military works. The local people also had to provide food for the invaders. According to a Dutch study, this forced labour, as well as the absence of people from their own gardens, led to hardship and death among the indigenous populace.¹⁹¹ The dictatorial nature of these policies led to "the relocating of whole villages, the torturing and killing of many Papuans and the forcing of whole families into hard labour. Their behaviour generated more hatred than Holland ...had in a century."¹⁹²

Papuans were also badly treated by the Indonesians who worked with the Japanese.¹⁹³ This collaboration, willing or otherwise, occurred in most of the

¹⁸⁸ Lagerberg (1963), p.7

¹⁸⁹ Penders (2002), p.88

¹⁹⁰ Penders (2002), p.61

¹⁹¹ Groenewegen and Van de Kaa, Pt. 1 (1964), p.115

¹⁹² Osborne (1985), p.13

¹⁹³ Penders (2002), pp.88-89

archipelago. Many Indonesians initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators and expected they would help Indonesians to become independent. This belief was fostered by Japanese propaganda disseminated through Radio Tokyo and other means.¹⁹⁴ While local residents from other parts of the archipelago worked with the Japanese either willingly or otherwise, De Bruijn's account of the Japanese invasion suggests that most Papuans did not work voluntarily. This may have been due in part to the relationships that had developed with Dutch administrators and the aggressive, short-term strategy apparently adopted by the Japanese.¹⁹⁵ Penders suggests that the actions of the Japanese administration during this period were a critical factor in the development of a 'Papuan' identity. He claims there was the "...the emergence during the war, particularly in northern New Guinea, of the first signs of a national Papuan consciousness, which first showed distinct anti-Indonesian overtones. This occurred firstly as a reaction to the ill-treatment of the Papuans by the Japanese forces and their Indonesian helpers."¹⁹⁶

As mentioned previously, there are genetic and linguistic differences between peoples in the coastal regions and the peoples in the highland regions. De Bruijn, writing at the time of the Pacific War, claims that the mountain people did not have any feelings of shared identity with the people of the coast. While relations between various mountain groups were not always amicable, this account highlights the connection between different highland groups, with little feeling of identity between highlanders and lowlanders. This may be due in part to the trade route that De Bruijn mentions going from west of the Lakes area as

¹⁹⁴ Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly, 'The Indonesian nationalists and the Japanese "liberation" of Indonesia: visions and reactions', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, March 1996 v27 n1 p1(18), p.1(18)

¹⁹⁵ See Rhys (1947)

¹⁹⁶ Penders (2002), pp.88-89

far as the Baliem valley. A group came to De Bruijn to complain as the police (Indonesians) had called them Papuans.

‘We will work for you,’ they said, ‘but we will not work for your police if they call us Papuans. We are Ekari and Migani people, and have nothing to do with the Papuan (coastal) people, who do not even own a pig and have to work for their own food.’¹⁹⁷

The particular hatred among many Papuans for the Indonesians who worked with the Japanese mentioned above was not ahistorical. This enmity can be seen to have originated before the war in the treatment of Papuans by officials from other areas of the Indies, especially those from the Moluccas and South Sulawesi.

They had always been despised and treated as savages. Not so much by the Dutch but by the lower ranking officials. They had always been at the lowest point of the ladder: firstly there were the Dutch, then the Chinese, followed by the hated South Moluccans (‘the Black Hollanders’), then the Javanese, and finally the Papuans.¹⁹⁸

This opinion was shared by Van Eechoud, an influential Eurasian administrator and police commissioner who later became resident of the colony. He refers to the bad feelings between Papuans and those from other areas of what is now Indonesia. He refers to “Keiese, Menadonese, Javanese, and especially the Ambonese officials of lower rank" who worked in West New Guinea in lower positions within the administration, the police force or in village schools.¹⁹⁹

There were a number of different immigrant groups in West New Guinea during and immediately following the war. There were people from Buton in Sulawesi

¹⁹⁷ De Bruijn’s account in Rhys (1947), p.126

¹⁹⁸ Penders (2002) pp.88-89 quoting Nicolaas Jouwe

¹⁹⁹ Lagerberg (1963), p.11. This response mirrors the response faced by many ethnic groups who were privileged by the colonial rulers, such as that faced by the Chinese in many parts of Southeast Asia.

and from Ternate in Moluccas who sought to support the Indonesian nationalist cause.²⁰⁰ Many of the immigrants such as teachers and officials were forced to assist the Japanese forces. With Japanese protection diminishing towards the end of the period of occupation, these unwilling collaborators were then vulnerable to vengeance from local residents. Penders reports one example in the Onin region, with hundreds of Chinese and Christian teachers and officials from Ambon being executed by the Japanese military.²⁰¹ There were also many Javanese *romusha* (slave labourers) brought to West New Guinea by the Japanese to build roads and airfields on the north coast. There was a threat of rebellion from these *romusha*, with 500 *romusha* being in the colony by February 1946. They were returned to Java by the Dutch at the end of March 1946.²⁰²

The behaviour of the Japanese military and Indonesian officials during the occupation may have led to an increase in the Papuan nationalistic feelings of indigenous people in some occupied areas. The coming of the American forces under General MacArthur was another significant collision with the outside world. These incomers had a great impact on the Papuans who came in contact with them – the unimaginable firepower that they brought, the seemingly limitless resources and food.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ It can be assumed that most (if not all) of the people from these groups were Muslim.

²⁰¹ Penders (2002), p.143

²⁰² Penders (2002), pp.143-145. It is unfortunate that there are few published materials on this period which cover the war from a Papuan viewpoint. Writers such as Smith (1953) cover the experience from an American perspective, with very few references to the indigenous population. The experiences of De Bruijn do attempt to show how the war affected Papuans, but he was isolated in the Enarotali area, with little outside contact. Other histories of the territory have devoted little space to this period. (Smith, Robert Ross, *The War in the Pacific: The approach to the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II Series, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1953, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/bk1/approach/> in March 2006)

²⁰³ Penders (2002), p.90

There were also Afro-American soldiers in MacArthur's troops, who Papuans in some areas would have seen working alongside white soldiers. This equality (or apparent equality to Papuan eyes) seems to have caused a change in the thinking of those in the areas in which the American troops were stationed. Racial parity was seemingly possible, in contrast to the situation in the Dutch colonial society where Papuans did not feel equal to the colonial masters or to people from other parts of the Dutch East Indies such as Ambonese or Javanese officials. According to Lagerberg, some Papuans were so impressed by this that Nusi Islanders, with the help of an American officer, wrote to President Truman asking for West New Guinea to be under American rule.²⁰⁴

The American forces developed bases and infrastructure in the areas they occupied as they island-hopped across the Pacific, changing dramatically the infrastructure of these sites. Hollandia only developed into a city during the American interregnum.²⁰⁵ Hollandia was only a small town of 400 in 1940. However, by 1944 it had grown astronomically, having a population of 140,000 people with 100 kilometres of roads, a pipeline and a ship repair base.²⁰⁶

The battles in Papua were part of the advance of the American forces through the Pacific and New Guinea and on to the Philippines. There were many casualties in the former Dutch colony, with 1,165 deaths and 6,453 casualties among the American forces according to Robert Smith.²⁰⁷ The Japanese soldiers suffered far more casualties, with 17,215 dying and 2,661 prisoners of war.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ Lagerberg (1963), pp.29-30 & Penders (2002), p.135. Nusi is a small island near Biak.

²⁰⁵ See Appendix A for more information on the changes to the name of this town.

²⁰⁶ Lagerberg (1963), pp.17-18

²⁰⁷ All figures taken from Smith (1953), pp.577-578. Figures for Papua calculated by author.

²⁰⁸ The figures for POWs include Japanese, Formosan and Korean prisoners.

There are no figures given by Smith for Papuans killed²⁰⁹, and no mention of the possible numbers of indigenous people injured or displaced. Papuans appear not to exist for this author, with no mention at all of an indigenous population in his writing on the campaign for Jayapura.²¹⁰ This lack of recognition of the role played by Papuans in the Pacific War is in contrast to that given to indigenous people in the eastern half of the island. The importance of Papuans and New Guineans in that region is well recognised within the Australian war literature and the status of the Kokoda Track within Australia's war iconography. Indigenous people were the 'Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels' in this widespread Australian myth, which despite the patronising connotations, recognises with gratitude the vital role played by indigenous residents in this military campaign.²¹¹

A Papuan Battalion was established by Van Eechoud in 1944.²¹² This force, made up mainly of Papuan soldiers and Javanese officers, conducted operations against the remaining Japanese forces that had not surrendered to the American military. There were nearly 400 soldiers in this force by April 1945²¹³ and Van Eechoud's intention was that these soldiers would become the foundation of the territory's police force, with this goal being realised after the war.²¹⁴ The Papuan battalion was involved in the uprising against the Dutch led by Sugoro in the post-war period.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ The only author to mention Papuan deaths in the Pacific War is Lagerberg (1963). According to him, "although no figures are known the number of Papuans who died during the war from military action, from privation, or from other causes, must be estimated in the thousands." p.23

²¹⁰ Smith (1953), pp.53-83

²¹¹ See for example FitzSimons, Peter, *Kokoda*, Hodder Headline, Sydney, 2004, or 'Digger History', accessed from <http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/pages-2aif-cmf/fuzzy-wuzzy.htm>, in May 2005, for a more populist view.

²¹² Penders (2002), p.92

²¹³ Penders (2002), p.93

²¹⁴ Ploeg (2002), pp.7-8

²¹⁵ See Chapter 8 for more details on this point.

Penders mentions another role played by indigenous people in the Pacific War. Dutch authorities put a reward of half a guilder on the head of any Japanese soldiers. Papuans took advantage of this offer, killing 2,119 and capturing 249 Japanese soldiers between August and October 1944, hastening the end of hostilities in the territory.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Penders (2002), p.92, quoting Van Eechoud.

Post-war isolation

After the war there was an increasing acknowledgement among the colonial powers of the inevitability of the end of the colonial period worldwide.

Barracough states that: “between 1945 and 1960 no less than forty countries with a population of 800 millions – more than a quarter of the world’s inhabitants – revolted against colonialism and won their independence.”²¹⁷

Across Europe, colonial governments were forced to realise that the age of empire was over. The Netherlands government started to make preparations for the eventual cessation of their suzerainty over New Guinea, including training an indigenous elite and involving Papuans in the political process, though in largely symbolic roles.

The province was now a separate, self-governing province for almost the first time under colonial rulers.²¹⁸ The new governor, Jan van Eechoud, was determined to give opportunities to Papuans within the administration. Pre-war administration of the regency had been as part of the Dutch East Indies, with changes in the late 1930s altering the model to follow the Australian government style in the eastern half of the island. Van Eechoud changed the model once more, basing the rule on colonial practices in Africa. Van Eechoud saw many more similarities between the situation in Papua and Africa than between Papua and the East Indies.²¹⁹

While Sukarno declared the independence of the new nation of Indonesia and the war for independence eventually led to the expulsion of the Dutch from the rest of the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch re-established their rule over West New

²¹⁷ Barracough, Geoffrey, *The revolt against the West*, pp.118-130 in Duara, Prasenjit (ed.), *Decolonization : perspectives from now and then*, New York, Routledge, 2003, p.118

²¹⁸ Ploeg (2002), p.81

²¹⁹ Ploeg (2002), p.82

Guinea with little resistance from the indigenous population. That there was little resistance by indigenous people against the colonial power, supporting or mirroring the Indonesian independence struggle is hardly surprising.²²⁰ The negative feelings towards immigrants from Java, Sulawesi and Ambon mentioned previously would have hindered any feeling of solidarity with that movement. Additionally, there was almost no educated indigenous elite aware of the global zeitgeist.

Additionally, the fragmented ethnic nature of the territory noted by De Bruijn²²¹ suggests that an 'imagined community' that covered the whole of Papua – a national identification – did not exist for most of the population at this time.²²² Some pro-Indonesian groups were set up, however, such as '*Partai Indonesia Merdeka*'²²³, a secret party set up by Lukas Rumkorem, Corinus Kery and Julianus Tarumaselly to support Indonesia's independence fight.²²⁴ It is interesting to note that this group was established in Biak, an area with higher levels of education, employment and migration than the rest of the colony at this time, as well as a long history of connection with the islands to the west.

The struggle for independence meant that the colony of West New Guinea was separated politically from the rest of the archipelago, as well as from the eastern half of the island. The Dutch were not as able to draw upon the services of the 'Indonesian' personnel that had run the administration in Dutch New Guinea prior to the Pacific War, with many of these administrators having left the colony. According to Peter Savage the Japanese occupation of the majority

²²⁰ See Mahdi (2000)

²²¹ See pp.105-106 above.

²²² For more details on the imagined community concept see Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, Revised edition, Verso, London, 1991

²²³ Freedom of Indonesia Party. Translation by author.

²²⁴ It is interesting to note that the Indonesian language was used by this group, as it was by both pro- and anti-Indonesian parties in the post-war period. See Henderson (1973) for a thorough examination of indigenous politics of the 1942-1963 period.

of the Dutch colony left those few Dutch officials remaining in West New Guinea with few trained non-European personnel.²²⁵ It should be noted that the Japanese had control over Java until their surrender on 15th August 1945²²⁶, and were instrumental in the declaration of independence by Hatta and Sukarno, with the nationalist leaders instructed by Marshal Terauchi to prepare for the swift granting of independence.²²⁷

These factors led to an increase in Dutch government spending in the colony, along with the need to prepare the colony's people for independence. There was an increasing level of fiscal support for the colonial administration from the Centre and changes to the society, with higher levels of education and paid employment resulting in greater urbanisation and indigenous political participation. During this period, the territory was to be a net receiver of money (in the public sector at least) with the Dutch subsidising the colony heavily.²²⁸

The administration started to raise education levels in the colony. This was done from 1944 when Van Eechoud set up the first police school and the first public service training school for Papuans. The latter was to train over 150 graduates during the post-war period, most for lower level public service positions. Nicolaas Jouwe later recalled Van Eechoud's speech at the opening of the public service school.

We came here in 1828, and we told you what to do. Today you are called to take the government of this country in your own hands; today the new Papuan is being born.²²⁹

²²⁵ Savage, Peter, 'The nationalist struggle in West Irian: the divisions within the liberation movement', *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, vol.14, no.2, June 1978, p.143

²²⁶ Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001, p.13

²²⁷ Penders (2002), p.23

²²⁸ Kroef (1958), p.13, Lijphart (1966), and

²²⁹ Penders (2002), p.93

Crocombe and Ali suggest that “...one of the prerequisites for a successful national liberation struggle is the existence of an educated, articulate and politically conscious leadership. Such leaderships initially at least, are drawn from the educated petty bourgeoisie.”²³⁰ This seems to be borne out in the case of Papua.

Between 1944 and 1949, all the early leaders of the Papuan nationalist movement attended the training schools set up by the Dutch following the Pacific War to produce personnel for their administration.²³¹ One of the graduates from this school, Frans Wospakrik, later became the rector of the Universitas Cenderawasih in Jayapura and then the First Deputy Head of the MRP (The Papuan Peoples’ Assembly). He stated in an interview with Jacques Bertrand that this “generation saw itself as becoming a free nation. Inter-ethnic conflict existed, but we started to think in terms of one nation.”²³² Chauvel goes further, claiming that: “fostering a Papua-wide identity was one of the objectives of the training schools.”²³³ James Siegel suggests that the Indonesian anti-colonial movement was an elite, conservative movement.²³⁴ This is echoed by the Papuan anti-Indonesian movement, an elite movement as shown by the high education levels of those who led it.

These developments were not to the liking of those who were occupying or had occupied these posts previously, Indonesians, mostly originating from the South Moluccas area.²³⁵ Chauvel suggests that the presence of Indonesian teachers and officials in Papua during this period contributed to Indonesians’

²³⁰ Crocombe, Ron & Ali Ahmed, *Politics in Melanesia*, Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, 1982, pp.4-5

²³¹ Crocombe & Ahmed (1982), p.5

²³² Bertrand (2004), p.146 quoting from an interview with Frans Wospakrik

²³³ Chauvel, Richard, *Essays on West Papua: volume one*, Working Paper 120, Monash, Victoria, 2003, p.1

²³⁴ Siegel (1997), p.6

²³⁵ Penders (2002), p.93

identification of Papua as part of their nation. As the Indonesians were the immediate face of the colonial state for Papuans, negative reactions to colonialism contributed to Papuans' feelings of alienation from Indonesia. Chauvel states that "...rivalry arose between an emerging Papuan elite and Indonesians. The Indonesians had the jobs to which the Papuans aspired."²³⁶ In this period, indigenous people had more contact with people from the eastern islands of the archipelago, than they did with Europeans.²³⁷

According to Chauvel, an investigation by the Dutch in 1949 found that there were about 1,700 Papuans who had some degree of education, mostly to secondary level.²³⁸ The figures from Lagerberg suggest that most education in the province at this time was at the elementary level. The table below gives figures for the colony in 1949.

Table 4.1: School and pupil numbers, Dutch New Guinea, 1949²³⁹

Type of school	Number of schools	Number of pupils
Elementary	531	25,883
Continuation	9	804
Primary(Malay speakers)	-	208
Primary(Dutch speakers)	-	24
Continuation of primary	-	20
Vocational	-	511

The table shows that most education was in elementary schools. While there are no figures available to me on the language of instruction in these schools, it seems reasonable to conclude that the languages of instruction were no different to those that had been used in the rest of the Dutch East Indies.

²³⁶ Chauvel (2003), p.13

²³⁷ Chauvel (2003), p.14

²³⁸ Chauvel (2003), p.19, note 3

²³⁹ Lagerberg (1963), p.28

However, Garnaut and Manning claim that: “Despite the predominance of Malay as the lingua franca of the trading and urban people, Dutch language and not Malay was being introduced in the newly opened schools in the highlands in the early 1960s.”²⁴⁰ In general, it appears that primary education was mainly in Malay or local languages along with a few Dutch language primary schools, with secondary education being conducted in Dutch. The numbers above suggest that only a tiny minority would have been educated in Dutch.²⁴¹ Lagerberg states the administration chose Dutch as the ‘language of culture’ following the Pacific War.²⁴²

However, there was still racial inequality in education. There were European schools which were considered to offer a higher standard of education than purportedly equivalent schools attended by Papuans.²⁴³ The Dutch had started training village teachers but this training was stopped in 1948. There was more emphasis on the education of an elite, rather than on providing a widespread basic level of education.

However, there was still a great increase in the numbers of Papuans being schooled.²⁴⁴ In 1960, there were 1,058 teachers and 65% were classed as ‘natives’. The number of Papuan teachers had increased 150% since 1952 while the number of Papuan pupils had increased from 26,417 in 1952 to 36,419 in 1960. There were 29 Papuans studying at higher levels in the Netherlands, with 19 studying in the Pacific region.²⁴⁵ With no higher education facilities in the colony, these were the only students to continue their education to a higher

²⁴⁰ Garnaut & Manning (1974), p.16

²⁴¹ Van der Veur, Paul W., *Education and social change in colonial Indonesia*, Athens, Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1969, pp.2-3

²⁴² Lagerberg, Kees, *West Irian and Jakarta imperialism*, C. Hurst & Co., London, 1979, p.6

²⁴³ Lagerberg (1963), p.170

²⁴⁴ See Van der Veur (1969) for details of the colonial schooling system.

²⁴⁵ Lagerberg (1963), pp.163-165

level. However, with this tiny minority of Papuans receiving higher education and experiencing life outside Papua, an educated, indigenous elite was gradually beginning to emerge.

Indigenous employment in the Dutch administration proceeded quickly during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Papuans held 30% of government posts by 1957, over 50% by 1960 and 75% by September 1962, although many of these positions were in the lower levels of the bureaucracy.²⁴⁶ Correspondingly, Dutch control over the colony covered increasingly larger proportions of the population after the Second World War. The population was estimated as being 700,000 in 1952.²⁴⁷ Increasing numbers of Papuans now came under Dutch rule and within Dutch jurisdiction. The table below shows how this changed during this period.

Table 4.2: Indigenous people under Dutch rule or in contact with the Dutch colonial government, 1947-1960²⁴⁸

Year	Papuans under rule	In contact with gov't
1947	215,788	-
1949	267,447	-
1952	274,162	111,000
1953	262,609	129,000
1954	280,782	95,750
1955	288,353	98,230
1956	311,403	31,170
1957	340,450	19,150
1958	350,902	38,650
1959	374,837	28,225
1960	461,858	71,070

²⁴⁶ Crocombe & Ahmed (1982), p.5

²⁴⁷ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1964), book 1, table III, p.86

²⁴⁸ Lagerberg (1963), p.21, pp.102-103 & pp.148-149. It is not made clear of the exact definition of the term 'in contact with the government' but it appears to mean that minimal administrative relations had been established.

These last figures were partly higher due to a change in the definition of ‘under rule’. This rule was fairly nominal, even at this stage, with areas in which murder was punished by the rule of colonial law qualifying as under rule. Registration was simply a head count of those in the 66 districts into which West New Guinea was divided.²⁴⁹

These districts varied in terms of administrative presence. Many had an administrative post run by a Dutch administrative assistant, or in some cases simply a clerk or a secretary. There was little control over their activities in areas away from the urban centres and they were allowed to control their own budgets as they saw fit. There was often simply an administrative post run by a single Dutch official with a small number of indigenous assistants.²⁵⁰ These posts had nominal authority over the region around it, but since there was little infrastructure or communication within most districts, many Papuans still had little more than occasional contact with any immigrants.²⁵¹

This lack of direct control was also reflected in the permeability of the inter-colonial borders. In the 1950s, the prohibition on drinking alcohol and other restrictive practices on Papuans in the Australian part of the island, made movement from east to west across the border an attractive proposition. According to Van der Veur, there was a great deal of cross-border movement as late as the 1950s. “...it must be obvious that the concept of a boundary line was meaningless to the Moejoes, Ninggerums, and Oktedis and that movement in both directions was constant.”²⁵² There were contemporary cases of Dutch police entering Australian territory in order to carry out ‘payback’ raids on villagers.

²⁴⁹ Lagerberg (1963), pp.148-149

²⁵⁰ For an account of one of these posts see the biography of De Bruijn by Rhys (1947).

²⁵¹ Lagerberg (1963), pp.19-22

²⁵² Van der Veur (1966), p.98

There was recognition of the *de facto* porosity of the frontier in the local level agreement in the Ingembit area between the Dutch head of Boven Digul and an Australian Patrol Officer in 1954. Short visits were permissible while longer ones were frowned upon. Van der Veur claims that: "Recruitment of labourers across the border was not to be permitted and the search for employment across the frontier was to be prevented 'as far as possible'."²⁵³

This suggests that movement across the 'line of control' was routine at this time, reflecting the artificial nature of the border and the colonial powers' lack of concern with actualising it, or perhaps their inability to do this. This was to change with the handover of power to Indonesia. Van der Veur claims that the arrival of the Indonesians "transformed the Irian boundary from a line on the map into a barrier of increasing significance."²⁵⁴

This lack of contact in rural areas is in contrast with the growth of the urban centres and the development of more modern socio-economic and political structures. While urban centres are described in all sources as having grown, with Papuans migrating to these urban areas looking for employment and/or education, there is an enormous disparity in the figures given of the populations of these cities by different authors. Lagerberg says that Hollandia had a 'native' population of 7,089 by 1960, the Dutch demographic study of 1961 gives a figure of 22,662, while Penders gives the population as 73,240.²⁵⁵ As mentioned earlier in relation to education, indigenous people still faced racial discrimination. In housing and in employment, Papuans felt that the Dutch were advantaged over them in the final years of Dutch rule. There were still areas

²⁵³ Van der Veur (1966), p.100

²⁵⁴ Van der Veur (1966), p.136

²⁵⁵ Lagerberg (1963), p.148, Groenewegen (1964), book 1, p.103 & Penders (2002), p.399

which were white only, with Lagerberg mentioning parts of the city “where no natives lived.”²⁵⁶

Most employment in these urban areas was still within the public service. In 1961 there were 18,986 indigenous Papuans in the paid workforce in the colony. Of these workers, 56% worked for the government (10,548). For those in private employment, the largest sector was construction.²⁵⁷ Internal migration within the colony was also an important factor. Out of the 18,986 people in the paid workforce in 1961, more than a quarter (5,189) came from the Schouten Islands, now Biak and Numfoor. This is despite making up less than 8% of the total administered population at the time.²⁵⁸

Although the workers from ‘Indonesia’ who were working in Dutch New Guinea had decreased in number, there were still migrants from these areas working in the colony. According to figures from 1959, there were 14,000 immigrants employed in Dutch New Guinea. The majority of these workers (8,000) were from Maluku.²⁵⁹ While this is not an insignificant number, there were still greater and increasing numbers of indigenous people working in the cash economy at this point. Many Papuans moved to the city from the area around Jayapura in search of employment in the market economy. Michael Rumbiak suggests that the development that the Dutch initiated “triggered a stream of migration towards Jayapura from its surrounding as this now became a centre where alternative jobs were offered and where highly valued manufactured goods became available.”²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ Lagerberg (1963), p.168

²⁵⁷ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), p.68

²⁵⁸ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), Appendix XXIX(c) and Appendix IV(a)

²⁵⁹ McGibbon (2005), p.13

²⁶⁰ Michael Rumbiak quoted in Lautenbach, Hendrika, *Demographic survey research in Irian Jaya*, Thela Thesis, 1999, p.201

Papuans were mostly employed at the lower end of the government. There was also competition for positions between Papuans and immigrants.

After the increasing expectations during the Van Eechoud period, the Papuan now found a governmental system developing in which he participated only in the lower or lower middle ranks, while the middle ranks were entirely occupied by the so-called local forces which had come over from Indonesia.²⁶¹

However, there was still a large proportion of the public service occupied by indigenous people. According to Dutch figures from 1961, 55% of civil servants were Papuans (4,950 out of 8,800).²⁶²

Following Indonesian independence in 1949, many Europeans and Eurasians came to West New Guinea from the new nation. Penders states that the population of Europeans²⁶³ in the colony increased from around 1,000 at the end of 1949 to over 8,000 at the end of 1950.²⁶⁴ Nearly 2,000 Eurasians were brought from Indonesia on one-year contracts and were settled near Manokwari. There were many problems with this scheme, with a lack of accommodation leading to many living in abandoned American cold storage lockers. Unsurprisingly, many returned to Indonesia.²⁶⁵ The problems that had occurred with this settlement led the government to establish a Colonisation Service. The immigration of both European and Eurasian groups caused resentment from Papuans. Lagerberg states that: "The difficulties were principally caused by occupation of natives' land and abruptness in human

²⁶¹ Lagerberg (1963), p.148 & Penders (2002), p.76

²⁶² Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), p.16

²⁶³ A category which included Eurasians.

²⁶⁴ Penders (2002), p.85

²⁶⁵ Penders (2002), p.56

relations.”²⁶⁶ There was also antagonism towards the settlers as they were seen as a threat to the job prospects of Papuans.

These difficulties in interethnic relations were part of a pattern of racial apartheid within society in West New Guinea during the 1950s and 1960s, with different entrances and queues for Dutch and natives, Europeans being served first in shops etc. Eurasians were higher up this status ladder than Papuans. “...educated Papuans were filling lower echelon posts while often being lorded over by Eurasians, who generally were insensitive to Papuan feelings.”²⁶⁷ While the Dutch government purported to be preparing the Papuans for independence during this period, it appears that the colony was still just that – an old-fashioned colony run along racial lines.

While there were changes to society in urban areas with more formal employment, migration from outside Papua and within, and the arrival of new industrial products, in rural areas many Papuans were fundamentally untouched by these developments. Pans studied migration in the Bird’s Head region in 1960, looking at legends and stories from a variety of sources. He found contact between groups was mainly related to the trafficking of *kain timur*, the traditional trade in cloth that had been mentioned by the earliest European travellers to the island.²⁶⁸ Pans reports that there was migration from the lowlands to the mountains. There were several causes of this movement, with population pressures on agricultural land, the availability of suitable land in mountain areas and avoidance of the slave trade being mentioned.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Lagerberg (1963), p.148 & Penders (2002), p.50

²⁶⁷ Penders (2002), p.402

²⁶⁸ See pp.93-94 above for earlier references to this trade

²⁶⁹ Lautenbach (1999), p.202. Whether the slave trade was still ongoing at this point is unclear in the text but seems unlikely given the attitude to such traditional practices held by the Dutch.

The status of West New Guinea during this post-war period was in dispute politically. The declaration of independence made by Sukarno and Hatta on 17th August 1945 “defined the new Indonesian state as stretching from the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern island of Ambon. New Guinea was not mentioned, although later observers have said that, being a part of the Netherlands Indies, its inclusion was taken for granted.”²⁷⁰ The first meetings between the Republican government and the Netherlands were held in Malino (South Celebes) and Pangkalpinang (Bangka) in July and October 1946. West New Guinea was represented at the first of these by Frans Kaisiepo. He advocated joining the Far East area (Negara Indonesia Timor) at the Malino conference, but he was forced to retract this “under pressure from the natives upon his return home.”²⁷¹ While there was no suggestion that West New Guinea might be excluded from the Indonesian federation at the Malino conference, at the Pangkalpinang conference there was pressure from Eurasian leaders to leave West New Guinea out of the federation in order to found a Eurasian fatherland. This was strongly opposed by the Indonesian representatives.²⁷²

The Linggadjati Agreement in November 1946 provided for an independent Federal state, with any area being able to choose to have a special status within the state, or to opt not to join the Federation at all. This did not apply to West New Guinea, however, as “the primitive Papuans could not be expected to decide democratically on the desirability of a special political status inside or outside Indonesia.”²⁷³ There was a formal explanation in this agreement, that this right to choose did not apply to West New Guinea, but it was suggested that a special status be granted to West New Guinea. This was totally rejected by

²⁷⁰ Osborne (1985), p.14

²⁷¹ Lagerberg (1963), p.33

²⁷² Lijphart (1966), p.11

²⁷³ Lijphart (1966), p.12

most Indonesian Republicans who pushed the Dutch to include New Guinea in the United States of Indonesia. One notable exception was Mohammed Hatta, the first vice-president of the republic. He was against the inclusion of West New Guinea into the nation of Indonesia, believing that Papuans were ethnically different from other Indonesians and should have the right to self-determination.²⁷⁴

Among the Indonesian nationalist leaders in 1945 there had been debate about what areas should be included in the new nation. Yamin argued for a 'Greater Indonesia', an 'Indonesian Fatherland' encompassing what is now Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and even Papua New Guinea. Hatta was opposed to this concept, seeing these arguments as "akin to the Nazi concept of German nationalism".²⁷⁵ While this broader concept of the nation was not to win out, the boundaries of the old Dutch colony were agreed by the majority to be inherited by Indonesia. Hatta was in the minority among the nationalist leaders in suggesting that (West) Papua should not be included. He stated that "...we should not be worried about Papua; it can be given to the Papuans themselves. I acknowledge that the Papuans also have the right to become an independent people".²⁷⁶

The conception of Indonesia as a successor state meant that the basis of this new state was not to be determined by ethnicity or physical geography. In this imagining of the new nation, any ethnic or geographical difference was unimportant, with the oppression by the Dutch and the resistance to this rule culminating in the fight for independence having unified the archipelago's people. Thus if all peoples were equally part of the nation, any compromise to

²⁷⁴ Osborne (1985), p.13

²⁷⁵ Chauvel, Richard, 'West New Guinea: perceptions and policies, ethnicity and the nation state', in Milner and Quilty, *Episodes*, OUP, Melbourne, 1998, p.18

²⁷⁶ Mohammad Hatta speech 11th July 1945 quoted in Chauvel (1998), p.18

secession by West New Guinea would have set a dangerous precedent for other areas such as Aceh and Sulawesi which may have had such tendencies.²⁷⁷

Following the formal recognition of Indonesian independence (without New Guinea), there were bilateral talks between the new nation and the Netherlands in 1950, 1951/2 and 1955/6 to decide on the political fate of New Guinea. These talks failed to resolve the issue.²⁷⁸ Indonesia attempted to get the General Assembly of the United Nations to back Indonesia's claim to New Guinea from 1954 to 1957, but the resolution did not get the required two-thirds majority. This was said to have led to strong anti-Dutch feelings within Indonesia. Some such as Sutan Sjahrir, the first Prime Minister of Indonesia, saw the real problem as being due to the "dominant economic position of Dutch enterprise in Indonesia"²⁷⁹

In December 1957, the Indonesian government ordered a strike against Dutch enterprises. This led to confusion and chaos, with the army stepping in to restore order. The government announced the confiscation of all Dutch property and the expulsion of nearly all the 50,000 Dutch nationals living in Indonesia.²⁸⁰ Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were broken off in 1960.²⁸¹

The Dutch felt that there was likely to be a threat to their colony of West New Guinea from Indonesia and built up their military forces. According to Saltford, half of the Indonesian government budget was spent on military equipment

²⁷⁷ Chauvel (1998), p.19

²⁷⁸ Lijphart (1966), pp.15-16

²⁷⁹ Lijphart (1966), p.18

²⁸⁰ These figures include Eurasian people also. Dutch and Eurasian residents were able to remain as long as they chose to become Indonesian citizens.

²⁸¹ Lijphart (1966), p.18

between 1961 and 1963.²⁸² The Dutch began to speed up preparations for independence, liaising and cooperating administratively with Australia. At this point, according to Lijphart, the Netherlands and Australia began a period of greater cooperation between their colonies, with the eventual aim being the unification of the island of New Guinea as a single nation.²⁸³ This was, and has remained, a tantalising prospect for many Papuan nationalists, with appeals to the concept of pan-Papuan or Melanesian unity being made by independence fighters and activists in recent years.²⁸⁴ Considering the issues that have occurred in PNG with relation to Bougainville, there can be doubts over whether such a union would have resulted in peaceful co-existence between the two halves of the island.

Dutch policy also started to put greater emphasis on Papuan self-determination. Up to this point, the government had not allowed any Papuan say in government decisions, partly due to the more traditional government of the earlier Governor Van Waardenberg.²⁸⁵ The New Guinea Council, initially proposed in 1949, was finally set up in 1960,²⁸⁶ and consisted of 28 members (23 of whom were Papuans).²⁸⁷ Different sources conflict on the power held by this council. Penders suggests that it had power over legislation, a role in budgetary decision-making, and other rights along the lines of a real

²⁸² Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006, p.12

²⁸³ Lijphart (1966), p.19. See also Saltford (2003) for background on the cooperation between the Netherlands and Australia in regard to Dutch New Guinea.

²⁸⁴ 'The Online Papua Mouthpiece', accessed at <http://www.westpapua.net/news/00/05/14MAY.HTM> in May 2006 exemplifies this point of view, with claims that "this "Berlin Wall of Melanesia" has been tightly under control of the Indonesian military power up until now. We did not make the choice to separate from our brothers, sisters, parents, children and relatives on the other half of the island."

²⁸⁵ Penders (2002), p.386

²⁸⁶ Penders (2002), pp.386-391

²⁸⁷ Penders (2002), p.391 states that 22 members were Papuans, Lijphart (1966), pp.19-20 states that 23 were Papuans

parliament.²⁸⁸ Penders suggests that the council was modelled on the early Netherlands-Indies *Volksraad*.²⁸⁹ Lijphart, on the other hand, suggests that its powers were more conditional, with the council having an input on government decision making, legislation and the economy. Lijphart claims that the final power still rested with the Dutch governor.²⁹⁰ There were also local regional communities with similar powers to the New Guinea Council set up in rural areas. Members of the Council and rural communities were elected by direct election in some areas with turnouts of over 80%.²⁹¹

While feelings towards Indonesia were mostly negative, there was a great deal of variation from area to area, with people in some areas such as Fakfak and Biak being pro-Indonesian. In other areas such as the Hollandia region, people apparently wanted Dutch rule to continue temporarily to prepare for eventual independence.²⁹² During the final years of Dutch rule, two pro-Indonesia parties were formed with most of the supporters of these parties being from Biak.²⁹³

The Dutch wanted to shift preparations for self-determination to the United Nations. The Brazzaville proposal developed by Joseph Luns, the Dutch foreign minister, was rejected by the UN General Assembly, as was an Indian proposal for Indonesia and the Netherlands to resume talks.

Two significant events occurred during December 1961. Firstly, there was the declaration of independence by West Papuans.

²⁸⁸ Penders (2002), pp.390-391

²⁸⁹ Penders (2002), p.387

²⁹⁰ Lijphart (1966), pp.19-20

²⁹¹ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (1961), pp.12-13

²⁹² Osborne (1985), pp.20-24. See also Henderson, (1973) for a more comprehensive look at post-war politics in the colony.

²⁹³ Osborne, Robin, 'OPM and the quest for West Papua Unity' in May, R.J. (ed.), *Between two nations: the Indonesia – Papua New Guinea border and West Papua Nationalism*, Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, p.51

On 1 December 1961 the Morning Star was raised beside the Dutch Tricolour. There was great celebration, although the committee clearly lacked effective links with the mass of West Papuans. The gap between the elite, with their Dutch educations, and the village majority was immense.²⁹⁴

This was simply a symbolic declaration with power remaining in the hands of the Dutch. Its symbolism has had an enduring impact though, with commemorations of this day being held every year, mostly through the raising of the Morning Star flag. The Morning Star flag (the *Bintang Kejora*) was designed in 1961 by Nicolas Jouwe²⁹⁵, a prominent political figure, later a pro-Papuan nationalist exile. It symbolises the Koreri, the anti-foreigner movement that had avid followers during the Pacific War period on Biak and surrounding islands.²⁹⁶

As Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford states: “The central symbol of this desire for independence has long been the Morning Star flag, which was installed as a national emblem in 1961, when the territory was still a Dutch colony, by the West New Guinea Council, a multiracial advisory body of elected and appointed representatives.”²⁹⁷ Papuans such as leading human rights activist John Rumbiak still refer to this declaration as the beginning of Papua as an independent country.²⁹⁸ The Morning Star has continued to be a very important symbol for Papuans, and flag raisings have often led to violence, with the Indonesian army and police attempting to stop such ceremonies as occurred with the flag raising in Biak in 1998 with reports of large numbers of people

²⁹⁴ Osborne (1985), p.25

²⁹⁵ ‘History of West Papua’, accessed from <http://www.wpngnc.org/history.htm> in February 2008

²⁹⁶ Sharp, Nonie in association with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, *The morning star in Papua Barat*, Arena, North Carlton, 1994, p.4

²⁹⁷ Mote, Octavianus & Danilyn Rutherford, ‘From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia’s Troubled East’, *Indonesia*, Volume 72 (October 2001), p.123

²⁹⁸ John Rumbiak, speech to International Commission of Jurists in Sydney on 24th June 2004

having been killed, wounded and raped by the Indonesian military.²⁹⁹

Rutherford suggests that such flag raisings have had a mystical power for many Papuans. She states in relation to this incident in Biak that: “The raising of the flag was supposed to elicit the arrival of powerful outsiders and engage the force of the divine.”³⁰⁰

Secondly, the Indonesian government, frustrated with a lack of progress diplomatically, attempted to invade the colony in order to force the issue. Sukarno’s speech in December 1961 announced the *Trikora* (*Tri Komando Rakyat* or Three commands of the people). Sukarno asserted that the three commands were “first, to crush the Dutch colonial effort to build a puppet Papuan state, second, to raise the Indonesian flag in West New Guinea as part of Indonesia, third, to prepare for a general mobilisation to defend the freedom and unity of Indonesia”.³⁰¹ Sukarno also famously declared that Dutch New Guinea must become part of Indonesia “before the cock crows on the 1st of January 1963”.³⁰²

The campaign, Operation Mandala, was headed by the young Suharto, promoted to Major-General by Sukarno.³⁰³ The campaign got off to a bad start with Yos Sudarso, the deputy chief of staff in the Navy, being killed when the boat he was on was sunk by the Dutch even before operations in the region had really begun.³⁰⁴

The campaign was not a success, with paratroopers being killed during the drops into the swamps of the southern part of the islands. According to Ryan, of

²⁹⁹ Rutherford (2003), p.1

³⁰⁰ Rutherford (2003), p.25

³⁰¹ Elson (2001), p.81

³⁰² Kansil, Drs. C.S.T., *Sejarah Indonesia Untuk SMTP*, Jilid I, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta, 1987, p.116.

Translation by author.

³⁰³ Elson (2001), p.81

³⁰⁴ Elson (2001), p.83

the 2,100 Indonesian paratroopers, 180 were killed. Another 800 were imprisoned by the Dutch.³⁰⁵ Those who did manage to survive were not supported by local people as the Indonesians had hoped, and “instead of being welcomed as liberators by the West Irianese, they were received coldly and usually handed over to Dutch troops.”³⁰⁶ Saltford writes it was the Papuan police who found and captured the Indonesian troops who had been landed prior to the UN ceasefire. As Saltford points out, this account (corroborated by UN observers) does not correspond with the Indonesian version, in which “victorious Indonesian soldiers, hand in hand with their Papuan brothers, had fought and defeated the Dutch.”³⁰⁷ There are no shared memories of the winning of freedom from the colonial rulers that could be the basis for feelings of identification with the nation.

It is clear from the extensive commentary on the Bunker agreement that Cold War politics was the deciding factor in the eventual Dutch capitulation to Indonesian pressure. The United States did not wish to alienate Indonesia and was worried about Sukarno’s apparent drift to the left as evidenced by the purchase of Soviet weapons in 1960.³⁰⁸ The United States directly and indirectly through Australia, put pressure on the Netherlands to accede to the Indonesian demands.³⁰⁹ Finally, in August 1962, the Dutch gave in to this pressure. Indonesia and Netherlands signed up to the plan brokered by Ellsworth Bunker,

³⁰⁵ Ryan (1970), pp.197-198

³⁰⁶ Elson (2001), p.84

³⁰⁷ Saltford (2000), pp.30-32, quote from p.32. An article showing the views of Indonesians towards Papua at this time can be seen in an article by Major General Simatupang, a former army Chief of Staff. Simatupang, T. B., ‘An Indonesian Christian View of the West Irian Question’, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No. 4. (Jun., 1962), pp. 28-32

³⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: ending repression in Irian Jaya*, ICG Asia Report No.23, Jakarta/Brussels, 2001, accessed at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm> in January 2005, p.3. The political situation at this time is a complex topic beyond the ambit of this thesis. More details can be found in Elson (2001) and Saltford (2003).

³⁰⁹ For more commentary on the international dimensions of this conflict see also Saltford (2003), Osborne (1985) or Elmslie (2002).

a retired US diplomat. The United Nations temporary Executive Authority took over administration of New Guinea on 1/10/1962 and this control was handed over to Indonesia on 1/5/1963 with the understanding that a plebiscite on the future of the province should be held before the end of 1969.³¹⁰

³¹⁰ Lijphart (1966), pp.20-21

Conclusion

While often depicted as a Stone Age backwater, untouched by outside 'civilization', New Guinea had been part of a trade network for thousands of years. It was also one of the first areas for agriculture to be developed, with dense populations developing in the fertile highland valleys. These ethnic groups did not coalesce into large-scale societies, but remained fragmented, linked mainly by trade. There were chains of trade from the highland to the coast, with goods being traded two or three times before reaching the coast.³¹¹ The coastal peoples were traders, connecting those inland with more extensive trade networks of Southeast Asia. Trade was often mediated through the groups living on off-shore islands such as Banda and Seram Laut, as well as through Bugis and Chinese traders.

While there had been trade and warfare between areas in the east of the archipelago and New Guinea, it seems unlikely that areas outside the Bird's Head peninsula and the surrounding islands had been under the control of the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, or part of the Majapahit Empire. There are clear links to the east, between those ethnic groups close to the border, as well as trading relations that cross this colonial boundary.

The arrival of the Europeans had little impact on the peoples of the island until the 19th century, with disease and belligerence inhibiting European settlement. The Dutch had very little control over the half of the island that was nominally their colony until the start of the 20th century. Even at the end of Dutch rule, some Papuans had little or no direct contact with the colonial administration.

³¹¹ Swadling (1996), p.128

However, in certain areas of the territory there was change under the Dutch. During the pre-war period, there was immigration to West New Guinea from other areas of the Dutch East Indies, particularly officials, missionaries and traders. There were large numbers of public servants from the eastern part of the Indies such as Ambon and Sulawesi. There was friction between these groups and indigenous people, with resentment at the lack of job opportunities for local people in the government administration, the largest employer.

Following the Pacific War the Dutch government recognised that eventual independence was inevitable and invested considerably in education in order to create an educated elite capable of running an independent state. There was a commitment to increasing indigenous employment and political participation. It has been suggested it was this final post-war colonial period that gave a feeling of national identity, at least among the educated elite. Certainly, by the early 1960s most of the political parties were against incorporation into the Indonesian nation, rather favouring independence. This identification with a supra-ethnic Papuan identity was not something that had spread to more than a tiny minority of the population by this point. However, it is a period which has become symbolically important to Papuan nationalists now. As Rutherford says, “the critical historical experience for today’s Papuan nationalists dates to the period between 1949 and 1963, when the Netherlands ruled western New Guinea as a separate entity.”³¹²

There was a vast expansion of Dutch administrative control and contact during this post-war period. Until this time, life for most indigenous people had been affected little by colonial rule. While there were still few Europeans in rural areas, the Dutch presence altered the society in many ways. There was rural to

³¹² Rutherford (2003), p.7

urban migration to take advantage of the economic possibilities there, with wage labour for the government being a major form of employment. The language of government and education was mainly *Bahasa Melayu*, with this becoming the *lingua franca* for inter-group communication. The elite were schooled within the Dutch system, with formal training in Dutch, and this language oriented the elite differently to the elite across the border who were educated in English.

The cultural spheres (areas) concept suggests that there were more similarities and connections between groups in the same sphere, whether on the east or west side of the border. There have also been attempts to justify Indonesian rule over Papua by invoking the Majapahit Empire and the Sultan of Tidore. While western parts of the island such as the Bird's Head region were certainly involved in trade networks to the west, as mentioned earlier, these claims appear unlikely. I suggest that the different colonial histories undergone by Papua and Papua New Guinea have resulted in distinct societies. The cultural areas theory suggests that the use of different languages, exposure to different media worlds and the orientation in different directions (west for Papua and east for PNG) would lead to diverse societies.

This also applies to the archipelago to the west. With the rest of the archipelago becoming politically separated from Papua after the Pacific War, this divide created two imagined communities where before there had been a number of interlocking societies. The experiences in relation to independence are especially relevant to this divergence in identification.

The rapid rise of a Papuan nationalist sentiment in this period agrees with the theory espoused by Anderson.

Nationalism arises when, in a certain physical territory, the inhabitants begin to feel that they share a common destiny, a common future. Or, as I once wrote, they feel bound by a deep horizontal comradeship. Typically, it arises quickly and suddenly in one generation, a clear sign of its novelty.³¹³

However, the new political aspirations held by some Papuans were to have no bearing on the outcome of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning the territory. There was not even any Papuan participation in the agreement between the two countries that saw the handover of power to Indonesia in 1963. The actual participants – the Dutch and Indonesian as opponents and the Americans as mediators – saw no need to incorporate the indigenous residents of the territory their agreement covered. The negotiations were decided by the nationalistic political manoeuvring of Sukarno, and the realpolitik of the Cold War United States foreign policy.

The next chapter will examine the changes that were to occur in the territory with the departure of the Dutch and the arrival of the United Nations and Indonesia.

³¹³ Anderson, Benedict, 'Indonesian nationalism today, and in the future', *Indonesia*, No.67, April 1999, pp.1-11, p.3

Chapter 5: The history of Irian Jaya from 1962

This chapter is a brief history of the province from the time of the departure of the Dutch in 1962 until the start of the new millennium. It is included as background information in order to evaluate the changes to Papuan society.

This chapter examines events from the start of the UNTEA¹ period to the present day, focussed on particular themes of this history which have a bearing on the phenomenon of migration to the province during this period that will be examined thoroughly in the data analysis sections of the thesis.

The UNTEA period

The Dutch relinquished their control over their colony on the 1st October 1962, handing over power to a United Nations body which had *de jure* control over the territory until the 1st May 1963.² Paul Van der Veur suggests that the date of transfer to the UNTEA was hastened by U Thant at the instigation of the Indonesian government, in order to fulfil Sukarno's promise that the Indonesian flag would fly over the territory by 1st January 1963.³

The period of United Nations control was supposed to bridge the transition of power from the Netherlands to Indonesia. In many ways, this was to be the start of the period of Indonesian control of the territory with this UNTEA period being one of *de facto* control by the Indonesian administration. Saltford comments on the lack of organisation and preparation of this UN administration and Peter Hastings states that the "UNTEA itself was a makeshift and largely inefficient

¹ UNTEA - United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

² Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006, pp.ii-iii

³ Van der Veur, Paul, 'The UN in West Irian: A Critique', *International Organization*, Vol.18, No.1, 1964, p.55

administration intent on effecting a handover as quickly and peacefully as possible.”⁴

Indonesia had large numbers of troops in the territory, with the number being almost the same as the number of UN troops at around 1,500.⁵ Indonesian troops, while nominally under UN direction, disregarded the UNTEA and took control of important facilities such as the Sentani Airport from the Papuan police, beat up Papuan police officers, fired on three Dutch nationals, and even attacked a Papuan police station.⁶

John Saltford’s thesis on this period is a detailed account of the failings of the UN supervision of the handover of power to Indonesia in 1962/3 as well as the problematic Act of Free Choice vote in 1969. According to Saltford, one of the main problems with the UN authority was its inability to recruit personnel who were suitable for their positions and able to speak either Indonesian/Malay or Dutch. This was compounded by the temporary nature of the UN presence, with more qualified staff being unwilling to travel so far for such a short term of employment. The UN did not provide many interpreters, meaning that the staff not skilled in Indonesian were forced to rely on Indonesian officials as translators, compromising the independence of the UN authority.⁷ The UN had hoped to staff their operations mainly with former Dutch administrators, enticing them to stay on in the province by offering well-paid positions. However, most of these officials were to leave and in their absence the positions were filled by Indonesian bureaucrats.⁸

⁴ Hastings, Peter, *New Guinea: problems and prospects*, Cheshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1969, p.211

⁵ Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia’s secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p.31

⁶ Saltford (2000)

⁷ Saltford (2000), pp.42-44

⁸ Van der Veur (1964), p.59

By March 1963, of the administrators working for the UNTEA, 1,200 were Indonesian, 200 were Dutch and there were 80 officials from other countries.⁹ At the time of the sovereignty transfer to Indonesia, in May of the same year, there were 1,600 Indonesian administrators in the province.¹⁰ According to the British ambassador to Indonesia at this time, “the Indonesian contingent commander and the head of the Indonesian Mission had virtually been running the internal affairs of the territory for several months past.”¹¹ The dominance of Indonesian officials in this administrative body endangered the independence of the UN organisation. It seemed that overall the UNTEA had little contact with Papuans, with comments made to Van der Veur at the time that: “A chasm yawned between us and UNTEA. They had no contact with the people whatsoever. As far as I am concerned they may just as well not have been here.”¹²

The employment issues that had arisen during the UNTEA period continued after the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Papuans complained to Herbert Feith in 1964 that there were no government jobs for them, but only for Javanese people. Papuans held 4,950 of the 8,800 positions in the public service at the end of the Dutch colonial period. This level of Papuan employment in government was to diminish within the Indonesian state, with people from other parts of the archipelago occupying jobs at all levels of the administrations, especially higher-level positions.¹³ According to Crocombe and Ali, “between 1962 and 1963...the number of middle level West Irianese slumped from 81 to 6, and the number of non-West Irianese rose from zero to 34.”¹⁴ This resulted in

⁹ Saltford (2000), p.125

¹⁰ Saltford (2000), p.120

¹¹ Saltford (2000), p.120

¹² Van der Veur (1964), p.59

¹³ Sharp, Nonie, *The rule of the sword: the story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, 1977, p.30

¹⁴ Crocombe, Ron & Ali Ahmed, *Politics in Melanesia*, Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, 1982, p.6

large numbers of indigenous people returning to their villages of origin, returning to a subsistence livelihood there after being displaced from employment in the money economy.¹⁵

¹⁵ Van der Veur (1964), p.61

The 26th province

Following the handover of power to Indonesia the resistance to Indonesian rule disrupted the new administration to such an extent that President Sukarno banned foreigners (other than missionaries) from entering the province in September 1963.¹⁶ Ismail and colleagues claim that there were 15,000 Papuan intellectuals deported from the territory at this time, although this number seems impossibly high given the number of educated Papuans at this time.¹⁷

Not only government officials were arriving from other parts of Indonesia. There were supposedly restrictions on migration to the province from the rest of Indonesia, from the integration of the province in 1963 up until 1969. However, it does not seem that this limited greatly the number of immigrants to the province. Saltford states that: "By 1964, however, the resident Indonesian population was estimated to be 16,000, twice as large as the maximum pre-1963 Dutch population."¹⁸ The private sector was becoming dominated by immigrants, with Hastings noting during his trip to West Irian in 1968 that most of the stores in Jayapura were run by Makassarese traders.¹⁹

These migrants took employment away from indigenous Papuans. Also, there was prejudice against the indigenous population by the new arrivals. Two US officials who visited the province in 1964 reported that Papuans were alienated from the new administration. They stated that the Indonesian bureaucrats

¹⁶ Ismail, Muhammad Gade et al., *Aceh, Jakarta, Papua: akar permasalahan dan alternative proses penyelesaian konflik*, YAPPIKA, Jakarta, 2001, p.88

¹⁷ Ismail et al (2001), p.88. See chapter 7 for more details on the education figures from this time. These figures suggest that this claim is erroneous.

¹⁸ Saltford, John, *The United Nations and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: the anatomy of betrayal*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, p.77

¹⁹ Hastings, Peter, *New Guinea: problems and prospects*, Cheshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1969, p.218

“patronised the Papuans in an almost ‘classical colonial sense’ and were quick to complain how lazy the locals were and how ‘like children they must be led’.”²⁰

Following the formal handover of power, there was looting of resources from the province by the incoming personnel, both civil and military.²¹ This was exacerbated by the differences in the currencies used in the new province and the rest of the nation. The West Irian rupiah was made a fixed currency, pegged to the Dutch guilder, but was freely convertible to the Indonesian rupiah. This situation led to artificial conversion rates and corruption. This enabled those who sold items in Jakarta to make large profits. Budiardjo and Liong claim that “Indonesians made huge profits by using their earnings to buy up commodities in West Papua and export them to Indonesia for their own use or for sale on the black market.”²²

This corruption disadvantaged Papuan consumers who were unable to buy these goods. Hastings witnessed the effects of this corruption, and says that:

Consumer goods ... rapidly disappeared from shop counters, mainly into the hands of Indonesian troops and Administration personnel, who swiftly traded them into the black markets of Djakarta; food became scarce and Papuans in the towns ... began cultivating their subsistence gardens again. Many were obliged to leave their houses which were commandeered by the incoming Indonesians and today, apart from a few high ranking Papuans, few occupy the houses in which they lived in 1963.²³

²⁰ Saltford (2003), p.78

²¹ It appears that this had been occurring during the UNTEA period, but the scale of the corruption appears to have increased following the UN's departure.

²² Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988, p.17

²³ Hastings (1969), p.212

According to Jaspan, this forced the government to impose an 'economic quarantine' in order to stop the stripping of import goods from the province.²⁴

Sharp also says that a 'political quarantine' was imposed. Sukarno imposed a ban on open political activity such as public political meetings, censored the press and curtailed movement.²⁵ These changes were in not in accordance with the political freedoms that were supposedly guaranteed during this period by the New York Agreement.²⁶ This quarantine prevented most foreigners, including academics and journalists but not missionaries, from entering the new province. While Suharto suggested that this would be temporary, the movement ban has been in place off and on until the present.²⁷

The Indonesian government wished to set up a university in the new territory within a year of the handover of sovereignty. This was more for symbolic reasons than for educational or social reasons. Even the committee charged with establishing the new institution concluded that the need for secondary education was more needed for the territory than this university.²⁸ There were few students qualified to enter tertiary education in the province. From figures presented by Jaspan, it appears likely there were less than a hundred Papuan students in secondary education at this time, most in a lower level teaching college.²⁹ Most of the students then would not be Papuans, but migrants such as civil servants and military staff.³⁰

²⁴ Jaspan, M.A., 'West Irian: The first two years', *The Australian Quarterly*, June 9-21, 1965, pp.9-21, pp.11-12

²⁵ Sharp (1977), pp.16-17

²⁶ Saltford (2000), p.151

²⁷ Saltford (2000), pp.151-152

²⁸ Jaspan (1964), p.263

²⁹ Jaspan (1964), pp.263-264

³⁰ Jaspan (1964), p.264

Jaspan claims that the university used the facilities of missionary schools in Jayapura (then Kotabaru). However, David Neilson suggests that the university was planned by the Dutch on land given to them by the Indonesian Protestant Church (GKI). It was then established by Indonesia in the period after the Dutch had agreed to transfer power to Indonesia, but before the arrival of the UNTEA.³¹

This new institution, *Universitas Cenderawasih*, was the first on the island of New Guinea. As Jaspan points out, universities in other areas of the nation were set up in response to local demand.³² However, in Papua, the local need was subordinate to the national interest. Those to benefit from the scheme were mostly not Papuans. Of the 101 students in the first year of the university, only 26 were indigenous students. With no indigenous students passing the end of year examinations, it appears that most of these students were not at a level to benefit substantially from this new institution, initially at least. Papuans did study at other universities across Indonesia, with 270 students in tertiary education across the nation in 1963, with sources projecting an increase to 800 by 1965.³³

One important group of foreigners present in the territory throughout this period of change were missionaries. With the political quarantine of the territory that had been imposed, it was difficult for foreigners to enter what was now West Irian, except through church organisations. These missionaries were not a good source of information on the province to reporters and academics in the rest of the world.

³¹ Private email communication from David Neilson, April 2006

³² Jaspan (1964), p.268

³³ Jaspan (1964), p.267 & Jaspan, M, 'The Tjenderawasih State University of West Irian', *Vestes* (The Australian Universities Review Journal of the Federal Council of University Staff Associations of Australia), Vol. VII, No.4, 1964, pp.262-268, p.18

Although there were several hundred missionaries in West Irian, there is no evidence that they were a particular source of useful information. In fact, the US missionaries and their families, who made up the largest group (256 resident in the interior in 1964), were described as having excellent relations with local government officials, which perhaps explained their unwillingness to do anything that could jeopardise their future.³⁴

Missionaries were then (and continue to be) important providers of education, transport and medication to people in the province, being especially important to those living in the more remote areas.³⁵

³⁴ Saltford (2003), pp.74-75

³⁵ See chapters 7 and 9 for more discussion of the role played by missions in the province in general and in the highlands in particular.

Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule

Led by Johan Ariks, the Arfak people of the Manokwari region rebelled against Indonesian rule in July 1965.³⁶ Osborne suggests that the Arfak people were in practice the founders of the major resistance movement against the Indonesian rule of the province, the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM – Free Papua Movement).³⁷ With these actions being prior to Suharto's rise to the presidency, this contradicts Anderson's assertion that the OPM was a result of the New Order regime of Suharto. It does seem, however, that this revolt was a response to policies that "showed the local people that, in the eyes of the Center, Irian mattered, not the people who lived there."³⁸ Anderson also contends that: "The people of Irian were never seriously invited into the common project, so it is only natural that they quickly began to feel that they were being colonized."³⁹ This resistance to Indonesian rule was to continue for several years, with thousands of troops being involved.⁴⁰

Willy Mandowen claims that the OPM originated in the Jayapura region in 1963, being founded by Aser Demotekay for the liberation of West Papua.⁴¹

Mandowen also states that the term *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* was ascribed to the group by the Indonesian security forces, with the group being formally founded in 1970.⁴² While there was dissension between different factions of the OPM, Osborne claims that the organization did "liaise between nationalists in

³⁶ Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970, p.240

³⁷ Osborne (1985), p.35

³⁸ Anderson, Benedict, 'Indonesian nationalism today, and in the future', *Indonesia*, No.67, April 1999, pp.1-11, p.5

³⁹ Anderson (1999), p.5

⁴⁰ Osborne (1985), p.35

⁴¹ Mandowen, Willy, 'West Papua and the right to self-determination a challenge to human rights', pp.30-31 in Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005

⁴² Mandowen in Rathgeber (2005)

Irian's different regions. For example, coastal people played a part in the Enarotali uprising and OPM couriers had even walked up to the Baliem Valley."⁴³

⁴³ Osborne (1985), p.45

The Act of Free Choice

The lead up to the 'Act of Free Choice' of 1969 was an unsettled period in Papua, with different ethnic groups working together. Franz Kaisiepo, the governor, asserted publicly that "tribes which had been enemies for years were united in their hostility to the Indonesians."⁴⁴ Papuans were criticising the method of the Act of Free Choice even before it was conducted. Protests were passed to the UN representative, Ortiz Sanz, requesting a one-man-one-vote referendum rather than the method eventually selected, as it was predicted (correctly) that this method would be manipulated by the Indonesian authorities.⁴⁵

With the Act of Free Choice date coming closer, the government decided to act to ensure there were no embarrassing disturbances in the province. President Suharto sent his long-time deputy, Ali Murtopo, to the province to ensure that the campaign would have no chance of failure. Murtopo became Commander of the Special Operations section of the military in the province and had a pivotal role, using a "mixture of browbeating and intimidation...and persuasion and bribery"⁴⁶ on the delegates to the Act of Free Choice vote. Suharto had already appointed another trusted lieutenant, Sarwo Edhie, as the Provincial Commander of Irian Jaya in July 1968. Edhie suppressed dissent and arrested many of those who spoke in favour of independence. Edhie acted to build up the number of troops to counter the resistance in the Manokwari area and launched a campaign against the Arfak rebels.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Osborne (1985), p.42

⁴⁵ Saltford (2000), p.215

⁴⁶ Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001, p.179

⁴⁷ Crocombe & Ahmed (1982), p.15 and Saltford (2000), p.198-200

There is a considerable literature on this period and a detailed analysis of the problems with the administration of the referendum. The detailed works compiled by Pieter Drooglever and John Saltford point to considerable evidence that the Act of Free Choice was anything but that, with Indonesian intimidation of delegates along with UN supervision questionable.⁴⁸ Suffice it to say that the Act of Free Choice was voted on by the 1,022 delegates in 1969, with the result being unanimously in favour of remaining part of Indonesia.

⁴⁸ See for example Saltford (2003), Saltford (2000), Drooglever, Pieter Joost, *Een daad van vrije keuze : de Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2005

Resumption of hostilities

With the province now recognised by the international community as part of Indonesia, the government began to expand its presence and influence in the province. There were expansions in the numbers in schools across the province with the number of students enrolled rising dramatically.⁴⁹ The provincial administration was relatively well funded, continuing the high funding levels of the colony under the Dutch in the years immediately before. Overall, Garnaut and Manning state that: “In [1971/72], the 21 million residents of West Java received Rp 317 per capita while residents of Irian Jaya received Rp 11,024.”⁵⁰

This expansion of the administration across the new province also had its negatives. One program started in this period was *Operasi Koteka*, a campaign conducted by the government in 1970 through the military. It was intended to ‘civilise’ those highlanders who wore the *koteka* (the customary male clothing for highland groups, the penis gourd), to encourage such groups as the Dani to wear clothes and to change the social life of villages to more resemble ‘Indonesian’ society.⁵¹ This program was not well received by the Dani of the Jayawijaya region after the military made it compulsory for men to wear trousers. With people in this region unaware of how to maintain these items, it was unsurprising that many men developed skin infections as a result.⁵² The rationale behind this program is revealing, with Osborne reporting the authorities as believing that “the Ndani could not become civilised if they continued to go naked.”⁵³ This points to an understanding of socio-economic development as being connected somehow to the adoption of the customs and

⁴⁹ See chapters 7-9 for more details.

⁵⁰ Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p.45, note 1

⁵¹ Sharp (1977), p.25

⁵² Osborne (1985), p.66

⁵³ Osborne (1985), p.66

habits of the dominant group, a colonial conception.⁵⁴ The operation was a failure.

The Freeport mine has been an major development in the province, often noted to be one of the largest taxpayers in the nation.⁵⁵ The mine was the recipient of the first mining contract awarded by the new Suharto government in 1967.⁵⁶ Exports from the Freeport mine started in 1972, with protection of the mine by the military continuing to date from the early 1970s. It has been suggested that initially the company hoped to ignore the local population, but later began to build schools and clinics in the area, and to provide employment for them.⁵⁷ The mining company thought they had made an agreement with the local Amungme people in 1974, although this is not the understanding of local people who believe that they were forced to accept the arrangement by threats made by military officers.⁵⁸ The buildings that had been built were then destroyed during the conflict in 1977.⁵⁹

In 1976 there was rioting in Tembagapura, near the mine, and this escalated in 1977 when, according to Ballard, “two policemen at the village of Akimuga were ejected by the villagers.”⁶⁰ This was then followed by strafing of this village by military planes. The Freeport mine copper slurry pipeline was cut by Papuan villagers, an attack on the heart of the economic development of the province

⁵⁴ This issue will be explored in more detail in chapter 6. It seems ironic that at the same time this program was being conducted in order to homogenise cultural practices, Ibu Tien Suharto was inspired to celebrate cultural diversity by establishing *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*.

⁵⁵ Ballard, Chris, *Human Rights and the Mining Industry in Indonesia: a baseline study*, MMSD Working Paper No. 182, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development., London, 2002b accessed at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?o=G00929> in November 2008, p.23

⁵⁶ Ballard (2002b), p.23

⁵⁷ Global Witness, *Paying for Protection: the Freeport mine and the Indonesian security forces*, Global Witness, Washington D.C., 2005, p.9

⁵⁸ Ballard (2002b), pp.24-25

⁵⁹ Global Witness (2005), p.10

⁶⁰ Ballard (2002b), p.25

under Suharto.⁶¹ According to Osborne, this was a reaction to indiscriminate bombings on villages in the vicinity of the Freeport mine.⁶² The Indonesian military retaliated with attacks on villages in areas OPM fighters were thought to be operating. These included air strikes which strafed and napalmed villages in retaliation for killings of Indonesian soldiers or minor acts. According to Terry Doyle, an Australian civilian pilot who operated in this area for 8 years, this retaliation was “pretty heavy-handed...totally uncalled for. What had been really only a minor civil disturbance, or a few crimes against property, was met with massive retaliation, way out of proportion.”⁶³ As well as the air strikes, there were ground forces in these villages that are reported to have killed many of the inhabitants.⁶⁴

The Grasberg mine was begun in 1989, expanding the scale of the mining operations at the site considerably and increasing the number of migrants from outside the province coming to the new town of Timika looking for employment. The increasing numbers of newcomers have led to tensions with the indigenous population that have escalated into large-scale inter-group violence on a many occasions. There has also been a history of conflict between the military around the mine and local people, with the Global Protection report suggesting that 37 Papuans were killed by military personnel or disappeared in 1994.⁶⁵ There were further issues with a massacre in 1995 and rioting in 1996.⁶⁶ While there have not been incidents at such a scale since this time, Ballard does note that: “For many Amungme communities, the 20 years since 1977 have

⁶¹ Brundige, Elizabeth & Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004, p.23

⁶² Osborne (1985), p.69

⁶³ Osborne (1985), p.70

⁶⁴ Osborne (1985), pp.70-73

⁶⁵ Global Witness (2005), p.10

⁶⁶ Ballard (2002b), pp.25-26

been characterised by a sequence of flights to the forest, usually for one to two years at a time, before returning to rebuild their settlements and re-establish gardens.”⁶⁷

These incidents were connected, with Chris Ballard suggesting this was a province-wide revolt.⁶⁸ This revolt and the consequent military response by the Indonesian military meant that 1977 was the year of the first large-scale border crossings from the province across to Papua New Guinea. In May and June of that year there were more than 1,000 border crossers.⁶⁹ This became a major news story and an international incident, with United Nations involvement. UN representative Tom Unwin was the only independent person to meet the refugees.⁷⁰

The early 1980s was a period with much conflict across the territory, leading to international attention falling on the province. There are a large number of academic publications from this period, reflecting the interest these issues generated and on the repercussions of the transmigration program on the indigenous population. The OPM was seriously factionalised during the early 1980s, with factions attacking and killing members of other factions.⁷¹ There were continuing small scale incidents through the early 1980s such as the Holtekang abduction of 22 mainly Indonesian hostages in 1981, attacks on military personnel and migrants, and sporadic raisings of the Morning Star

⁶⁷ Ballard (2002b), p.26

⁶⁸ Ballard, Chris, 'The denial of traditional land rights in West Papua', *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 26.3, Fall 2002, accessed online through sfx at <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=1565> in May 2007

⁶⁹ Sharp (1977), pp.4-5

⁷⁰ Sharp (1977), pp.4-5

⁷¹ Osborne (1985), pp.80-85

flag.⁷² There was conflict between migrants and indigenous Papuans, with killings and retaliatory killings in the Hamadi markets in Jayapura.⁷³

In 1984, the situation became more extreme, with rights abuses in the Jayapura regency as well as the murder of the prominent Papuan anthropologist, musician and leader Arnold Ap.⁷⁴ This resulted in thousands of refugees (perhaps as many as 11,000) crossing the border into PNG⁷⁵ following OPM attacks in the province and the subsequent Indonesian government military response. The apparent trigger for the start of the troubles of 1984 was the raising of the Morning Star flag in Jayapura on 13th February. However, the OPM claimed that this was but part of a general uprising, with attacks taking place in Biak, Manokwari, Wamena and Merauke. This may have been connected with the departure of Seth Rumkorem and the subsequent détente between the two OPM factions.⁷⁶ The Yale report of 2004 suggests that the trigger for the border crossings was army operations in Jayapura in February 1984 in response to OPM activity.⁷⁷

This had international repercussions, with international press attention focussed on the issue. There were bi-lateral tensions between Indonesia and PNG arising from domestic political pressure within PNG. Many in this nation wished their country to give support to what they perceived as their Melanesian brothers and sisters suffering oppression. The PNG government appeared to wish to accede to Indonesian demands to simply return the refugees and not alienate its big neighbour, though this was not easily accomplished without the risk of

⁷² Osborne (1985), pp.89-99

⁷³ Osborne (1985), p.99

⁷⁴ Chauvel, Richard and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's perceptions and policies*, Policy Studies No.5, East-West Center, Washington, 2004, p.24

⁷⁵ Osborne (1985), p.102

⁷⁶ Harris, Stephen V. & Colin Brown, *Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya problem of 1984*, Griffith University, Nathan, 1985, pp.8-9

⁷⁷ Brundige (2004), p.36

domestic unpopularity. The diplomatic incidents which occurred subsequently suggested that Indonesia was insensitive to the PNG administration's internal political difficulties with appeasing their western neighbour.⁷⁸

In terms of the refugees, the PNG government had not allowed the UNHCR to visit any of the camps of the border-crossers, except for the Black Water camp. Harris claims that: "Had the UNHCR been admitted into the other camps, this would have been tantamount to admitting that the inhabitants of those camps, too, were political refugees – and thus not liable for repatriation."⁷⁹ Most of these refugees were to remain in PNG, with only 1,500 having returned to Indonesia by 1987.⁸⁰

One issue that developed from the independence movement was the labelling of indigenous people as 'separatists' by security forces. In a similar manner to the use of the term 'communist' during the New Order period, military and government personnel have been accused of using this term to discredit any people who are critical of their actions. A measure introduced in 1963 was the Anti-Subversion Presidential Decree. The vague and general nature of the definition of this decree is shown by its definition of subversion as "any attitude or behaviour ...which is considered to undermine the ill-defined 'aims' of the Revolution."⁸¹ While designed to strengthen Sukarno's grip on power in the rest of the archipelago, in Irian Jaya it gave the authorities "powers to make anti-subversion charges against anyone campaigning for Papuan rights, under the threat of the death sentence."⁸² This was to continue into the new millennium. Franciscans International, an NGO active in Papua, commented that in the 2004-

⁷⁸ See Harris (1985)

⁷⁹ Harris (1985), p.23

⁸⁰ Brundige (2004), p.37. It should be noted that this figure is the UNHCR estimate, while the Indonesian government claimed that 6,000 refugees had returned.

⁸¹ Budiardjo & Liong (1988), p.16

⁸² Budiardjo & Liong (1988), p.16

5 period “the stigma of separatism [was] regularly imposed on individuals or institutions that the security forces consider[ed] to be suspicious.”⁸³ This was also noted by UN Special Reporter Hina Jilani after her visit to the province in July 2007.⁸⁴

The small scale human rights issues that had occurred throughout the 1980s continued during the 1990s. There were shootings of unarmed villagers in the Timika area in 1995 and 1996.⁸⁵ John Rumbiak claimed that there had been 80 summary executions of Papuan people between 1998 and 2000 by the Indonesian forces.⁸⁶ The transmigration program continued and other, spontaneous migrants arrived from other areas of the nation. The economy of the province continued to grow, especially following the ‘Go East’ campaign of the early part of the 1990s.⁸⁷ The Freeport mine continued to contribute large sums to the national budget. The vague nature of these statements above on the 1990s period points to a gap in the literature on Papua. There is a dearth of materials on the province from this period, with the extensive literature on the area during the 1980s falling away greatly. The excellent materials that have been produced during the past decade by many authors tend to skip past this period with little comment. Partially, this reflects the seemingly static nature of the society during this period, with no great changes occurring in the province.

⁸³ Wing, John with Peter King, *Genocide in Papua? - the role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua, August 2005, p.49

⁸⁴ Jilani, Hina, *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders: Addendum, Mission to Indonesia*, 28th January 2008, A/HRC/7/28/Add.2, accessed from <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7session/A-HRC-7-28-Add2.doc> in February 2008, p.21

⁸⁵ Mote, Octavianus & Danilyn Rutherford, ‘From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia’s Troubled East’, *Indonesia*, Volume 72 (October 2001), p.120

⁸⁶ John Rumbiak’s claims, ‘Papua/Irian news reports in Papua New Guinea, April 1996 – August 2001’, compiled by Dr Peter Elder, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/chrono/notes/elder.pdf> in February 2008

⁸⁷ McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural society in peril: migration, economic change and the Papua conflict*, East-West Center Washington, 2004, accessed from [www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in September 2005](http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in_September_2005), p.16

The lack of any great change, along with the difficulties placed in the way of researchers by the Indonesian government appears to have resulted in a lack of any extensive research on this period.

With the fall of Suharto came a relaxation of the political stranglehold that had been in place during the New Order era. Papuan aspirations of independence rose considerably, with the events in East Timor increasing the feeling within the indigenous population that independence was possible. A group of Papuan leaders from the church and civil society had established the Forum for Reconciliation for the People of Irian Jaya (*FORERI*) in July 1998.⁸⁸ This group was to lead the political process that led to the Team of One Hundred (*Tim Seratus*) from Papua that went to the presidential palace in February 1999 to demand independence from Indonesia. According to Peter King this demand “created shock in Jakarta and euphoria all over Papua.”⁸⁹ This group was also behind the Papuan Mass Consultation (*Musyawahar Besar Papua*) and Papua Congress II (*Kongres Papua II*) in 2000.⁹⁰ This congress was attended by 20,000 delegates,⁹¹ with the Presidium Council created by this congress electing Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal as joint chairmen.⁹²

This congress was possible as a result of the relaxation on the repression of political expressions in the province made by the first democratically elected president of the nation, Abdurrahman Wahid. Abdurrahman Wahid allowed

⁸⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, Asia Briefing Number 47, 23 March 2006, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4042&l=1> in March 2006, p.6

⁸⁹ King (2004), p.38

⁹⁰ ICG (2006), p.6

⁹¹ Sumule, Agus, *Protection and Empowerment of the Rights of Indigenous People of Papua (Irian Jaya) Over Natural Resources under Special Autonomy: from legal opportunities to the challenge of implementation*, Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper No. 36, ANU, 2002, p.5

⁹² International Crisis Group, *Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, Asia Report No.53, Jakarta/Brussels, 5th September 2006a, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4364&l=1> in February 2008, pp.6-7

(and was present for) the raising of the *Bintang Kejora* (Morning Star) flag on December 1st 1999, along with renaming the province Papua.⁹³ It had a rich symbolism for Papuans that these changes were announced on this date, widely perceived as a ‘Papuan Independence Day’.⁹⁴

While Abdurrahman Wahid had allowed the Morning Star flag to be raised (a very popular move among indigenous Papuans⁹⁵) this policy had not been popular with police (and presumably military forces) in the province.⁹⁶ These changes were politically opposed very strongly by politicians in Jakarta and these changes were rejected by the nation’s parliament. With flag raisings once more illegal, the security forces moved to stop these acts – now deemed seditious – often with force.

In the capital of Jayawijaya regency, Wamena, the actions of security forces to tear down these symbols resulted in the death of around 30 people in October 2000.⁹⁷ The rioting led to anti-immigrant violence, with fears for migrants in the area, especially for teachers.

Of 2,467 teachers in Jayawijaya, around 95% are immigrants, including Irian people from the lowland areas. For the people of Wamena, immigrants are people who are not indigenous to Jayawijaya. Several teachers originally from coastal areas of Irian Jaya also received stab wounds at the time of the riots.⁹⁸

There were also disturbances in the provincial capital in this year, with fights between indigenous Papuans and immigrants flaring in the Abepura markets in

⁹³ Chauvel (2004), p.27

⁹⁴ See chapter 4, pp.128-129

⁹⁵ Chauvel (2004), p.29. During my visit to the province, indigenous people remarked that Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid’s nickname) was the only good Indonesian president.

⁹⁶ Chauvel (2004), p.28

⁹⁷ Chauvel (2004), p.30

⁹⁸ ‘Nasib ribuan guru di Jayawijaya belum jelas’, *Kompas*, 11/10/2000. Translation from the original Indonesian by the author.

Jayapura regency. The situation inflamed local people sufficiently that “300 people armed with traditional weapons attacked the police station near the Abepura market killing three policemen as well as burning down shops.”⁹⁹ While the police could not identify the attackers, the police suspected highlanders and raided student dormitories where highland Papuans resided. Ninety students were detained, with three being killed and some others being tortured.¹⁰⁰ According to a Swiss journalist, Oswald Iten, who was also being held at the time, many of these prisoners were also tortured and medical help was withheld from severely beaten detainees.¹⁰¹ As a result of the many disturbances around the province, many settlers left the province at the end of 2000. The International Crisis Group estimated that as many as 25,000 migrants had fled on the national shipping lines during October and November 2000.¹⁰²

These disturbances were partly behind the political process that ended with the declaration of Special Autonomy passed by the House of Representatives in October 2001.¹⁰³ Chauvel argues that this law was a “policy response from weak and insecure governments to Papuan demands for independence.”¹⁰⁴ Chauvel also claims that this law was part of a series of overt and covert operations foreseen by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as measures to combat the widespread indigenous support for independence from Indonesia.¹⁰⁵ According to a government document:

The covert activities would include recruiting, training, and supporting pro-Indonesian militia at the village level. Other measures involved providing pro-

⁹⁹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: ending repression in Irian Jaya*, ICG Asia Report No.23, Jakarta/Brussels, 2001, accessed at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm> in January 2005, p.7

¹⁰⁰ ICG (2006), p.7

¹⁰¹ ICG (2001), p.7, note 28

¹⁰² ICG (2001), p.8

¹⁰³ Chauvel (2004), pp.32-33

¹⁰⁴ Chauvel (2004), p.ix

¹⁰⁵ Chauvel (2004), p.29

Indonesia leaders with government positions at all levels from village to province, bestowing honors on local leaders, and appointing “national heroes” from Irian Jaya. Among the policy initiatives supported were regional autonomy, the partition of the province, and the creation of new administrative districts. The memo argued that the implementation of both regional autonomy and partition should be accelerated.¹⁰⁶

The following year was to see large military operations in the Manokwari region in response to the killing of migrant settlers, with operations in other areas of the province.¹⁰⁷ The situation was to intensify with the murder of the chairman of the Presidium Council, Theys Eluay, in November of 2001. This caused a resurgence of independence sentiment.¹⁰⁸ While the memo mentioned above suggested that “local leaders” should be dubbed “national heroes”, the soldiers convicted of his murder were labelled ‘national heroes’ by General Ryamizard Ryacudu.¹⁰⁹ There were to be other murders in the province in 2002, with the deaths of two American and one Indonesian teacher on the road to the Freeport mine. This was to provoke intensive international scrutiny of the operations of the military in the province, and the relationships between the military and the mining giant.

The next year was to bring major changes to the territory with the presidential decree issued by the new President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. This edict (Inpres 1/2003) announced the government’s intention to split the province into three portions: Irian Jaya, Irian Jaya Barat (West Irian Jaya) and Irian Jaya Tengah

¹⁰⁶ Chauvel (2004), p.29

¹⁰⁷ Chauvel (2004), p.33

¹⁰⁸ See Chauvel (2004), pp.33-35 for an examination of the motives for his death. See also International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua*, Asia Report 39, Brussels/Jakarta, 2002, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1449&l=1> in February 2008, pp.3-5.

¹⁰⁹ Chauvel (2004), p.34

(Central Irian Jaya).¹¹⁰ The declaration created strong feelings, with suggestions that this was “an indication that Soeharto-style divide and rule tactics from Jakarta continued”.¹¹¹ The formation of Irian Jaya Barat was to go ahead, and while the legality of its formation was questioned in court moves to annul the division were rejected.¹¹² The establishment of Irian Jaya Tengah, however, was to be halted by widespread rioting in the intended capital of the new province, Timika.¹¹³ This division surprised many in the province who had considered the division of the province (originally passed into law by the Habibie government) to have been thwarted, and created “widespread anger within important sectors of the Papuan elite and looked certain to cause tensions.”¹¹⁴ McGibbon suggests that it was “an effort to exploit regional and tribal cleavages”¹¹⁵ and its implementation seemed to be following the program mapped out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs document referenced by Chauvel above.¹¹⁶ There were certainly those who stood to benefit from this division, partially to do with national politics,¹¹⁷ and the province of West Irian Jaya is still in existence as of 2008, having been renamed Papua Barat (West Papua) in 2007¹¹⁸

Along with this major administrative change to the province, the number of districts and sub-districts in the province has increased greatly since the

¹¹⁰ See Chauvel (2004), pp.36-42 for a thorough examination of this division. The map on p.259 illustrates the form that these three provinces were supposed to take.

¹¹¹ International Crisis Group, *Dividing Papua: How not to do it*, Asia Briefing No.24, Jakarta/Brussels, 9th April 2003, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1764> in February 2008, p.4

¹¹² McGibbon (2004), p.52

¹¹³ See Sullivan, Laurence, *Challenges to Special Autonomy in the province of Papua, Republic of Indonesia*, Discussion paper 2003/6, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 2003, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/sullivan-2003-ssgm-otsus.pdf> in February 2008 for an extended discussion of the legal issues surrounding this division in relation to Special Autonomy.

¹¹⁴ ICG (2003), p.7

¹¹⁵ McGibbon (2004), p.34

¹¹⁶ See p.158 above.

¹¹⁷ See ICG (2003), p7

¹¹⁸ ‘Irian Jaya Barat Berubah Nama Menjadi Papua Barat’, <http://www.indonesiaindonesia.com/f/12312-irian-jaya-barat-berubah-nama-menjadi/> in February 2008

implementation of the Regional Autonomy legislation in 1999. While there had previously been only nine regencies, there are currently 29, with a further nine being planned.¹¹⁹ This administrative growth has not been without problems. Political pressure to indigenise the executive arm of local government meant that the heads of these new districts were all Papuan.¹²⁰ McGibbon reports that this pressure for indigenous roles in the bureaucracy meant that: “It is also estimated that 80 percent of senior bureaucratic posts (so-called Echelon 2 and 3 positions) were Papuans. Furthermore, under Police Chief I Made Pastika the police claimed to have dramatically increased the number of Papuan recruits”.¹²¹ McGibbon also states that there were suggestions that up to 3,000 new senior positions would have to be created as a result of these administrative divisions.¹²²

These moves to promote indigenous participation in the higher levels of the bureaucracy are positive, and are in contrast to those during the Suharto era when only four in nine *butatis* were indigenous people.¹²³ Unfortunately, newspaper reports in Papua point to the difficulties of finding suitably experienced Papuan administrators willing to live in the more remote parts of the province. Many of these new officials are either unqualified or inexperienced for their new posts, or do not wish to live in these new districts, instead residing in Jayapura and occasionally visiting the district they are purportedly working in and for.¹²⁴ An ICG report states that “there were also issues of a complaint, supported by almost daily reports of official misbehaviour in the local press, that Papuan officials are as prone to corruption and high-

¹¹⁹ ICG (2006), p.3

¹²⁰ ICG (2006), p.1

¹²¹ McGibbon (2004), p.49

¹²² McGibbon (2004), p.52

¹²³ Manning, Chris and Michael Rumbiak, *Economic Development, Migrant Labour and Indigenous Welfare in Irian Jaya 1970-84*, Pacific Research Monograph 20, ANU, Canberra, 1989

¹²⁴ Personal communications to the author during visit to the province, August 2005

handedness as their non-Papuan predecessors.”¹²⁵ The Special Autonomy law has created many more positions for educated Papuans in the provincial administration, co-opting the elite in ways that were predicted by the official document quoted above.¹²⁶ This lack of suitable, willing indigenous candidates for these positions was posited as being likely to result in migrants re-gaining important positions in the local and provincial administration.¹²⁷

There was dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Special Autonomy package in Papua with the Dewan Adat (Papuan customary council) and 10,000 protesters symbolically handing the package back to the central government in August 2005.¹²⁸ This symbolic gesture was viewed with a great deal of hope and optimism by indigenous people, with expectations that this was the first step towards independence.¹²⁹ This belief was strengthened by the proposal by US congressmen that would require the US Secretary of State to produce a report on the Act of Free Choice vote.¹³⁰ These developments led to wildly optimistic views among the indigenous population in highland areas that the United Nations would soon step in to free Papua from what they viewed as the Indonesia yoke.¹³¹ This optimistic view of the likelihood of UN intervention in Papua was widely held by indigenous people and was repeated many times to the author.¹³²

¹²⁵ ICG (2002), p.8

¹²⁶ See p.158 above

¹²⁷ McGibbon (2004), p.52

¹²⁸ ICG (2006), pp.6-7

¹²⁹ Comments made to the author during visit to the province, August 2005.

¹³⁰ ‘Members of Congress Urge President Yudhoyono of Indonesia to Open up Access to West Papua; Ongoing Human Rights Abuses Condemned’, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) report, accessed from <http://www.etan.org/news/2005/09papua.htm> in February 2008

¹³¹ Observations made by the author during visit to the province, August 2005.

¹³² Protesters in West Papua (West Irian Jaya) issued a press release that demanded that: “The decolonisation commission of the United Nations must immediately register the political status of Papua land as a colonised territory which has to be granted freedom through referendum.” From Benedetti,

While there were riots in Abepura in 2006 which resulted in the deaths of three policemen and a military officer,¹³³ in general relations between the indigenous and migrant communities did not involve violence in this period. According to McGibbon, one major reason for this is the approach of the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) which has attempted to be inclusive of migrants.¹³⁴ The church also has a major role in inter-ethnic cooperation, working to maintain relations between migrants and indigenous people. This was apparent during my attendance of a church ceremony in the province, with the congregation being multi-ethnic and the preacher an indigenous woman.¹³⁵ While the worshippers did sit in groups that were either Papuan or non-Papuan and not mixed, though these seemed to be family groups, with people mixing freely at the end of the service.

The inter-group connections that were evident in this congregation are also apparent in the statement issued jointly by Papuan religious leaders in September 2005 that the province should become a 'Land of Peace'.¹³⁶ However, reports of human rights abuses by the Indonesian military continued, with Sumule reporting that there had been 136 extra-judicial killings between 2000 and 2003.¹³⁷ Although the human rights report by Human Rights Watch in the Central Highlands region of Papua in 2005 and 2006 included serious cases of human rights abuses by the military in this region¹³⁸, the number of such

'Another mass protest in Manokwari', 17th June 2007, *WestPan*, accessed from <http://www.westpapua.ca/?q=en/node/483> in January 2008

¹³³ ICG (2006a), p.10

¹³⁴ McGibbon (2004), p.31

¹³⁵ Observations from author's visit to the province, August 2005.

¹³⁶ See 'Joint Statement by Papuan Religious Leaders', Jayapura, West Papua, 15 September 2005, Australian Indigenous Law Reporter website, accessed from <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/2005/84.html> in February 2008

¹³⁷ Sumule (2002), p.5

¹³⁸ 'Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua's Central Highlands', Human Rights Watch, Volume 19, No. 10(C), July 2007, accessed from <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/papua0707/papua0707webwcover.pdf> in February 2008

cases and their severity appear to have lessened in recent years. This report investigated 14 cases of human rights abuses during this period¹³⁹ and suggested that “the passing of the Soeharto era and the transition to Special Autonomy has brought about some gradual easing of tensions between Papuans and the central government in Jakarta, resulting in some decrease in military crackdowns and sweeping operations of the Papuan population.”¹⁴⁰ There was still an atmosphere of tension in the province, however, described by the UN reporter on human rights, Hani Jilani, as a ‘climate of fear’.¹⁴¹ This report also concluded that: “In the vast majority of cases of violence against human rights defenders, police and military forces are the perpetrators of such violence.”¹⁴²

¹³⁹ HRW (2007), p.14

¹⁴⁰ HRW (2007), p.24

¹⁴¹ Jilani (2008), pp.20-23

¹⁴² Jilani (2008), p.24

Papuan perspectives on migration and genocide

It is also vital to examine the issue from the perspective of those who are intimately involved in this history, to those who have lived this history. As Benny Giay suggests, the indigenous people in the territory had experienced the history of the area and so should be considered the main historical documents of this period, in contrast to histories written by those in other countries.¹⁴³

There have been many claims of acts of genocide against the indigenous population during the period of Indonesian sovereignty. This section will review some of the claims that have been made by such Papuan leaders as Benny Giay, Tom Beanal, Socratez Sofyan Yoman, both the contention of genocide, on the impact of migration and the general perception of Indonesian rule.

Benny Giay is an influential theologian and thinker in the province. He has consistently argued that there are fundamental differences between Papuan and Indonesian people which cannot be resolved, with the differences between these groups in terms of food eaten, clothing worn, skin colour and hair type being areas he notes.¹⁴⁴ Giay suggests that there is a perception among Papuans that the process of modernisation imposed by Jakarta is “a systematic and well-planned approach to wipe out Papuan culture, traditions and identity.”¹⁴⁵

Tom Beanal has written mainly on the impact of the Freeport mining company on the Amungme people. He suggests that the arrival of this company and the floods of people that this precipitated have brought new issues, values and

¹⁴³ Giay, Benny, *Menuju Papua Baru: eberapa pokok pikiran sekitar emansipasi orang Papua*, Deiyai, Jayapura, 2000, pp.1-2

¹⁴⁴ Giay (2000), pp.3-4

¹⁴⁵ Giay, Benny, 'Against Indonesia: West Papuan strategies of resistance against Indonesian political and cultural aggression in the 1980s', p.129 in Wessel, Ingrid & Georgia Wimhöfer (eds.), *Violence in Indonesia*, Abera, Hamburg, 2001

systems to the Amungme people, transforming their lives.¹⁴⁶ The mine has disturbed the life of the indigenous population, according to the joint leader of the Presidium of the Council of Papuans, with the changes causing opposition to the mine. There has been poor treatment of local people, with “discrimination and harassment towards their beliefs and way of life, which has always been looked down [sic] by the outsider.”¹⁴⁷

Another religious leader, Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman, has also become an important spokesman on the situation within the province. He certainly views the Indonesian rule as a negative development. He claims that the Dutch were benevolent rulers in contrast, and that: “Although Indonesians call the Dutch ‘colonialists’ who colonised the Indonesian Malay people, however, history had proved that not even one bullet from Dutch soldiers ever touched or injured the body of any native Papuan.”¹⁴⁸ In contrast, the reverend suggests that the Indonesian rule has been characterised by military occupation, violence against the indigenous population and that the four main agendas followed by these occupiers have been “economic, political, security and systematic ethnic cleansing of the native West Papuans.”¹⁴⁹ Yoman was also reported in 2006 as suggesting that genocide was being conducted against the Papuan population, and was “the result of militarisation of his homeland by Indonesian troops and police, transmigration, an enforced family planning policy to ‘depopulate’,

¹⁴⁶ Beanal, Tom, *Amungme: magaboarat negel jombe-peibe*, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, Jakarta, 1997, p.v

¹⁴⁷ Beanal (1997), p.xxxiv

¹⁴⁸ Yoman, Socratez Sofyan, ‘West Papua: Voice of the West Papuan Church seeking protection for native West Papuans’, 24th June 2008, accessed from http://www.infopapua.org/artman/publish/article_1777.shtml in December 2008

¹⁴⁹ Yoman (2008)

alcohol and a rampant epidemic of HIV/Aids widely regarded as the worst in the Pacific.”¹⁵⁰

The lack of trust in the government is evident in Yoman’s assertion that there are plain-clothes intelligence officers throughout the province, “as fast food and ice cream traders, motorbike riders, hotel waiters, drivers and other forms of disguises. They are in every corner of the West Papuan land.”¹⁵¹ Yoman comments on the areas of education and health services, suggesting that these had declined since the Dutch had left, while Papuans had been marginalised by the influx of ‘Malay’ people. He also called for an independent census of the population. The suspicion of the government that is evident in his other comments is extended to the population figures. It is contended by the current author that while the figures from the census may be generally accurate, the lack of faith in the government precludes these from being accepted by the Papuan population.

Herman Wayoi claims that it appeared that the Indonesian government’s aim was to control the territory, and “planned to exterminate the ethnic Melanesians and replace them with ethnic Malays from Indonesia.”¹⁵² Clemens Runaweri alleges that the government is trying to spread the ideology of Panca Sila to replace the Christian religion held by most Papuans, to eliminate “the Papuans’ religion in a clandestine manner.”¹⁵³ Another Papuan religious leader to suggest that there had been genocide against the indigenous population was Agus Alue Alua, a seminary rector. Mote and Rutherford quote him as saying that:

¹⁵⁰ Robie, David, ‘Papuan clergyman condemns Indonesia’s ‘genocidal’ policies’, *Te Waha Nui Online*, 18th August 2006 accessed from http://www.tewahanui.info/news/180806_wpClergyman.shtml in December 2008

¹⁵¹ Yoman (2008)

¹⁵² Quoted in Chauvel (2005), p.52

¹⁵³ Chauvel (2005), p.53

"'systematic violence', 'systematic killing', and 'systematic destruction', that is, 'genocide'. The result is that we, the Papuan people, are slated to vanish from the face of this earth.... We've been slaughtered like beasts for the sake of preserving Indonesian political stability and unity."¹⁵⁴

This was part of his speech to President Habibie during the 'Team of One Hundred' meeting with him in 1999.

The examples above illustrate the dissatisfaction with the effects of migration to the province, as well as distrust with the government. They also illustrate the belief that there have been genocidal actions conducted against the Papuan people. The conclusion of the current research will examine how well such claims are supported by the evidence provided by the census data that will be examined in chapters 7-9.

¹⁵⁴ Mote & Rutherford (2001), p.125

Conclusion

The start of the Indonesian period was a period of dramatic political change. The UNTEA period was not well handled by the United Nations, with Indonesian control over the territory growing during the UN authority's period of nominal authority. Following the handover of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, new public servants flooded in to the province from the rest of Indonesia, taking work from many indigenous people who had been employed in this sector. There was large-scale corruption by the new officials and by Indonesian troops. The formal international acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory was confirmed by the orchestrated Act of Free Choice vote, with researchers Drooglever and Saltford (and many others) concluding that this process was manipulated such that the results were not representative of the wishes of the indigenous populace.

This period of Indonesian sovereignty was marked by insurgencies by small groups of indigenous people against the national government. In the years after the transfer of power there was armed military resistance in the Arfak region. There were uprisings in the highlands in 1977 and across the province in 1984, with large-scale border crossings by refugees from retaliations by Indonesian military forces. The Free Papua Movement (OPM) was formed in this period but never operated on a significant level. While this movement served to keep Papuan independence as a political issue nationally and internationally (even if one with a low profile), the probably unintentional result was the maintenance of a high military presence in the province.

While conflicts on this scale have been isolated, persistent reports from this territory of human rights abuses including executions, rape and torture have continued through the majority of this period. The insidious corruption across Indonesia is intensified in this distant corner of the nation by its isolation and

the dominant presence and role of the military. The military's role in the province is a topic that is too broad to be covered in this research.¹⁵⁵ Their actions have certainly caused widespread resentment to Indonesian rule, with the human rights abuses and corruption involving military personnel serving to maintain the apparent universal desire for independence among indigenous people. Such actions have contributed to the perception among indigenous people that there have been systematic attempts to commit genocide against indigenous people. The role of the military in business and in corrupt and/or illegal activities within the province is an area that seems certain to have influenced the political situation and which could be profitably explored through further research.

While the Suharto period is notable for the underlying political constancy, after his fall there have been substantial changes to the territory. The province was granted Special Autonomy by President Wahid, the territory was divided into two provinces under President Sukarnoputri, and many more regencies and districts were created. These changes have caused an expansion in the number of local government positions resulting in more of the educated indigenous elite being employed in the Indonesian public service, police and in political leadership roles. The co-option of this elite is likely to result in less organised opposition to the territory's status as part of Indonesia.

The peaceful strategy advanced as a consolidated front by indigenous activist groups and church bodies appears to have resulted in a reduction in violence in the province, with less social tension and fewer human rights issues. There were still political tensions, however, and dissatisfaction with the Special Autonomy program resulted in the symbolic return of the program to the central

¹⁵⁵ International Crisis Group (2006a) includes a balanced review of the operations of the military in the province.

government in 2005. It remains to be seen if this program can provide the resources (and be implemented well enough) to provide development of the physical and human resources in the province.

Chapter 6: National Representations– the Depictions of Papua and its peoples in museums and texts

The history of the province since 1962 that was presented above does not cover in depth the ways in which migrants and indigenous people interacted during this period. This has been covered to some extent through the reports by observers of the situation. However, the perceptions held by migrants to the province and by those in other parts of the archipelago who made decisions that affected the province, especially those in Jakarta have influenced the interactions between groups in the province. An understanding of the character of the perceptions of Papua and Papuan people held by the other actors would ideally have been gained through research conducted in Indonesia, most probably through the use of a small-scale, qualitative survey. It was found to be impossible to conduct such research at this time due to the political situation in the country, the sensitivity of the civil and military administrations towards Papua.

With this avenue of investigation, an alternative approach to uncovering such preconceptions was needed. The representations that are presented in such official forums as museums and university textbooks reflect and produce national understandings of the peoples of a nation.¹ Through an examination of the exhibitions on Papua, both in the province itself and in Jakarta, this chapter will attempt to illustrate the attitudes towards and (mis)conceptions held towards Papuans by (other) Indonesians. This section will be based on observations made by the author during visits to Jakarta in 2004 and to Papua in 2005. This chapter will also examine the depiction of the province, its history, culture and society primarily, in school and university textbooks produced for

¹ Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, Revised edition, Verso, London, 1991, Chapter 10: Census, map, museum, pp.163-185

use in these institutions across the archipelago. This chapter will illustrate the attitudes towards and (mis)conceptions held towards Papuans by (Other) Indonesians and supplements the history chapters to give a more complete picture of the ways in which migrants and indigenous people interact in the province.

Museums were chosen as an area of study as they reflect the understanding of the province held by the governments, both provincial and central. Benedict Anderson suggests that museums confer legitimacy onto the nation.² Papua is marginal geographically in Indonesia, as well as politically, and Papuans are often regarded by other Indonesians as 'primitive', Stone Age fossils.³ Since the start of Indonesian governance of the territory, there has been questioning of the legitimacy of Indonesian rule of the territory by Papuans. The popular nature of this dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule is evidenced by the National Conferences that were held in 2000, as well as the number of well-known activists operating both within and outside Indonesia. With the incorporation of Papua into the Indonesia, a nation building exercise would be expected to be embarked upon by the new administration. Anderson's writings suggest that an examination of the museum exhibitions should reveal attempts to legitimise the Indonesian rule.

National education is another area in which the attitudes which the state wishes to instil in its citizens are evident. Public education can be used by governments to advance nation building projects. This can certainly be seen in Indonesia with the emphasis on such patriotic activities as the singing of the national anthem

² Anderson (1991), pp.178-185

³ See Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/_phd.html in August 2007, p.48 for a discussion of the view of Papuans by many Indonesians.

and the focus during the Suharto years on the Panca Sila ideology. Farhadian notes that: “The close tie between language and nation building makes the learning of Indonesian a requirement for participation in the New Society.”⁴ It has been suggested that public education in general is an aspect of nation building, with Kymlicka claiming that minorities also need to utilise this tool to strengthen their own unity. Kymlicka states that minorities “must use the same tools that the majority nation uses in its program of nation-building – i.e. standardized public education”.⁵

The first section of this chapter will cover aspects of the literature on museums in relation to ethnicity and its role in nation building. The second section will examine the question of the image of Papua and Papuans offered by museums in Indonesia through examining six museums, four within the province itself and two in the nation’s capital. There will be a short description of the individual museums’ displays, followed by an assessment of the similarities and differences in the depictions. Each museum will be analysed using five criteria: the type of museum and its mission; the foundation and organisation of the museum; the structure and arrangement of the displays; the labelling of artefacts and the descriptions and explanations that are given; omissions from the museum’s displays. There will also be a discussion of any exceptional or notable features of the six museums. The observations of the author from 2005 in the province and 2004 in Jakarta are only representative of the situation of these museums at this point in time and it is unfortunate that there are no published materials that cover these institutions (or at least the Papuan sections of them) at an earlier point to examine if these representations have changed during the period since 1962.

⁴ Farhadian (2005), p.58

⁵ Kymlicka, Will, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford, 2001, p.159

The last section of this chapter will examine the materials that are used by secondary and tertiary students across Indonesia that cover the history of Papua and its integration into the nation. These images also contribute to the imagined Papua (and Papuans) of those from the rest of the nation, and by Papuans themselves. Finally, this chapter will draw conclusions on the national understandings that motivate these depictions and the ways in which the displays reflect and produce these conceptions.

Writings on museums

Anderson's seminal work on the imagining of the nation includes a chapter on the role played by census, map and museum in the construction of national identification.⁶ He conjectures that the museum served the purpose of connecting the colonial powers with the prestige of past rulers and Tradition.⁷ The exhibition also celebrated the power of these new rulers over their 'primitive' subjects. "As a collective phenomenon the industrial exposition celebrated the ascension of civilized power."⁸

While the majority of writing on this subject concerns the European colonial powers, as Hess points out, the "employment of cultural exhibitions, documentaries, and spectacles to underpin systems of authority, however, is not restricted to the West."⁹ There is certainly a powerful narrative within Indonesian society and histories suggesting that the Indonesian state's mission within Papua is a civilising one,¹⁰ a narrative that is accepted by many non-Papuan Indonesians.¹¹

Hess also suggests that the post-colonial representations of culture such as those within museums are complicated by the essentially arbitrary nature of the successor state's boundaries and internal administrative divisions.¹² Hess states

⁶ Anderson (1991), Chapter 10: Census, map, museum, pp.163-185. Chapter added to second edition of this work.

⁷ Anderson (1991), p.181

⁸ Hess (2006), p.17 quoting Curtis Hinsely, "The World as marketplace: commodification of the exotic at the World's Columbian Exposition, Chicago, 1893", in Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine, eds., *Exhibiting cultures: the poetics and politics of museum display*, Washington D.C., Smithsonian Institution, 1991, p.245

⁹ Hess, Janet Berry, *Art and Architecture in Postcolonial Africa*, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 2006, p.17

¹⁰ See for example chapter 5, pp.149-150. Author's personal experience in Indonesia and in conversation with Indonesian people.

¹¹ Author's own experience in Indonesia and in conversation with Indonesian people.

¹² These boundaries are arbitrary in the sense that they do not necessarily bear any relation to ethnic or pre-colonial boundaries.

that the “task of promoting pride in a nation detached from a colonial administrative structure – at the same time that unification within colonial boundaries of diverse cultures was rationalized – resulted in the abstraction and objectification of specific cultures, even as cultural differences were identified as the new nation’s defining characteristic.”¹³

The museum is a space defined by the curator. According to Hooper-Greenhill: “Power relations within museums and galleries are skewed towards the collecting subject who makes decisions in relation to space, time, and visibility; in other words as to what may be viewed, how it should be seen, and when this is possible.”¹⁴ This power to control the visitor’s experience and understanding of the subject gives curators the power to influence their visitors’ understanding of such subjects as Papua. The following sections will examine a number of museums in Indonesia and in Papua itself in order to scrutinise the subtext of their spaces and displays.

¹³ Hess (2006), p.18.

¹⁴ Hooper-Greenhill, Eilean, *Museums and the shaping of knowledge*, Routledge, London, 1992, p.7

Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature), Jakarta¹⁵

Taman Mini Indonesia Indah was opened in 1975 at the instigation of Ibu Tien, President Suharto's wife. This "Mother of the Nation" wished to show the natural and human richness of Indonesia.¹⁶ According to Frances Gouda, the stimulus for the construction of this museum/theme park was Disneyland.¹⁷ Gouda states that: "In the course of a visit to Disneyland in California in 1971, Mrs. Suharto had been struck, as if by a bolt of lightning, with an inspiration to create a park that could celebrate 'Beautiful Indonesia' in miniature."¹⁸ John Pemberton says that there were protests against the establishment of Taman Mini, with many thinking the money could have been used for the more immediate, practical concerns facing the people of the area.¹⁹ As so often during the New Order period, these protests were quickly squashed by Suharto.²⁰

There is an emphasis on the cultural diversity across the archipelago, with the museum's consisting mainly of 'houses' for each province. These buildings are arranged around a central lake which is a small-scale map of the archipelago. This architectural design appears to evoke the 'Unity in Diversity' motto that was emphasised through the Suharto years. Siegel suggests that Taman Mini might be "a more forceful version of authenticity than the ethnographic museum."²¹ It is certainly more popular, receiving far more visitors than the more formal museums in the heart of the city.

¹⁵ The description is based on the author's visit to the museum in September 2004

¹⁶ Taman Mini Indonesia Indah website, accessed from <http://www.tamanmini.com/tentang/sejarah> in September 2005

¹⁷ Gouda, Frances, *Dutch culture overseas: colonial practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 1995, p.236

¹⁸ Gouda (1995), p.236

¹⁹ Pemberton, John, *On the subject of "Java"*, Cornell, Ithaca and London, 1994, p.153

²⁰ Pemberton (1994), p.153

²¹ Siegel, James T., *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, p.3

The Papuan house is rather removed from the central area of the museum and the majority of the other provincial houses, reflecting Papua's geographic and societal position on the margins of the nation. The buildings are intended to reflect a generic house design that was produced by Papuans. However, there is no indication in the museum of the ethnic groups whose designs are reproduced in the main building and the outdoor, concrete reproduction of a highland village, although the latter appear to follow Dani traditions. With the wide range of houses constructed by different ethnic groups in this territory, the lack of labelling of these displays suggests a homogenised image of 'the Papuan'.

Outside the main building is a pool with a sculpture of a canoe paddled by several Papuan figures. These figures, along with other figures inside the building, are caricatured images of the Savage, men with spears in hand, wild hair and staring eyes. Figures both inside and outside the building are sanitised for local sensibilities by clothing the men in untraditional costumes – shorts for men and short dresses for women. As with the mock traditional houses, there are no labels to explain to which ethnic group these figures are supposed to belong. As mentioned earlier, Hess describes similar displays, stating that such displays evoke comparison to European colonial displays.²²

The main building houses the collection of Papuan artefacts such as stone tools, masks, bowls, spears, shields and wooden statues. The displays are mostly crowded with items, a display shortcoming also apparent in other provincial houses. There is no immediately apparent rationale for the arrangement of the displays within the display cases, and there are no signs provided to inform the visitor of any intended structure that the curator may have had for the assembly

²² Hess (2006), pp.132-133

of items. This observation is true of the two-storey main building's space as a whole. Similarly, while there are a small number of labelled pieces, the vast majority of items are not labelled in any way, with no indication of what part of the province they come from, which ethnic group made the items, how they were used or the meanings ascribed to these pieces by those who produced and utilised them.

This points to one of the most notable features of this exhibition's representation of Papua – the impression of a single, unitary culture that it gives the visitor. While there are a small number of descriptions of cultural aspects of life in Papua, there are few indications that any of these practices, beliefs and rituals are not (or were not) practised by people across the province. This omission is not consistent with one of the museum's aims of showcasing the ethnic diversity of the archipelago.²³ For example, one of the very few informative signs concerns initiation ceremonies but the lack of information on the ethnic groups that practice such ceremonies gives the impression that these rites are performed by ethnic groups across the province.²⁴

The Papuan displays do not include one of the most popular exhibition genres across the nation's museums – the traditional dress exhibit. A staple display in Indonesian museums is ceremonial clothing for men and women, with exhibits showing purportedly traditional outfits from particular parts of the country, province or from individual cities.²⁵ The West Java house at this museum has this type of exhibit, with outfits from different cities in the province. While an area such as West Java, which is comparatively far more ethnically

²³ Aims as described by the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah website.

²⁴ One of the few display labels in the Papuan house section is a label on initiation. The label states that the male initiation ceremony consists of drawing blood from the youth's back with a sharp stick. There is no indication of which group's practices this label describes, or that there are other groups with very different initiation practices. Author's own observations, September 2004.

²⁵ Author's own observations made from visits to many parts of Indonesia since 1992.

homogenous,²⁶ illustrates its diversity with a number of outfits from different cities in the province, the heterogeneity of dress in Papua is not shown. The majority of the population in both East and Central Java self-identify as Javanese.²⁷ That there are different houses for Central and East Java shows the dominance of political considerations over the professed focus on cultural diversity in the museum.

This allowance of ethnic diversity only within the constraints of the political framework has been noted by John Bowen.²⁸ He comments on the South Sulawesi house at Taman Mini and the fact that it ignores the ethnic differences within this province. He says that “in New Order public contexts one could only speak in terms of the residents of a geographical region, as in ‘people of South Sulawesi’ and not mention ethnic names, lest one be guilty of exacerbating ethnic tensions.”²⁹ This seems to apply to the Papuan exhibition.

In many ways, Taman Mini is a continuation of the great Exhibitions that the major colonial powers held in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Frances Gouda in her book on the Dutch colonial exercise includes a section on the colonial exhibition. Gouda sees these exhibitions as a glorification and a staging of the power of the colonial masters.

²⁶ Nearly three quarters of West Java’s population is made up of one ethnic group, the Sundanese people. See Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia’s population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, pp.166-169

²⁷ Central Java is 98% Javanese, while East Java is 78% Javanese. *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001, Table 10.9, p.75

²⁸ Bowen, John, ‘Normative pluralism in Indonesia: Regions, religions and ethnicities’, pp.152-169 in Kymlicka, Will & Baogang He (Eds.), *Multiculturalism in Asia*, Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford, 2005

²⁹ Bowen in Kymlicka and He (2005), p.154

The essential purpose of the Colonial Exposition was the disclosure and celebration of European political and cultural power, which had presumably touched even the darkest and most backward corners of the earth.³⁰

Gouda suggests that Taman Mini was a reprise of these colonial exhibitions. Taman Mini's displays show the periphery to the centre. As Anne Maxwell writes about the earlier 'native villages' that featured in these colonial exhibitions, "such displays brought far-flung territories and exotic peoples near, while at the same time converting them into material suitable for Europeans' visual consumption."³¹ This conversion of the exotic into fare acceptable to the colonial view is evident in the addition of trousers and dresses to the display figures of people who would traditionally have worn penis gourds and grass skirts.

Another similarity with these earlier exhibitions is the apparent lack of interest in authenticity, with spectacle and political considerations being paramount. Pemberton states that at the opening ceremony of Taman Mini all the provincial governors dressed up in the costume of their province, regardless of their personal ethnic origins.

An East Javanese 'New Guinean' governor with a fur crown and large ornamental nose bone, sat, exemplifying diversity, alongside his fellow regional representatives.³²

This exemplifies the political interests involved in Taman Mini, interests that guided the museum to divide the nation by province rather than by ethnic group.

³⁰ Gouda (1995), p.205

³¹ Maxwell, Anne, *Colonial photography and exhibitions: representations of the 'Native' and the making of European Identities*, Leicester University Press, London, 1999, pp.35-36

³² Pemberton (1994), p.158. The Javanese 'New Guinean' with the ornamental nose bone was General Sutran, former bupati of Trenggalek." Ibid., footnote 20, p.158

Museum Nasional (National Museum), Jakarta³³

This government-run museum in the centre of the nation's capital is the nation's premier ethnographic and anthropological exhibition centre. There are around 100,000 objects from across the archipelago stored in the museum, with historical and ethnographic prominent among them.³⁴ The museum is housed in an imposing 19th century Dutch neo-classical building. The building was established by the Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences between 1862 and 1868 and is "the oldest scientific institution of South-East Asia."³⁵ While Taman Mini represents the New Order's approach to ethnic and cultural diversity, this museum represents a more formal, academic position.

The main Papuan collection is split between several cases in a room devoted to ethnographic displays. There are other related items in displays that span the region, such as the models of houses from a number of different groups. There is a clear rationale to the groupings, with rooms dedicated to particular aspects of the nation's people.

Overall, the labelling of the collection is far superior to that at Taman Mini. However, while there is more detailed information on the origin of exhibits, this does not often include ethnographic information. Many items are labelled by geographical location within Papua, with such labels as 'North Coast Irian Jaya'. Furthermore, this is true of a large ethnographic map in pictures of Indonesia, an exhibit of the same type as the costume display mentioned previously. The display features a map of the nation with numbers corresponding to ethnic groups. These numbers match with pictures of a male and female member of

³³ The description is based on the author's visit to the museum in September 2004

³⁴ From Museum Nasional website, accessed from <http://www.museumnasional.org/collections.html> in January 2006. The building was built in 1862, but the society was established in 1788. Taylor, Jean Gelman, *The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983, p.86.

³⁵ Heuken, Adolf, *Historical sites of Jakarta, Second Edition*, Cipta Loka Caraka, Jakarta, 1983, p.166

each *ethnie* in supposedly traditional dress. Those for other areas of the country are mostly described using ethnic terms, while those for Papua are described using simply geographical terms.

Since both Taman Mini and the National Museum are interested in ethnicity, it seems remarkable that this area of high ethnic diversity is not explored within their collections. This lack of concern for the cultural diversity of an area at the edge of the nation illustrates the marginal nature of the province within the imagination of those in the nation's centre.

Museum Negeri Provinsi Papua (National Museum of the Province of Papua), Waena, Jayapura, Papua³⁶

This regional museum is run by the provincial administration. There is no available information to explain the museum's aims, but it appears to be organised to provide information about the ethno-cultural diversity of the province and to display indigenous, artistic works. Lonergan states that many provincial museums were established across the archipelago in the 1980s and 1990s to augment those already existing in Jakarta.³⁷

The museum is housed in a concrete, two-storey, white-tiled building, a generic construction style that has no connection to local traditions of construction. There is a well-displayed, reasonably large collection of artefacts from across the province. There are a range of exhibits, with practical pieces such as knives and pots, pieces of more religious significance including carved prows and poles. There are also larger pieces such as a carved wooden canoe from the nearby Lake Sentani. The exhibits are organised by the function of the objects displayed. The collection is well labelled with the ethnic groups to which exhibits corresponded mentioned. There is also information on cultural practices in different tribal groups, with some English signs, although most signs are in Indonesian. During my visit the staff of the museum (most of whom appeared to be indigenous people) guided me around the museum personally, and were able and enthusiastic in this role.

The focus of the collection is on carvings, especially those from the Asmat region on the south coast of the territory. In an echo of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, there is a display of houses from various ethnic groups across the

³⁶ The description is based on the author's visit to the museum in August 2005

³⁷ Lonergan, Beth, *Exceptional souvenirs: museum displays and the idea of Indonesia*, unpublished Honours thesis, UNSW, 2002, p.55

province, though these houses are in miniature. In contrast to the museums of Jakarta, there is a focus on the individual characteristics of particular ethnicities, the heterogeneity of the peoples of the province.

There are no notable absences from the museum's coverage of the art of the province. The good organisation and management evident in this museum are in stark contrast to some of the other museums in the province. It should be noted that at the time of my visit this large building was totally empty of visitors. Such a museum seems more likely to appeal to tourists than local residents, so it is significant that the museum is in the provincial capital rather than in the far more visited highland regional town of Wamena. It seems that political considerations of situating such institutions in the provincial centre have prevailed over practical concerns.

Taman Budaya Provinsi Papua (Papua Province Cultural Park), Waena, Jayapura, Papua³⁸

This cultural park is located a few hundred metres from the National Museum of the Province of Papua above. However, the well-organised collection at the Museum Negeri bears little resemblance to the abandoned nature of this centre, with laundry hanging to dry visible in one of the buildings on my visit. Since the park was not in daily operation at this time, it was not possible to determine anything about the organisation of or the aims of this museum. It is probably safe to assume that it is funded by the provincial government. Having been established in 1996, it is lamentable that Taman Budaya has become derelict in such a short space of time.³⁹

Repeating the Taman Mini structure on a smaller scale, the park consists of a number of buildings that are supposed to represent traditional designs of particular regions of the province. Rather than reflecting cultural/ ethnic distinctions, the houses appear to represent particular regencies. The regional houses have no collections, and are in fact empty or only filled with drying washing.

One interesting house is the Freeport building. Although there is no Freeport region of the province, the mining company is apparently accorded the status of an autonomous regency within this museum, a reminder of the importance of these mining operations to the provincial (and national) government(s). Although it appears from this that the park was willing to work with businesses, this does not seem to have stopped the park from becoming moribund. It is interesting to note that the 'Freeport district' building seemed not to be

³⁸ The description is based on the author's visit to the museum in August 2005

³⁹ 'Kami Bangga Hitam dan Keriting Oleh: Putu Fajar Arcana', *Imparsial*, 12 September 2005, accessed from <http://www.imparsial.org/news/index.php?year=2005&month=9&action=READ&lang=id-8859&id=news-1127722683> in January 2006

deserted. Although there was no display evident, this building was locked and appeared to be still in use.

The park is not without function, however. The Fourth Papuan Traditional Festival was held here at the end of August 2005.⁴⁰ This was a presentation of dance, song and story from a number of ethnic groups from around Papua held on a grassy space at the rear of the complex. This performance fits the ostensible rationale of the park, but it is significant that the function was poorly publicised, with many local residents and tourists unaware of its existence.⁴¹ The promotion of and pride in Papuan culture that was evident in this festival can be seen as a challenge to Indonesian rule. According to Feith, the famous Papuan musician, anthropologist and activist Arnold Ap was killed partially due to his role in promoting Papuan culture. Anne Feith claims that Ap “was seen as a threat because Papuan culture in the form of music, dancing and drumming was a way of Papuans expressing their Melanesian identity, - of them feeling ‘not Indonesian’.”⁴² That there was indeed a political aspect to the festival was confirmed by the speech given by the presenter of the performance. In an emotive speech, he spoke about how all Papuans were one people, a fairly strong call to arms given the political situation vis-à-vis separatism.⁴³

⁴⁰ Pesta Adat Papua IV, 22-27 August 2005

⁴¹ Other tourists at the author’s hotel were totally unaware of this festival as the only references to this festival were in local, Indonesian language newspapers. Hotel staff and other local residents were also unaware of this festival.

⁴² Feith, Anne Marie, *We don’t want bullets.... We can do this through talk: A Human Rights Response to Indonesian Rule in West Papua*, Master of Social Science (International Development) thesis, RMIT University, School of Social Science & Planning, June 2005, p.23

⁴³ Authors own translation of comments made in Indonesian during Pesta Adat Papua IV, 22nd August 2005. The numerous cases of lengthy prison sentences for flag raising demonstrate the Indonesian government’s response to non-violent expressions of independence sentiments.

The decay that is apparent in this museum seems symbolic of the perceived neglect of the province by the centre.⁴⁴ The presence of the Freeport building shows the importance attached to this company by the government. This is understandable considering the large sums paid in taxation by the mining multinational. This juxtaposition points to an exploitative nature of relations towards the province by the administration.

⁴⁴ See for example Fengler, Wolfgang, Jasmin Chakeri and Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir, 'Is Papua Spending Its Fiscal Resources Wisely?', *The Jakarta Post*, 16 November, 2005

Museum Lokabudaya (Cultural Museum), Cenderawasih University, Abepura, Papua⁴⁵

This museum is in the grounds of the major university in the province. The main focus of the museum is Asmat art, mainly carvings, with this collection being based on material provided by the Rockefeller Foundation.⁴⁶ One curator of this museum was Arnold Ap, a musician and prominent figure within Papuan society from the late 1960s onwards until he was murdered in 1984.⁴⁷

The quality of the pieces on display was very high. The work was grouped by object type, with items of similar functions or style from different ethnic groups being displayed together. Many of the items displayed were ceremonial or religious items such as decorated shields, ceremonial costumes and intricately carved wooden poles. The exhibition was well labelled, with information on the individual works, as well as more detailed explanations of objects' symbolic and practical use to particular groups.

There are more signs referring to cultural and ethnic difference and to ethnographic practices and beliefs within the province than in any of the museums mentioned above. This is a strength, with a great deal of information on culture, as is suggested by the museum's name. Most of the information covers the Asmat ethnic group rather than attempting to be more comprehensive, which fits with the majority of the museum's collection being from this region.

At the time of my visit there was no information on the current position of Asmat people or ways in which Asmat culture has changed through contact with

⁴⁵ The description is based on the author's visit to the museum in August 2005

⁴⁶ Some of the materials were collected by Michael Rockefeller prior to his disappearance in the province.

⁴⁷ Arnold Ap was murdered by Indonesian Special Forces personnel. See Feith (2005), pp.22-23

non-Papuan peoples. There have been many threats to Asmat culture from logging,⁴⁸ an activity that would directly threaten their ability to produce the artifacts found in this museum.

⁴⁸ See Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Priyneha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004, pp.27-28. This logging was apparently conducted with the forced labour of Asmat people.

Pilamo Museum, Wamena, Papua

This museum in the highlands of the province was built in the style of a building of one of the major ethnic groups in this area, the Dani. According to the website of an Indonesian university, the museum had been “used to store the cultural remains of the ethnic groups [sic] ancestor”.⁴⁹ Local residents were able to assure me that the museum in fact formerly housed a preserved mummy of an ethnic group leader. Unfortunately, I was unable to verify this fact during my visit to the area as this museum has closed. It was suggested that there had been no basic maintenance conducted on the museum due to a lack of funding from the local government.⁵⁰

The Baliem Valley, including Wamena, is an important area of the province for tourism, with far more tourism in the valley than in the Jayapura area in which the major provincial museums are located.⁵¹ It is remarkable that the administration did not feel it was important to cater to the needs of such a potentially important industry. Additionally, it seems noteworthy that there has been no attempt to preserve any of the traditional objects such as the amulets and shell-ties that are sold to tourists in such quantities throughout the town, leaving few of these culturally significant items of indigenous culture for future generations.

⁴⁹ ‘Municipalities and Districts, Jayawijaya Regency’, Petra Christian University website, accessed from <http://www.petra.ac.id/eastern/irian/cities/jayawija/pilamo.htm> in September 2005

⁵⁰ According to information given to the author during his visit to the province in August 2005 by local residents.

⁵¹ While almost all visitors have to spend some time in the Jayapura/Sentani area in order to obtain permission to visit the highlands and to wait for connections to the Wamena plane, the author’s experience in this area suggests that the vast majority of tourists spent as little time as possible in the lowlands which was viewed as a transit area only.

Representations within educational materials

The representations of Papua that appear in museums contribute to the image of the province and its people held by Indonesians from the rest of the archipelago. Also contributing to the national understanding of Papua are the books that students use in their school and university education. These images affect the image of Papuans held by non-indigenous people as well as the self-image held by Papuans. The images held by those non-indigenous people who work or live in the province will influence their attitudes towards Papuan people and the question of self-determination. With most capital for businesses coming from outside the province, as well as the vast majority of business owners being non-Papuans,⁵² the employment prospects of indigenous workers will depend partly on the image held by these non-indigenous employees.

The following section will examine the representations of Papua contained in Indonesian academic and school books. Representations of the province within these texts from the New Order period were examined in order to determine the image of Papua that was deemed suitable to present to pupils. These images were profoundly influenced by the political ideology of the era.⁵³ With little discourse in the mainstream media on the subject, such texts, especially those produced for school students, are important in forming the opinions that the majority of the population have in regard to the province. With few other sources of information on Papua available to the vast majority of Indonesians, these materials would have affected the understanding of the territory of those who became migrants. This process would have happened directly through school tuition for those able to continue to higher levels of education than

⁵² Author's observations from visit to the province, August 2005.

⁵³ See for example Anderson, Benedict (ed.), *Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia*, Cornell University, New York, 2001

primary school, as well as indirectly for those with less education through communication with the more educated members of the community and through contact with government officials.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono, Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru: 1500-1900 – Dari Emporium Sampai Imperium, Jilid (Volume) I, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1987

This volume is a university level text. Professor Kartodirdjo's volume on the history of Indonesia between 1500 and 1900⁵⁴ includes a section on the early history of Papua. The use of the term Indonesia for the history of this period is problematic considering the lack of any integrated social, cultural or political structure covering the region that is now Indonesia during this time period. Indeed, the term Indonesia had not even been coined until the 20th century. The nationalist ethos that the use of this term for this period suggests is also apparent in his treatment of Papua. It is claimed that by "1660 the whole of Papua (Irian) was under the sway of Tidore."⁵⁵ The impression given to the reader is that Papua has been under the control of Tidore (and subsequently the Dutch and consequently the successor state of Indonesia) since the 17th century. This justifies the incorporation of Papua within the state by legitimising the imperial boundaries and consequently Indonesia as the successor state to the Dutch colony.

Nevertheless, in this text's discussion of the history of the region during the 17th and 18th centuries, Kartodirdjo discusses the influence of the surrounding powers of Ternate, Tidore and Bacan on the coastal regions. It is suggested that these powers had no more than a nominal control over the coastal areas, with this suzerainty in many respects resembling nothing so much as organised piracy. Kartodirdjo claims that the "influence of Tidore on the north coast of Irian was only effective as long as it was supported by armed force."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Sartono Kartodirdjo was a prominent, respected historian of Indonesian history.

⁵⁵ Kartodirdjo (1987), p.263. Translation by author.

⁵⁶ Kartodirdjo (1987), p.266. Translation by author.

The book offers a relatively detailed analysis of the history of the region from this period. While in some respects it appears to support the successor state argument for Indonesian rule of the territory, in other ways this volume undermines this conception, through its description of the tenuous nature of Tidorese control over Papua. Overall, this is a sophisticated analysis of the region at this period.

Kansil, Drs. C.S.T., *Sejarah Indonesia Untuk SMTP, Jilid I*, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta, 1987

This volume is a history textbook intended for junior high school students. In contrast to the Kartodirdjo volume, and in keeping with the education level of its anticipated audience, this volume adopts a much simpler register, both linguistically and in terms of its content. The book claims that it was the wish of all Indonesian people (from Aceh to Irian Jaya) that Irian Jaya be free.⁵⁷ In evidence of this contention, it is claimed that there were demonstrations held in support of West Irian becoming part of Indonesia, such as public demonstrations in 'Kota Baru'.⁵⁸ There is no mention of any American involvement in the agreement that was reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the sovereignty of what was then West New Guinea.⁵⁹ The Dutch decision to transfer sovereignty of their colony to Indonesia is explained by this text as being due to two factors: Indonesian diplomacy in the United Nations, and the Operation Mandala military exercise. Extensive research by Saltford⁶⁰ as well as other authors into the issue suggests that this analysis is flawed, ignoring as it does the role of the United States in pressuring the Netherlands.⁶¹ This text attempts to legitimise Indonesian hegemony over Papua, with the aspects of the history that disagree with this narrative being omitted from the volume.

⁵⁷ Kansil, Drs. C.S.T., *Sejarah Indonesia Untuk SMTP, Jilid I*, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta, 1987, p.118

⁵⁸ Kansil (1987), p.118. Kota Baru was the name given to what is now Hollandia during the interim UNTEA period.

⁵⁹ Kansil (1987), p.116

⁶⁰ Saltford (2000)

⁶¹ See for example Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985; Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002; or Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001 for more information on the political manoeuvrings that led to the handover of power, as well as the unimportance of these military operations other than for their role in hastening the political process.

***30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Author unknown, Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (publisher), Jakarta, Volumes 2, 3 and 4, 1985**

The next materials examined were intended mostly for a general audience, a series of books called *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (30 years of Indonesian Freedom)*.⁶² The volumes examined were the second, third and fourth books in the series. These three volumes cover the years 1950 to 1975.

The second volume looks at the archipelago several years prior to the handover of power by the Dutch. It states that Indonesia formed a province of West Irian on the 17th August 1956.⁶³ This, however, was a province in exile, a province in name only since the province itself was still in reality controlled by the Dutch. The capital of this pseudo-province was designated as the main town on the island of Tidore, then called Soa Siu (now Tidore). This conformed to the narrative of Tidorese control over the whole of the western half of New Guinea until the end of the 19th century.⁶⁴ This was also evident in the choice of the then current Sultan of Tidore as the Governor of this new province of West Irian, Sultan Zainal Abidin Syah.⁶⁵ This concentration on the establishment of this pseudo-province in preference also suggests a need to legitimise Indonesian sovereignty over Papua.

There is a section within this same work covering the military operations that were conducted in 1962 with the aim of infiltrating the Dutch colony and setting up a *de facto* 'free area'. It makes no mention of the lack of enthusiasm for these operations apparently exhibited by the indigenous populace who were

⁶² *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Author unknown, Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (publisher), Jakarta, Volume 2, 1985 & Volume 4, 1985

⁶³ *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Volume 2, 1985, p.100

⁶⁴ *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Volume 2, 1985, p.100

⁶⁵ *30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, Volume 2, 1985, p.100

the intended beneficiaries of the plans.⁶⁶ While it could certainly be argued that there is bias in the writings of the foreign researchers whose work disagrees with this analysis, the fact that the Indonesian materials make no reference to the results of the operations hints at a lack of success to report.⁶⁷

The same volume includes a number of pictures of the celebrations that were held on the handover of power from the UNTEA to Indonesia on the 1st of May, 1963.⁶⁸ The previous page assures the reader that “the people of West Irian were impatient [sic] waiting to be reunited with their brothers and sisters in other parts of Indonesia.”⁶⁹ However, the people in the pictures of this supposedly popular celebration are nearly all non-Papuan Indonesians, with only one of the twelve pictures including any indigenous people at all.⁷⁰

The third volume covers the years 1965 to 1973. These were very important years in the history of Papua, including as they do the start of Indonesian rule of the province, as well as the Act of Free Choice vote in 1969. The book covers this history concisely in one page of the book, along with pictures of the delegates meeting for this vote in different cities around the territory. This vote is presented as a unanimous decision of the Papuan people, with no mention of any dissent against this resolution, either at the time or later.⁷¹

The fourth volume in the series includes very little information on Papua. However, there is a photo of indigenous Papuan students learning how to cook in the First Family Safety School.⁷² They are cooking using utensils and

⁶⁶ See for example Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970, pp.197-198; Elson (2001), p.84 and Saltford (2000), pp.30-32

⁶⁷ 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Volume 2, 1985, pp.201-202

⁶⁸ 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Volume 2, 1985, pp.230-231

⁶⁹ 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (1985), Volume 2, 1985, p.229. Translation by author.

⁷⁰ 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (1985), Volume 2, 1985, pp.230-231

⁷¹ 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka (1985), Volume 3, 1985, p.200

⁷² 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Volume 4, 1985, p.182

ingredients that seem to originate from outside Papua, with practices and foods which seem more similar to those from the western part of Indonesia. Such food preparation and foodstuffs would be radically different from those familiar to ethnic groups in the region and thus to the indigenous students who attended this institution. These pictures appear very similar to photos such as those included in a volume produced by the Dutch documenting their colonial attempts to civilise their colonial subjects.⁷³

⁷³ *Holland in Hollandia*, Van Hove, 's-Gravenhage, 1948. There are a number of photographs in this volume showing the 'advancement'

Widjosiswoyo, Drs Supartono, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia Dan Sejarah Dunia: 3*, PT Intan Pariwara, Jakarta, 1991

During the New Order period, the publisher of this volume, Intan Pariwara, was regarded as the most authoritative publisher of history books for schools, a status that would give weight to its writing on Papua for students who used this volume.⁷⁴ This volume is intended for use by class three Senior High School students.

This volume again mentions the ersatz province of Irian Jaya that was set up in Tidore in 1956.⁷⁵ Widjosiswoyo suggests that the province was based in Tidore, with the Sultan of Tidore appointed as the governor, because “historically, Irian Jaya formed a part of the Sultanate of Tidore.”⁷⁶ As mentioned earlier, this conception supports the sovereignty of Indonesia over Papua but is not supported by the evidence generally accepted outside Indonesia.⁷⁷

Widjosiswoyo suggests that the western powers supported the Dutch to provide a protective barrier against the danger of communism. He states that: “At the same time, western countries such as Australia and the United States stood behind the Netherlands in the interest of defence. Irian Jaya formed an umbrella for these countries especially against the danger of communism.”⁷⁸

The nation under Sukarno in the early 1960s was assessed by the United States as being in danger of ‘falling’ to Communism. This book makes no mention of this, or the role of this assessment in the pressure the US placed on the Dutch to transfer power to Indonesia.⁷⁹ It is not surprising that this volume does not

⁷⁴ Personal communication from Rochayah Machali, June 2007

⁷⁵ Widjosiswoyo (1991), p.127

⁷⁶ Widjosiswoyo (1991), p.127

⁷⁷ See chapter 4 for more discussion of the history of the connections between Papua and Tidore.

⁷⁸ Widjosiswoyo (1991), p.127. Translation by author.

⁷⁹ See chapter 4, p.131 for more details on this issue.

mention this aspect of the political situation for several reasons,⁸⁰ and it makes for a history in which Indonesia is presented as the oppressed victim of realpolitik rather than the beneficiary of it.

Widjosiswoyo claims that the New York Agreement in 1962 included a stipulation that the Act of Free Choice should be held in 1969.⁸¹ However, this is misleading. In fact, by the terms of the agreement, the United Nations was to return to the province to organise the vote within five years.⁸² There is also no mention of the fact that Sukarno had announced that this referendum was not to take place in 1965,⁸³ only for Adam Malik to declare a reversal of that decision the following year in accordance with Suharto's wish to fulfil all such agreements and win the acceptance of the international community.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ With communism being an anathema under the New Order, it would not have been deemed appropriate for the author to remind students of the fact that Indonesia was viewed as a potential communist threat internationally at this time.

⁸¹ Widjosiswoyo (1991), p.128

⁸² Saltford (2000), p.2

⁸³ Saltford (2000), p.177

⁸⁴ Saltford (2000), p.177

Indonesia Indah, Yayasan Harapan Kita / BP3 Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Jakarta, 1995-1998⁸⁵

This is a series of ten books produced by the *Yayasan Harapan Kita* (a foundation established by the Suharto family). As with Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, there was a connection to Ibu Tien, who headed the foundation at this time, with these books supposedly compiled under the leadership of the influential New Order politician Harmoko. The series editor was Dr. H. Sukamdani Sahid Gitosardjono. As a series compiled under such politically powerful figures, these books reflect the official understanding of the national society as the New Order wanted it presented.

Book 1: 'Bangsa Indonesia I', S. Budhi Santoso (ed.), 1995

This officially sanctioned description of Indonesia, its people and its culture, divides the nation into three cultural groups or civilisations (*kebudayaan*), namely Malay, Javanese and a third group, described simply as being non-Malay and non-Javanese.⁸⁶ These groups are described in what can only be described as racist terms.

The meaning or understanding of 'Malay' is a race that has physical characteristics of having dark brown skin. There is an opinion that the Malay race constitutes the result of a mix of the Mongol race that is yellow skinned, the Dravidian race that is black skinned, and the Aryan race that is white skinned.⁸⁷

Such comments suggest a primordialist understanding of ethnicity, with this conceptualisation being evident in comments related to the indigenous peoples of Papua.

⁸⁵ See also Chapter 3, p.59 for more discussion of the contents of these volumes, particularly volume 1.

⁸⁶ 'Bangsa Indonesia I', S Budhi Santoso (ed.), 1995, p.167

⁸⁷ Santoso (1995), vol. 1, p.168. Translated from the original Indonesian by the author.

Of the biggest of the ethnic groups in the archipelago, one of them is the Dani group, in Irian Jaya. This ethnic group is considered as a remnant of the negroid [sic] race.⁸⁸

The author(s) appear to connect ethnicity and race, and race with skin colour, a view long discredited in academic circles in the west.

Book 2: 'Bangsa Indonesia II', S. Budhi Santoso (ed.), 1995

This book is divided into chapters on each province, with one on the province of Papua. The pre-history section looks only at the history of European exploration of this area. The book mentions that there is a division of the people in the region into Melanesian and Papuan and includes information on the many ethnic groups in the province. There are sections on different ethnic groups such as the Asmat, Dani, Biak-Namfor, Marind-Anim, Sentani and Muju. This book's treatment of ethnic groups is completely different to that of the first book, reflecting a more current anthropological and sociological understanding of ethnic groups in society, in both tone and content. There is no suggestion that some ethnic groups are superior to other groups, no mention of race and the section on Papua appears no different in content to those on other provinces.

Book 10: 'Busana tradisional', S. Budhi Santoso (ed.), 1998

This volume covers the traditional clothing of the peoples of the archipelago. This volume is similar in tone to volume 2. The first illustration in the book is of cloth from Sentani (near Jayapura). The pictures on the following pages are of Dani people, including a picture of a man wearing a koteka. There is a lengthy section on Papua, including information on clothing worn by different ethnic groups. As with the second volume, this book bears few similarities to the first

⁸⁸ Santoso (1995), vol. 1, caption to photo on p.10

book. It appears that the political pressures that appear to have influenced the content of the first book did not affect the other volumes.

Conclusions

Museums

The museums that have been covered vary greatly in the quality of the exhibitions. One noticeable deficit of the museums in Jakarta is the lack of ethnic information. The image of the province that is presented is of ethnic homogeneity, with little information on the ethnic composition of the province or the ethnic groups who produced the objects on display at either Taman Mini or Museum Nasional. This is in contrast to the diversity suggested by the displays covering more dominant ethnic groups such as the Javanese and Sundanese. For these comparatively ethnically homogenous areas there is information on cultural variation between different regions and cities. This neglect of the ethnic heterogeneity hints at the lack of understanding of the margins by the centre.

It could also be suggested that the obvious reason for no exhibition similar to the ethnic dress exhibition so common in museums across the nation is the lack of clothing among traditional indigenous groups. While it may be true that cloth garments were not worn by most ethnic groups, there is certainly a wide variation in the style of men's penis sheaths and women's clothing.⁸⁹ It seems likely that the embarrassment most non-Papuan Indonesians appear to feel in relation to such apparel is behind the lack of such exhibits.

The exhibits were mostly ahistorical and did not present any information on the contacts with other parts of the archipelago, contacts with Europeans or the Dutch period of rule. The exhibits were exclusively pre-historic or pre-modern items, reflecting an image of Papuans as primitive, Stone Age people. There was

⁸⁹ People in other areas of what is now Indonesia did in fact wear clothing that was very different to that worn currently, with some women's clothing having some similarities to that of some Papuan women's.

also no mention of the political changes that have occurred within the region, of the sovereignty changes that resulted in the territory becoming part of Indonesia in 1963.

There was also no mention of the prison camp that was used for political prisoners from the Dutch colonial period, Boven Digul.⁹⁰ Benedict Anderson's work suggests that post-colonial museums serve the political purpose of legitimising the new state.⁹¹ This theory suggests that the history of nationalist internment in Papua would be an important aspect of museums in the province in order to integrate the territory into the nationalist narrative, hence legitimising Indonesian rule. However, it appears that the curators of these museums (or their superiors) did not wish to refer the minds of the visitors to this part of the nation's history or did not think it an important enough topic. Perhaps resistance to the rule of a remote (colonial) government is not the message they wish to present, or perhaps there is simply indifference to the need to justify the province's integration.

The exhibits presented Papua as a separate, isolated territory unconnected to the other half of the island of New Guinea or the islands near it. There was no reference to the relations of power between parts of Papua and the sultanates of Tidore and Ternate. There was also no mention of the cultural linkages between those in the western half and those in the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. With many ethnic groups' land having been split by the boundaries imposed by the European powers, it would appear from an ethnographic standpoint that mention of those on the other side of the political boundaries could be made. In fact, none of the museums mentioned the groups on the other side of the colonially imposed frontier. It appears that political

⁹⁰ See the chapter 4, pp.100-101 for more details on Boven Digul.

⁹¹ Anderson (1991), pp.163-185

considerations have overridden any ethnographic considerations. This coincides with the arguments put forward by Hess in connection with post-colonial African states earlier.⁹²

Anderson's theories on the museum as part of the nation building project are undermined by the characteristics of these museums. Firstly, the museums in Papua do not appear to be designed specifically for local and/or indigenous visitors. The museum buildings and display structures were generic, with little difference between those in Papua and those in Jakarta. Additionally, there does not appear to be any attempt to locate Papua as a part of the Indonesian nation or to present connections with nearby regions as mentioned above. The displays were overwhelmingly of an ethnographic nature, with the majority of the displays being of statues, spears and so on, with no attempts to "appear as the guardian of a generalized, but also local, Tradition."⁹³

The museums were also very poorly attended by local residents, indigenous or otherwise. On the author's visit to the province it was clear that the majority of these institutions were very far from popular. As mentioned above, two of the museums in the province were derelict or close to it. At the Cultural Museum (Museum Lokabudaya), there were no other visitors at the time of my visit. In the State Provincial Museum (Museum Negeri Provinsi Papua) the doors were closed on my arrival. After searching for the curator or other staff, the doors were opened, the museum lights were turned on, and I was given a personal tour by a member of staff. It appeared that there were few visitors of any description to this relatively well-organised and well-funded museum.

⁹² Hess (2006), p.18. See above p.365 for Hess' theories of post-colonial boundaries.

⁹³ Anderson (1991), p.181

The plaster models of figures in the exhibition at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah suggest a colonial understanding of ‘the Papuan’. Hess discusses similar figure displays in South African museums which were assembled in the early 20th century.⁹⁴ In the post-Apartheid era in which these displays were exhibited, these items provoked controversy when they were re-presented to the public, leading to the closure of the exhibition in 2001.⁹⁵ A similar reaction has not been apparent in Indonesia in general, or in Papua in particular. It may be that the lack of public attendance at these museums is partially behind the lack of criticism.

According to Hess, such displays of figures of indigenous people were “used in the early 19th century to illustrate supposedly typical physical characteristics of the so-called Bushmen as a ‘primitive anthropological type’ low on the evolutionary scale, and later were grouped according to geographic regions and languages in South Africa ‘to demonstrate theoretical links between physical type, language, and culture.’ ”⁹⁶ This exhibition structure can be seen in the National Museum, where ‘typical type portraits’ adorn maps of the nation. There appears to be an association between state administrative structure and ethnic or tribal group structure that is evidenced by these displays, along with the labelling of items in the National Museum by region rather than ethnic group mentioned previously. The state’s administrative structure evidently carries much weight in the categorisations made by Indonesian anthropologists.

Anderson suggests that museums are important to post-colonial states as a means of conferring legitimacy through the prestige of the old regimes.⁹⁷ This does not seem to be the case with the museums that have been covered in this

⁹⁴ Hess (2006), pp.132-133

⁹⁵ Hess (2006), pp.132-133

⁹⁶ Hess (2006), pp.132-133

⁹⁷ Anderson (1991), pp.?

study, with no references being made to the Majapahit or Tidorese control of parts of Papua that Indonesian historians have suggested to legitimise the Indonesian rule.⁹⁸ I suggest that this reflects a certain confidence within the Centre in the state's ability to control Papua without needing to incorporate the Papuan people in the national project. This is exemplified by the quote attributed to Ali Murtopo prior to the Act of Free Choice.⁹⁹ Those who were present at a speech he gave at this time reported him as suggesting that:

Jakarta was not interested in us as Papuans but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find us a place there.¹⁰⁰

The inclusion of mock villages and houses seems to be an echo of the colonial exhibitions of the 19th century. According to Lonergan, these types of displays became more common as the need for colonial consolidation grew, with these "exhibitions increasingly project[ing] national identity onto the empire."¹⁰¹ Correspondingly, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah was established by the New Order government, an administration which placed a great importance on national unity.

The diversity of the province, especially the ethnic complexity, is not presented in these displays. An ethnographer from a London museum commented that the Indonesian treatment of Papuan peoples was remarkable in that

⁹⁸ See Van der Veur, Paul W., *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*, ANU, Canberra, 1966, pp.6-7 for details of Majapahit and Tidorese connections with Papua.

⁹⁹ Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, a close confidant of Suharto, was sent to Papua prior to the Act of Free Choice as a trouble-shooter. See Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006, p.267.

¹⁰⁰ Webster, David, "...Sampai Merauke": The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-1962, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1999, unpublished, p.51

¹⁰¹ Lonergan (2002), p.16

no ethnic groups are mentioned in the text that accompanies the photographs of Irian Jayans in the booklet on traditional dance. The text is equally vague about the kinds of dances that are popular in the province and this contrasts with the rather more precise coverage that the other provinces receive.¹⁰²

This lack of information on what seems an important ethnological aspect of the region indicates the marginalisation of the province within the national imagination. That this neglect is limited to Papua suggests that there is more than just its geographic distance from the Centre behind this disregard. This marginalisation is also exemplified by the poor state of museums within the province itself.

The museums within the province were much more specific in the information that was presented on the display objects and the customs of different ethnic groups across the province than were the museums in the nation's capital. However, the good information in these two museums was balanced by the fact that only two of the four museums in Papua were operational, with the other two having no exhibits at all apparently due to funding difficulties. One of the purported considerations behind the Special Autonomy program for Papua (*Otsus*) was the wish to support the social and cultural life of the province.¹⁰³ For half of the museums in the province to be effectively derelict points to a de facto neglect of Papuan cultural heritage, as well as problems with the administrative functioning of this level of government. However, it should be noted that there are many other (more pressing) budgetary needs for the provincial administration such as the relief of poverty and education.

¹⁰² Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988, p.49

¹⁰³ 'Undang-undang Republik Indonesia, Nomor 21 Tahun 2001: Tentang Otonomi khusus bagi provinsi Papua', Meninbang d, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-id.html> in January 2006

As mentioned earlier, Anderson theorised that the museum acts as a source of legitimacy for the state. However, for museums to have any politically integrative role, they must be visited and viewed by those whose allegiance to the nation is in doubt and needs to be developed. There is a clear lack of attention to museums in the province, with two of the four museums reviewed not being in operation at the time of my visit to the province in 2005. These closures, along with the low levels of attendance evident at the operational museums, suggest that Anderson's theories on the museum are in need of modification. This lack of effort by the state to search for legitimacy by these means is rather unexpected given the strength of secessionist feelings among Papuans.

While Anderson's hypotheses certainly seem applicable to the nation as a whole, these observations indicate that they may not be true for smaller minority groups. The lack of political importance ascribed to peripheral groups like Papuans by majority groups is exemplified by the statements above by Ali Murtopo.¹⁰⁴ These considerations suggest that museums as a politically legitimating tool may be used primarily to influence the majority and/or influential group or groups, with far less importance given to incorporating peripheral groups into the national project, a far cry from 'Unity in Diversity'.

¹⁰⁴ See above p.399 for Ali Murtopo's speech to an audience in Papua.

Educational materials

The majority of the school textbooks and general interest history books examined follow national political ideology in their history of the province. The territory is described as being a Tidorese colony prior to the Dutch colonisation, with a focus on the exploration of the region by Europeans. The Dutch were protected from having to hand over the territory to Indonesia by the Americans and Australia, and it is suggested they did not fulfil their obligations from earlier agreements. There is no hint that this might be the case for Indonesia in relation to the Act of Free Choice. This referendum is depicted as a formality that was agreed upon unanimously and happily by the delegates present. There is no mention of any dissent at that time, or since, towards Indonesian rule by Papuan people. These volumes, with the exception of the work by Kartodirdjo, give a reader many reasons for the inclusion of Papua into the nation of Indonesia, with no explanation of why there are separatist sentiments, or even any mention of the fact that many Papuans are not satisfied with being included in the Republic.

These findings match with the writings of Charles Farhadian, who reported that the school curricula in Indonesian schools are Java-centred. He suggests that the “conspicuous absence of West Papuan history, culture, and languages in school curricula exacerbates the marginalisation of West Papuans and can lead to increased feelings of shame”.¹⁰⁵

The representations covered in this chapter do little to challenge the impressions held by many Indonesians that Papuans are primitive people, figures of fun. Peter King claims that: “Many Indonesians in Papua see *Papua bodoh* – stupid Papuans; backwards Papuans, especially highlanders; ungrateful

¹⁰⁵ Farhadian (2005), p.59

Papuans, treacherous, wild terrorist and ‘secessionist’ Papuans ... aliens in a word.”¹⁰⁶ This is also confirmed by a Jakarta Post editorial, which stated that: “There is a common tendency in this country, particularly among the political elite and the decision makers, to treat Papuans as uneducated and stupid, simple tribespeople who are ungrateful for the services provided by the government.”¹⁰⁷ George Aditjondro also suggests that it is a commonly held belief among Indonesian people that “Papuans are not really human in the ‘hierarchy of civilizations’”.¹⁰⁸ Further confirmation of these perceptions of indigenous Papuans comes from former Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono, who is reported to have stated that there was discrimination in Indonesian society towards Papuans, alienating Papuans from Indonesian society and politics.¹⁰⁹

The understandings of ethnic difference presented in much of the material above show reasons why there is dissatisfaction within the Papuan population to being part of a nation where they are not treated as equals. The division of people by racial characteristics suggests that the conception held by those in the Centre of Papuan people is as second class citizens of the nation – a very different ethos to the official ‘Unity in Diversity’.

¹⁰⁶ King, Peter, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, p.33

¹⁰⁷ ‘Losing Papua’, Editorial, *The Jakarta Post*, 20th March 2006, newsletter from [Kabar-Irian] Irian News - 3/21/06 (Part 3 of 3), accessible from <http://www.kabar-irian.info/pipermail/kabar-irian/2006-March/000778.html> in February 2008

¹⁰⁸ Chauvel & Bhakti (2004), p.56


¹⁰⁹ From comments made by Juwono Sudarsono as reported by Brigham Golden in an interview. (Columbia University / Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Papua), published in The Van Zorge Report on Indonesia (Vol. VIII No. 3—February 21, 2006), accessed from Kabar-Irian Irian News - 4/17/06 (Part 2 of 3) at <http://www.kabar-irian.info/pipermail/kabar-irian/2006-April/000787.html> in February 2008

Chapter 7: The Papuan population

The history of the province covered in the previous three chapters has examined the literature on the political process, the resistance to Indonesian rule and on human rights. It has also examined representations of Papua and its indigenous inhabitants. The following three chapters will examine the history of Papua from the 1960s until 2005 in demographic terms. This will involve an analysis of the Indonesian statistical data from this period in order to evaluate the scale and temporal development of migration and its impact on the province's people. There are a few tables in these chapters which were compiled by other authors. These are mainly tables from the Dutch period along with some tables from the Indonesian census which had already been compiled in suitable ways. These tables were included as a comparison to figures that have been compiled by the author covering the period after 1962. All charts and the majority of tables in these chapters were compiled by the author. There are many charts with figures from a number of sources, figures compiled from a number of tables, or with percentages. This analysis is all the original work of the author based directly on these statistical materials.

This chapter will examine the impact of migration on the province as a whole, with chapters 8 and 9 examining the consequences of this movement of people at the regency level.

Map 3: 'Basic map of Papua'¹



Data on the population of Papua province does not go back very far in the 20th century. The Dutch census of 1930 that was conducted in other parts of the East Indies did not stretch as far as this region, the eastern-most part of the colony. There was little Dutch administrative control over the territory until 1910.² The first estimate of the population was 1 million, little more than a guess at this time considering the lack of exploration by Europeans of large parts of the interior before this point. The Dutch had very limited administration in the territory, and were yet to contact people in many parts of the colony, especially

¹ 'Peta dasar Propinsi Papua' ('Basic map of Papua'). Accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/p-pwb/papua-umum-57k.gif> in February 2008. Map used with the permission of PapuaWeb and according to their conditions of use which are available from <http://www.papuaweb.org/info/disclaimer.html>

² See chapter 4 for a more extensive analysis of the history of this period.

in highland areas.³ This population figure was revised downwards in 1952 to 700,000, though this was still only an estimate.⁴ This was still no more than an educated approximation, however, as even just before the handover of power to Indonesia in 1962 the Dutch figures claimed to have administrative control over 532,928 people though their control was fairly minimal.⁵

The administration figures from this period give background information on village sizes, the number of foreign and 'Asian' residents, and indigenous employment before the Indonesian period. The most useful data from this period was the demographic survey carried out immediately prior to the departure of the Dutch. This survey was conducted between 1960 and 1962 with European Economic Community (EEC) funding. It did not cover the whole population of the colony as the later Indonesian censuses did, but was a large scale survey with over 70,000 people in six canvass areas being interviewed.⁶ While these findings are an invaluable source of data on the pre-Indonesian population of the region, the six areas were mostly coastal or island districts and did not cover highland regions, due to the lack of administration in most highland areas at the time.⁷

The Indonesian government's *de jure* rule of the province started in 1963⁸ and since that time the administration has conducted four censuses. The province

³ Van der Kroef, Dr. J. M., *The West New Guinea Dispute*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958, p.12

⁴ Lagerberg, C.S.I.J., *Years of Reconstruction: New Guinea from 1949 to 1961*, Research and Microfilm, Maryland, 1963, pp.21-24, pp.102-103 & pp.148-149

⁵ Lagerberg (1963), pp.21-24, pp.102-103 & pp.148-149. See chapter 4 for more details of this issue.

⁶ Groenwegen, Dr. K. & Dr. D.J. van de Kaa, *Resultaten van het demografisch onderzoek Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea (Data from 1961 Dutch Demographic Survey)*, [EEG PROJECT 11.41.002], Books 1-6, Government printing and publishing office, The Hague, 1964-1965, Book 3, pp.1-2

⁷ The six regions were Schouten-eilanden, Noemfoor, Benden-Waropen, Nimboran, Fak-Fak and Muyu.

⁸ There was a certain level of power held by the Indonesian military and government officials posted there from 1962 to 1963 during the period of UN control. See for example Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970, p.238 or Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under*

was supposedly 'quarantined' until 1969, with travel restrictions purportedly limiting the number of migrants arriving during this period.⁹ The figures in the national census in 1971 only reported the figures for urban areas of Papua. However, the figures in the publications produced by the local government statistics organisation, the Bureau of Statistics Jayapura, cover the rural areas of the province also.¹⁰ While the main census document and provincial census volumes produced by the national Bureau of Statistics do not include any details on the population outside the cities, the provincial Bureau of Statistics published a limited volume that includes data for rural areas.¹¹ It is unclear why there is this discrepancy in the data published by the central and the provincial statistics departments. It seems most likely that the data was simply late in being compiled, as the regional report was produced in the year following that in which the national figures were published.

The first census of the province with full data covering both urban and rural areas was the Indonesian census of 1980. There were questions on place of birth, place of previous residence, place of residence 5 years ago, religion and language spoken at home. However, in this census (along with the 1990 census), there was no question on ethnicity included. As Suryadinata and colleagues suggest discussion of ethnicity was discouraged under the New Order.

the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002, p.32

⁹ How effectively this policy was carried out is debatable, with Hastings noting that during his trip to West Irian in 1968 most of the stores in Jayapura were run by Makassarese traders. (Hastings, Peter, *New Guinea: problems and prospects*, Cheshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1969, p.218). Garnaut and Manning report that by 1971, only 450 transmigrant families had been settled (Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, pp.38-39). This figure may not be accurate, however. See the discussion pp.238-239

¹⁰ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1972

¹¹ *Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya (Angka Sementara)*, Biro Pusat Statistik Djajapura, Jayapura, 1972

During the New Order under President Soeharto when Indonesia was at the stage of nation building, the concept of SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar Golongan) was considered sensitive, especially ethnicity and race. Discussion on issues related to ethnicity and race was discouraged. Questions on ethnic background would only make the population ethnic-conscious, and this would be harmful to national unity.¹²

However, the inter-group conflicts in this province, as well as in other provinces such as West Kalimantan and Maluku show that this approach to ethnic relations was ultimately unsuccessful. Due to the lack of questions on ethnicity, indirect means of ascertaining the ethnic composition will need to be used in this thesis for the years before 2000, with the questions on language and religion being the most important of these, as well as questions on the previous province of residence and residence of birth. These questions will be vital to this study in determining the number of migrants to the province.


As has been mentioned in chapter 2, the issues with the population enumeration were much greater with the 2000 census than they had been with earlier censuses. The figures from the 2006 BPS publication *Penduduk Provinsi Papua* will be used to provide a later, more reliable source of data which will be used to confirm that the 2000 data can be used with reasonable confidence in the current research.

¹² Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003, pp.XX-XXI. A translation of this phrase is 'Ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group', often used in relation to conflict. Translation by author.

Population figures

The population of Papua has grown greatly during the period following the relinquishment of power by the Dutch in 1962. The Dutch had previously estimated the population of their colony as 700,000.¹³ The population that was registered with authorities was lower than this estimate at just 486,755.¹⁴ The first census conducted by the Indonesian administration in 1971 showed that there were 782,050 residents of the new province. By 1980, the population had increased to 1,107,291, with further growth in the next two decade shown by the 1990 figure of 1,630,107 and the population of 2,233,530 in 2000.¹⁵ The chart below shows the growth in the population for both urban and rural areas.

Chart 7.1: Population of Papua province, urban and rural, 1971-2000¹⁶



¹³ Groenewegen (1964), Book 1, Table III, p.86


¹⁴ Groenewegen (1964), Book 1, Table III, p.86

¹⁵ Figures from *Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya*, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974, (Table 02); *Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya (Angka Sementara)*; *Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-71*, Table 4, p.6; *Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980*, Seri S28, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1983, Table 02; *Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Seri S2.27, Population of Irian Jaya: Results of the 1990 population census, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1992, Table 02; *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua : tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province : main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 01

¹⁶ See footnote 22 above.

These figures show a growth in both the urban and rural areas of the province, with higher rates in urban than in rural areas. The growth rates for these areas of Papua are shown in chart 7.2 below.

Chart 7.2: Population growth, 1971-2000, urban and rural¹⁷



It can be seen that the growth rates for both areas of the province tended to decrease during this period, excluding the 1971-1980 rural figures. This mirrors national trends of falling birth rates, a common pattern in many developing countries in which child mortality rates have fallen, along with rural to urban migration that takes away the need for child labour in agriculture. The reasons for the small growth in the rural population between 1971 and 1980 are unclear, though one controversial explanation is genocide by Indonesian military actions. This hypothesis will be examined later in this chapter, as well as in chapter 8. Certainly, one major factor in this apparently limited growth is the uncertainty over the figures from the earlier years of the Indonesian administration of the province (continuing the inexact estimation of the then colony's population size by the Dutch). The figures from the late 1960s and early

¹⁷ Figures calculated by author from the figures in the previous chart.

1970s, given in *Irian Barat dalam angka*¹⁸, suggest that there was still estimation of the population of the more remote regencies, with the figures for such areas as Jayawijaya and Paniai/Nabire being suspiciously round numbers.¹⁹

The 2005 figures show that there continued to be a rise in the province's population, with the total number of people at this time being 2,439,838.²⁰ This suggests a growth rate since the 2000 figures of 1.8%.²¹ While this growth rate is lower than that calculated for earlier periods, there has been a trend to lower population growth rates throughout the period covered by the current study. It also seems possible that the 2000 figures were over-estimates of the actual population numbers.

The next sections will examine particular characteristics of the population that will be used to examine the scale of migration to the province, and its impact on the indigenous population. The main areas that will be examined will be the sex and age composition of the population; religious affiliation will be used to estimate the magnitude and distribution of migration to the province. The educational attainments and employment characteristics of the population will be examined to ascertain the impact of migration on these areas for the indigenous population. Finally, the available direct data on migration will be examined to provide confirmation of the inferences drawn from the other areas of the censuses mentioned above.

¹⁸ *Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-1971*

¹⁹ *Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-1971*, Daftar 3: Jumlah penduduk daerah propinsi Irian Barat dari tahun 1967 s/d 1971, p.5 shows that the 1970 population for Jayawijaya was 198,000, which fell to 174,872 in 1971. It is likely that the 1970 figure is simply an estimate.

²⁰ *Penduduk Provinsi Papua: Hasil Survei Penduduk antar sensus 2005*, Seri S2.31, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2006, table 3

²¹ *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua 2002*, Table 01 & *Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005*, table 3. Growth rate calculated by author.

Sex and age composition of the population

The ratio of men to women in the population gives an indication of the characteristics of the population, and can illustrate the nature of migration to (and within) the receiving province. The following section will examine this ratio in Papua between 1951 and 2000. The data from before the Indonesian period comes from the Dutch demographic survey that was carried out on six areas of the colony as well as earlier data included in the publications from this survey. Below is the data on the years 1951 to 1961.

Table 7.1: Sex ratio by year, Males per 100 females²²

Year	Sex ratio
1951	109.6
1952	109.8
1953	110.6
1954	112.2
1955	109.7
1956	109.0
1957	109.8
1958	109.5
1959	108.2
1960	109.1
1961	107.7

The sex ratios that were noted from these years are high in comparison with the typical worldwide sex ratio of 105 males per hundred females.²³ There was wide variation in the sex ratio across the colony as shown below.

²² Groenwegen & Van de Kaa (1964), Book 1, p.86. Sex ratios calculated by the author. All sex ratios are calculated as the number of males per 100 females in the population.

²³ Rowland, Donald T., *Demographic methods and concepts*, OUP, Oxford, 2003, p.87

Table 7.2: Population of canvassed areas by sex ratio, 1960-62²⁴

Canvassed area	Sex ratio
Schouten-eilanden	104.6
Noemfoor	97.7
Beneden-Waropen	92.4
Nimboran	103.8
Fak-Fak	113.5
Muyu	91.3 ²⁵

The high ratio of men in Fak-Fak suggests that there was migration to this region, since migration is commonly a male dominated phenomenon, particularly migration that is planned to be temporary in nature by the migrants themselves. Similarly, Muyu which was experiencing a high rate of emigration at this time has a low sex ratio, suggesting that men were the most common emigrants from this regency.²⁶

The migrant population used to be heavily overrepresented by men. Also Groenewegen and van de Kaa (1967) found that migration in the canvassed areas of Irian Jaya in the 1960s predominantly took place among men 15-29 years of age.²⁷

This association of migration with men in Papua can also be seen in the data from the 1971 census. As can be seen from the chart below of urban areas from that census, the sex ratio is markedly higher for those of working age than is typical. In general, rural to urban migration tends to be male dominated, with women staying in rural locations. There are often cultural prohibitions and restrictions on the actions of women that tend to prevent women from

²⁴ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), Book 3, abridged from tables A.6.1 - A.6.6, pp.24-25


²⁵ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), abridged from pp.24-25. Figures are for slightly differing times for each

²⁶ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), Book 3, Table 7, pp.26-35 shows there was a great deal of migration within the canvassed area in Muyu. It is also possible that these low figures were due to men evading government officials in order to avoid forced relocation to villages. See Penders (2002), pp.110-115.

²⁷ Lautenbach (1999), p.211

migrating, with many ethnic groups in Indonesia considering it inappropriate for women to live alone or away from their families.²⁸

Chart 7.3: Sex ratio, males per 100 females by age groups, 1971²⁹



The sex ratio is markedly uneven, with significantly higher values for ages 30-34 than for 35-39. This is true for each decade except for the 20s, with this being likely to be an error caused by respondents' misreporting of their age. Even now, many Papuans are not sure of their own age (even among younger people) or the ages of other members of their family.³⁰ This is especially true for older people, with comments to the author on the ages of elderly-looking Papuans being extremely vague and imprecise.³¹ This is even true among younger Papuans, however, as noted by Lautenbach in her demographic research in the Bird's Head region.³²

²⁸ Lautenbach (1999), p.210

²⁹ Sensus Penduduk 1971– penduduk Irian Jaya, p.5

³⁰ Author's observations from visit to Papua, August 2005

³¹ Author's experience from visit to Papua, August 2005

³² Lautenbach, Hendrika, Demographic survey research: Data gathering (problems) on the subject of fertility in the Bird's Head Peninsula of Irian Jaya, pp.117-126 in Miedema, Jelle & Cecilia Ode, Rien A.C.

Furthermore, the data on migrants from this census points out that migration from other areas of Indonesia was predominantly male. The figures in table 7.3 below show the high sex ratios for those from all destination areas, especially those from Sulawesi. This reflects cultural norms held by many in these origin areas, with certain ethnic groups in Sulawesi such as the Bugis having culturally institutionalised expectations that young people, especially young men, will temporarily migrate to find work.³³ Even with the indigenous population it is apparent that there must be high rates of migration from rural to urban areas of the province.

Table 7.3: Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 1971³⁴

Place of birth	Sex ratio
Indigenous population	134
Inner Islands (Java and Bali)	142
All Sulawesi	249
Maluku	155
All other Indonesian	188

The figures from the provincial Bureau of Statistics for 1971 also bear out the conclusion that there was migration to the urban areas of Papua. The figures produced by this body showed the population by sex and by regency. An analysis of these figures shows that the sex ratios for those regencies such as Jayapura (134) and Fak-Fak (119), that were more urbanised and more part of the modern economy, had higher sex ratios than the hinterland regencies such as Paniai (101) and Jayawijaya (107).³⁵ Since these figures are broken down by age, it can be seen that in Jayapura regency, the highest sex ratio (170 men for

Dam (eds) with the assistance of Connie Baak, *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian Jaya, Indonesia : proceedings of the conference, Leiden, 13-17 October 1997*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1998, p.121

³³ Muhidin, Salahudin, *The population of Indonesia : regional demographic scenarios using a multiregional method and multiple data sources*, Rozenberg, Amsterdam, 2002, p.56

³⁴ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – penduduk Irian Jaya, compiled from pp.85-98

³⁵ Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya, p.2. Data analysis by author.


each 100 women) is for the 15-24 age group, suggesting a male, migrant population.³⁶

Nine years later in 1980 the sex ratio was not as extremely high as the rates for 1971, but still much higher than those that would be expected naturally. There were many more men than women in urban areas, again suggesting that migration to urban areas was a significant factor at this time. It may be that some of this migration was from rural to urban areas within Papua. This is supported by the rural sex ratios being extremely low for the 20-24 age group, and lower than in urban areas for working age people in general. The genocide of Papuans that has been suggested by many sources³⁷ is not incompatible with these figures. However, the sex ratios for older and younger age groups are not extremely low. This fact, along with the lack of certainty about individual's own age among Papuans mentioned above, leads me to conclude that this conclusion is not supported by the evidence. Additionally, if this low ratio were due to human rights abuses, it would be expected that the low sex ratio would be found in later censuses. This will be examined below. The table below shows the sex ratio for different age groups as found in the 1980 census data.

³⁶ Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya, p.2. Data analysis by author.

³⁷ For examples of these claims see Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Priyneha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004 and Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988

Chart 7.4: Sex ratio, Papua province, urban and rural, 1980³⁸



By 1990, the overall sex ratio in the province was closer to the expected ratio, but was still biased towards males. As can be seen from the table below, migrants from other parts of the archipelago resident in Papua had lower sex ratios than they had been ten years earlier. This suggests that migration of families was more common, with longer-term migration being more typical. The sex ratios are lowest for indigenous Papuans, followed by migrants from Java. This low ratio may reflect the fact that many of the migrants from Java are transmigrants. Transmigrants are moved as families, with one of the rules for the selection of migrants being that they should be “married, in good health, and between the ages of eighteen and forty-five”.³⁹ The low sex ratio for those people from Java in rural areas supports this assumption since many transmigrants were from this island.

³⁸ Based on figures from Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, table 02. Sex ratios calculated by author.

³⁹ Oey, Mayling, Migration and fertility in Indonesia, in Ilchman, Lasswell, Montgomery & Weiner, *Policy sciences and population*, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975, p.219

Table 7.4: Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 1990⁴⁰

Place of birth	Sex ratio		
	Urban	Rural	Total
Java	115	112	113
Sulawesi	122	161	131
Maluku	159	158	159
Irian Jaya	118	106	108
Other	158	155	157
Total	121	107	110

The sex ratios for migrants from Sulawesi vary greatly between urban and rural areas. Most migrants from this island were not public servants according to Chris Manning. He states that at this time most had “relatively low levels of education and are primarily engaged in unskilled wage labour, trade, transport and primary-sector activities such as market gardening, fishing and logging activities.”⁴¹

Migrants from Maluku also are mainly men, with surprisingly high sex ratios for this group. The predominance of male migrants from this province has increased slightly since the 1971 census. Some authors have commented that migrants from this area tend to be employed as public servants,⁴² a fact which only makes this ratio more surprising. It may be that the relative proximity of Maluku to Papua, especially to the Bird’s Head region which is an area of high immigration, means there is more temporary migration than from other provinces.

The figures for other areas are very high, suggesting that these migrants were generally single men seeking employment and not bringing their families with

⁴⁰ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2, created using data from pp.44-69. Data analysis by the author.

⁴¹ Manning, Chris, ‘Newcomers bring new ideas’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 136, No. 18, 30 Apr 1987, p.42. Also see Lautenbach (1999), p.211 among others

⁴² Lautenbach (1999), p.211

them for this inter-provincial move. This form of migration is likely to be shorter term, and involve remittances and/or migrants taking money with them when they leave the province. The frontier nature of the province is a large factor in this characteristic of migration to the province, with men employed on work camps remote from towns being unlikely to be accompanied by their wives or children.⁴³

The most recent census of 2000 suggests that there had been some change in the previous ten years in terms of the gender composition of the population. The main difference was for migrants from Maluku, with ratios for both urban and rural areas being much lower than in 1990. The sex ratios shown in table 7.5 below are quite similar to those for 1990, but the ratios for migrant ethnic groups show a decrease in the ratio. This points to more stability in this population, with more long-term migrants and more families originating from this province.

Table 7.5: Population by sex ratio and place of birth, 2000⁴⁴

Place of birth	Sex ratio		
	Urban	Rural	Total
All Java	113	114	114
All Sulawesi	117	151	125
Maluku	133	142	135
Papua	112	109	110
Other	158	144	151
Total	116	111	112

To provide a comparison for the situation within Papua, the figures for the nation of Papua New Guinea can be examined. This is a region with similar

⁴³ Manning (1987) also makes this point about the nature of the province having a bearing on the majority of migrants being men.

⁴⁴ *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2000. Table created by the author using data from Tables 11.a.x, Interprovince lifetime migration stream, pp.79-105

geographical constraints, but with far less immigration. The data below shows the sex ratios as reported for the nation between 1980 and 2000.

Table 7.6: Sex ratios for Papua New Guinea, 1980-2000⁴⁵

	1980	1990	2000
Urban	138.4	126.2	118.7
Rural	106.1	109.1	106.1

The higher sex ratios in urban areas point to a great deal of rural to urban migration. The decreases in these rates between 1980 and 2000 suggest that migration became more permanent in nature during this period.

Chart 7.5 below details the sex ratio by age group between 1961 and 2000 taken from the Dutch survey of 1961, as well as the Indonesian censuses between 1971 and 2000. This data will be examined in order to consider the validity of the claims that have been made that the Indonesian authorities have committed genocide against the indigenous population of Papua.⁴⁶

It is evident from the figures in this chart that there are more males at most age groups in all these years. The figures for 1961 show a fairly standard sex ratio across the age groups. According to Pressat: "At the most advanced ages, the numbers of each sex are very unequal. ...This fact is virtually universal, like the phenomenon that is its cause: the excess male mortality that occurs at all ages of life, soon bringing the observed excess of males at early ages (at birth


⁴⁵ 'Population and social statistics: Demographic Indicators', *National Statistical Office for Papua New Guinea*, http://www.nso.gov.pg/Pop_Soc_%20Stats/popsoc.htm and http://www.nso.gov.pg/Pop_Soc_%20Stats/Social/Health/health.htm, accessed May 2005

⁴⁶ See for example Brundige et al (2004)

there are about 105 boys per 100 girls) to an excess of females.”⁴⁷ The age-sex composition of the population in 1961 corresponds to this pattern.

The age-sex composition for 1971 is much more male dominated. This is understandable given the nature of the areas covered. Firstly, only urban areas of the province were included in this census. These areas were growing rapidly at this time, with the population swelling through intra- and inter-provincial migration. These areas tend to be male dominated. For example, the sex ratio across the border in PNG in 2000 was 106 in rural areas but 119 in urban areas.⁴⁸

Chart 7.5: Sex ratio by age group, 1961-2000⁴⁹



⁴⁷ Pressat, Roland, *Demographic analysis: methods, results, applications*, (translated by Judah Matras), Edward Arnold, London, 1972, p.273

⁴⁸ National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea (2005)

⁴⁹ Data from Groenwegen & Kaa (1964), p.70; Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya p.5; Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya: Hasil sensus penduduk 1980 Table 02; Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, p.3; *Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Seri L2.2.30 (Population of Papua: Results of the 2000 population census), 2001, p.3. Figures compiled and sex ratios calculated by author.

There are lower sex ratios for age groups between 20 and 39 years of age. The fact that there are many men of these ages ‘missing’ from this census data could be interpreted as evidence for the genocide of Papuans by the Indonesian military and government as has been suggested by some writers.⁵⁰ However, these low ratios are not carried over to older age groups in later censuses as would be seen if these sex ratios were due to genocide.

While rural areas would be likely to have low sex ratios at these ages due to male migration to urban areas, this dip in the sex ratio is also apparent in the urban areas of the territory. In 1971, there were 6,449 people born in Papua living in other provinces, 5% of the total urban population of this time.⁵¹ The figures on outmigrant numbers from all the censuses are shown in the table below, along with the percentage of the population these migrants represented.

Table 7.7: People born in Papua who were resident in other provinces of Indonesia⁵²

Year	1971	1980	1990	1995
Outmigration	6,449	15,559	30,786	47,356
Total population	923,440	1,107,291	1,630,107	2,233,530
% of total population	0.7	1.4	1.9	2.1

Considering that there were only 15,773 more women in the 20-29 year old age groups for 2000,⁵³ it seems likely that the sex ratio difference in these age groups is partially explained by differential rates of study and/or work in other parts of the archipelago as has been mentioned for the figures from earlier censuses. This suggests that these low ratios are partially due to the temporary

⁵⁰ Brundige et al (2004)

⁵¹ Sensus Penduduk 1971, Table 23, pp.101-102

⁵² Figures on outmigrants from *Fertilitas, mortalitas, migrasi: Hasil Survei penduduk antar sensus (SUPAS)*, Seri: S3, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1995, Table 12.3, p.89. Population figures from material referenced in footnote 54 above. Data analysis by author.

⁵³ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 3: Penduduk Menurut Golongan Umur, daerah Perkotaan/perdesaan, dan jenis kelamin, p.12

absence of residents of this age from the census. It is not clear, however, whether this is due to migration out of the province or absence from villages in order to avoid government or military officials. It seems also likely that one cause is simply a lack of compliance with census takers by young men. This is an issue with censuses in developed countries with well-funded census operations which do not have the geographical difficulties of Papua. This will be discussed in later chapters.⁵⁴

The figures from the period show sex ratios in urban areas as being much higher than the biological norm. This suggests that there was migration to the urban areas of Papua from within the province and outside the province that was temporary in nature. The figures for those from other provinces show a great deal of variety in the sex ratios, with migrants from Java having much lower sex ratios than those from Maluku and Sulawesi. This reflects the characteristics of transmigrants to the province from Java as mentioned above. These high sex ratios continued largely unchanged from the first census in 1971 to 1990, but decreased in the following decade. The 2000 census shows that migration had shifted in character, with far more women having migrated to the province. This suggests a more mature stage of the phenomenon, with more family migration and longer-term settlement by migrants in the province.

The age composition of the population of Papua has changed vastly during the period of Indonesian sovereignty. One very important change is the rise in the life expectancy of the population. The figures below show these changes in Papua, Indonesia as a whole and in two other provinces. These provinces were selected to provide a comparison, namely one other Outer Island province

⁵⁴ See the conclusion for more discussion of this issue.

which has experienced high levels of immigration (East Kalimantan) and an Inner Island province (East Java).

Table 7.8: Estimated life expectancy at time of birth by province, for selected provinces of Indonesia, 1971-1995⁵⁵

	1971	1980	1990	1995
Irian Jaya	56.7	53	57.9	62.7
East Java	45.9	54.1	61.2	67.3
East Kalimantan	53.2	53.8	62.7	65.7
Indonesia	45.7	52.2	59.8	64.4

It can be noted that the life expectancy dropped between 1971 and 1980 for Irian Jaya only. This may simply be due to the differences in populations covered by these figures, with the 1971 figures being based on the urban population only. All the figures from later censuses are for both rural and urban inhabitants and can be compared with more certainty.


The life expectancy for the province increased during this period, but the figures for East Java, East Kalimantan and for the nation as a whole increased more than 25% faster over the period 1980 to 1995 than the life expectancy in Papua. Whatever the cause of this slower growth in life expectancy, it appears that the administration's policies have not led to the improvements in longevity that have occurred in other provinces. However, Papua does not have the lowest life expectancy of Indonesian provinces and its life expectancy is far higher than that of neighbouring Papua New Guinea. The life expectancy in PNG in 2000 was only 53.7 years for men and 54.8 years for women.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Fertilitas, mortalitas, migrasi 1995*, p.59. Abridged by author.

⁵⁶ National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea (2005)

Chart 7.6 below compares the age composition of Papua in 1961 and 2000. The data from 1961 was compiled from the results of the Dutch demographic survey⁵⁷ and the 2000 data is from the 2000 census.⁵⁸

Chart 7.6: Populations of 1961 and 2000 by sex and age groups, male and female, as percentages⁵⁹



It can be seen that the shapes of the two pyramids are dissimilar. The 1961 pyramid is much broader at the base than the 2000 pyramid, indicating that there were high levels of fertility at this time. The graph for the 2000 figures is also broader at the bottom but much less so than for 1961. The more rectangular shape points to the Papuan population undergoing a demographic

⁵⁷ While this survey was only conducted in six canvassed areas of the then colony, it was a large-scale study with over 5,000 respondents.


⁵⁸ Groenwegen & Van de Kaa, Book 4, p.70 & Karakteristik Penduduk Asli (2000), p.12

⁵⁹ Compiled by the author from data from Groenwegen & Van de Kaa (1965), Book 4, p.70 and Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, p.12

transition. According to Rowland this process describes the “movement of death and birth rates in a society, from a situation where both are high... to one where both are low.”⁶⁰ This suggests a more stable society, with higher life expectancies, lower birth rates and lower levels of child mortality.

The data on age composition shows up differences between the migrant and indigenous populations. The chart below compares these groups by age groups in 1971.

Chart 7.7: Papuan and non-Papuan populations by age group as percentages, 1971⁶¹



The non-indigenous population bulges in the young adult age groups, a pattern associated with inward migration. This confirms the inference from the sex composition data of a work-related migration of working age adults to the province in the early days of the Indonesian rule of the region, with this data


⁶⁰ Rowland (2003), pp.17-18

⁶¹ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, compiled by author from pp.85-98

being from the census only 2 years after the travel restrictions to the province were officially lifted. With 33,923 migrants out of an urban population of only 150,786 at this time (most of whom were males of working age), it seems certain the employment prospects of the indigenous population would have been negatively affected by this influx. All other factors being equal, the comparatively lower levels of education in Papua would have tended to disadvantage indigenous residents' employment chances compared to those of the migrant population.⁶²

By 1990, the urban areas had grown greatly, with the urban population now approaching 400,000.⁶³ The age composition of these areas was still different from those of rural areas as shown by chart 7.8 below.

Chart 7.8: Sex ratios by age group, Urban and rural, 1990⁶⁴



⁶² See later section on education levels in Papua compared to other areas of Indonesia at this time.

⁶³ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 02, Population by age group, urban/rural and sex, p.3

⁶⁴ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 02, Population by age group, urban/rural and sex, p.3. Sex ratios calculated by author.


It can be seen that the sex ratio for rural areas is much lower for those in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups. These figures are consistent with rural to urban migration, with men migrating more than women.

The figures from the 2000 census are given below. The sex ratios in rural areas are very much higher than would be expected, especially among the older age groups. It appears that this complex issue is not related to that of migration, however.⁶⁵ This bias towards males in urban areas shows up in the 2000 figures also. The total sex ratios are expected, but the variations across the age groups do not correspond to the expected pattern quoted from Pressat above. The sex ratios for older age groups are much higher than is typical. I suggest that these figures are due at least in part to the low social status of women in most ethnic groups in the province, with women working harder than men, having the possibility of child birth complications, and having less time and money to attend medical clinics or purchase medicines.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ For an examination of the issue of sex ratios within the highlands of Papua see Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/_phd.html August 2007, chapter 6, pp.66-114.

⁶⁶ See Butt (1998), chapter 3 for discussion of this inequality in the case of the Dani people, as well as more generally in Papua.

Chart 7.9: Sex ratios by age group, Urban and rural, 2000⁶⁷



⁶⁷ Penduduk Papua 2000, Table 02, Population by age group, urban/rural and sex. p.3. Sex ratios calculated by author.

Religion

Religion is a good indicator of the transformation that has occurred within the population since the handover of power from the United Nations in 1963. Before the arrival of European missionaries in the 19th century, monotheism had spread only as far as the north-western tip of New Guinea and the isles off this coast, especially the Raja Empat islands. The religious beliefs of the indigenous people of the Humboldt Bay area appear not to have been affected by the trading networks that brought immigrants to the Bird's Head region.⁶⁸ For people in most parts of Papua, the first contact with Europeans was not with Dutch administrators, but with Catholic or Protestant missionaries. The Jayapura area, being in the northern half of the island, was predominantly an area of Protestant activity. As a result, the vast majority of Papuans from this region are Christian.

It is easy to assume that the rise in the number of Muslims during the period from 1962 onwards results mainly from the increasing population of migrants and their descendants. The current section will examine whether this assumption is valid and, if so, whether this factor can be used to estimate the number of indigenous residents during the period of Indonesian sovereignty. This will be examined in the light of the data in the latest census showing the differences in belief between the migrant and indigenous populations.

While all Indonesian censuses have contained a question on religion, the Dutch demographic survey that was conducted immediately before the change of sovereignty did not include any information on the religious affiliations of

⁶⁸ A discussion of the indigenous beliefs held by people in the Jayapura region is beyond the scope of this discussion, due in part to the large number of different ethnic groups. See for example Sharp, Nonie in association with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, *The morning star in Papua Barat*, Arena, North Carlton, 1994 for more details on indigenous religious beliefs in Papua.

people at this time. This means there is no base figure for the pre-Indonesian period. However, there were a few areas of Papua in which there were Muslim populations, with Fak-Fak being the most notable area.⁶⁹

The lack of figures on religious belief seems to illustrate a lack of concern for this aspect of the society by the Dutch administration.⁷⁰ Since Jayapura had been the capital of the colony after the war, there had been migration from other areas. With the capital's population including immigrants from across the Dutch East Indies (as well as from around the world), all of the religions prevalent later – Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam and animism – were probably represented at this time. While most of the European administrators were to leave following the transfer of power, many foreign Christian missionaries were to remain in the new province and continue to convert indigenous people.⁷¹

It is important to note that the religion categories on all the Indonesian censuses were to some extent more proscriptive than descriptive. The Panca Sila doctrine that was first developed by Sukarno, and further raised in importance by Suharto, has as its first principle the belief in one god. Within the New Order, atheism was very strongly associated with the dreaded communism. Suharto states as early in his Presidency as 1966 that “the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] is foreign for Indonesia which is religious and attached to Pancasila.”⁷² Pancasila insists on monotheism as the only (and necessary) form of religious belief. This made difficult the incorporation of other

⁶⁹ See Chapter 4 for more information on this topic.

⁷⁰ See Chapter 4 for ways in which the Dutch did encourage missionary activity.

⁷¹ See Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006, p.152 for information on missionary activity following the transfer of power.

⁷² Suharto quoted in Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001, p.149

ethnic groups whose belief systems were not monotheistic, including most groups within Papua. In practice, people with other belief systems were simply categorised as holding one of the five (originally six) religions. Hence these figures may be inaccurate to some extent, though this is far more likely to have biased the number of Catholic and Protestant inhabitants. It seems highly improbable that any non-Muslim indigenous people would have been placed in this category other than in the Bird's Head area.⁷³

The figures on religion reveal much about the province's society as could be expected of a majority Christian province as part of a majority Muslim nation. The topic of religion has been a sensitive one, both in Papua and in the Indonesian Republic as a whole. The questions in the census also reflected the delicate nature of this topic. The first census after independence in 1961 did not include a question on religion for this reason.⁷⁴ By the time of the next census in 1971, religious belief had become prescribed by the state, with only a certain number of religions being allowed by the government. Suryadinata and colleagues state that in 1965 "Sukarno, the then president of the Republic of Indonesia, issued a presidential decision stipulating six officially recognized religions, namely, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism."⁷⁵

The figures from 1971 show there were 33,083 residents of the province who self-identified as being Muslim, making up 22% of the (urban) population at this time.⁷⁶ The age group data shows that this segment of the residents of the province were more prevalent among those of working age than among those

⁷³ It appears likely that a census taker would classify these non-conformers as the same religion as others in their ethnic group or the most common religion in the district they resided in.


⁷⁴ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.103

⁷⁵ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.103

⁷⁶ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 11, p.44

just above retirement age (the 50-59 age group) or for children. This suggests a large number of the migrant population to the province were those of working age, many of whom were without their families. This conclusion is supported by the distribution of Muslim residents across regencies, with 43% of Muslims residing in the Jayapura regency, an area which received a large number of migrants following the change of sovereignty.⁷⁷ While the figures for the oldest age groups give much higher percentages for Muslim residents than for younger age groups, this should not be taken to mean that the Muslim population had a longer life expectancy, as the lower figures for the other sectors could be due to older residents returning to their village of origin more often due to its relative proximity.

Chart 7.10: Muslim population by age group and percentage of whole population of this age group, 1971



By the time of the next census in 1980, only five of these categories were still officially accepted, with Confucianism having been de-recognised by Suharto's

⁷⁷ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 12, p.47. Percentages calculated by author.

cabinet in 1979.⁷⁸ There were to be only five official religions until Confucianism was re-recognised in January 2006.⁷⁹

While there are areas of the nation that are Christian or Hindu, the majority of the nation's inhabitants are Muslim. At the time of the 1971 census, 88% of the population followed Islam nationally. For Sulawesi the figure was 79% while for Java this figure was much higher at 96%.⁸⁰ The figures for 2000 were the same for the nation as a whole and for Java, while the percentage of Muslims in Sulawesi increased slightly to 81%.⁸¹ Since these are the most common areas of origin for migrants to Papua, most of the migrants might be expected to be Muslim.

However, in another major origin area of migration to Papua, Maluku, the religious composition of the population is more similar to the figures for Papua. In Maluku in 1971, 50% of the population expressed a belief in Islam, with 50% believing in other religions.⁸² However, by 2000, 62% of the population were Muslim.⁸³

Papua was (and is) a majority Christian province, with only 22% of the population being Muslim in 1971 and 24% by 2000. It should not be concluded that the Muslim percentage of the population had only increased slightly though, as the 1971 figures are for urban areas only while the 2000 figures are for all areas. Comparing the figures for urban areas only, a large rise in the proportion of the population who follow Islam during this period can be noted,

⁷⁸ Suryadinata et al (2003), p.104

⁷⁹ 'International Religious Freedom Report 2006', released by the United States of America, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, September 2006, accessed from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71341.htm> in May 2007

⁸⁰ All figures from Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, compiled from p.59


⁸¹ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, pp.31-39

⁸² Sensus penduduk 1971, Table 13, p.59. Percentages calculated by the author.

⁸³ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Tables 06.x, pp.31-39. Percentages calculated by the author.

with those self-identifying as Muslim increasing from 22% to 42% between 1971 and 2000. There is a gulf between rural and urban areas, with only 18% of the rural population being Muslim.⁸⁴ The figures below show the percentage of the population identifying as Christian (both Protestant and Catholic) and Muslim between 1980 and 2000.

Chart 7.11: Religious affiliation, 1980-2000⁸⁵



It can be seen that the percentage of Muslim people has doubled during this period, with the number of believers rising from 132,879 in 1980 to 331,229 in 1990 and 410,231 in 2000.⁸⁶ This is already a significant increase, but the effect of this increase is compounded by the urban nature of this immigration. As well as the rural/urban differences in the religious composition of the province,

⁸⁴ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Tables 06.x, pp.31-39

⁸⁵ Figures from *Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap*, Biro Pusat Statistik, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 1981, Table 5: Penduduk Menurut Agama, *Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Seri S2.27 (Population of Irian Jaya: Results of the 1990 population census), Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1992, Table 05.3 (p.18) & 05.6 (p.21) & 05.9 (p.24): Population by province and religion); *Penduduk Papua 2000*, Tables 05.x, pp.22-30. Figures for 1971 not included to avoid comparison of dissimilar areas. The figures do not include other religions, which are less than 1% in total for all years. Christian figures are a compilation of the figures for Protestant and Catholic. Figures compiled from these tables and percentages calculated by the author.

⁸⁶ As footnote above.

there are considerable variations in religious affiliation across the province. The two charts below show the figures across the provinces for 1980 and 2000. Only Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism were included in these charts as the other officially recognised religions have an insignificant presence in Papua.⁸⁷

Chart 7.12: Population by regency and religion, 1980⁸⁸





Chart 7.13: Population by regency and religion, 2000⁸⁹



⁸⁷ According to Penduduk Papua 2000, Table 05.x, pp.22-30, only 0.3% of the population has a different religion to these two major faiths.

⁸⁸ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, p.5. Percentages calculated and compiled by author.

⁸⁹ Penduduk Papua 2000, compiled from pp.31-39 by the author, percentages calculated by the author.

For 1980, the highest percentages of the population who self-identified as Muslim were to be found in those regencies in the Bird's Head region of the province, closest to the rest of the archipelago. These were areas which had Muslim inhabitants before the start of Indonesian rule and it can be assumed that many of these residents are indigenous people.⁹⁰ The other area to have high percentages was Jayapura, the provincial capital, an area with high levels of immigration.

By 2000, the percentage of Muslim residents had increased in most regencies. The figures show high proportions of Muslim inhabitants in Fak-Fak, Mimika and Sorong, as well as the municipalities of Jayapura and Sorong. These figures suggest that the majority of these migrants are inter-provincial ones. This conclusion is supported by the figures from *Profil Kependuduk Provinsi Irian Jaya*, which show that the majority of migrants were from a small number of origin areas. The table below shows the most common areas of origin for migrants to these regencies and municipality.

⁹⁰ As discussed in chapter 4, these areas had the closest ties with the rest of what is now eastern Indonesia, with Papua having had trade links and a (possible) tributary relationship with Ternate, Tidore and Seram. The first Dutch government settlement in New Guinea in 1828 was in the Bird's Head area. The settlers recorded encountering Muslim people in this area, as well as speakers of a language from Seram. See Van der Veur, Paul W., *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*, ANU, Canberra, 1966, p.11 and chapter 4 of this thesis for more details of this.

Table 7.9: Migrants to Fak-Fak, Mimika, Sorong and Sorong Municipality by province of residence 5 years earlier, 2000⁹¹

Total migrants		
Place of residence 5 years earlier	Total	%
South Sulawesi	14,346	20.23
Maluku	7,873	11.10
West Java	5,618	7.92
North Sulawesi	4,925	6.95
Sorong	4,739	6.68
Central Java	4,736	6.68
West Nusa Tenggara	3,356	4.73
Other	3,201	4.51
North Maluku	2,460	3.47
Jayapura municipality	2,371	3.34

It can be seen that the vast majority of migrants are not from other areas of Papua, but are from nearby provinces in eastern Indonesia, along with West and Central Java. What links these destination areas is the high levels of development in comparison to other parts of the province.⁹² There are large-scale mining and natural gas extraction operations in these regencies which have drawn migrants to these areas.

Similarly, those areas which have the lowest levels of development such as Paniai, Jayawijaya and Puncak Jaya also have the lowest levels of Muslim residents. The percentages of Muslim citizens in all these three highland regencies are extremely low, with the figures for Paniai having decreased during this time period from 2.8% to 0.9%.⁹³ Neither Paniai nor Puncak Jaya has areas

⁹¹ *Profil kependudukan Provinsi Irian Jaya Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002, pp.26-28. Data analysis by author. Figures from this volume were ordered by the number of migrants to these origin by their provinces/regencies/municipalities of origin, with the highest ten areas of origin being given in the table. The figures for those who were resident in these provinces were subtracted from the figures given in the original tables.

⁹² See the section on economic development in this chapter for further details on this point.

⁹³ *Penduduk Papua 2000*, Table 06.x, pp.31-39

considered to be urban, an indication of the extremely low levels of development in these highland areas.

The distribution of the two Christian sects, Catholicism and Protestantism, reflects the division of the island into spheres of influence. Catholic missionaries were allowed to operate in the southern part of the colony, while Protestant mission activities were restricted to the northern part.⁹⁴ All the regencies along the southern coast, namely Merauke, Mimika, Fak-Fak and Sorong have high levels of Catholic residents, as does the regency of Paniai. Paniai was one of the first highland areas to have a Dutch administrative and missionary presence and was accessed from the south coast by these migrants.⁹⁵

The charts below illustrate the difference in religious composition between the regencies of Papua, comparing the religious affiliations of the indigenous and non-indigenous populations in 2000.

⁹⁴ This arrangement continued until 1928. See Groenwegen & Van de Kaa (1965), Book 1, p.113

⁹⁵ See Rhys, Lloyd, *Jungle Pimpernel: The story of a district officer in Central Netherlands New Guinea*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1947 for a fascinating background to Dutch posts in this area.

Chart 7.14: Indigenous population by regency and religion, 2000⁹⁶





Chart 7.15: Non-indigenous population by regency and religion, 2000⁹⁷



It can be seen that very few indigenous residents are Muslim, with only 3.5% of the Papuan population self-identifying with this faith. Of these indigenous Muslims, nearly a third live in the province of Fak-Fak, along with substantial numbers of indigenous Muslims in Sorong and Manokwari. Excluding these

⁹⁶ Compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.22-25

⁹⁷ Compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.22-25

regencies located in the Bird's Head region, only 1.3% of the indigenous population of the rest of the province identify as Muslim.⁹⁸

Contrastingly, the non-indigenous population is mainly Muslim, with two out of every three migrants having this faith.⁹⁹ As was noted earlier in regards to the religious affiliation of the population as a whole, those regencies with the lowest levels of non-indigenous Muslim residents are those in the central highlands areas, with Puncak Jaya, Paniai and Jayawijaya having dramatically lower levels of non-indigenous Muslims than any other regencies.¹⁰⁰ These isolated areas have experienced little economic development, with correspondingly fewer immigrants coming to them. However, there is hostility towards the relatively small number of migrants from many indigenous people in the highlands area. The view was expressed to the author by indigenous people that there were 'good migrants' and 'bad migrants', with the latter being disrespectful towards the local population, rich and sending all their money back to their province of origin.¹⁰¹ It certainly appears that this hostility on the part of the indigenous residents has affected the composition of the migrants who did arrive, with few Muslim migrants appearing willing to travel to these regencies.

⁹⁸ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.22-25. Percentages calculated by author.

⁹⁹ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.22-25

¹⁰⁰ Non-indigenous Muslim percentages for these regencies – Puncak Jaya (7%), Paniai (12%) and Jayawijaya (29%) are far lower than that of the next lowest regency – Biak Numfor (54%) – or for the province as a whole (66%). From Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.22-25

¹⁰¹ Author's observation from visit to the highlands region, August 2005. See chapter 9 for more discussion of the situation in Jayawijaya regency.

Education

Until the Second World War, education opportunities in the Dutch colony of West New Guinea were extremely limited. An investigation by the Dutch in 1949 found that there were about 1,700 Papuans who had some level of formal education, mostly to secondary level.¹⁰² This number was a tiny proportion of the population of nearly 270,000 in contact with the administration at this time.¹⁰³

The Dutch returned in the wake of the conquering American Pacific forces. New Guinea became the only remaining part of the East Indies colony following Indonesia's winning of independence. The colonial rulers of this territory were not immune to the current of decolonisation sweeping the post-war world. It was decided to increase the education levels of the territory's populace with a view to providing an elite to run the post-colonial state. By 1961, there were over 40,000 students receiving primary or continuing education, over 40% of them female.¹⁰⁴ Police and public servant education colleges were also established in the mid-1940s, with many of the future nationalist leaders attending these training schools.¹⁰⁵

The formation of this educated elite was to be at the expense of more widespread basic education. While these training schools were being founded, the government halted the training of village school teachers in 1948.¹⁰⁶ By 1960, the colony had 1,058 teachers and 65% were Papuan, an increase of 150% since 1952. There were 19 Papuans studying in the Pacific region, 29 studying in

¹⁰² Chauvel, Richard, *Essays on West Papua: volume one*, Working Paper 120, Monash, Victoria 2003, p.19 note 3

¹⁰³ Lagerberg (1963), p.21, pp.102-103 & pp.148-149

¹⁰⁴ Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs, *Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1961*, The Hague, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961, p.68

¹⁰⁵ Crocombe, Ron & Ali Ahmed, *Politics in Melanesia*, Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, 1982, p.5

¹⁰⁶ Lagerberg (1963), pp.28-29

the Netherlands, including three at a Dutch university.¹⁰⁷ There was no official university in the colony, although Dutch institutions were to form the basis for the university established by Indonesia at the end of 1962.¹⁰⁸

The table below presents the percentages of the estimated number of villages in which there were schools of any kind (or from which attendance was possible) in 1942 and 1962. It can be seen that there had been a great increase in the provision of education across the colony. The final total for the area of New Guinea under administrative control shows that while the canvassed areas had very high levels of schooling, other areas (particularly highland regions) had much lower levels.

Table 7.10: Percentage of villages able to access village schools¹⁰⁹

Canvassed Areas	1942	1962
Schouten-eilanden	91	100
Japen-Waropen	61	87
Nimboran	65	79
Fak-Fak	70	100
Muyu	24	88
Total canvassed area	68	92
Total under admin. control	28	55

By 1971, the education system had been greatly expanded by the new Indonesian administration. A large percentage of the provincial budget was allocated to education (20% of the development budget), especially for building new primary schools.¹¹⁰ There was a large increase in primary school enrolments.

¹⁰⁷ Lagerberg (1963), pp.163-165

¹⁰⁸ Garnaut & Manning (1974), p.30

¹⁰⁹ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), book 2, p.99

¹¹⁰ Hill, Hal (Ed.), *Unity and Diversity: regional economic development in Indonesia since 1970*, OUP, Singapore, 1989, p.86

Scores of new primary schools were established during the first year [of Indonesian rule], largely because of the large number of young Indonesian teachers imbued with nationalism who flocked in on the heels of the troops in 1963. The Indonesian language had become mandatory, and was not difficult for children who had spoken Malay during the Dutch administration.¹¹¹

There were also increases in the tertiary education sector, including the establishment of the first university in the territory, *Universitas Cenderawasih*, only a few months after the official transfer of power from the UN to Indonesia. However, this new university was utilised more by the newcomers than by the indigenous population, with courses being organised to accommodate employees such as public servants.¹¹²

The figures from the years following the handover of power to Indonesia show a rapid rise in the number of students in schools in the province.

Table 7.11: Number of students by year, 1964-1971¹¹³

Year	Number of students
1971	125,120
1970	122,838
1969	116,850
1968	106,896
1967	89,901
1966	86,664
1965	85,298
1964	71,426

¹¹¹ Ryan (1970), p.207

¹¹² Garnaut & Manning (1974), p.30

¹¹³ Irian Barat dalam angka 1964-1968, Daftar 11: Banyaknya sekolah/kursus, murid dan guru di propinsi Irian Barat, p.23 and *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1964-1968*, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1969, Daftar 23: Banyaknya sekolah/kursus, murid dan guru di propinsi Irian Barat tahun 1967 s/d 1971, p.24

The figures show a rapid increase in the level of schooling in the province, with an annual increase of 8.3% over the 1964 to 1971 period.¹¹⁴ However, education levels were still low compared to most of the rest of Indonesia, especially to Inner Island areas such as Java and Maluku. The chart below shows the levels of education attained by residents in the province by their place of birth. It will be noticed that education levels of those born in the Inner Islands (principally from Java), Maluku and other areas are much higher than those of either Irian Barat or Sulawesi. This reflects the nature of these migrants, with those from Java and eastern Indonesia primarily public servants and businesspeople. Also, Maluku historically had higher levels of education, with the Dutch administration having recruited many officials from this area. This was true both generally across the East Indies and specifically in West New Guinea.¹¹⁵


Migrants from Sulawesi have been characterised in the literature as occupying lower level jobs, either manual labour or within small businesses.¹¹⁶ This appears to be borne out by the education level of this group of migrants, with education levels for those born in Sulawesi being close to the low levels for indigenous residents.

¹¹⁴ Percentage calculated from figures in table above by author.

¹¹⁵ See Chapter 4 for negative reactions to these immigrants by indigenous people during the Dutch period

¹¹⁶ See for example Manning (1987), p.42 or Lautenbach (1999), p.211

Chart 7.16: Educational attainments by place of birth, Papua, 1971¹¹⁷



The education attainment figures from this census are broken down by place of birth of the respondents. From the data in the table below, it can be seen that there had been a large influx of educated migrants into the province. The table below shows the figures for male tertiary education, by province of birth.

The figures have been ordered by the number of those with tertiary education. It can be seen that the three most common provinces of birth were all Javanese provinces, with 932 residents with tertiary education from all these provinces.¹¹⁸ This was slightly over ten times as many as there were indigenous residents of the province with tertiary education.

¹¹⁷ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tables 23, pp.99-107. Analysis of data by author.

¹¹⁸ This figure is the total number of residents in Papua who were born in Central Java, East Java, West Java, Yogyakarta and DKI Jakarta.

Table 7.12: Male population 10 years of age and over by place of birth and educational attainment, grouped by highest number of those with tertiary education, 1971¹¹⁹

Place of birth	Little or no education	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Central Java	268	542	1,629	367
East Java	112	442	831	229
West Java	241	363	835	179
North Sumatra	63	49	237	157
Yogyakarta	34	78	287	100
West Irian	21,666	15,816	8,592	92
Maluku	752	826	1,469	76
D.K.I. Jakarta	235	171	210	57
Abroad	36	81	64	55
West Sumatra	6	53	97	36

These figures show the large influx of those with high levels of education into the province, primarily from the provinces of Java. It seems extremely likely that the majority of these immigrants were government or military officials. These figures appears to confirm the contentions of Nonie Sharp that the “level of Papuan employment in government was to diminish within the Indonesian state, with people from other parts of the archipelago occupying jobs at all levels of the administration, especially higher-level positions.”¹²⁰ With such large numbers of educated migrants in the province, the position of the Papuan elite was weakened. There were far fewer female residents educated to tertiary level, with the greatest number coming from East Java (31), overseas (28), and Central Java (22).¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tables 23, pp.99-107. Analysis of data by author. Provincial names translated by author.


¹²⁰ Sharp, Nonie, *The rule of the sword: the story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, 1977, p.30

¹²¹ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tables 23, pp.99-107. Analysis of data by author. Provincial names translated by author.

The low level of basic education among the population in 1971 was reflected in the literacy levels, with nearly 14% of the urban population being unable to read and write.¹²² Intriguingly, the figures from this table reveal there were 1,163 residents in the urban areas (mainly in Jayapura) who were literate in a non-Latin script, but not in either an Arab or Chinese script. I am unable at present to determine which other script this could be, or if this figure is due to errors in the census processing or in resident response.¹²³

The education levels continued to rise through the next decade, with close to half of all residents reported as having completed primary school or above by 1980.¹²⁴ The chart below illustrates the levels of educational attainment in the province at this time.

Chart 7.17: Population of urban and rural areas, by educational attainment, 1980¹²⁵



¹²² Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 15, p.60

¹²³ There were separate figures given for Arabic and Chinese literacy.

¹²⁴ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and educational attainment, pp.25-33. 47% of the population were recorded as having primary education or above. Data analysis by author.

¹²⁵ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33. Figures compiled and percentages calculated by author.

It is clear from this chart that the educational attainments in rural areas are far lower than for the urban areas of the province at all education levels. The majority of those with low levels of education resided in rural areas, with nearly three quarters of those who had not completed primary education being from these regions.¹²⁶

By 1980, the level of illiteracy in urban areas had fallen slightly from the earlier figure, with 11% of urban residents being illiterate.¹²⁷ The literacy rate was far lower in rural areas, with nearly three out of five of the rural population being illiterate.¹²⁸ The illiteracy rate in rural areas is more than five times higher than that in urban areas and the difference in rates is higher for men (6.6 times) than for women (4.2 times). Women have lower rates of literacy than men in both urban and rural areas. These suggest both cultural bias towards education for men and greater rates of migration to urban areas by men. There is also great variation in the rates between regencies, with only 18% illiteracy in Fak-Fak and 82% illiteracy in Jayawijaya.¹²⁹

The literacy rate continued to increase through the next decade, with the urban rate of illiteracy falling to 4.9% by 1990, and the rate for rural areas falling to 40%.¹³⁰ The illiteracy rate for both areas fell, but the divide between the urban and rural parts of the province continued to widen, with the rural to urban ratio of illiteracy having increased from 5.2 in 1980 to 8.2 in 1990. For male residents, the ratio was even higher, with men in rural areas being more than ten times more likely to be illiterate than those in urban areas.¹³¹ Overall, only 4% of those

¹²⁶ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33. 74% of those who had not completed primary school were rural residents. Data analysis by author.

¹²⁷ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51

¹²⁸ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51. 58% of the rural population were illiterate.

¹²⁹ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51.

¹³⁰ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 11.x, pp.46-48

¹³¹ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 11.x, pp.46-48. Data analysis by author.

who were classed as illiterate were urban residents.¹³² As for 1980, the 1990 figures also show great differences in literacy rates between regencies, with illiteracy varying from only 8% in Biak Numfor up to 67% in Jayawijaya.¹³³ While the increasing levels of education in the province are clearly illustrated by these figures, it is also apparent that education is not being received or utilised equally, with significant variations in literacy levels between different regencies of Papua, and between urban and rural areas.

These increasing literacy levels reflect the increase in education provisions across the province. In urban areas, the percentage of those having completed primary school education or above had risen from 63.5% to 75.5%.¹³⁴ However, the level of educational attainment appears to have fallen across the province in rural areas. The percentage of those who had achieved primary school completion or above had decreased to 29% by 1990, compared to 37.9% in 1980.¹³⁵ These comparisons are problematic, however, as the 1980 figures appear not to have included a sizeable proportion of the rural population, with only 250,640 of the rural population of 869,975 at this time being included in the data published from the 1980 census.¹³⁶ If this is taken into consideration, it appears that the real number of children in primary education had increased since 1971. The 1990 figures were more comprehensive, including data on 827,371 rural residents.¹³⁷ The chart below illustrates the education levels for urban and rural residents at this time.

¹³² Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 11.x, pp.46-48. Data analysis by author.

¹³³ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 12.x, pp.49-57. Data analysis by author.


¹³⁴ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33 and Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33

¹³⁵ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33 and Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33

¹³⁶ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33 and Table 02

¹³⁷ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33

Chart 7.18: Educational attainments, urban and rural, 1990¹³⁸



The contrast between urban and rural areas in education is dramatic, with rural people nearly three times as likely to have little or no education and urban residents being 4.7 and 7.4 times more likely to have secondary and tertiary education respectively.¹³⁹

The figures on schooling also show that there were relatively higher rates of schooling in coastal areas compared to highland areas. In 1990, there were 24,835 students in public primary schools in Jayapura regency, while there were only 20,646 students in public primary schools in Jayawijaya regency.¹⁴⁰ With the population of the highland regency being greater than that of the coastal one, this meant that students in Jayapura were more than 60% more likely to attend schools than those in Jayawijaya.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33. Educational attainment figures compiled and percentages calculated by the author.

¹³⁹ Data analysis by author.

¹⁴⁰ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya kerja sama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan daerah Tingkat I, Jayapura, 1991, Table IV.1.5: Banyaknya sekolah dasar (SD) negeri, rata-rata guru, murid per sekolah menurut kabupaten tahun 1990/1991, p.79

¹⁴¹ Data analysis by author from data above.

By 2000, the levels of educational attainment would be expected to have risen to far higher levels than at the start of the Indonesian period. While the 1971 census only covered urban areas, it is surprising to find that the education levels had fallen during this time. While in 1971, 46% of the populace had no education or had not finished their education, by 2000 this figure had increased to 51%. The figure for the indigenous population was even higher, with 62% not having completed any formal education.¹⁴² This seeming failure of the education system is partially due to the 1971 education levels being based on the urban population only.

However, a comparison with the national education levels shows that the province has a greater difference between the urban and rural areas than is common for Indonesia. As can be seen from the table below, for urban areas, education levels in Papua are better than for the nation as a whole.¹⁴³ However, for rural areas, education levels in Papua are worse than for the nation as a whole. These figures illustrate that while there are disparities across the nation between urban and rural regions in regard to education, the differences in Papua are more dramatic. Even in other large, sparsely-populated provinces as East Kalimantan there is no such divergence.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.28-31

¹⁴³ Penduduk Indonesia 2000, pp. Table 14.1, Population 5 years of age and over by province and educational attainment, pp.145-153. Percentages calculated by author.


¹⁴⁴ The figures for East Kalimantan show that the educational attainment in rural areas is actually better than in the nation as a whole with 23.6% having completed secondary education and 1.3% having completed tertiary education. Penduduk Indonesia 2000, pp. Table 14.1, Population 5 years of age and over by province and educational attainment, pp.145-153. Percentages calculated by author.

Table 7.13: Education attainment levels, Urban and Rural, Papua and Indonesia, 2000¹⁴⁵

Region	Little or no education	Primary level	Secondary level	Tertiary level
Papua urban	22.0	19.5	51.6	6.9
Indonesia urban	25.4	28.5	40.5	5.5
Papua rural	61.0	23.0	15.4	0.7
Indonesia rural	42.6	38.5	17.9	1.0

The 2000 census also included data on the differences in educational attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous residents. The chart below compares the education levels of the indigenous population against those of migrants, divided by age group. It is apparent that for every age group, indigenous residents have much lower rates of completion of all education levels.

Chart 7.19: Indigenous and non-indigenous population by age groups and educational attainment, 2000¹⁴⁶




¹⁴⁵ Penduduk Indonesia 2000, pp. Table 14.1, Population 5 years of age and over by province and educational attainment, pp.145-153. Percentages calculated by author.

¹⁴⁶ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.28-31. Figures compiled and calculated by author.

The education levels of younger age groups are better than those of older age groups, suggesting that educational levels have improved during this period. Even for younger age groups, there is a huge divergence between the completion rates of indigenous and non-indigenous students. For those entering the work force in Papua as elsewhere, lower education levels tend to result in lower rates of employment in urban areas.¹⁴⁷

For both indigenous and non-indigenous residents, the difference between education in the rural and urban sectors is very marked. These figures demonstrate that within the rural areas, less than a third of the non-indigenous population have finished primary school education, while this is true for almost two-thirds of the indigenous population.

Chart 7.20: Population by educational attainment, Indigenous and non-indigenous residents, Urban and Rural, 2000¹⁴⁸



¹⁴⁷ See employment section below.

¹⁴⁸ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, pp.28-31. Figures compiled and calculated by author.

However, it can also be seen that the indigenous population lags behind on educational attainment in both rural and urban areas, and at all levels of education. This substantial difference between the two population sectors demonstrates the persistence of Manning's observation from the 1980s¹⁴⁹ that many of the education opportunities have been utilised by children from outside the province as well as the children of immigrants. The author's personal experience agrees with this observation also, having been present at a school reunion of graduates from a Jayapura school held at Taman Mini in Jakarta in 2004. It was apparent that the overwhelming majority of these apparently affluent people were not ethnically Papuan but had been educated there before leaving to live in the nation's capital.

The figures from 2005 show a continuing improvement in literacy rates. The illiteracy level for urban areas of the province fell to 2.5% of the population, with the rate for rural areas being 35%.¹⁵¹ Illiteracy was not evenly spread across the province. Only a small fraction of those who were illiterate resided in urban areas: 2.5% of those who were illiterate lived in urban areas, while 97.5% of the illiterate were in rural areas of the province.¹⁵² With many employment opportunities in the more modern urban regions of the province requiring some level of literacy, illiteracy would make it difficult for this sector of the population, one in three rural dwellers, to move to the city for employment.

Rural areas of the province have poor education levels for a number of reasons. As Theo van der Broek suggests, an important factor in relation to teaching in rural areas in Papua (and nationally) is the actual, physical presence of teachers

¹⁴⁹ Manning (1987), pp.42-43

¹⁵¹ Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005, Tables 11.x, pp.62-70

¹⁵² Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005, Tables 11.x, pp.62-70

in these schools.¹⁵³ Recent research in West Java conducted by the local government found that there were many civil servants absent from their positions, with teachers being the worst offenders.¹⁵⁴ This situation was also found to be the case in rural Papua by the author during his visit to the province. At one school in the Jayawijaya region, one teacher suggested to the author that he was forced to cover for the absence of other teachers who were in Wamena and Jayapura. It appeared that these teachers were still receiving pay while they were on extended leave.¹⁵⁵ Other teachers, who were still nominally working at the school, were in practice retired. This left the school short of teachers, necessitating large and mixed-level classes.¹⁵⁶

Complaints about the standard of teaching in the province are not new, with Michael Rumbiak reporting in the early 1980s that in the Nimboran area of Jayapura regency, a rural area relatively close to the political and economic centre of the province, “schools did not have sufficient facilities and there was still a serious lack of good teachers.”¹⁵⁷ Similar findings were reported a few years later by Suharini Supangat in her PhD thesis which examined teaching in the Baliem Valley area through observation of a school in a village near Wamena. According to Supangat “little teaching-learning occurs in the school.”¹⁵⁸ She says that teachers are often inexperienced, and those who are experienced have a “lack of interest in their teaching jobs.”¹⁵⁹ There are poor teaching methods, no proper assessment of students’ progress, no preparation

¹⁵³ Theo van den Broek, p.168 in Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005

¹⁵⁴ Rumania, Nana, ‘Truant teachers caught off guard in West Java’, *Jakarta Post*, 12th June 2007

¹⁵⁵ It was unclear from my conversation whether these absences were authorised or not.

¹⁵⁶ Author’s conversation with school teacher, Jayapura regency, August 2005

¹⁵⁷ Rumbiak, Michael, *Nimboran Migration to Jayapura, Irian Jaya, and Rural-Urban Ties*, Unpublished MA Thesis, ANU, Canberra, 1983, p.22

¹⁵⁸ Supangat, Suharini, *Indonesian School as Modernizer: a case study of the Orang Lembah Baliem Enculturation*, Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University. Ann Arbor UMI, 1986, abstract, second page, unnumbered page

¹⁵⁹ Supangat (1986), p.256

for classes by teachers, and a lack of materials and facilities.¹⁶⁰ The local press has recently reported that there was a shortage of over 3,000 teachers for the province, about 20% of the required number.¹⁶¹

The lack of adequate government personnel is not restricted to the education sector. Jan Pouwer suggests that there are similar issues with medical workers. He states that: "The interior remained deprived of adequate medical care because the Indonesian staff preferred to work in the urban centres and did not travel enough."¹⁶²

It is instructive to compare the education figures for the province with other provinces in the nation. The charts below illustrate the education attainments in both urban and rural areas in several provinces and for Indonesia as a whole. South Sulawesi and Maluku were chosen as they are both areas of origin for migration to Papua, East Java represents Inner Island provinces, and East Kalimantan is a useful area for comparison as it is similar in certain respects to Papua, being a large, sparsely populated province with high rates of immigration.

¹⁶⁰ Supangat (1986), pp.269-273

¹⁶¹ 'Serious shortage of teachers in West Papua', *Cenderawasih Pos*, 6th October 2008

¹⁶² Pouwer, Jan, 'The colonisation, decolonisation and recolonisation of West New Guinea', *Journal of Pacific History*, 34(2), pp.157-179, 1999, p.173

Chart 7.21: Urban population by education attainment by percentage, Papua and selected other provinces, 2000¹⁶³





Chart 7.22: Urban population by education attainment by percentage, Papua and selected other provinces, 2000¹⁶⁴



¹⁶³ *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Table 14.1, pp.145-153

¹⁶⁴ *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Table 14.1, pp.145-153

It can be seen that in urban areas Papua has higher levels of secondary and tertiary education than the national average and in fact has better levels of education than any other province, apart from the tertiary figures for South Sulawesi which has a much lower percentage of secondary education. Correspondingly, the levels of non-completion of primary education and primary level attainment are the lowest of these areas. It appears that in urban areas, the population is more educated than the Indonesian average or in any of the other provinces.

However, the rural area figures show that Papua has the lowest level of education of the areas chosen. The levels of both tertiary and secondary education are the lowest, the rate of non-completion of primary level education by far the highest. The figures demonstrate that the province has a higher difference between urban and rural areas than in the comparison areas, or than is found in the nation as a whole. Although there is a low standard of educational provision in the province as discussed earlier in this section, it appears that this does not affect non-indigenous people as negatively as it does indigenous people. As has been illustrated by chart 7.20 above, there are dramatic differences in the education levels of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in rural areas. There are a number of potential reasons for this difference between these two groups. Firstly, non-indigenous people living in rural areas mostly live in less isolated areas, in coastal areas close to urban developments. The number of migrants in these areas is partly due to the transmigration program, with transmigration settlements tending to be relatively proximate to urban areas. It could also be that these differences are differences in expectations regarding the value of education, as well as differences in familial ability to support the education of the children. Research in the province through such methods as surveys or interviews would be useful

in revealing the reasons behind this difference and thus ways to create more equity in education between indigenous and non-indigenous residents.

Employment

Under the Dutch, the colony was a peripheral part of the East Indies and, prior to World War II, economic development was comparatively slow. Between 1892 and 1935, exports from Dutch New Guinea increased by around 10%. Across the border in Australian New Guinea, exports increased by over 7,000%.¹⁶⁵ This difference was blamed on the Dutch economic policies, with a contemporary author suggesting that “if the Dutch had put money in Dutch New Guinea in the past instead of drawing benefits from it, we might have had the same normal course of affairs, as is shown by the Australian territories.”¹⁶⁶

While this situation changed post-war, the slow pace of economic change under the Dutch is reflected in the small number of employees in the money economy in this period, with just under 19,000 registered workers out of an estimated population of 700,000.¹⁶⁷ Employment was increasingly dominated by the colonial administration. Immediately prior to the departure of the Dutch, more than half of those employed were in the public service.¹⁶⁸ Registered employment was primarily in cities and towns, with over two-thirds of the workforce being in urban areas.¹⁶⁹

The rate of development varied greatly across the colony, with certain areas such as the Schouten Islands (now Biak-Numfor) and Yapen-Waropen having much higher rates of employment. There were many inter-provincial migrants from these islands in what is now Cenderawasih Bay (*Teluk Cenderawasih*) to

¹⁶⁵ Klein, Dr. W. C., *A comparison in colonial development: Trade in Australian and Dutch New Guinea*, Asiatic Review, London, 1937, p.15

¹⁶⁶ Klein (1937), p.16

¹⁶⁷ According to Lagerberg, 20,000 Papuans were employed in the western labour economy directly, four times that number indirectly. This amounted to one-third of the registered population. Lagerberg (1963), p.186

¹⁶⁸ In 1951, 31% of those employed were in the public service, rising to 56% by 1961. Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), p.72

¹⁶⁹ Groenewegen & Van de Kaa (1965), p.72


other areas of the colony, with 3,500 workers or nearly a fifth of the total workforce. More than a quarter of all employees in the colony were from the Schouten Islands, with another 13% from Yapen-Waropen.

By the time of the first Indonesian census of the province in 1971, employment in the money economy had more than doubled. There were now over 47,000 registered workers.¹⁷⁰ The two main sectors of employment were agriculture and community services. The latter includes public servants and was the largest industry at this time. The charts below present the percentages of the economically active population by industry for Irian Jaya and for Indonesia as a whole as a comparison.


¹⁷⁰ Sensus Penduduk 1971, p.220. This figure is actually an underestimate of the rise in employment as this census only covered urban areas, although most employment has been in these areas.

Chart 7.23: Economically active population of Papua and Indonesia by industry, 1971¹⁷¹

Irian Jaya as %



Indonesia as %



There are two major differences between the economies of Papua and of Indonesia as a whole. One is the relative dominance of the community service

¹⁷¹ Sensus Penduduk 1971, compiled by author from p.220 & p.223

sector in Papua. It appears from the figures above that the importance of government employment continued after the transfer of sovereignty. The centralised nature of government within Indonesia is thus of great relevance to employment in the province. The allocation of public service positions to those with good connections in Jakarta is well documented in the literature.¹⁷² The indigenous population which had been politically separated from the rest of the nation for almost twenty years (and with low levels of contact prior to this) would have had few links with those in the new Centre.

A number of writers have commented on this influx of public servants from other parts of the archipelago.¹⁷³ Garnaut and Manning state that of the 13,337 public servants in the province in 1968, 4,150 were migrants.¹⁷⁴ This number is probably an underestimate, however, as it is simply the number of *Trikora* staff in the province at this time.¹⁷⁵ There were almost certainly other staff classified in the local staff figures who were migrants as this classification did not mean the staff were indigenous employees. This was the high point of the *Trikora* employee numbers in the province, with the figures showing a decline to 2,429 by 1971.¹⁷⁶

In addition to public servants in general administration, there was also an influx of government workers from another area of government – the military. The military's importance within the province is a subject of great concern to most writers on Papua, especially in relation to human rights abuses. The military also

¹⁷² See for example Malley, Michael, 'Regions: Centralization and Resistance', in Emmerson, Donald K., *Indonesia beyond Suharto*, East Gate, New York, 1999, pp.75-81. See also Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.31

¹⁷³ See for example Sharp (1977), p.30 and Saltford (2000), p.77

¹⁷⁴ Garnaut & Manning (1974), p.38

¹⁷⁵ Irian Barat dalam angka 1964-1968, Daftar 127: Djumlah Pegawai Negeri Sipil di propinsi Irian Barat, p.111

¹⁷⁶ Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-1971, Daftar 144: Djumlah pegawai negeri Sipil di propinsi Irian Barat, p.117

had a great deal of influence over political decision-making.¹⁷⁷ In relation to employment, there was a large movement of military personnel to the province from before Indonesian rule formally began. The UNTEA force of 1,500 that arrived in 1962 was matched by a similarly-sized military presence from Indonesia.¹⁷⁸ Suharto's trusted ally Sarwo Edhie was appointed as military commander of the territory in 1968 and increased troop numbers to counter rebellions in various regions, especially Manokwari.¹⁷⁹

As well as actual military personnel, Aditjondro says that the first migrants to the province between 1962 and 1969 were very closely connected with the security forces that arrived in this period. He suggests that this initial association has contributed to the negative view of migrants that has continued to the present.¹⁸⁰

The second difference between the economy of Papua and that of the nation is the comparatively small service sector in the province. Across the archipelago, small-scale trading is an important source of employment in urban areas, especially in areas and times of higher unemployment such as that which followed the monetary crisis of 1997 and the subsequent economic crash. The smaller scale of this industry at this point reflects the recent and minor economic development in the province. Although it would appear that such trading is open to any, studies in Indonesia have shown success in such businesses is linked with education. According to Edi Suharto, "competence in reading, writing and arithmetic is extremely useful for operating small-scale

¹⁷⁷ See for example Garnaut & Manning (1974), p.24

¹⁷⁸ Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p.33

¹⁷⁹ Crocombe & Ali (1982), p.15

¹⁸⁰ Aditjondro, George, *"Datang Dengan Kapal, Tidur di Pasar, Buang Air di Kali, Pulang Naik Pesawat": Suatu telaah tentang dampak migrasi suku-suku bangsa dari Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara ke Irian Jaya sejak tahun 1962, (Arrive by Ship, Sleep in the Market, Piss in the River, Leave by Plane)*, YPMD, Jayapura, 1986, p.72

enterprises.”¹⁸¹ The low general education levels in the province under the Dutch mentioned in the education section above would have disadvantaged indigenous residents in this sector.

The data from 1971 also includes tables linking occupation to educational attainment. This data shows that most administrative and managerial workers, along with professional and technical workers, were educated to secondary or tertiary level.¹⁸² The only occupation groups for which the majority of workers had not finished primary school education were farmers, and service workers.¹⁸³ As was mentioned above in the education section of this chapter,¹⁸⁴ the data shows there were a large number of migrants with tertiary education who arrived in the province following its integration into Indonesia. Although only 104 residents whose place of birth was Papua had tertiary level education, there were 1,577 respondents employed in the province with this educational attainment.¹⁸⁵ This means out of those with such high levels of education employed in the province, at least 93% must have been non-indigenous people. The vast majority of employees working in administrative, managerial, professional and technical positions at higher levels must have been migrants at this time.

The data from 1971 also shows a huge gender disparity in employment, with the vast majority of workers at this time being male. The figures show that of the 47,113 employees recorded by the census, nearly 84% were men.¹⁸⁶ Women

¹⁸¹ Suharto, Edi, 'Human Development And The Urban Informal Sector In Bandung, Indonesia', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 2 (December, 2002), p.125

¹⁸² Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 37, pp.199-201. Data analysed by author.

¹⁸³ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 37, pp.199-201. Data analysed by author.

¹⁸⁴ See p.212-214 for the data from 1971.

¹⁸⁵ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tables 23, pp.99-107 and tables 37, pp.199-201. Data analysed by author.

¹⁸⁶ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 34: Economically active population by occupation, status and sex, p.177

were not employed in any numbers in higher level jobs, with only 39 women working in administrative and managerial positions, compared to 1,352 men.¹⁸⁷ The male dominance of employment in the modern sectors of the economy is in accord with a large migrant presence in the workplace.

There were great differences in employment between different migrant groups. Michael Rumbiak claims that the biggest ethnic group in Jayapura in 1971 was from Java (14%), while 8% of the population were from Sulawesi. He suggests that those from Java and other islands) were government workers, while migrants from Sulawesi were petty traders (*pedagang kaki lima*).¹⁸⁸ Aditjondro claims that indigenous people are not comfortable when faced with the 'aggression' of migrants from South and Central Sulawesi.¹⁸⁹ He says that the retail interactions between migrants and indigenous people are problematic, with local people not having had experience of haggling during the Dutch era as prices were then fixed rather than being open to negotiation.¹⁹⁰

The 1980 data suggests that there had been an expansion of the economy in the province, albeit a slow growth. There were 55,958 employees in urban parts of the province, only 8,000 more than ten years previously.¹⁹¹ The majority of employment was in rural areas, with 301,476 workers in these areas, although these figures do include large numbers of subsistence farmers whose activities were mainly unaffected by changes in the modern economy. For the province as a whole, nearly three quarters of those included in this question were workers in agriculture.¹⁹² The other main employment industry in the province was still

¹⁸⁷ Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 34, p.177

¹⁸⁸ Rumbiak (1983), p.18

¹⁸⁹ Aditjondro (1986), p.71

¹⁹⁰ Aditjondro (1986), p.72

¹⁹¹ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 29.x: Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and type of activity, pp.102-110

¹⁹² Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Table 36, p.139

the public services sector, with 13% of employees working in this sector. Other than these two industries, however, there were no major employment sectors, with no other industry making up more than 3% of workers. The mining industry, while a big contributor to the national government through taxation, only employed 2,962 workers, less than 1% of employees in the province.¹⁹³

Those with lower levels of education were mainly concentrated in the agricultural sector, with 87% of those who had not finished primary school education working in this industry. The professional and managerial jobs continued to be mainly dominated by those with secondary and tertiary education, but interestingly, in this census there were many working in clerical and related jobs with secondary and tertiary education. For those with secondary education, 25% worked in professional jobs and 30% in clerical jobs, while for tertiary education the percentages were 36% and 35% respectively. These figures show an increasingly educated workforce, in which some of those with higher employment attainments had to be content with lower status positions. Considering the lack of other industries in the province that would be able to accommodate 19,013 clerical staff, it appears likely that many of these workers are public servants.

By 1990, the economy had expanded enormously. There were now over 650,000 workers, 61% of the working age population. This compares favourably to the figures for the nation as a whole, with only 55% of the working age population being in employment nationally.¹⁹⁴ These figures most reflect the rural situation, however, with the figures for employment in urban areas being 46% for Papua and 48% nationally.¹⁹⁵ Of those who were economically active,

¹⁹³ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Table 36, p.139

¹⁹⁴ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, pp.261-267

¹⁹⁵ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, pp.261-267

for Papua 89% were employed, compared to 94% across the archipelago.¹⁹⁶

Work in urban areas continued to be a mainly male activity, with three quarters or employees in these areas being men.¹⁹⁷ There was more balance in rural areas, with 43% of workers being women, with the majority presumably farmers. The urban sector had grown very strongly during the decade since the previous census, with the number of urban employees having grown from 55,958 in 1980 to 118,538 in 1990.¹⁹⁸

The agricultural sector continued to be by far the largest sector of the Papuan economy, accounting for nearly three-quarters of employment. Many of the observations from 1971 still hold for the economy of 1990. The service sector remained a relatively minor industry compared to the national figures and the community services sector was somewhat larger than it had been, with the public service remaining an important employer in this province. While the mining industry was by far the most lucrative segment of the province's economy, the number of workers employed remained low. For Papua, only 0.7% of workers were within this industry, lower than the national rate of 1%.¹⁹⁹

While agriculture was the largest industry in the province as a whole due to the large percentage of the population working as subsistence farmers, in urban areas of the province the major employment sector is community, social and personal services. This sector employed 44% of those working in these areas, reflecting the large government and military presence in Papua.²⁰⁰ The next largest employment sector was wholesale trade, retail trade, restaurants and

¹⁹⁶ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, pp.261-267

¹⁹⁷ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 22.x: Population 10 years of age and over by age group and type of activity during the previous week, pp.91-99. Analysis by author.

¹⁹⁸ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 26.x, pp.127-135

¹⁹⁹ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, p.312

²⁰⁰ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 25.x, Population 10 years of age and over who worked during the previous week by employment status and main industry, pp.118-126

hotels with 20% of workers. In contrast, manufacturing employed only 4% of urban workers at this time.

The figures for employment were also broken down by educational attainment levels. This data reveals that the education levels for those in urban and rural areas were vastly different. While in rural areas nearly three in four workers had not completed primary level education (72%), in urban areas only 16% of workers had such little education. The majority of urban workers were educated to secondary level (55%). In the most common industry, community services, only one in twenty employees had not completed primary level education.²⁰¹ Those with higher levels of education were concentrated in particular industries. Eighty-two percent of those with tertiary education worked in the community services sector, with this sector also employing 54% of those with secondary education. It appears that the trend for higher levels of education for those employed in higher status jobs first noted in 1990 had continued up to this point.

With the government being such a major employer in the province, the figures on the education level of public servants are important indicators of changes to the educational attainment of the province's workforce. The data from this time shows that the majority of public servants had completed secondary level education, with 72% having this level of education, and a further 8% having completed tertiary level education. Only 20% had primary level education, with no public servants not having completed this level.²⁰²

²⁰¹ All figures in this paragraph from *Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990*, Tables 27.x: Penduduk berumur 10 tahun ke atas yang bekerja selama seminggu yang lalu menurut pendidikan tertinggi yang ditamatkan dan lapangan usaha utama (Population 10 years of age and over who worked during the previous week by educational attainment and main industry), pp.136-144. Data analysis by author.

²⁰² *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*, Tabel III.3.3: Banyaknya pegawai negeri dilingkungan pemerintah daerah propinsi Irian Jaya menurut pendidikan yang ditamatkan tahun 1990, p.64

These figures show the gap between the urban and rural areas in terms of employment and education. The lack of educational attainment among the majority of the rural population will inhibit rural to urban migration within the province. For those who do migrate to the coastal cities from the hinterlands, employment is most likely to be in trade and services (31%) or in agriculture (30%).²⁰³

The data on employment from the 2000 census once again showed a dramatic increase in the number of workers in the urban areas of the province during the previous decade. There were 218,652 workers in the urban areas in 2000 compared to 118,538 in 1990.²⁰⁴ Rural areas of the province did not grow nearly so quickly, with the rural workforce growing from 540,884 in 1990 to 848,633 in 2000.²⁰⁵ The growth rate in employment in rural areas is 4.6%, lower than the 6.1% of the urban areas of the province.²⁰⁶

For the first time, these figures were broken down by ethnicity, with data given on indigenous employment separately to the total figures for the province. This data will be used to determine the division of employment between indigenous and migrant workers.


²⁰³ Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 27.x, pp.136-144. Data analysis by author.

²⁰⁴ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 10 & 10A, pp.50-55

²⁰⁵ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 10 & 10A, pp.50-55

²⁰⁶ Rates calculated from above figures by the author.

Chart 7.24: Employment by industry, indigenous and non-indigenous residents, urban and rural, 2000²⁰⁷



The chart above illustrates the differences between these two segments of the Papuan population. It can be seen that there is a huge disparity in employment between the urban and rural areas of the province, and also between indigenous and non-indigenous workers in both these areas. The urban figures show that the only sector in which indigenous workers are more likely to work is agriculture. The urban trade sector is predominantly non-indigenous, with non-indigenous people more than four times as likely as indigenous people to be employed in this sector. In other areas, indigenous and non-indigenous people appear to have similar employment patterns in urban areas, especially in

²⁰⁷ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 10 & 10A, pp.50-55. Data compiled into fewer categories for clarity. As the figures for other employment are such low percentages that reading them is impossible, the figures are given here: Agriculture – 92.4%, Manufacturing – 0.7%, Trade – 0.5%, Services – 3.3%, Other – 3.2%. Percentages calculated by author from figures in these tables.

services and other sectors.²⁰⁸ In rural areas, very few indigenous workers are anything but farmers. Unsurprisingly, most non-indigenous rural workers are also farmers. However, of those working in the non-agricultural sector overall, the great majority are non-indigenous, with non-indigenous residents being nearly five times more likely to be working in the non-agricultural sector than indigenous residents.²⁰⁹ Non-indigenous people had a far higher probability of being employed in these sectors than indigenous people; 4 times more likely in the services sector, 7 times more likely in the manufacturing sector, and 16 times more likely in the trade sector.²¹⁰

Overall, non-indigenous people make up a third of the total workforce, but in urban areas, non-indigenous employees comprise nearly three-quarters of workers.²¹¹ When the figures on employment are analysed, it can be seen the dominance of migrants over particular industries within the province. In the non-agricultural sector, the great majority of workers in the non-agricultural sector are non-indigenous, with migrants comprising more than two-thirds of employees in this sector. Non-indigenous people had 77% of manufacturing and 91% of trade jobs in urban areas of the province in 2000.

In rural areas, where there were still few migrants, non-indigenous residents comprised only 22% of the total workforce. However, they filled 57% of the non-agricultural jobs.²¹² In rural areas, non-indigenous workers made up 53% of workers in the service sector, 66% of manufacturing jobs, and 82% of trade positions.

²⁰⁸ The other sector here includes the three categories with the fewest employees in the census categorisation: transportation, other and not stated. This consolidation was done for clarity.

²⁰⁹ Data analysis by author from above data.

²¹⁰ Data analysis by author from above data.

²¹¹ All figures in the following section derived from an analysis of the data from *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Tables 10 & 10A, pp.50-55 by the author.

²¹² Data analysis by author from above data.

These employment figures show the dominance of migrant workers in the non-agricultural sector in Papua. It appears that for the indigenous population, migration to the province has resulted in restrictions in opportunities for employment. This is most evident in the figures from the 2000 census, but the data from the earlier census material also suggests that this had continued from the start of the Indonesian sovereignty over Papua.

Migration

There is information on migration patterns provided directly by the materials in the censuses. The first census on the province from 1971 showed there were 37,251 migrants in the province, with nearly two thirds of these migrants being men.²¹³ This census included data on the length of residence in the province among residents. The data below illustrates the years of residence for migrants as a percentage of the total number of migrants.

Table 7.14: Migrants by duration of residence in the province as a percentage of the migrant population, 1971²¹⁴

Duration of residence	M	F
0	8.79	11.00
1	19.65	18.04
2	17.63	13.62
3	14.21	12.52
4	8.14	8.55
5	6.86	9.40
6	6.05	7.05
7	5.72	7.93
8	3.38	2.89
9	0.91	0.25
10+	5.83	6.56
Not stated	2.83	2.18

It can be seen that a large percentage of migrants to the province are recent arrivals, with two-thirds of migrants having arrived in the province within the four years before this census, namely from 1967 to 1971.²¹⁵ This does not

²¹³ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 24, pp.111-125. Percentages calculated by author.

²¹⁴ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 24, pp.111-125. Percentages calculated by author.

²¹⁵ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 24, pp.111-125. Percentages calculated by author.

correspond to the Indonesian claims that the province was to be quarantined from large-scale migration, a period which was supposed to have ended in 1969.²¹⁶ These figures demonstrate that there was large scale migration to the province before the official ending of this period of protection from the effects of migration to the province and before the province became officially permanently part of Indonesia with the Act of Free Choice vote. This points to a *de facto* disregard for these policies from the administration within the province and more generally within the national government.

The 1971 census also broke down the migrant population's duration of residence in the province by their province of previous residence. The table below includes data on the ten top provinces of origin, listed by the number of migrants from those provinces.

²¹⁶ Manning & Rumbiak, p.26

Table 7.15: Residents of Papua by province of previous residence and duration of residence, 1971²¹⁷

Province of Previous residence	0-4	5-9	10+	Not stated	Total
Maluku	5,745	2,502	998	299	9,544
Jakarta	3,516	2,039	215	83	5,853
South Sulawesi	3,896	702	264	206	5,068
West Java	2,776	1,221	97	26	4,120
Central Java	2,759	865	47	114	3,785
East Java	2,024	515	60	25	2,624
North Sulawesi	564	434	37	13	1,048
Southeast Sulawesi	668	79	154	0	901
North Sumatra	566	133	0	42	741
Yogyakarta	520	205	0	3	728
Other	1,820	462	400	157	2,839
Total	24,854	9,157	2,272	968	37,251

It can be noted that the largest numbers of migrants previously resided in Maluku, with the majority of these migrants having arrived in Papua within five years of this census. There were sizeable proportions of long-term migrants from both Maluku and Southeast Sulawesi, with 10.5% and 17.1% of such migrants respectively having lived in Papua for more than 10 years.²¹⁸ There were also large numbers of migrants from all the provinces of Java, with 46% of incomers being previously resident on that Inner Island.²¹⁹ This data also breaks down the migrants by sex. These figures show that nearly two-thirds of migrants were male (64%).²²⁰ This confirms the conclusions that were drawn from the sex ratio data earlier in the current chapter.

²¹⁷ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tabel 25: Penduduk yang pernah pindah menurut propinsi terakhir sebelumnya dan lamanya tinggal di propinsi ini (Table 25: Migrant population by province of previous residence and duration of residence in present province), pp.126-134. Data analysis by author.

²¹⁸ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 25, pp.126-134. Data analysis by author.

²¹⁹ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 25, pp.126-134. Data analysis by author.

²²⁰ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 25, pp.126-134. Data analysis by author.

The figures also show the population by place of birth. The majority of migrants were from only a few areas, with the ten most common provinces of birth for non-indigenous residents of Papua being Maluku, provinces of Java, provinces of Sulawesi and North Sumatra.²²¹


The survey by Bandiyono and Suharto in Sorong in 1990 confirms that migration to urban areas had had a major impact on the demographic composition of the cities of Papua by this stage. They found that the majority of the population (58%) were migrants, while 42% were non-migrants.²²² The survey also showed the migration patterns of the 200 person sample, and found that migrants were five times more likely to move to Sorong from outside the province as from other parts of Papua.²²³ It appears that indigenous people do not move to the urban areas of the province in anything like the numbers of migrants arriving from other parts of Indonesia. The table below shows the origins of those who had migrated to this major urban centre of the province.

²²¹ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 23: Population by place of residence and place of birth, pp.101-102. Data analysis by author.

²²² Bandiyono, Suko and Makmuri Sukarno, 'Migration to the city of Sorong, Irian Jaya', *Buletin Pengkajian Masalah Penduduk dan Pembangunan*, V(1-2), pp.45-56, Jan-May 1994, p.48

²²³ Figures calculated by author from data in Bandiyono & Sukarno (1994), p.49

Chart 7.25: Sample population of Bandiyono & Suharto survey by place of origin, Sorong, 1990, by percentage




Unfortunately, the census results from 1980 and 1990 did not include information on intra-provincial migration. However, the results are similar to those obtained from the census in 2000. The total number of immigrants in the province had grown to 420,327 people by 2000.²²⁴ Of these migrants, 55% were male. The majority of these migrants lived in coastal areas, with Jayapura having the greatest number of migrants. In all nearly one in three migrants to the province were resident in Jayapura (31%), while 18% of migrants lived in Sorong, 12% in Merauke and 11% in Manokwari.²²⁵ These were all the more economically developed areas of the province other than Merauke. The great majority of the migrants in Merauke were rural residents, suggesting that these were transmigrants, a situation that was also found in Manokwari regency.

²²⁴ Penduduk Papua 2000, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78

²²⁵ Penduduk Papua 2000, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78. Percentages calculated by author.

Chart 7.26: Percentage of migrants by regency, 2000²²⁶



Only a small number of migrants were to be found in highland regencies, with just over 12,000 migrants in total in Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya and Paniai. While these three regencies made up 28% of the province’s total population, migrants to them made up only 3% of the total migrants to Papua.²²⁷ The chart above illustrates this societal gulf between the high levels of migrants in the coastal areas, compared to the highlands area which is still mainly populated by indigenous people.


The immigrants in the chart above could be from other parts of Papua rather than from outside the province. However, the figures from this census show that there were very low levels of inter-regency migration. The chart below show the migration status of residents in the province by regency, dividing the population into those who were resident in their regency of birth, those who

²²⁶ Penduduk Papua 2000, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78. Percentages calculated by author.

²²⁷ Penduduk Papua 2000, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78. Percentages calculated by author.

had moved between regencies in Papua, and those who had moved into the province from other parts of Indonesia.

Chart 7.27: Population by migration status, by regency and percentage, 2000²²⁸



It can be seen that the rates of inter-district migration are far lower than are the rates of migration from outside the province. This reinforces the conclusions reached from earlier data that migration to the province has reduced the levels of migration to urban areas by indigenous people and their opportunities for employment in the modern, cash economy. However, this may have acted to lessen the rate of socio-cultural change for indigenous people in these areas.

²²⁸ Penduduk Papua 2000, Tables 11.a.x, pp.79-84. Figures calculated by author.

Transmigration

Along with the data on migration in general, there is also data on transmigration to the province. There were several different aims of this scheme, with strategic military aims being among them, along with the development of the region. The province was seen as being far too lightly populated, and underdeveloped in many ways. Bhakti and Basyar also mention the importance placed by the government on the role of transmigrants as importers of agricultural knowledge. It was assumed that transmigrants could assist indigenous people to 'advance' their agricultural practices to rice production. As Pouver notes, the government "took the incorrect and fatal point of view that shifting cultivation is by definition a harmful form of land use and that Papuans must be turned into intensive farmers and cultivate cash crops."²²⁹

Bhakti and Basyar state that the first transmigrants to the province arrived in 1964, with 27 families being settled in Kumbe, Merauke and 9 families settled in Dosai, Jayapura.²³⁰ By 1996, the program had settled 288,446 transmigrants in the province.²³¹ Bhakti and Basyar assert the transmigrants were sent to educate the indigenous population on rice farming, especially in the Kumbe area, where transmigrants were expected to manage the unirrigated rice fields that had been established by the Dutch.²³² Such conceptions of the superiority of rice agriculture over those used in the area illustrate the lack of worth given to the indigenous people's agricultural practices.

²²⁹ Pouver (1999), p.174

²³⁰ Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa and M.Hamdan Basyar, 'Dampak sosial, politik dan keamanan transmigrasi di Irian Jaya', *Buletin Pengkajian Masalah Penduduk dan Pembangunan*, V(1-2), pp.57-78, Jan-May 1994, p.64

²³¹ Bandiyono, Suko et al, *Mobilitas Penduduk perbatasan Irian Jaya di wilayah Jayapura*, PPT-LIPI, Jakarta, 1997, p.98

²³² Bhakti & Basyar (1994), p.64

Another accusation that has been made against the transmigration program by indigenous leaders and foreign activists is that the program attempted to settle ex-military personnel in these camps for strategic reasons to counter Papuan separatist actions. Otten discusses how the military forces have been involved to protect transmigrants in Papua.²³³ She suggests that sites were selected for strategic reasons to protect the border with PNG and to counter separatist sentiments.²³⁴ However, Aditjondro claims that such accusations are not borne out by the facts, stating that “the numbers of retired policemen, military (army) and navy personnel that have been resettled under the [transmigration] schemes, is insignificant compared with the ordinary peasant migrants.”²³⁵

The first figures on the scale of transmigration to the province are from *Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-1971*. The table below gives the numbers of transmigrants who moved to the province in the years following the handover of power to Indonesia in 1963.

Table 7.16: Transmigrants to Papua, 1964-1971/2²³⁶

Year	Number of transmigrants
1964	95
1965	-
1966	363
1967	374
1968	287
1969	1,221
1970	1,276
1971/1972	677
Total	4,293

²³³ Otten, Mariël, *Transmigrasi: myths and realities - Indonesian resettlement policy. 1965-1985*, IWGIA Document No. 57, Copenhagen, 1986, pp.192-195

²³⁴ Otten (1986), pp.192-195

²³⁵ Aditjondro, George, 'Transmigration in Irian Jaya: issues, targets and alternative approaches.', *Yaal-Ambu*, 13(3), pp.23-40., September 1986a, p.28

²³⁶ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, p.19

The figures demonstrate that there was extensive transmigration to the province well before the Act of Free Choice. This suggests a dishonesty in the government's stated policy of quarantining the new province, which apparently limited the number of transmigrants to Papua.²³⁷ According to Saltford: "In 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio had pledged that West Irian would not be 'colonised' by the Javanese and there would be no transmigration to the territory from other provinces of Indonesia."²³⁸ The figures agree with figures given by Manning and by Arndt.²³⁹ Arndt claims that only 267 families were sent to the province before 1969, with a further 260 families arriving in 1971-2.²⁴⁰

The number of transmigrants was to increase through the 1970s, with figures from 1980 showing the total number of transmigrants in the province to have risen to 11,573.²⁴¹ This is still a small number in comparison with the population of the province and the number of spontaneous migrants who had arrived. The majority of these transmigrants were located in three regencies; Jayapura (3,651), Sorong (3,778) and Merauke (2,165). The highland areas have not been included in the transmigration scheme in any way, with Farhadian suggesting these areas were considered 'off-limits' to the program.²⁴²

The transmigration program did increase in size across the nation during the 1980s. During the third five-year plan, *Repelita III*, 300,000 families were moved from Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the outer islands, while another 65,000 families became local transmigrants in their province of residence. Of these, 5%

²³⁷ Manning (1987), pp.42

²³⁸ Saltford (2000), p.155

²³⁹ Manning (1987) and Arndt, H., Transmigration to Irian Jaya, pp.161-174 in May, R.J. (ed.), *Between two nations: the Indonesia – Papua New Guinea border and West Papua Nationalism*, Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986


²⁴⁰ Arndt, p.166 in May (1986)

²⁴¹ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1980*, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 1981, Tabel III.3.2: Keadaan transmigrasi diperinci menurut kabupaten penempatan pada akhir tahun 1980, p.48

²⁴² Farhadian (2005), p.61

(16,600 families) were settled in what was then Irian Jaya.²⁴³ The following chart illustrates the way in which the number of transmigrants to the province had increased during the first two decades of Indonesian sovereignty.

Chart 7.28: Transmigrant family numbers to Irian Jaya, 1965-1984²⁴⁴



The transmigration program was then temporarily halted in 1986 due to the national financial crisis that occurred during that year. The numbers moving to Papua had already fallen to a third of the previous year's figures in 1984/5, with only 84 families moving to the province in 1985/6.²⁴⁵ In total, the big expansion of the program that had been expected for the 1984-1989 period did not eventuate. Aditjondro says that a number of different factors meant the ambitious targets set for the fourth five-year plan (*Repelita IV*) were not met. These include the lack of suitable sites, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of

²⁴³ Indonesia: The transmigration program in perspective, World Bank Country Study, The World Bank, Washington, 1988, p.xv

²⁴⁴ World Bank (1988), p.xxiii

²⁴⁵ Aditjondro, George, *Cahaya Bintang Kejora: Papua Barat dalam Kajian Sejarah, Budaya, Ekonomi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia*, ELSAM, Jakarta 2000, p.246

experience and skills of the contractors, the lack of funds, and the reluctance of villagers to give up their land for transmigration.²⁴⁶

By 1990 the number of transmigrants had risen to 15,851.²⁴⁷ There were again large numbers of transmigrants settled in Jayapura (4,169) and Merauke (5,758), while there were also large settlements in Manokwari (3,847) and Fak-Fak (1,222). This data was also broken down by the transmigrants' province of origin. The majority of transmigrants arrived from Java (8,259 people or 52% of the total number). There were also large numbers of local transmigrants, with 6,580 people being classed as local recruits, 42% of the total settlers.²⁴⁸

It is not clear, however, if these transmigrants are actually indigenous people or not, with the transmigration rules classifying those who were resident in the province prior to their acceptance on to the transmigration program as local transmigrants, whatever their place of birth. As revealed by Ministry of Transmigration reports, many of the places reserved for local transmigrants are actually taken up by former transmigrants who reside in these areas or spontaneous migrants from other areas of Indonesia.²⁴⁹ Even construction work on and to transmigrant sites has mainly been done by migrants, often teams from south Sulawesi.²⁵⁰ Places on the transmigration programs are not supposed to be for these ex-transmigrants, but the corruption endemic in the administration means that bribes are commonly paid in order to take part in the scheme. Since transmigrants have to pay a fee to be registered for the program, local indigenous people are unlikely to have, or to see the need to part with in

²⁴⁶ Aditjondro (1986a), pp.32-33

²⁴⁷ Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel III.5.2: Realisasi penempatan transmigrasi di beberapa daerah di propinsi Irian Jaya dirinci menurut daerah asal tahun 1990, p.69

²⁴⁸ Percentages calculated by author from data in material above.

²⁴⁹ Herawati, Titi, *Studi pengembangan pemukiman untuk alokasi penempatan Penduduk daerah transmigrasi (APPDT)*, Pusat Penelitian dan pengembangan, Departemen Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman perambah hutan R.I., Jakarta, 1998, pp.90-92

²⁵⁰ Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.59

order to remain on their own ancestral land. This disadvantages those local indigenous people as their land is taken for the transmigration program while they are unable to participate in it.

Bhakti and Basyar suggest that the issue of land has been a major social issue, with local people's alienation from their ancestral land without compensation likely to be an issue which will be felt by future generations. Otten quotes the Deputy Governor in the mid-1980s, Soegiyono as saying that "there was no compensation given for any communal lands taken, since new schools or churches were considered as a 'symbolic exchange'."²⁵¹ There was not always an understanding among local people that such lands had been alienated. Those whose land has been used for these sites often ask transmigrants for a share of crops grown on the land as they still feel that this land belongs to them.²⁵² As Assmann mentions, land is one of the issues local people have with the program across the archipelago, along with "different customs, traditions, languages and religions as well as power restrictions of traditional leaders and mistakes by the administration."²⁵³

Titi Herawati reports that at the Arso transmigration site, while 20% of the transmigrants were supposed to be local transmigrants, in fact only 20 people were locals, most of whom were local public servants close to retirement. Transmigrants already in the area from earlier projects also register their relatives as local transmigrants, even though these relatives are still in Java or Bali. This corrupt practice further reduces the number of places available to real local residents.²⁵⁴ The data from this time suggests that only 1% of the

²⁵¹ Otten (1986), p.172

²⁵² Bhakti & Basyar (1994), p.72

²⁵³ Assmann, K., 'Transmigration in Indonesia special reference to the ethnic national aspect', *Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika Zeitschrift*, 18 (6), pp.998-1010, 1990, p.998

²⁵⁴ Herawati (1998), pp.128-129

transmigrants were residents affected directly by the projects or residents of the project area.²⁵⁵ Similar practices were reported by Manning and Rumbiak ten years prior to Herawati's reports.²⁵⁶

Jan Pouwer suggests that the 20% indigenous participation rate has had unintended negative consequences. Government officials were keen to fulfil their administrative duties and fill this quota, but with "insufficient enthusiasm among the populace for taking part in the project, the government resorted to military coercion to ensure Papuan participation."²⁵⁷ The figures given by George Aditjondro show that between 1979 and 1986 only 13% of transmigrants settled in the province were local transmigrants, 2,773 out of 21,118.²⁵⁸ Otten also notes this issue, quoting the Public Relations Head of the Transmigration program as saying that in Koya near Jayapura, fifty houses had been built for local transmigrants but that none had been occupied, with local people preferring to live in their villages in the forest.²⁵⁹

The publication by the local Bureau of Statistics (*Irian Jaya dalam angka 2000*²⁶⁰) showed the number of transmigrants in the province fell from 13,893 people in 1998/1999 to none at all in 2000/2001.²⁶¹ This reflects the major changes to the transmigration scheme in 2000 under the Wahid government that effectively stopped its operations.²⁶² Between 1964 and 2000, a total of 220,256 people

²⁵⁵ Herawati (1998), p.7

²⁵⁶ Manning & Rumbiak (1989), pp.57-58

²⁵⁷ Pouwer (1999), p.175

²⁵⁸ Aditjondro (2000), Tabel 1: Target transmigrasi tahunan dan pencapaiannya di Papua Barat dari tahun 1979/1980-1988/1989, p.246. Totals and percentages calculated by the author.

²⁵⁹ Otten (1986), p.165

²⁶⁰ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 2001

²⁶¹ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 2000*, Tabel 3.2.1: Penempatan transmigrasi per kabupaten di Irian Jaya (Table 3.2.1: Transmigration settlement by regency in Irian Jaya), 1998/9-2000/1, p.117

²⁶² There is an extensive literature on the subject of transmigration. See for example Hardjono, J.M., *Transmigration in Indonesia*, OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1977; Fasbender, Karl & Susanne Erbe, *Towards a New Home: Indonesia's Managed Mass Migration*, Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg, 1990; M.Adriana Sri Adhiati

had been brought to the province under this scheme.²⁶³ These migrants had been settled in seven regencies; Jayapura, Sorong, Fak-Fak, Paniai, Merauke, Yapen Waropen, and Manokwari.²⁶⁴ It is not known how many of these transmigrants returned to their province of origin or migrated on to different provinces. Manning and Rumbiak estimate the figure at between 10% and 15% of transmigrants.²⁶⁵ As well as contributing directly to the number of migrants in the province, it appears likely that these migrants were instigators of chain migrations from their districts of origin, encouraging friends, relations and neighbours to settle in this distant province.

Much of these chain migrations were not to the rural areas in which the transmigrant sites were situated, but were to the urban areas. This was due to the high numbers of transmigrants who left the program in search of employment in cities near the areas they were originally settled. Many transmigrant sites failed in part due to the poor locations chosen for these projects, with poor lands, soil, climate and enmity from local people being mentioned by Bhakti and Basyar.²⁶⁶

Aditjondro estimates that 1,500 transmigrant houses had been abandoned by the settlers over a two year period in the early 1990s, especially among the transmigrants that were recruited from the poor, urban parts of Java, particularly Jakarta, the social transmigrants.²⁶⁷ According to Mariël Otten, there was coercion in the recruitment of people for the transmigration program, especially in urban areas of Java and of the poorest people. She claims that in

and Armin Bobsien (ed.), 'Indonesia's Transmigration Programme -An Update', A report prepared for Down To Earth, July 2001, accessed from <http://dte.gn.apc.org/ctrans.htm> in February 2008.

²⁶³ Herawati (1998), p.79

²⁶⁴ Herawati (1998), p.79

²⁶⁵ Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.50

²⁶⁶ Bhakti & Basyar (1994), p.71

²⁶⁷ Aditjondro (1986a), p.36

these areas, “the *gelandangan* (‘homeless wanderers’) are picked up from the streets in raids and are being deported to transit camps where they receive preparatory classes for resettlement.”²⁶⁸ Those without identity cards for the city were also given the choice of returning to their home area or become part of the program.

Otten suggests that the policy was useful to the central government as a method of maintaining an adequate supply of labour to areas in the Outer Islands. This would ensure developments such as resource extraction and palm estates had enough willing workers close at hand. Otten claims that plots were deliberately designed such that transmigrants needed to supplement the incomes from their plots by external employment. These characteristics of the program were similar to those implemented by the Dutch in the forerunner of transmigration, the *kolonisasi* program.²⁶⁹ Those ex-transmigrants who moved to the cities and towns nearby usually sought work in lower level jobs.

Aditjondro says that “the male transmigrant drop-outs search for manual jobs in the construction business, the female ones become hawkers, jamu vendors, and even prostitutes.”²⁷⁰ Aditjondro further suggests that this has contributed to the rise of VD or STD cases in the province.

This step migration to local towns and cities meant that the new developments that occurred were less likely to benefit local people, with competition from the transmigrants reducing their chances of employment. That many of the transmigration sites were not successful also negated any potential benefit to the local community. It is clear that transmigration has had an impact on migration in general to the province. There is disagreement among

²⁶⁸ Otten (1986), p.69

²⁶⁹ Otten (1986), pp.136-137

²⁷⁰ Aditjondro (1986a), p.36

commentators over the scale of this impact and the relative importance of transmigration compared to spontaneous migration. Aditjondro notes that while there has been dissatisfaction with some aspects of the transmigration program, it is mainly not the transmigrants who have been targeted by Papuans in times of social conflict, but rather the spontaneous migrants from South and Southeast Sulawesi. However, Otten notes that: “400 to 700 Papuans were arrested and sent to prison between October and November 1983, because they showed resistance to the transformation of their land into transmigration property.”²⁷¹


The aims of the transmigration scheme to the province appear to have been met to some extent. There have been increases in development in general, including in the quantity of rice produced. However, such successes do not appear to benefit the indigenous population greatly. Strategic military aims of reducing separatist tendencies in this peripheral region appear to have failed, with the increasing number of migrants in the province exacerbating Papuan resistance rather than the opposite. The extent of the transmigration program’s contribution to the increasing number of migrants in the province (as well as its effects on the economic and political situation) could benefit from more recent research, with the majority of the work on this topic being from the 1980s and early 1990s. Additionally, there is a need for an understanding of the interactions between those still resident on transmigrant sites and the surrounding population. While the program may have stopped, its effects have not gone away.

²⁷¹ Otten (1986), p.161

Other information

The figures on possessions owned by households give a picture of the ways in which wealth is distributed around the province. Such questions have not been included in every census, however. The figures from 1990 show that those who live in urban areas are far more likely to own a range of household items. The chart below shows the percentages of households who own common household items, for urban and rural areas at this time.

Chart 7.29: Household items owned by percentage, urban and rural, 1990²⁷²



It is clear that there are far more products of development available to those in the urban areas, showing the relative material prosperity of those living in these areas. As well as being 13 times more likely to own a car/motor boat, urban residents were 12 times as likely to have a television, and 11 times as likely to own a stove.

²⁷² Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Table 43.1: Banyaknya dan persentase rumah tangga menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan barang rumah tangga yang dikuasai (Table 43.1: Number and percentage of households by regency/municipality and household items owned), p.247

These figures on television ownership were also broken down by regency and show that the majority of televisions were owned by those in coastal regencies. Of the 33,562 televisions in the province, a third were in the Jayapura regency, 23% were in Sorong and 15% were in Biak-Numfor. Contrastingly, only 2% were in the most populated regency of Jayawijaya and there were none at all in the regency of Paniai.²⁷³

The 2005 data shows that the difference in material possessions between the urban and rural areas of the province did not appear to have changed. The data from this census on the type of flooring that is present in households illustrates the divergence between these two areas. In rural areas, only 24% of houses had such solid flooring as brick, concrete, tile or stone.²⁷⁴ The majority of houses in these areas had wood (37%) and dirt floors (25%). In urban areas, 84% of houses had brick, concrete, tile or stone flooring. There were still large numbers of houses with wood floors (13%), but only a few houses had dirt floors (3%). These figures illustrate the chasm in prosperity between those in the urban areas of the province, and those in the rural areas.

The quantitative demographic survey conducted by Hendrika Lautenbach in the Bird's Head region examined the characteristics of migrants to Teminabuan district in South Sorong regency. This research showed that, for this area, the most common form of migration within her research area was intra-provincial rather than inter-provincial.²⁷⁵ While the majority of the population were originally from this subdistrict (76.0%), 13.3% were from other parts of Irian Jaya, mostly from subdistricts close to Teminabuan. Another 10.7% of the

²⁷³ Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel VIII.6.11: Jumlah pesawat, televisi yang terdaftar di beberapa kantor pos di provinsi Irian Jaya tahun 1990, p.246

²⁷⁴ All figures from *Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005*, Tabel 38.x: Rumah tangga menurut kabupaten/kota dan jenis lantai terluas dari tempat tinggal (Table 38.x: Households by regency/municipality and primary floor material of dwelling unit), pp.155-157. Calculation of percentages by author.

²⁷⁵ Lautenbach (1999), p.200

respondents were from other provinces of Indonesia, with 6% from Sulawesi, 2.0% from Java and 1.9% from Maluku.²⁷⁶ The migrant population was strongly biased towards men, with 57% of the migrants surveyed being male.²⁷⁷ Compared to the indigenous population, these migrants were nearly three times more likely to be working as public servants (37% compared to 12.8% for non-migrants by household) and were better educated. The figures on the reason for the move to the region showed that many female respondents moved for family reasons, suggesting that many migrants moved as a family group.²⁷⁸ Lautenbach has this to say about the particular characteristics of migrants from different regions of origin.

Inmigrants in the Teminabuan district are generally people from other islands of Indonesia.... Most people from Sulawesi are traders and start a business in the subdistrict where such initiatives are lacking and opportunities available. People from the Moluccas and Java are usually civil servants, either in the local administration, the health services, or teachers at one of the secondary schools. Few indigenous people hold such a post, due to their overall lower level of education.²⁷⁹

These observations support the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the census materials examined in the present study of the occupational differences between migrant and indigenous people. While this study suggests that intra-provincial migration is important, this appears to only apply to movement within the regency as most of these migrants were from surrounding areas. With Teminabuan being a smaller centre, this points to the continuance of migration from rural hinterlands to local urban centres. The figures on inter-regency migration tabled earlier in this chapter suggest that the next step of

²⁷⁶ Lautenbach (1999), p.200

²⁷⁷ Lautenbach (1999), pp.212-213

²⁷⁸ Lautenbach (1999), pp.212-213

²⁷⁹ Lautenbach (1999), p.211

migration, to and between larger urban centres, has occurred at relatively low rates in the province. It is hypothesised that this form of migration has been limited by the arrival of educated migrants.

Migration Comparisons


It is useful to examine the patterns of migration that occur in other areas in order to gain a broader perspective on the issue within Papua itself. The other provinces that have been chosen to examine this issue are East Java, South Sulawesi, East Kalimantan and Maluku. There will be also comparisons with neighbouring Papua New Guinea.

The figures on other provinces in Indonesia show that Papua was certainly not the province with the highest levels of immigration from other provinces. The figures from 2000 show that 3.3% of the population of Papua had been born in other provinces, while the figure for Maluku was 12.8%.²⁸⁰ This was also found for urban areas, with 11.9% of Papua's urban population born in other provinces, with the figure for Maluku being 28.3%. The figures for rural areas are far lower, with only 1% of Papua's rural population being life-time migrants, rising to 7% for South Sulawesi.

However, the notable characteristic of migration to and within Papua is the low level of intra-provincial compared to inter-provincial migration. Among the provinces mentioned above with higher overall levels of migration, there is also high levels of internal migration within these areas, particularly from rural to urban areas. The chart below illustrates the rates of migration within and between provinces for the selected areas and for Indonesia as a whole.

²⁸⁰ Penduduk Indonesia Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Tables 11.a.x, pp.79-105. Data analysed by author.

Chart 7.30: Residents by recent migration status, by area of origin as percentages, selected areas, 1995²⁸¹




It should be noted that Papua is the only province for which migration from outside the province was higher than from other areas within the province. This is also reflected in the relatively low rates of intra-provincial migration. Only 2.6% of those in Papua had migrated recently from other areas of the province, while the lowest figures for other provinces were 5.2% in both South Sulawesi and Maluku.

The figures are even more dramatic for urban areas of Papua. In these areas, migrants from outside the province outnumber migrants from inside the province by 50%. This is in contrast to other provinces, in which the ratio of internal to inter-provincial migrants ranges from 1:1 in East Kalimantan, rising to 6.3:1 in East Java. The chart below shows the different migration patterns in the areas selected.

²⁸¹ Perpindahan penduduk dan Urbanisasi 1995, Table 06.1-06.9, pp.64-72. Data analysed by author

Chart 7.31: Urban residents by recent migration status, by area of origin as percentages, selected areas, 1995²⁸²



These figures suggest that the influx of migrants from other areas is a significant factor in the province, and appears likely to be a major reason behind the relatively low levels of rural-urban migration in Papua. This would be expected to have markedly diminished the opportunities for employment in the urban areas for the indigenous population.

The situation is far different in the other half of the island of New Guinea, in PNG. That area is not part of a larger country as is the case with Papua and it has been noted that international migration is not an important component of migration in this nation. Connell notes that “PNG is largely uninfluenced by international migration.”²⁸³ This means that the growth in urban areas in the nation is primarily due to natural increases in the population and rural-urban migration within the territory.

²⁸² Perpindahan penduduk dan Urbanisasi 1995, Table 06.3, p.66. Data analysed by author

²⁸³ Connell, John, *Papua New Guinea: The struggle for development*, Routledge, London, 1997, p.176

The capital and largest city, Port Moresby, grew at 16% per year between 1966 and 1971 before settling into a more sustained rate of around 5% from 1980 to 2000.²⁸⁴ Between 1966 and 1990 the urban population of the country increased from 110,716 to 445,488.²⁸⁵

While these increases are dramatic the figures from 2000 show that the urban population was then only 13% of the total population.²⁸⁶ This compares with the much higher percentage of the population living in Papuan urban areas of 26%.²⁸⁷ While this figure is high, the percentage of Papuans living in urban areas is far lower, being 13% - almost an identical percentage to that found in PNG.²⁸⁸ However, these similarities in rural-urban migration between the two halves of the island do not appear to be reflected in such phenomena as the use of money currency for bride prices in highland areas as noted by Leslie Butt.²⁸⁹ The difference may be due to the employment prospects for those who do move from rural to urban areas on either side of the border. While those in PNG can expect to hold jobs in any sector of the economy, this is not the case in Papua as is noted in the employment sections of the three statistical chapters in the current study.

It should be noted that these figures from Papua New Guinea also have their own inaccuracies. Koczberski and colleagues describe the ways in which the myth of an idyllic rural PNG has influenced policies regarding rural-urban

²⁸⁴ Koczberski, Gina, George N. Curry and John Connell, 'Full Circle or Spiralling Out of Control?: State Violence and the Control of Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea', *Urban Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp.2017–2036, 2001, p.2017

²⁸⁵ Koczberski et al (2001), p.2020

²⁸⁶ Asia-Pacific in Figures 2006, Papua New Guinea country figures, UNESCAP, accessed from <http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/apif/2006/Papua-New-Guinea-apif2006.pdf> in December 2008

²⁸⁷ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli (2000), Table 01, pp.1-3. Data analysed by author.

²⁸⁸ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli (2000), Table 01, pp.1-3. Data analysed by author.

²⁸⁹ See p.322 for more details.

migration in this country.²⁹⁰ Those in urban areas are considered to have their real homes in their village of origin or even, for second generation migrants, the villages from which their parents came. Garnaut noted as early as the 1970s that as many as a quarter of these children may not have ever visited this supposed home village.²⁹¹ This has resulted in many from the urban areas being forcibly returned to their 'homes'. The mass evictions in Madang in 1997/98 were intended to resettle 8000 settlers, 30% of the city's population.²⁹² Such figures suggest that the scale of rural-urban migration is actually greater than that officially acknowledged by the state in PNG, accounting to some extent for the differing impacts on the rural parts of these two regions.

²⁹⁰ Koczberski et al (2001), p.2030

²⁹¹ Koczberski et al (2001), p.2028

²⁹² Koczberski et al (2001), p.2023

Conclusion

The population of Papua has grown greatly since becoming part of the nation of Indonesia. This is especially true of the urban areas of the province, with growth rates for the population in these areas being higher than in rural areas. The sex ratio data points to a high percentage of migrants in the population, with both inter- and intra-provincial migration. Initially, this migration appeared to be mainly short-term male migrants, but by 1990 the characteristics of migrants in the province seems to have become more long-term, with the sex ratio showing a greater equality of the number of male and female residents. This trend continued to 2000, with the changing sex ratios suggesting a more balanced population with more permanent migrants settling in the province.

The age composition of the population has changed from 1961 to 2000, with the population pyramids from these years showing the province had undergone a demographic transition from a high fertility-high mortality society to one with a more stable society with lower birth and death rates. The age group data shows that men tend to live longer in Papua, with the sex ratio balanced greatly towards men in the older age groups. In younger age groups, especially in rural areas, the sex ratio was balanced towards women in all censuses. These figures could be interpreted to indicate that there had been genocide towards the indigenous population. However, the sex ratios in older age groups in later censuses do not support this inference. Migration among the younger age groups appears to be partially responsible for the absence of men from this age group data, being a continuance from the pattern found before the Indonesian administration of the territory by the Dutch demographic survey of 1961. The difficulties of conducting a census in such isolated areas is another possible cause, along with the unwillingness of men to participate in this population count. The life expectancy of those in the province has increased during this

period. Although this increase has been slower than in other parts of Indonesia, the life expectancy of those in the province is nearly 10 years better than across the border in Papua New Guinea.

The figures on religion show an increasing number of Muslim residents in the province. While there were 33,083 Muslim residents in 1971, this grew to 132,879 by 1980, to 331,229 by 1990 and to 410,231 by 2000. At this point, Muslim residents made up nearly a quarter of the province's population. Through this period, the Muslim population was concentrated in urban areas, especially the more developed coastal regencies such as Jayapura, Sorong and Fak-Fak. The figures from 2000 show that the vast majority of the Muslim population are not indigenous people, but are migrants. However, the figures show that Christian migrants have been allowed to move to the province, contrary to suggestions that were made to the author that such a policy had been in effect.

The education levels of the population have improved during the period of Indonesian sovereignty, with literacy levels rising and more children receiving some years of education. However, in all available census data, indigenous residents have lower levels of education than do residents who have migrated to the province from other parts of the nation. This is true for both first generation migrants and for later generation non-indigenous residents also. As could be expected, education levels in the urban areas are higher than in rural areas. The highest levels are in urban, coastal regencies, with the more remote, highland regencies having the lowest levels of educational attainment and school attendance. These regencies are also those with the highest and lowest percentages of migrants respectively. It can be concluded that the migrant population has been more educated than the indigenous population throughout this period, with confirmation of this coming in the data from the 2000 census.

The figures on indigenous and non-indigenous education in this census showed that the education levels of indigenous residents lagged behind those of the migrant population at all levels, in urban areas, and even more so in rural areas.

The money economy in Papua has grown enormously since the departure of the Dutch.²⁹⁴ This partly reflects the improvements in transportation in the province, and between the province and other areas of the nation and the world. There have been huge increases in the export of natural resources from this province, both minerals and other resources such as timber, which has increased the number of those involved in the trade sector dramatically during this period. The growing urban population increased the number of service workers, but the largest employer in urban areas still appears to be the government, with the community sector the largest employer in urban areas. This formed a continuity from the colonial period of the dominant role of the government in providing employment in the Dutch colony that persisted in the Indonesian province.

There was a divergence in the employment situation between the rural and urban areas of Papua, with the above situation primarily applying to the urban areas. In rural areas, agriculture continued to be the majority occupation, many continuing the cultivation of sweet potatoes and sago. Those in the rural economy continued to have lower levels of educational attainments than those in the urban areas of the province throughout the period of this study.

Data from the first census in the province in 1971 shows that the high education levels of those employed in urban areas could not have been due to indigenous workers alone, with the great majority of educated workers at this time being recent immigrants. The lower level of education within the province, especially

²⁹⁴ See for example Hill (1989)

within the rural areas, is certain to have inhibited internal rural to urban migration. This is illustrated by the lack of a money economy in rural areas of the highlands regions as noted by Butt, with few in these regions remitting money from outside or being involved in paid work within the small urban areas of these regencies.²⁹⁵ This situation is notably different to that across the border in the highland regions of Papua New Guinea, with rural to urban migration there less restrained by the immigration of a workforce to the urban areas of the nation from outside.²⁹⁶ These patterns of exclusion from the urban workforce and their consequent effects on rural communities were noted by Manning and Rumbiak in their important research in the late 1980s.²⁹⁷ It appears that similar factors continue to have a major impact on the indigenous population.

The figures from 2000 are the first to show the different employment patterns of the indigenous and non-indigenous workers in Papua. This data illustrated the lack of parity in the workplace between people in these two groups. Certain industries were dominated by non-indigenous workers being nearly four times more likely to work in the trade sector as indigenous people in urban areas, and nearly sixteen times more likely in rural areas. While non-indigenous people make up only 22% of rural workers, they make up 81% of employment in the trade sector, 66% of the manufacturing sector and 65% of the transport sector. In the urban areas, with nearly three quarters of workers being non-indigenous, these workers have 91% of trade jobs, 82% of transportation jobs, and 77% of manufacturing jobs. It appears that employment opportunities for indigenous

²⁹⁵ Butt (1998), pp.103-104

²⁹⁶ Butt (1998), pp.103-104. While there are many foreigners working in PNG, and occupying many of the higher level technical and managerial positions, the vast majority of the middle and lower level positions in urban areas are occupied by indigenous people.

²⁹⁷ Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.30

people are, and have been for the period of this study, severely limited by the arrival of migrants with higher levels of education and experience.

Employment for indigenous people has also been hampered by the ethnic associations between people. As noted by Frans Pigome, employment opportunities in Papua (along with other parts of Indonesia) are often dependent on the ethnic connection between managers or employees and job seekers.²⁹⁸ This was also noted by the author through conversations in the province. The fact that many of those in higher positions, business owners and managers, were immigrants has tended to disadvantage the indigenous population from finding work in the paid economy.

The next chapter will examine the socio-economic data and the figures on migration at a smaller scale than that of the current chapter, looking at the data on the Jayapura regency over the same period.

²⁹⁸ Pigome, Frans, 'Paths to Justice and Prosperity: West Papua 2007', organised by Indonesian Solidarity in association with the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), University of Sydney, and The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Technology, August 9th 2007, Sydney, Australia

Chapter 8: The effects of migration on Jayapura regency

“Papoea Barat, dari Sorong sampai Hollandia sampai Merauke” (West Papua, from Sorong [to Hollandia] to Merauke) — Mansren movement declaration, 1942¹

Since 1910, under a variety of names, Jayapura has been the capital of the western half of New Guinea.² It is also the most populous city, with a municipal population of just over 155,000 reported in the 2000 census.³ The city has grown dramatically since the transfer of power to Indonesia. This chapter will examine the impact of migration on the people of Jayapura regency. Jayapura was chosen as it is the capital of the province and a major city in the territory, with the business and government employment in the regency leading to it being an area with high levels of migration.

To examine the impact of migration on the regency’s people, the census material will be examined. This is necessary to determine the number of migrants who have arrived and remained in the province and the characteristics of these migrants. This task is complicated by the lack of published figures that differentiate between indigenous and non-indigenous residents prior to the 2000 census. In order to estimate the number of people who have moved to Papua from the other islands of the archipelago, it will be necessary to look at other data that gives an indication of the non-indigenous population. The number of migrants arriving in the regency can be estimated indirectly from the

¹ Webster, David, “...Sampai Merauke”: *The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-1962*, MA Thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1999, p.7

² See Appendix A: Names and naming for more discussion of place names in this area.

³ *Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Seri L2.2.30 (Population of Papua: Results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78, Population by life time migration status, regency/municipality and sex

figures on language usage, literacy and religion. The 2000 census is the most helpful in investigating the number of migrants in the regency, and their socio-economic role. This is due to the data in the census figures separating the population into two separate groups – indigenous and non-indigenous. These figures will then be used to evaluate the effect of migration throughout the period of this study.

The Dutch period and before


The city now known as Jayapura has had a number of names since the immigration of Europeans. Under the Dutch, it was Hollandia. After the handing over of Netherlands New Guinea to the UN it became Kota Baru (*New Town*) from October 1, 1962 and then, when Indonesia took over control of the territory on May 1, 1963 it became Sukarnopura (*Sukarno City*) till the end of 1968 before acquiring its present name.⁴ More recently, there have been demands made by indigenous people to change the name to the alleged original name of Port Numbay (also spelled Numbai).⁵ There were moves in 1999 to replace the name Jayapura with Port Numbay officially, but this change was not adopted.⁶ Unfortunately, there are conflicting accounts of the origin and meaning of this name. I will use Hollandia for the Dutch period and Jayapura for the Indonesian period as these names were used for more extended periods than the other names above.

⁴ 'A history of Jayapura', accessed from <http://www.governpub.com/Bee-H/Hollandia.php> in February 2006

⁵ See 'Re: Name Change to West Papua', input to reg.westpapua mailing list, 19 December 1999, accessed from http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/Re_NameChangeWP.html in April 2006

⁶ From 'Indonesia: Population and administrative divisions', *The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names*, accessed from <http://www.pcgn.org.uk/Indonesia-%20Population&AdminDivs-%202003.pdf> in October 2007, p.9

Map 4: Administrative map of Papua⁷



The Jayapura regency is a coastal region, included by Moore as one of the core areas in the lowland cultural sphere.⁸ The regency is the second largest in the province at 61,493km², making up 15% of the province's total area,⁹ an area slightly bigger than the whole of Aceh province at the other end of the

⁷ 'Batas administrasi baru untuk propinsi-propinsi Papua' ('New administrative boundaries for the provinces of Papua'). Accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/pp/peta-hr.gif> in February 2008. Map used with the permission of PapuaWeb and according to their conditions of use which are available from <http://www.papuaweb.org/info/disclaimer.html>. This map shows the intended division of Papua into three separate provinces. While Irian Jaya Barat was established as a separate administrative entity, protests caused the foundation of Irian Jaya Tengah to be delayed and eventually abandoned. See chapter 5 for more details on this issue.

⁸ Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003, p.101

⁹ 'Luas Wilayah Provinsi Papua menurut Kabupaten/Kota' (Area of Papua by Regency/Municipality), *Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics Papua Province)*, accessed from <http://www.papua.go.id/bps/dda%202001/BAB%20%20LETA%20GEOGRAFIS/Luas%20Wilayah%20Provinsi%20Papua%20menurut%20Kabupaten.htm> in September 2007. Merauke is the largest province by area, at 119 749km² nearly twice the area of Jayapura.

archipelago.¹⁰ It is partly low-lying, including Lake Sentani, and the massive Mamberamo River near the western end of the regency. It also includes the Cyclops Mountains which rise to over 2,000 metres to the north of Lake Sentani near the more populated area of the regency. It extends far into the interior and to the west of the town of Jayapura, though most of its population reside in just two districts, Jayapura Municipality and Lake Sentani.¹¹ The bay, called Humboldt Bay during the Dutch period (later called Yos Sudarso Bay¹² during the Indonesian period) is an excellent harbour. Being the first good harbour East of the Cenderawasih Gulf, it was an obvious choice for a trading and administrative post.¹³ It was established close to the border with the German colony, at the eastern limit of the Dutch East Indies colony. The Dutch were keen to establish their presence in the island to counter the threat of being usurped as colonists by the Germans or the British who had claimed the south-east of the island as their colonies.

This area is one of several areas of New Guinea in which prehistoric bronze artifacts have been found. Ceremonial axes have been discovered around Lake Sentani dating back to between 2,000 BCE and 250 CE.¹⁴ Glass bracelets of a similar design to those excavated from sites on Bali have been found at various places along the north coast of New Guinea, including the north side of Lake

¹⁰ 'Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam', *Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics Papua Province)*, accessed from <http://www.bps.go.id/profile/aceh.shtml> in September 2007

¹¹ Jayapura is now technically divided into a district and a municipality. The census data prior to 2000 does not make this distinction between the two as it was not divided in this way. In order to facilitate comparisons between censuses throughout this period the data from these two regions will be combined in the analysis below, unless otherwise stated.

¹² Yos Sudarso, the deputy chief of staff in the Navy in 1962, was killed when the boat he was on was sunk by the Dutch prior to Operation Mandala, the Indonesian attempt to win back Irian by force headed by then Major-General Suharto. Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001, pp.80-87

¹³ Moore (2003), p.101

¹⁴ Swadling, Pamela, *Plumes from paradise: trade cycles in southeast Asia and their impact on New Guinea and nearby islands until 1920*, PNG National Museum and Robert Brown, Hong Kong, 1996, p.205

Sentani.¹⁵ Swadling suggests there may be a connection between these artefacts and the plume trade. She points out that this area, along with the other main find sites in the Bird's Head region, was perfect for plume traders to operate in as the coastal sites are close to mountainous regions in which many birds of paradise species can be found.¹⁶ Moore states that these sites were part of a trade network, with connections to the Admiralty Islands northeast of New Guinea.¹⁷ Cribb also notes that the bird of paradise had been the basis for a trade network that existed prior to the arrival of the Europeans. He states that: "Westerners making first contact with the indigenous peoples of New Guinea during recent centuries found bird-of-paradise pelts and feathers widely used for adornment, and this practice is presumably an ancient one."¹⁸

The support given to the Sultan of Tidore by the Dutch encouraged him to establish control over parts of New Guinea, mainly through *hongji* (armed ship) raids. The raids that were conducted on coastal areas of New Guinea up until the end of the 19th century were to devastate the lives of many coastal dwellers of New Guinea, possibly including those in the Humboldt Bay region.¹⁹ An expedition comprising the Dutch man-of-war the *Circe* together with a Tidorese fleet of eight vessels sailed along the north coast in 1849. The furthest point on their voyage was Humboldt Bay, which was the limit of Dutch rule at this time. This fleet "investigated the possibility of beginning a Dutch garrison as a convenience for shipping travelling along the north coast."²⁰ This possibility was

¹⁵ Swadling (1996), p.59

¹⁶ Swadling (1996), p.57

¹⁷ Moore (2003), p.48

¹⁸ Cribb, Robert, 'Birds of paradise and environmental politics in colonial Indonesia, 1890-1931', pp. 379-408 in Boomgaard, Peter, Freek Colombijn and David Henley (eds), *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the environmental history of Indonesia*, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1997, p.382

¹⁹ See Swadling (1996), pp.146-149 for a description of the impact of these *hongji* raids on the Kowiai coast. Penders, C.L.M., *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002, p.117 also comments on the impact of raids on the New Guinea coast.

²⁰ Moore (2003), p.97

not realised for another sixty years. Swadling claims the *Circe's* voyage had as its primary aim the wish to "assess the potential of Humboldt Bay (now Yos-Sударso Bay) for settlement and to mark the north coast as far east as the 141st meridian for the Sultan of Tidore." However, bad weather separated the fleet, with the Dutch ship returning to Ambon without having reached the bay.²¹

It is doubtful that the Tidorese raiding had such a serious impact on the Jayapura region as they did on other regions of the New Guinea coast. According to Howard and Sanggenafa few of these raiders were to travel this far west.

For many centuries the coastal area to the west of the mouth of the Memberamo River was the eastern boundary of external influence beyond which traders and raiders from further west in Indonesia rarely passed. In effect this meant that coastal peoples east of the river's mouth were not subject to the same outside influences as were the peoples living to the west.²²

With this river being at the far west of the present day regency of Jayapura, this would have included the majority of this area.

In the early 1850s, militia from Ternate established a garrison in Humboldt Bay. This outpost was not to last long.²³ It is likely that there was hostility towards this garrison from local people, and the distrust of outsiders felt by indigenous residents of this area was to continue into the 20th century. There was a further expedition to this region by the Dutch in 1858, again accompanied by the Tidorese. Local people were initially hostile towards these arrivals, probably in

²¹ Swadling (1996), p.211

²² 'The people of Northern Papua', Michael C. Howard and Naffi Sanggenafa, pp.1-22 in Howard, Michael C. and Naffi Sanggenafa, *Indigenous peoples and migrants of Northern Papua*, Indonesia, Bangkok, White Lotus, 2005, p.12

²³ Swadling (1996), p.212

response to their earlier experiences with the Ternate garrison. However, once the Dutch captain signalled their good intentions through throwing presents ashore, indigenous people gave the mariners fruits and vegetables.²⁴

Hunting for plumes started in this area in 1858, with a Dutch border expedition, whose members purchased or shot birds of paradise. Large scale hunting by Ternatian hunters commenced in the 1880s, with Chinese, Ternatian and Tidorese traders establishing a trading post near the present site of Jayapura in the 1890s. In the early 20th century, the people in the area were considered to be belligerent by foreign hunters, with much conflict between these migrants and local inhabitants.²⁵ This reputation for hostility towards the outsiders may have played a part in the trading dominance that Chinese immigrants came to have.²⁶ For indigenous people, the arrival of these traders brought new goods. One important import was iron, with iron axes being widely used by the start of the 20th century.²⁷

The first administrative post was established by the Dutch in 1910, with the Dutch flag being raised in Hollandia on 7th March 1910.²⁸ The post was to act as the base camp for an expedition to determine the border between Dutch and German New Guinea.²⁹

In the early days of Dutch control of this area, trade was an important aspect of the local economy, with Chinese traders controlling the trade in products brought in from the hinterlands. The Chinese traders apparently advanced

²⁴ Swadling (1996), p.212

²⁵ Swadling (1996), pp.212-214

²⁶ Chinese traders had earlier been the only traders given the right to trade on the North Coast of New Guinea by the Dutch East India Company as they “could be trusted not to trade in nutmegs”. Swadling (1996), p.122

²⁷ Swadling (1996), p.212

²⁸ ‘Chronology: Significant Dates in Irian/New Guinea History’, <http://www.irja.org/history/chronology.htm> accessed February 2006

²⁹ Swadling (1996), p.213

goods and money to hunters from Ternate and Tidore, who were then tied into trading with these businesspeople to pay off their debts.³⁰ According to Ernst Mayr:

Whole towns subsisted on the plume trade. Hollandia was a town of 700 in 1923. In addition to Malay hunters and their Papuan companions, there were Chinese, Arab, and Dutch traders. The prohibition of hunting in 1924 brought about a slump, and when I visited the region in 1928, Hollandia was a regular ghost town of only 30 or 40 people...³¹

These dates conflict with those given by Pamela Swadling, who suggests that hunting was prohibited in the Hollandia area in 1931. This was the last area in which hunting was banned, with the majority of the rest of the colony off limits from 1924 according to Swadling.³² Whatever the date of the hunting ban, other travellers to Hollandia agree with Ernst Mayr on the deserted state of the city at roughly this time.

In the 1930s Evelyn Cheesman found Hollandia to be a small village, most of the inhabitants being Indonesian or Chinese. A few old Indonesian down-and-outers, who not so long ago had been making fortunes as bird hunters, still remained. The large number of Chinese stores in the small settlement was another indication of the past boom. These Chinese traders continued to import all sorts of foreign goods, including rice, textiles, metalware, fuel and beads.³³

By the early 1930s, Dutch administration had become more extensive, with roads being built from Hollandia to Tanah Merah Bay. There has been little development of infrastructure since this time, as this is still one of the longest

³⁰ Swadling (1996), p.214

³¹ Van der Veur, Paul W., *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*, ANU, Canberra, 1966, quoting Ernst Mayr, p.81

³² Swadling (1996), p.62 & p.99

³³ Swadling (1996), p.217

roads within the region. There are also roads connecting the city to the PNG border and to the nearby transmigration sites.³⁴ Plantations had been set up in the Hollandia area, with most of these being run by men with indigenous mothers and foreign fathers.³⁵ There were also German planters who had crossed the border from the German colony following World War I, with this colony having become an Australian protectorate in 1914.³⁶ Moore claims there were both Eurasian and European planters in the Lake Sentani area in the 1920s, growing rice and beans for export.³⁷

As can be seen from the map at the start of this chapter, Jayapura is close to the border with the present nation state of Papua New Guinea. At different periods, the boundary between the two territories has been relatively tightly policed or fairly porous. There has been trade across this frontier, both legally and illegally, as well as the movement of people both ways, with different laws on either side influencing this traffic. Plume hunters often crossed this line in search of birds of paradise.³⁸

Since the border established between the colonial territories took no account of natural features, traditional land rights and usage were often split by this artificial boundary. In practice, these rights were long unaffected, however, in large part due to the low level of exploration of this area by colonial administrations on either side. For example, in 1928 the Australian District Officer was under the misapprehension that the border near the north coast

³⁴ Personal observation by the author during visit to the regency, August 2005

³⁵ Swadling (1996), p.217. It can be assumed that Swadling is referring to European fathers, though some may also have been born to 'Foreign Oriental' fathers. This pattern was one that was shared with the rest of the archipelago, with the Eurasian population being very noticeable across the archipelago. See Furnivall, J.S., *Colonial Policy and Practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*, New York University Press, New York, 1956, p.233; Reid, Anthony (ed.), *Sojourners and Settlers: histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards NSW, 1996

³⁶ Moore (2003), p.181

³⁷ Moore (2003), p.187

³⁸ Swadling (1996), p.214

followed the line of the Tami River, several kilometres west of the colonially approved line. According to Van der Veur, “this erroneous view had developed because the people of Wutung had land rights and sac sac (sago) gardens in the uninhabited swamplands lying between the Tami River and Wutung.”³⁹

Along with the arrival of Europeans as colonial administrators, other Europeans came as farmers in the 1930s. As mentioned in chapter 4⁴⁰, the government wished to solve two problems at once, by encouraging settlers to leave the Netherlands (thus reducing unemployment in the home country) and to farm land in West New Guinea (thus opening up the colony for further colonial development). The areas developed were those near the centres of administration, the few areas in which there was any significant European presence. Garnaut and Manning state that several hundred Europeans arrived in the Hollandia and Manokwari areas in the 1930s intending to farm in these areas. However, their attempts were without success.⁴¹ Penders states that the plantations in Hollandia were “described in a 1938 government report as totally disastrous, the number of colonists having fallen from 102 in 1936 to fifty in 1937.”⁴² The plantation idea was not abandoned, however, with an experimental estate being set up by a joint venture of large Dutch companies in 1937.⁴³

Tanah Merah district in Jayapura regency was to see a dramatic reaction to the clash of cultures that was experienced by indigenous people in the encounter with Europeans. This came in the form of a messianic cult started by Simson

³⁹ Van der Veur (1966), p.82

⁴⁰ See pp.99-100, in chapter 4

⁴¹ Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p.11

⁴² Penders (2002), p.56

⁴³ Penders (2002), p.61

Sommilena around 1939.⁴⁴ The movement bore similarities to the Koreri movement of Biak, was anti-colonial and seemingly adapted indigenous ancestor worship for its form. While clearly envious of the material wealth that the newcomers possessed, indigenous people in this area had little understanding of the socio-economic and technological structure that the European dominance was based on. The movement incorporated Dutch employment terminology, as well as modern technology such as the telegraph to contact the ancestors who were believed to be living in the Javanese city of Bandung. While the Dutch imprisoned some of his followers, Simson was allowed to remain free. Following their arrival, the Japanese jailed Simson in August 1942, then released him in December of the same year.⁴⁵ Once it became clear that Simson was continuing with his messianic activities, he was executed by the Japanese forces. The cult lost its force with the arrival of riches brought by the American troops.

In 1940, Hollandia was a small town with a population of only 400. This was to change during the Pacific War, firstly with the Japanese developing the area as a base and building airfields at Lake Sentani.⁴⁶ These runways have become the main landing strips for Jayapura's current air connection, the main form of long-distance transport in the province. The Japanese stationed 55,000 troops in the northern Papua region, with some barracked in the Jayapura area.⁴⁷

With the arrival of the American forces, Hollandia became one of the key strategic locations for the Pacific War campaign. General Douglas MacArthur

⁴⁴ Penders (2002), pp.131-134. Penders claims it is possible that Simson was initially tricked into these beliefs by Eurasian plantation settlers.

⁴⁵ Penders (2002), p.134

⁴⁶ Lagerberg, C.S.I.J., *Years of Reconstruction: New Guinea from 1949 to 1961*, Research and Microfilm, Maryland, 1963, pp.17-18 suggests there were three runways, while Moore (2003) claims that only two strips were built here, p.194.

⁴⁷ 'The people of Northern Papua', Michael C. Howard and Naffi Sanggenafa, pp.1-22 in Howard and Sanggenafa (2005), p.20. Exact numbers stationed in the Jayapura region are not given.

made the area the headquarters of the American forces in 1944. The original town was located on a different site from its current location and was destroyed entirely by the American bombardment of the city in 1944.⁴⁸ On the arrival of the American forces, there were battles killing 159 American and 4,475 Japanese soldiers.⁴⁹ There are no available figures for the number of Papuans killed. This suggests a lack of concern for the fate of the indigenous people of the area. However, it should be noted that the difficulties of obtaining data in this region during wartime are another factor behind this deficiency and it is certainly possible that the number of indigenous people killed during these engagements was small.

Hollandia grew amazingly quickly during the time the Americans were based here, with MacArthur's Alamo troops occupying the area as part of their island-hopping strategy.⁵⁰ By 1944, Hollandia was inhabited by 140,000 people and had 100 kilometres of roads, a pipeline and a ship repair base. The extent of this road network arose from the layout of the new city, with military buildings being developed apart from each other to reduce the damage that would occur if there were a Japanese attack.⁵¹ This massive expansion must have made a huge impression on local residents, as it did in other areas of the territory.⁵²

In December 1945, there were attempts by some residents of the Jayapura area to join the independence movement in the west of the archipelago and rebel

⁴⁸ Van der Heiden, Peter, *Netherlands New Guinea (West Papua)*, website material based on *Vademecum voor Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, 1956 & *Handbook on Netherlands New Guinea*, 1958, 2005, accessed from <http://www.vanderheijden.org/ng/index.html> in May 2006

⁴⁹ Smith, Robert Ross, *The War in the Pacific: The approach to the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II Series, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1953, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/bk1/approach/> in March 2006, pp.577-578

⁵⁰ See Smith (1953) for detailed information on this campaign from an American military perspective.

⁵¹ Van der Heiden (2005)

⁵² See chapter 4. It should be noted that the extensive literature on the Pacific War in the western half of New Guinea is not found on the Eastern half of the island and there are inconsistencies in the figures given for the growth of the city.

against the colonial masters. The leader of the coup, Sugoro, was the head of the new public administration school based in Hollandia. There were still hundreds of 'Indonesian' members of the Japanese auxiliary forces stuck in the Hollandia region, and Sugoro wished to induce these soldiers to fight for the new republic.⁵³ Van Eechoud, the first West New Guinea resident, felt there was tension between the incomers, the *amberies*⁵⁴, and the indigenous populace. This movement supposedly did not have much support from indigenous Papuans, with the rebels being mainly immigrants from other parts of the archipelago. However, it appears that a later plot by Sugoro against the Dutch had the support of some indigenous members of the Papuan Battalion, students at the police school, and Lake Sentani residents.⁵⁵

One of the rationales behind the Dutch desire to hold onto New Guinea was to provide a homeland for Eurasians from other parts of the old colony, as well as for long-term European residents of the colony who did not wish to return to the Netherlands, many of whom had been imprisoned by the Japanese during the Pacific War.⁵⁶ The Netherlands government looked for areas for colonisation in the Hollandia region in 1946-7, but found only two areas suitable for agriculture, each of only 500 hectares.⁵⁷ The government offered funded accommodation and land to former Dutch prisoners of war and people who still were awaiting evacuation from the interior of Java. However, it appears that this was not attractive to these former POWs. Penders claims that the scheme

⁵³ Penders (2002), pp.135-136

⁵⁴ *Amberie* was the name used by Papuans for immigrants.

⁵⁵ Penders (2002), pp.135-136

⁵⁶ See chapter 4 for more information.

⁵⁷ Penders (2002), p.73

“met with a very disappointing response, as only about forty people had taken up the offer.”⁵⁸

Despite this lack of interest, the Batavia government established a council to deal with transmigration and emigration, particularly in regards to West New Guinea. This council decided there should be no settlement there before research in West New Guinea could find areas that were suitable for agriculture, as well as the lack of certainty regarding the political status of the territory.⁵⁹

The post-war period was one of growth for Hollandia. The Dutch pumped money into the development of the colony, and especially into that of Hollandia. Being the capital of the colony, there was more development in Hollandia than in other areas. This was one of the few urban centres of the colony, and one of the few in which there was a money economy.⁶⁰ There were many educational centres set up during this period, such as the training schools for ‘native’ government officials established in 1948⁶¹, and the training school for indigenous police officers.⁶²

There was tension across the colony between indigenous residents and the incomers from other areas of the Dutch East Indies. A Dutch study of the Papuan elite found that many Papuans felt discriminated against by Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries. Papuans felt they “had been treated as animals (*binatang*)⁶³, as being dumb and not able to speak good Malay”, and that their career progress was obstructed by Indonesian officials.⁶⁴ As the centre

⁵⁸ Penders (2002), p.73

⁵⁹ Penders (2002), pp.73-74

⁶⁰ Penders (2002), p.397

⁶¹ Lagerberg (1963), p.28

⁶² Penders (2002), p.93

⁶³ It should be noted that *binatang* is an Indonesian/Malay word for animal.

⁶⁴ Chauvel, Richard, *Essays on West Papua: volume one*, Working Paper 120, Monash, Victoria 2003, pp.13-14

of development in the colony, Hollandia was an area of high tension between settlers and indigenous people. There was social unrest during 1950, with the first strike being in Hollandia in June. There was dissatisfaction with the government, particularly in relation to the issue of administration, with local people seeing the government as acting primarily in the interests of its own officials and of immigrants.⁶⁵ In both Hollandia and Manokwari, two of the largest urban centres at this time, “opposition was expressed against immigrants and allotment of land to immigrants.”⁶⁶

During the early 1950s, there was urban migration within West New Guinea, with more Papuans in school and employment.⁶⁷ Hollandia, being a centre of government, was one destination of this migration. With the Papuan population spread thinly across the vast terrain of the colony, the need for employees for this centre meant that workers were drawn from areas outside the capital. Since New Guinea was separated from what was now Indonesia, the Dutch could no longer so easily import administrators from other islands of the archipelago, and the lower levels of non-Papuans in the administration had to be made up of indigenous workers. People from other regions of the colony migrated from other parts of West New Guinea to centres such as Hollandia.

While the Dutch needed administrators, increasing urban growth was not to the liking of the colonial administration, which wished to balance this growth with development in rural districts. Exactly how much the population of Hollandia grew in the post-war period is unclear from the literature on the topic. There are vastly conflicting figures for the population of Hollandia. Ryan claims the

⁶⁵ Lagerberg (1963), p.69

⁶⁶ Lagerberg (1963), p.72

⁶⁷ Lagerberg (1963), pp.56-64

population of the city never exceeded 15,000 in this post-war period.⁶⁸ On the other hand, Penders states that the population increased from 20,943 in 1952 to 73,240 in 1960.⁶⁹ The latter figures appear more plausible, especially since Penders bases his figures on a 1960 survey.⁷⁰

The survey Penders took these figures from was conducted in 1960 by Jan Broekhuijse⁷¹ through interviews with poorer migrants, mainly those without government employment or good housing.⁷² He found that the majority of migrants worked as labourers in Hollandia. The sex ratio for Hollandia had changed markedly from 1952 to 1960, suggesting more permanent migration, with more families rather than single men.⁷³ This is supported by his survey figures, with more than three-quarters of the surveyed men being married. The men surveyed mostly came from areas close to Hollandia (Nimboran and Sarmi) and from other parts of the Dutch colony (Biak and Serui), showing the importance of internal migration at this point. The table below show their origins.

⁶⁸ Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970, p.188

⁶⁹ Penders (2002), p.399

⁷⁰ While the book by Ryan contains pertinent information, it does not have any references or footnoting, and there appears to be an anti-Indonesian bias in the writing.

⁷¹ Jan Broekhuijse was a former patrol officer in the highlands region who became a cultural anthropologist and published works on Dani society.

⁷² Penders (2002), pp.398-400

⁷³ Broekhuysse, Johan Theodorus, *De Papoea-migrant in Hollandia*, Bibliotheek der Rijks Universiteit, Utrecht, 1960, p.6

Table 8.1: Hollandia residents by origin, 1960⁷⁴

Origin	Number	Percentage
Hollandia rural	96	25
Nimboran	62	16
Sarmi	76	20
Biak	61	16
Serui	34	9
Australian New Guinea	12	3
Not known	36	10
Total	377	100

The figures for migrants from Australian New Guinea are most surprising. It would be expected that there would be some residents in Jayapura from Papua New Guinea, but that these residents would be business people, government officials or the like. However, that these residents were poorer residents with inadequate housing, suggests that the border between east and west of New Guinea was still fairly porous, allowing people to migrate from one colony to the other for employment. Those moving to the cities were mostly educated, with a 1960 study showing that 85% of married male migrants and 74% of female migrants were literate.⁷⁵ Since these migrants were more educated than the vast majority of Papuans were at this time, it seems unlikely that they would have been interested in agricultural employment in the rural districts of Hollandia. Rather, their relatively high levels of education probably prompted them to look for commensurate levels of employment in the city. Their level of schooling was relatively high for Hollandia at this time, but only 3% had any more than village school education.⁷⁶ It appears there was only a very small elite able to take over from the Dutch if the colony were to become independent.

⁷⁴ Broekhuysse (1960), p.6

⁷⁵ Penders (2002), p.400

⁷⁶ Penders (2002), p.400

Most had high expectations of success in the city, but it appears these hopes were unrealistic, with higher living costs counteracting the higher wages.⁷⁷

Another drain on family resources was the tradition of housing relatives. As well as families, almost all houses were home to relatives of these families. These relatives were generally single men, cultural expectations requiring families to accommodate these boarders.⁷⁸ Most boarders (*penumpang*) did not contribute towards household expenses, with only 7% sharing housing costs.⁷⁹ While this was a drain on the family involved, the extended social network and the responsibility to care for others from the same family or village aided migration to the city for indigenous rural residents.

Despite all these difficulties, many migrants were able to remit money to their home villages. The investigation by Broekhuijse mentioned previously reported that nearly one in four received assistance from their home village.⁸⁰ However, 40% were able to send 24 guilders a month to their families, roughly worth \$A100 in 2006 terms.⁸¹ Broekhuijse concludes that there was a lack of adequate training for urban immigrants. This, along with the inadequate housing, he felt reflected badly on the administration. The study concludes by warning “that the neglect of the government and the racist-tainted disregard and aloofness on the part of the white community, as a whole, for the economic plight of the Papuan

⁷⁷ Penders (2002), p.399

⁷⁸ This system is still in operation in highland towns, with my personal experience (August 2005) suggesting that relatives is a broad term for many Papuans, with fairly remote kin or those from the same village of origin being given lodgings.

⁷⁹ Penders (2002), p.400

⁸⁰ Penders (2002), p.400

⁸¹ This value was calculated using the International Institute of Social History website calculator which can calculate the comparative value of the guilder between years from 1450 to the present day. ‘Value of the Guilder’, accessed from <http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate.php> in January 2007

urban dwellers could turn their still generally pro-government stance into hate.”⁸²

Relations between Papuans and the colonists continued to be far from harmonious during this post-war period. Although the government claimed to be preparing the colony for independence, the colonial attitudes of Europeans appear to have changed little from that of the classical colonialism of the 19th century. The following quote on life in the capital illustrates the Dutch attitude towards their subjects.

the polyclinic in Hollandia harbour was cited. It had two entrances: one featuring a sign in Dutch for whites and the other one in Malay for the natives. Moreover, waiting Europeans made it abundantly clear to Dutch-speaking Papuans that they were not welcome in their queue.⁸³

In conclusion, the Dutch period was one of very limited change for the colony up until the Second World War. For most people in Papua, life did not change markedly, with the vast majority continuing to live in villages and practising subsistence agriculture. The war was a period in which far larger numbers of outsiders came to the island, the Japanese and the Allies, bringing the products of the developed world and building modern housing and infrastructure. The post-war period was one of a much more extensive Dutch presence, with schools, training and employment bringing more Papuans into the urban environment. The elite that was to later challenge the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia was educated during this period at training schools set up by the Dutch.

⁸² Penders (2002), p.400

⁸³ Penders (2002), p.401

In these schools, in isolation from the rest of the old Dutch East Indies (now the new nation of Indonesia), a greater sense of being a part of a unitary Papuan identity developed among this elite. This was a departure from the local, ethnic identification that is reflected in the large number of languages spoken in both halves of the island. This supra-ethnic identification was fuelled in part (both before the war and after it) by migrants from other islands to the west, most especially Ambon, taking many of the positions in the Dutch administration and having higher social status. Jayapura was in the middle of these developments, being the capital of the colony and the most developed area of it. There was migration to the city from within the colony, from the eastern half of the island, from Indonesia and from Europe. The next section will examine the developments that occurred following the departure of the Dutch.

The Indonesian Period

Following the handover of power to Indonesia in 1963, thousands of migrants arrived in the new province. Peter McDonald's work suggests that by 1971 as many as 33,513 people had moved to Papua.⁸⁴ This was balanced by 6,449 Papuans who had emigrated to other provinces giving a net migration total of 27,064. The census of 1971 only covered urban areas and recorded the population of Jayapura as 45,786.⁸⁵ However, it can be assumed that the vast majority of these migrants went to the urban areas of the province.⁸⁶ The data in the 1971 census gives a slightly higher number of migrants in the province of 37,251 of whom 64% were male.⁸⁷

The population figures from 1968 to 1971 show a dramatic increase in the regency's population which must have arisen from high levels of immigration. Jayapura's population was 81,246 in 1968, 83,196 in 1969, 91,650 in 1970 and 100,753 in 1971.⁸⁸ The annual population growth rate between 1969 and 1971 is nearly 10%, indicating substantial migration to the regency.

The provincial figures in the 1971 census suggest that nearly a quarter of the urban population at this time were born outside the province.⁸⁹ Unfortunately,

⁸⁴ Figures from McDonald, Peter F., *Pedoman Analisa Data Sensus Indonesia 1971-1980*, Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, Australian Universities' International Development Program, Canberra, 1983, Table 8.3: Migrasi Masuk hidup menurut tempat tujuan, migrasi keluar seumur hidup menurut tempat asal dan migrasi bersih seumur hidup (Table 8.3: Lifetime Immigration by destination, lifetime emigration by place of origin, and net lifetime migration)

⁸⁵ *Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya*, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974, Tabel 8: Penduduk menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan status perkawin (Table 8: Population by regency/municipality and marital status), p.27

⁸⁶ Very few transmigrants had arrived in the province by this point. Considering the lack of transport in Eastern Indonesia at this time it seems unlikely that there would have been significant numbers of spontaneous migrants to rural areas at this time.

⁸⁷ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 25, pp.126-134. Data analysis by author.

⁸⁸ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1972, Daftar 3: Jumlah penduduk daerah propinsi Irian Barat dari tahun 1967 s/d 1971, p.5

⁸⁹ 24.3% of the population were born outside Papua. Figures compiled by the author from data in Sensus Penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 22.x: Population by place of birth and age, pp.85-98

there are no published figures available on place of birth at the regency level. It seems more likely that there would be a higher than average percentage of migrants to Jayapura due to the concentration of government and military administration. Considering the dramatic rise in the population of the regency between 1968 and 1971, a conservative estimate based on these figures is that there were more than 10,000 migrants residing in the city by 1971.⁹⁰

In the 1980 and 1990 census, there were no published tables on place of birth of the district's residents. Although the Central Bureau of Statistics published estimated figures on immigration and emigration through this period,⁹¹ this data covers the province as a whole and does not have specific data on the Jayapura regency.

An important study on this area was carried out by the late Michael Rumbiak in 1980. He studied migration by Nimboran people from the western part of the regency to Jayapura. The survey conducted in 1980 examined migrants' reasons for making this rural to urban move. The three main motivations were for employment, for education for themselves or their children, and for other socio-cultural reasons such as the need to avoid conflict and to obtain the money for bride prices.⁹² As such, the factors producing this migration were pull factors. Rumbiak suggests that: "The Nimborans were not pushed out by rural pressures on food, land or agricultural production, but were pulled by western civilisation

⁹⁰ See the religion section below for more data which corroborates this inference.

⁹¹ *Estimasi fertilitas, mortalitas dan migrasi: hasil sensus penduduk tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002

⁹² Rumbiak, Michael, 'Nimboran migration to Jayapura, Irian Jaya.' In Murray Chapman and Philip S. Morrison (eds) *Mobility and Identity in the Island Pacific. Special Issue of Pacific Viewpoint*, April 1985, 26(1), pp. 206-220

in Jayapura. The migrants desired money, industrial goods, and western education.”⁹³

Migrants tended to move to Jayapura rather than other cities due to connections in this city, either family or friends with similar origins, with people moving to areas in which relatives lived “because they were confident they could depend on the relatives’ support.”⁹⁴ Rumbiak suggests that the presence of kin in these areas is “a powerful attraction to migrants”, helping migrants with initial settlement (accommodation, job seeking) and maintaining familiar patterns of behaviour, food and so on. This encourages chain migration from source areas, with earlier migrants also being important sources of information on opportunities for later migrants.⁹⁵ Similar patterns of migration can be seen across the border to the east in Papua New Guinea. Koczberski and colleagues state that social and kinship networks play an important role in rural-urban migration in Papua New Guinea.⁹⁶ It appears that these networks provide similar support to those in Papua, with Koczberski and colleagues suggesting that “networks lessen risks associated with migration as new arrivals in towns and cities can anticipate support and assistance from kin.”⁹⁷

Jayapura has grown greatly during the 1971 to 2000 period covered by the census data in this study. The period saw the population increase from just over 100,000 to over 340,000.⁹⁸

⁹³ Rumbiak (1983), p.51

⁹⁴ Rumbiak (1983), p.85


⁹⁵ Rumbiak in Chapman and Morrison (1985), pp.211-213

⁹⁶ Koczberski, Gina, George N. Curry and John Connell, ‘Full Circle or Spiralling Out of Control?: State Violence and the Control of Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea’, *Urban Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp.2017–2036, 2001, p.2020

⁹⁷ Koczberski et al (2001), p.2030

⁹⁸ Figures taken from *Papua dalam angka 2002*, Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 3.1.8, Rata-rata pertumbuhan penduduk pertahun menurut kabupaten/kota di Papua (Average

Chart 8.1: Population of Jayapura, 1971-2000⁹⁹



The population figures from 1980 are broken down by age and sex. These figures can show the differences in the sex ratios between the age groups, with the table below illustrating these differences. It can be seen that the sex ratio is highest for the 25 to 49 year age group, suggesting an immigration of working age people into the regency.

Table 8.2: Population by age group and sex ratio, 1980¹⁰⁰

Age range	Sex ratio
0-4	112
5-9	113
10-14	113
15-24	120
25-49	135
50+	131
Total	121

population growth in Papua by regency/municipality). The figures for 1990 and 2000 are combined totals of the population of the Jayapura municipality and regency.

⁹⁹ *Papua dalam angka 2002*, Table 3.1.8

¹⁰⁰ *Jayapura dalam angka 1980*, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayapura, Jayapura, 1981, Tabel II.1.2: Penduduk kabupaten Jayapura menurut golongan umur dan jenis kelamin (hasil sensus penduduk tahun 1980), p.22. Sex ratios calculated by the author.

The 2000 census includes data on the place of residence five years earlier than the survey. The table below illustrates this data, with separate entries for Jayapura regency and municipality.

Table 8.3: Number and percentage of people in Jayapura regency and municipality by their place of residence five years previously, 2000¹⁰¹

Jayapura regency			Jayapura municipality		
Place of residence five years ago	Total	%	Place of residence five years ago	Total	%
Jayapura regency	142,280	90.37	Jayapura municipality	149,660	86.26
Central Java	3,070	1.95	Jayapura regency	4,111	2.37
East Java	2,483	1.58	Sulawesi	2,999	1.73
Puncak Jaya	2,169	1.38	East Java	2,044	1.18
West Java	1,712	1.09	Central Java	1,580	0.91
Yapen Waropen	1,070	0.68	Selatan [sic]	1,431	0.82
Jayawijaya	631	0.40	Nusa Tenggara Barat	1,093	0.63
Maluku	573	0.36	Biak Numfor	961	0.55
Nusa Tenggara Timur	406	0.26	Jayawijaya	918	0.53
Manokwari	402	0.26	Merauke	911	0.53

These figures illustrate the high rate of migration to these areas. In the regency, nearly one in ten residents has arrived there within the past five years, while in the municipality, almost one in seven residents is a newcomer. The figures also show a wide divergence in the origin areas of migrants to the municipality and the regency, though the reasons for this difference are beyond the scope of the current research.

As was mentioned previously, there were issues with the 2000 census, with the gathering of data interrupted by the ethnic conflict that was occurring at that time. To evaluate whether the population figures above are reasonably accurate, the figures for 2005 will be used. By this time Jayapura had been split into four regencies: Jayapura kota, Jayapura, Sarmi and Keerom. The combined

¹⁰¹ *Profil kependudukan Provinsi Irian Jaya Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002, Tabel 5.4: Jumlah Persentase Migran Risen Masuk Menurut Kabupaten/Kota, p.28. Figures abridged and ordered by author.

figures for these four areas show a population of 356,916 people in this year.¹⁰² This suggests an annual growth rate from 2000 to 2005 of only 0.9%¹⁰³, a figure that is at odds with the figures from earlier periods. The lack of compatibility of this data suggests that either the figures from 2000 are over-estimates or the 2005 figures are under-estimates. While the figures are certainly not conflicting, the possibility of inaccuracy within the 2000 data should be taken into consideration with the use of the results in the current chapter.

The following sections will assess the demographic changes that accompanied this growth of the regency's population, through examining the language usage of its inhabitants, their religious affiliation, their educational attainments, and their employment patterns.


¹⁰² Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005, table 3. Figures combined by author.

¹⁰³ Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005, table 3. Growth rate calculated by author.

Language

In both 1980 and 1990 there were questions in the census concerning language. In 1980, people were asked about the language they used at home, while in 1990 the question related to the respondents' mother tongue. The chart below illustrates the difference in responses between urban and rural areas, both in Jayapura regency and in Irian Jaya as a whole for comparison.

Chart 8.2: Language used at home as a percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban and Rural, 1980¹⁰⁴




While these figures do not show who was using Indonesian, indigenous and/or non-indigenous residents, the figures show a clear divide between language use in urban and rural parts of the province and in Jayapura regency. It appears that the vast majority of urban dwellers use Indonesian at home, while those outside the cities do so at much lower levels.

¹⁰⁴ *Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980*, Seri S28, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1983, Table 08,x, pp.37-39, Population by regency/municipality, language used at home, and sex

The 1990 census included data on the mother tongue of Papuan residents divided by regency. The chart below illustrates the pattern of this characteristic in Jayapura and the province, in urban and rural areas.

Chart 8.3: Mother tongue, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban and Rural, 1990¹⁰⁵



By 1990, the percentage of those whose mother tongue was Indonesian was 67% in urban Jayapura, slightly higher than the urban provincial average of 62%. Figures for rural areas are completely different, with only 19% of those in rural Jayapura being native Indonesian speakers. This figure is still higher than for the province as a whole, where only 13% of residents' mother tongue is Indonesian. As with the 1980 census, the contrasting figures for urban and rural areas in 1990 suggest that the vast majority of the population in these urban areas were immigrants. These figures also show a disparity in the population between the urban and rural areas of the province. With most development (and hence jobs)


¹⁰⁵ Figures compiled and percentages calculated by author from *Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Seri S2.27, (Population of Irian Jaya: Results of the 1990 population census, Series S2.27), Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1992, Tables 08, pp.37-39

being in the urban areas, this has important implications for the employment possibilities open to the indigenous population.

Religion

The figures published in the 1971 census only cover the urban areas of Irian Jaya.¹⁰⁶ At this time, only a few years after migration from the rest of Indonesia began, Islam was an important religion in the provincial capital, which had recently been given its new name of Jayapura. There were over 14,000 Muslims, comprising over 30% of the district's population. However, it was still a minority religion, with 31,404 Christian residents, or around two-thirds of the populace. Of the Christian population, the great majority (over 85%) were Protestant.¹⁰⁷ The other religions that were included in the census were Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian, but these were very much minority faiths, with only 207 people in total in these categories.

Chart 8.4: Religion by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, Urban areas, 1971¹⁰⁸



¹⁰⁶ All data in this paragraph analysed from Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, table 12, p.47

¹⁰⁷ This is in contrast to the province wide level of 73% of Christians being Protestant, but a reflection of the Protestant dominance outside the south coast of the territory.

¹⁰⁸ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, table 12, p.47. Percentages calculated by author.

Thus, by 1971, nearly one in three residents of Jayapura were Muslim.¹⁰⁹ These figures illustrate the high rates of migration to Jayapura from 1963 to 1971. Since this census only published data on urban areas, these migrants would not include transmigrants to settlements in rural areas, but would include many public servants and spontaneous migrants.

There are also figures on religion in the province given in the provincial publication *Irian Barat dalam angka 1967-1971*. This volume gives total number of Muslim residents of the province as 39,136.¹¹⁰ This suggests that the vast majority of Muslims lived in urban areas, with only 6,053 being in rural parts of the province. However, these tables give a total of only 3,000 Muslim inhabitants in Jayapura, a figure that is totally at odds with that given from the census materials from this year. It is suggested that these figures are thus too unreliable to be used to estimate the number of Muslim inhabitants of the rural areas.


By 1980, the number of Muslims in the regency was 38,932 or 26% of Jayapura's residents.¹¹¹ This was in contrast to the situation across the province as a whole, with only 12% of the total population being Muslim. Catholics still made up only a small proportion of the Christian community, with Protestant Christians outnumbering Catholics by 12 to 1. The chart below shows the division of the population by religion, for Jayapura and Irian Jaya.

¹⁰⁹ Actual percentage was 31%. All figures calculated by author from Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, table 12, p.47

¹¹⁰ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, Daftar 21: Keadaan umat beragama di propinsi Irian Barat, p.21

¹¹¹ All figures in this paragraph from *Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap*, Biro Pusat Statistik, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 1981, table 5, p.5

Chart 8.5: Religion by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1980¹¹²




With Islam being followed at more than twice the rate in Jayapura as in the province, it is clear that migration to the capital is at higher levels than across Papua as a whole. This is as can be expected from theoretical considerations, with migrants tending to congregate in urban centres which have more and wider employment possibilities.

The figures on religion from 1980 are also broken down by district of the regency. The chart below shows the figures for selected districts of Jayapura in this year.

¹¹² Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap, table 5. Percentages calculated by author.

Chart 8.6: Religious affiliation by district by percentage, Jayapura regency, 1980¹¹³



It can be seen that the vast majority of the Muslim population lived in a few districts of the regency: Jayapura district (the city itself), Abepura, Sentani and Nimboran. These areas are the most urbanised areas of the regency. The more rural, more isolated regions of the regency were almost exclusively Protestant. Though these areas contained almost a quarter of the regency's population, only 2% of the Muslim population lived in these districts.¹¹⁴ The figures point to an urban population of Muslim immigrants at this time.

The 1990 figures show that the number of Muslim residents continued to increase, both in real terms and as a percentage of the regency's population. There were 92,610 Muslim people living in Jayapura, making up 38% of the total

¹¹³ Jayapura dalam angka 1980, Tabel II.3.1: Banyaknya pemeluk agama diperinci menurut kecamatan tahun 1980, p.29

¹¹⁴ Jayapura dalam angka 1980, Tabel II.3.1, p.29. Percentages calculated by author.

population at this time.¹¹⁵ This continued to be a major migrant destination region in the territory, with 29% of Muslim people in the province living in Jayapura.¹¹⁶

By 2000, Jayapura had been split administratively into two sections, with the municipal capital being separated, both in terms of governmental administration and in the census data, from the other areas of the regency. In this data, the two areas will be referred to as Jayapura municipality and Jayapura regency. The municipality was predominantly urban, with 94% of its population in urban areas, while the regency was mainly rural, with four out of five residents living in rural areas.¹¹⁷ The number of Muslim residents was higher than in previous censuses, suggesting that many of the new residents were migrants from other provinces. In 2000 there were 48,357 Muslims in the regency and 78,438 in the municipality, making up 29% and 45% of the populations respectively.


For the first time, figures are given separately for the indigenous and non-indigenous populations in this census. It can be seen from the chart below that the majority of these Muslims are not indigenous believers. Only 2% of the indigenous populace follow Islam in the regency, 5% in the municipality.

¹¹⁵ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya kerja sama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan daerah Tingkat I, Jayapura, 1991, Tabel IV.9.1: Jumlah umat beragama di propinsi Irian Jaya menurut kabupaten 1990, p.114

¹¹⁶ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*, p.114. Analysis of data by the author.

¹¹⁷ Data for 2000 comes from *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua: tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province: main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 05: Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Administrasi dan agama, perkotaan dan pedesaan, p.22 & Table 05A, p.22. Data for non-indigenous population compiled by author. Data analysed and charts compiled by author.

Chart 8.7: Religion in Jayapura, indigenous and non-indigenous residents, 2000¹¹⁸



From this data, it can be calculated that approximately two-thirds of migrants to the province are Muslim. Muslims make up 65% of the migrant population in the regency, and 66% of non-indigenous people in the municipality.¹¹⁹

Of the non-indigenous population, there is also a high percentage of Christians in both areas, primarily Protestants. Many Papuans argue that Christian transmigrants were actively discouraged from moving to the province.¹²⁰ However, one-third of the non-indigenous population follow Christianity, compared to just fewer than 9% of the national population.¹²¹ These figures suggest that if there has indeed been a policy of hindering Christians from

¹¹⁸ Chart compiled by author from data in *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 05: Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Administrasi dan agama, perkotaan dan pedesaan, p.22

¹¹⁹ Figures calculated by author from data in *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 05: Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Administrasi dan agama, perkotaan dan pedesaan, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25


¹²⁰ Author's observation during visit to Papua, August 2005

¹²¹ Figures calculated by author from data in *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 05: Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Administrasi dan agama, perkotaan dan pedesaan, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25

migrating to the province, it has certainly not been successful and has not prevented Christians (primarily from Eastern Indonesia) from moving to Papua.

The charts¹²² on the page below show the proportions of the population following the two major religions in Jayapura as a whole, Christianity and Islam.¹²³ The charts illustrate the stark difference in affiliation, with indigenous people being overwhelmingly Christian, migrants being predominantly Muslim.

Chart 8.8: Religion in Jayapura, all residents, 2000¹²⁴



¹²² Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 05, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25. There were only 566 residents classified as Hindu, Buddhist or other, or 0.17% of the population. These categories have not been included in these charts for clarity of presentation.

¹²³ These figures are for the municipality and the regency combined.

¹²⁴ Figures compiled and analysed by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 05, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25

Chart 8.9: Religion in Jayapura, Indigenous residents, 2000¹²⁵





Chart 8.10: Religion in Jayapura, Non-indigenous residents, 2000¹²⁶




It had been suggested earlier in this chapter that the vast majority of Muslims in the province were migrants. It appears that this assumption is supported by the data shown above from the 2000 census, with less than 4% of the Muslims in Jayapura being indigenous people. This suggests that almost all of the Muslim residents of Jayapura recorded in earlier census materials were migrants. Given that the 2000 data shows there were also Christian migrants, it appears that we can approximate the number of migrants in the province by adding a third on to the total number of Muslims in the regency. The chart below illustrates the number of Muslim residents of Jayapura throughout the period of this study.

¹²⁵ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 05, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25

¹²⁶ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 05, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25

Chart 8.11: Muslim residents of Jayapura, 1971-2000¹²⁷



These figures show a sharp increase in the number of Muslim residents through the whole of this period. The rate of growth of the Muslim population increased much faster than that of the population as a whole, growing by 6.1% per year for the 1971 to 2000 period within Jayapura regency.¹²⁸ This contrasts to a growth rate for the population of the regency as a whole as of 3.2%.¹²⁹ The Muslim population grew from 14% of the regency's population in 1971, to 37% in 2000.¹³⁰ As was noted above, the number of Muslim residents is closely connected to the number of migrants. It can be concluded that the number of migrants in the regency in the regency has grown faster than the population as a whole, with migrants having increased as a percentage of the regency's population throughout the period of Indonesian sovereignty over the province.

¹²⁷ Figures compiled by author from data in censuses between 1971 and 2000. All figures come from the tables referenced in the footnotes above.

¹²⁸ Figures analysed by author from data in censuses between 1971 and 2000, references in the footnotes above.

¹²⁹ Figures analysed by author from data in Papua dalam angka 2002, Table 3.1.8 Rata-rata pertumbuhan penduduk pertahun menurut kabupaten/kota di Papua (Average population growth in Papua by regency/municipality)


¹³⁰ Percentages calculated by the author from the materials given above.

Education

During the period of Dutch control following World War II, the level of education provided in West New Guinea was low. However, the Dutch survey carried out in 1961 did not cover the Jayapura region. Since this region was the one with the largest Dutch administrative presence, it seems likely that there would have been schools in most sub-districts of the Jayapura region. However, how many children attended these schools is not recorded in any materials to my knowledge.

The first data on education within the Jayapura regency comes from the 1971 census. The chart shows that education levels in this regency were higher than across the province as a whole. This is unsurprising given the high levels of development of this region during the Dutch period.


Chart 8.12: Education levels by percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1971¹³¹



¹³¹ Data from Sensus penduduk 1971- penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 17: Penduduk Berumur 10 tahun keatas menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan pendidikan yang ditamatkan. Figures analysed by author.

With only 11% of the total population of the province in 1971, this regency had over half of the tertiary educated people in the province. While this is understandable given the location of the Universitas Cenderawasih, it appears that Jayapura was a centre for education at all levels. The chart below gives the figures for those with all education levels, as a percentage of the total population of the province with this educational attainment.

Chart 8.13: Percentage of those people with particular educational levels in Irian Jaya who reside in Jayapura regency, 1971¹³²




These figures show a high level of concentration of educational attainment within the Jayapura regency's population in comparison to that of the province as a whole. This reflects the higher levels of Indonesian administration and

¹³² Data from Sensus penduduk 1971- penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 17: Penduduk Berumur 10 tahun keatas menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan pendidikan yang ditamatkan. Percentages calculated by author.

urban employment in the modern economy in the provincial capital at this stage.

The next decade saw improvements in the numbers continuing their education. The chart below illustrates the education levels by 1980. In contrast to 1971 (with figures from urban areas only), these figures show the differences between the urban and rural areas of Jayapura. Urban areas have generally higher attainment levels for all stages of education, except for tertiary education, with Jayapura being the only regency in Papua to have higher levels of residents with tertiary education in rural areas than in urban areas. It is unclear why this is the case, though it is possible that the large numbers of military personnel in the regency have influenced this statistic.

Chart 8.14: Educational attainments, Urban and rural, Jayapura regency, 1980¹³³




By 1990 the education level in Jayapura had improved once more. The chart below illustrates the levels at this point. It can be seen that for urban areas the

¹³³ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33. Data analysis by author.

education levels in the regency are very similar to those across the province. There are greater levels of completion of all education levels than for the province as a whole. The levels for rural areas are much lower than those for urban areas, but higher than those of rural areas in the province as a whole. This is understandable considering that the residents in these rural areas are much closer to transport, schools and urban development than are those in the majority of the province.


Chart 8.15: Education level, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, urban and rural, 1990¹³⁴



The population of the regency of Jayapura continued to have better educational attainments than the province as a whole in 1990, although the difference had narrowed since the 1971 census. By 2000, the census included data on the difference in education between indigenous and non-indigenous residents.

¹³⁴ Data from Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33. Figures compiled and percentages calculated by author.

Chart 8.16: Indigenous and non-indigenous education levels, Jayapura regency, 2000¹³⁵



The chart above illustrates that indigenous education levels are far lower than those of the non-indigenous population within the Jayapura regency. The chances of an indigenous person having little or no education are nearly 50% higher than for a non-indigenous person.¹³⁶ The primary school levels are higher for indigenous people, though this mainly reflects the fact that fewer than 40% of the indigenous population have education past this level. The levels of higher education are far lower among indigenous people. For secondary level education, indigenous students are 23% less likely to have completed this level of education than non-indigenous people.¹³⁷ For tertiary education, non-

¹³⁵ Data from Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table07: Population aged 5 years or over by administrative district and highest education level achieved, pp.34-37. Figures compiled and percentages calculated by author.


¹³⁶ From Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table07, pp.34-37

¹³⁷ From Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table07, pp.34-37

indigenous people are two and a half times more likely to continue to this level than indigenous residents.¹³⁸

This data on the difference between education for the indigenous and non-indigenous populations of the regency is useful when comparing the changes to educational attainment during the whole period of Indonesian administration of Papua.

Chart 8.17: Jayapura regency education levels comparison, 1971-2000¹³⁹



As the chart above illustrates, the changes in the levels of education attained within the Jayapura district between 1971 and 2000 are positive, with better education levels by the end of this period than at the start of it. The percentage

¹³⁸ From Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table07, pp.34-37

¹³⁹ Figures from materials referenced above, compiled and percentages calculated by author.

of residents who had not completed primary education had decreased steadily up to 2000.¹⁴⁰

However, the overall figures before 2000 hide the differences in the education rates between indigenous and non-indigenous people. The opportunity for education has not been shared equally among the residents of the regency. Indigenous education is not at the same level as that of the non-indigenous population, with the percentage of the indigenous population who have completed some education in 2000 being only 48%. This percentage is slightly lower than the 49% of the total population in 1990 who had completed some education. By 2000, the percentage of the non-indigenous population who had completed some education was far higher at 80%.

The figures for indigenous residents in 2000 are almost identical to those for the regency as a whole in 1990. Indigenous people's education levels are ten years behind those of the population in general, while the non-indigenous population has higher levels of education. These differences disadvantage indigenous Papuans in terms of employment. With most, if not all, positions of leadership within the administration being filled by Papuans within the last few years, these low levels of education have ensured that the number of Papuans qualified to fill such positions is relatively small. It seems probable that many appointed to these positions were inadequately educated for the roles they had to fulfil.¹⁴¹

Additionally, with the current security situation, it is understandable that few non-indigenous residents are willing to reside outside urban areas. Thus, teachers in rural areas are Papuans who have relatively low levels of educational

¹⁴⁰ While the figures for 1971 are better than those for 1980, it should be remembered that the 1971 figures cover urban areas only.

¹⁴¹ See the conclusion chapter for more details on the issue of under-qualified public servants.

attainment. During my visit to the rural areas of Jayawijaya, I stayed with a school teacher and in conversation with him was struck by the relatively low level of Indonesian language he had for a person in his position. It was also striking that despite having lived in this Dani area for more than 10 years, this Lani man had not learnt any of the local language.¹⁴² This lack of adequate teaching further disadvantages rural residents, the majority of whom are indigenous. The 2000 figures show that the indigenous population has an education level that has lagged far behind that of the non-indigenous population. There seems no reason to assume that this has not been the case during the whole time period of this research.

¹⁴² Personal observation by the author, visit to the regency during August 2005

Literacy¹⁴³

There are no figures from the Dutch demographic survey on literacy during that period, but it is safe to assume that literacy rates were low.¹⁴⁴ While this survey did not cover schooling in the Jayapura region, the figures for the province as a whole were that school attendance was only possible from 55% of villages before 1962.¹⁴⁵

The first data on the regency comes from the 1971 census, although it is only for the urban areas. The level of illiteracy in Jayapura at this time was relatively high, with just over one in ten of residents being unable to read and write.¹⁴⁶

By 1980, illiteracy in the Jayapura regency had fallen to a lower level. As can be seen in the chart below, illiteracy levels were lower in all categories than for Irian Jaya as a whole. The figures for female illiteracy are higher than those for male residents in both urban and rural areas.


¹⁴³ The figures in this section rely on the Bureau of Statistics' definition of literacy, a fairly low level conception of literacy. See Jalal, Fasli & Nina Sardjunani, *Increasing Literacy in Indonesia*, UNESCO report 2006/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/45, accessed from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001460/146011e.pdf> in February 2008, p.3 for this definition of literacy.

¹⁴⁴ See the chapter 4 for details on the education levels across the province at this point.

¹⁴⁵ Groenewegen, K and D. J. van de Kaa, *Resultaten van het demografisch onderzoek Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea* (Results of the demographic research project Western New Guinea), [EEG PROJECT 11.41.002], Delen (Parts) 1-6, Government Printing and Publishing Office, The Hague, 1964-67, Part 2, Table V, p.99

¹⁴⁶ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 15, p.60

Chart 8.18: Illiteracy as a percentage, Jayapura and Irian Jaya, 1980¹⁴⁷



The difference in rates between urban and rural areas is relatively low in this regency in 1980. This is probably due to the proximity of the majority of the rural population to urban areas, especially in comparison to those in rural areas in highland areas.

By 1990, the literacy rates were higher, with just over one person in ten illiterate at this time. The total rates hide a huge disparity between urban and rural districts of the regency. In urban areas the rate was very low, with only 3.8% of the populace being unable to read or write. In rural areas the rate was 17.7%, nearly five times higher. This suggests a wide disparity between the urban and rural areas of the regency in education levels.

¹⁴⁷ Compiled by author from Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and literacy

Employment

In 1971, the figures on employment for the regency show that the largest industry was community services. Nearly two in five employees in the urban areas of the regency worked in this sector.¹⁴⁸ Since this sector includes those working in the public service, this is unsurprising considering the low level of economic development in Jayapura at this time, as well as the city being a provincial capital and thus a centre of government administration. The next largest industry sectors were construction (14%), agriculture and hunting (12%) and trade, restaurants and hotels (11%).¹⁴⁹

In 1990, the economy had grown, with nearly 90,000 people being recorded as being employed by the census. The figures show a split between the urban and rural areas of the regency. In rural areas, agriculture and fisheries were the main industry of employment. In urban areas, the community, social and personal services sector was the biggest employer, a sector that includes public servants.

¹⁴⁸ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 41: Economically active population by regency/municipality and industry, pp.225-227. The community services sector had 6,206 workers, 38% of the respondents to this question.

¹⁴⁹ Sensus Penduduk 1971 – Penduduk Irian Jaya, Table 41, pp.225-227

Chart 8.19: Employment by sector as a percentage, Jayapura urban, 1990¹⁵⁰





Chart 8.20: Employment by sector as a percentage, Jayapura rural, 1990¹⁵¹



The small percentage of manufacturing in the regency, both in urban and rural areas, reflects the lack of these industries in the province as a whole. For the regency, jobs in manufacturing only comprise 2.2% of the total workforce.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Data from Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 34.x, pp.202-210, Population 10 years and over who worked during the previous week by regency/municipality and main industry. Sectors combined and percentages calculated by the author.

¹⁵¹ Data from Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 34.x, pp.202-210. Sectors combined and percentages calculated by the author.

¹⁵² Data from Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 34.x, pp.202-210

The lack of goods producing industries is in line with the theories of internal colonialism.¹⁵³ Hechter states that:

Colonial development produces a cultural division of labour...development tends to be complementary to that of the metropolis. The colonial economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary commodities or raw materials for export....cities tend to be located on coasts with direct access to the metropolis.¹⁵⁴


The rural areas are dominated by agriculture, with over three in four employees working in this sector.

In the 2000 census, the data on employment in Jayapura was divided into separate tables for indigenous and non-indigenous employees. Indigenous residents dominate the agricultural sector, while the non-agricultural sectors were dominated by non-indigenous residents. The chart below shows the percentage of each industry that indigenous and non-indigenous people comprise.

¹⁵³See for example Hechter, Michael, *Internal colonialism : the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p.9

¹⁵⁴ Hechter (1975), pp.30-31

Chart 8.21: Indigenous and non-indigenous employment by industry as a percentage, Jayapura, 2000¹⁵⁵



The majority of employment is still within the agricultural sector, partially a reflection of the lack of development of other industries. Nearly two-thirds of those employed in this sector are indigenous people.¹⁵⁶ This contrasts with the situation within other sectors of the economy which is dominated by the non-indigenous populace. As can be seen, two-thirds of service employment, three quarters of manufacturing jobs, 81% of transportation and 87% of trade jobs are held by non-indigenous people.

If the figures are compared as percentages (thus removing the different population sizes of the indigenous and non-indigenous groups), the relative

¹⁵⁵ Data from Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 10 and 10A, pp.50-55, Penduduk berumur 15 tahun ke atas yang bekerja menurut wilayah administrasi dan lapangan usaha. Industry categories combined for clarity. Numbers of non-indigenous workers and percentages calculated by author.

¹⁵⁶ Indigenous people make up 45% of the population of the combined regency and municipality. Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 01, pp.1-3

rates of employment within different employment sectors are illustrated.¹⁵⁷

Non-indigenous people are more than five times more likely to work in the trade sector, are employed 3.4 times more often in the transportation sector, 2.5 times more in manufacturing, and 1.4 times more often in services.

Contrastingly, indigenous people are more likely to be involved in all agricultural sectors than are non-indigenous people.¹⁵⁸ These figures support the thesis that there is an ethnic division of employment within the regency. Indigenous people comprise the majority of primary industry employees, while non-indigenous people occupy the majority of tertiary sector employment. The differing status levels of these jobs and their different levels of income mean there is a gulf in employment between indigenous people and migrants in employment.

The cultural tradition of providing accommodation to relatives coming to urban areas was noted by Broekhuijse at the end of the Dutch period and by Rumbiak at the start of the 1980s. This hospitality continues in highland towns with large indigenous populations such as Wamena.¹⁵⁹ The relatively low indigenous population in larger, coastal urban areas such as Jayapura means most will not have relatives who can house them. This will tend to reduce their chances of staying long enough in the cities to find employment, or increase their chances of becoming homeless. Jayapura has a noticeable population of alcoholic Papuans and it is to be wondered how many of these people have fallen into this situation after coming to the city in search of employment. Certainly, many appeared to be from highland areas.¹⁶⁰ Farhadian reports that in recent years “Highland Dani arrive to [sic] Jayapura as impecunious strangers, and for the

¹⁵⁷ Figures were calculated from data in *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Tables 10 and 10A, pp.50-55 by author. Data for Jayapura regency and municipality combined.

¹⁵⁸ Figures were calculated from data in *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Tables 10 and 10A, pp.50-55 by author. Data for Jayapura regency and municipality combined.

¹⁵⁹ Personal conversation by author with residents of Wamena, August 2005

¹⁶⁰ Personal observations of the author from visit to the regency, August 2005

most part, they explore the new world alone, without knowledge about how to navigate successfully through their new surroundings.”¹⁶¹

Employment within the government has been an important sector of the job market within Jayapura from the Dutch period. This is even more significant in Jayapura than in other urban areas of the province as it is the provincial capital. In 1980, there were 1,012 public servants in the regency.¹⁶² The figures from 2001 show that there were more than twice this number by this point, with 1,302 public servants in the municipality and 1,306 in the regency.¹⁶³ Figures were given for the educational level of these government workers, with all these jobs being filled by those with some level of education attainment. Only a very small number of public servants had primary level education (3.5% in the municipality and 10.5% in the regency). The majority had secondary level education (52.0% in the municipality and 63.5% in the regency) and a large percentage had tertiary level education (44.5% in the municipality and 26.0% in the regency).¹⁶⁴

As was noted earlier in this chapter, the level of education among indigenous residents is lower than for non-indigenous residents. These factors suggest that indigenous people will be relatively disadvantaged in terms of employment within public service positions. It should also be noted that the education levels of public servants in the municipality are far higher than those for public servants in the regency. This partially reflects the higher level positions that are

¹⁶¹ Farhadian (2005), p.49

¹⁶² Jayapura dalam angka 1980, Tabel III.1.1, p.35

¹⁶³ Figures calculated by author from *Kota Jayapura dalam angka 2001 (Jayapura municipality in figures 2000)*, Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001, Tabel II.1.4: Pendidikan pegawai pusat dan daerah di lingkungan pemerintahan kota Jayapura, Educational attainment of central and region civil servants in region[al] government of Jayapura Municipality, 2001, p.16 and *Kabupaten Jayapura dalam angka 2001 (Jayapura regency in figures 2000)*, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001, Table 3.2.9: Number of local civil servants by education level and sex, p.37

¹⁶⁴ Figures calculated by author from *Kota Jayapura dalam angka 2000 (2001)*, Tabel II.1.4, p.16 and *Kabupaten Jayapura dalam angka 2000 (2001)*, Table 3.2.9, p.37

available within the government in the capital. While this may be the cause, the result is that the more qualified bureaucrats work in the area populated mainly by migrants, while those with less education work in the area populated by indigenous people.

Conclusion

The regency has increased in population greatly during the Indonesian period, with much of this growth coming from the arrival of people from outside the province of Papua. The population of Jayapura has more than tripled between 1971 and 2000. The religion and language data suggests that the migrants have generally settled in the urban areas of the regency, with these incomers making up increasingly larger percentages of the urban population.

According to the data from the question on religious affiliation, Muslims residents rose from making up 31% of the urban population to 45% in 2000 with the number of Muslim inhabitants of the regency rising from 14,000 to 126,000. These figures also showed that only one in fifty indigenous Papuans in the regency was Muslim. While indigenous people were almost all Christian, migrants were not all Muslim, with just over one in three migrants being Christian. From these facts, it can conservatively be concluded that the number of migrants living in the regency at the time of the earlier censuses was at least as high as the number of Muslim residents reported in these censuses.

The figures from 2000 show that the level of education among the indigenous population is at a similar level to that of the regency's populace as a whole ten years before in 1990. The non-indigenous population has much higher rates of completion of education, being only two-thirds as likely to not have finished primary schooling and more than twice as likely to have completed some form of tertiary education. The education level among the urban population was far higher than the rural population at all periods of this study, having higher percentages of attainment at all levels of education in all census materials throughout this period. Literacy rates are also much lower in the urban areas than in rural areas. There are no figures on differences in the rates of education

among indigenous and non-indigenous residents before 2000. However, taking into consideration the fact that the majority of rural residents are indigenous and that education rates in these areas are lower than the rates in the urban areas, the figures from 2000 suggest that the disparity in education between indigenous and non-indigenous people has continued through the whole of this period.

Employment in the regency has grown dramatically during this period. As with the figures above, one of the most striking aspects of employment in Jayapura is the division between the rural and urban areas. In terms of employment, urban areas are mainly areas of service, trade and construction, while rural areas are still predominantly agricultural. The 2000 census shows how strongly employment in sectors other than primary industries is dominated by non-indigenous residents. The majority of all jobs in secondary industries (trade, services, transportation etc) were held by non-indigenous people. The figures from the public service show that government workers are educated at much higher levels than are the population as a whole.

These conclusions show there have been great changes in the regency since the demographic survey carried out by Michael Rumbiak at the start of the 1980s. Although his survey suggests that rural-urban migration was positive and successful for Nimboran people, Rumbiak notes there were changes to migration patterns after 1980. Following this point competition from transmigrants meant that fewer Nimboran people could find employment in Jayapura as “often they have insufficient skills, fail to secure jobs, and return to the hamlet where they become local sources of discouragement to potential

migrants.”¹⁶⁵ This new situation has continued until the end of the period covered by the present study and appears likely to continue.

In total, these figures paint a picture of a divided regency: the typical rural resident is indigenous, Christian, poorly educated, and works in agriculture. Meanwhile, the typical urban resident is non-indigenous, Muslim, relatively well educated, and works in the service industry. These figures support a view of Jayapura as a colonial city on the periphery, with a ‘cultural division of labour’.

¹⁶⁵ Rumbiak in Chapman and Morrison (1985), p.220

Chapter 9: The effects of migration on Jayawijaya regency

Jayawijaya is a regency located in the central mountains of Papua, an area in the centre of the Jayawijaya mountain range, which runs along the middle of the island of New Guinea. The eastern edge of the regency borders the independent nation of Papua New Guinea.¹ The capital of the regency, Wamena, lies in the Baliem Valley, the major population and agricultural centre of the regency. The area has a wet, tropical climate, but with a cooler climate than the coastal areas of the island due to its elevation.² The regency is the largest in Papua in terms of population and the third largest in terms of area, being 52,916km².³

This region was one of the last parts of the world to be explored by westerners, with the central mountain region remaining unexplored by European explorers until the 20th century.⁴ The first contact between Europeans and the heart of the region, the Grand Baliem Valley, famously took place with the sighting of the valley by an American pilot in 1938, with the laid-out farmlands of the area being a revelation to the aviator, reminding him of the European farmland landscape.⁵

¹ See map Chapter 8, p.326 for a pictorial representation of the regency.

² *Kompilasi data kota Wamena Kabupaten Jayawijaya*, Propinsi Irian Jaya, Proyek Pembinaan Unit Perencanaan, Jayapura, 1983, p.3

³ 'Luas Wilayah Provinsi Papua menurut Kabupaten/Kota' (Area of Papua by Regency/Municipality), *Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics Papua Province)*, accessed from <http://www.papua.go.id/bps/dda%202001/BAB%20I%20LETAK%20GEOGRAFIS/Luas%20Wilayah%20Provinsi%20Papua%20menurut%20Kabupaten.htm> in September 2007. Merauke is the largest province by area, followed by Jayapura.

⁴ See Chapter 4 for more information on this period.

⁵ Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, <http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/phd.html> in August 2007, p.77

Butt points out that, despite this apocryphal story, there had been a number of other expeditions to this region prior to this point that had passed through the area. Ballard and colleagues discuss the expeditions launched by the Dutch and British between 1907 and 1913 which attempted to reach the high mountains of the interior, the so-called 'Race to the Snow'.⁶ These contacts had already led to direct or indirect knowledge of outsiders among the ethnic groups in what is now Jayawijaya prior to the incident and the subsequent rush to explore the region.⁷ Heider suggests there were European expeditions that had contact with Dani people in 1909.⁸ Ballard and colleagues also say that the impact of these early contacts was powerful. They suggest that: "For many of these highland communities, such as the Amungme, Nduga, Ekari and Dani, this dramatic expansion of the horizons of their world was the beginning of a remarkable revolution."⁹

World War I and the subsequent re-building in Europe meant there were fewer funds for colonial exploration. Kremer explored the interior in 1921 but did not encounter the Baliem Valley. The Archbold expedition did, however, sight the valley in 1938.¹⁰ The first European to settle permanently in the Baliem valley arrived in 1954.¹¹ The relative lateness of these encounters means that we have very little information on this region (outside archaeology) from before the 20th

⁶ Ballard et al (2001), p.8

⁷ Butt (1998), pp.77-78

⁸ Heider, Karl, *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*, Third Edition, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, 1997, p.34

⁹ Ballard et al (2001), p.8

¹⁰ Naylor, Larry L, *Culture Change and Development in the Baliem Valley, Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1977, p.10

¹¹ Heider (1997), p.2

century. The archaeological information on the area is limited in comparison to that on the highland regions across the border in Papua New Guinea.¹²

Moore divides the island of New Guinea into three regions; the lowland, mid-altitude, and highland spheres.¹³ He defines the highlands as being mostly 1,500 metres or more above sea level, and characterised by a high population density, with agriculture and pig breeding being practised by the population.¹⁴ According to this classification, the Baliem valley is one of the two main centres of the highlands region of Papua (along with the Paniai Lakes region). While Europeans have only recently explored this area, the highland region has been occupied by people for thousands of years. The highlands were also part of the regional trading networks, with cowrie shells being traded to the highlands 10,000 years ago.¹⁵

Agriculture in the area is based on the cultivation of root vegetables, with estimates that this practice has continued for nearly 7,000 years in the Baliem Valley region. While the ubiquitous staple is now the sweet potato, for the majority of this time, the staple crop in this region was taro.¹⁶ Sweet potatoes (*Ipomoea batatas*) were introduced relatively recently, with different authors giving figures between 250 and 400 years before the present as the date of their introduction.¹⁷ The production of these vegetables is exclusively women's work for the Dani¹⁸, and predominantly women's work for the other ethnic groups in

¹² See chapter 1 for an examination of the causes of this deficit of writings on the western half of the island by anthropologists (and other academics).

¹³ See chapter 4 for further discussion of Moore's concepts as they apply to the island as a whole.

¹⁴ Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003, p.42

¹⁵ Moore (2003), p.45. See chapters 4 and 5 for more details on the history of the island in general.

¹⁶ Butt (1998), p.75

¹⁷ Moore (2003) states that sweet potatoes were introduced between three and four hundred years ago, while Butt (1998) gives the figure of 250 years ago.

¹⁸ Butt (1998), p.76

the highlands region.¹⁹ According to Butt, within Dani society “no men work at cultivating the potato, and no adult woman is free from the arduous chore.”²⁰

The introduction of this new crop led to a dramatic increase in the population densities of the region, with sweet potatoes being more able to survive in poorer soils and producing greater yields.²¹ In fact, this change may have increased the importance of the breeding of pigs.²² Pigs are a vital part of highland societies, both in Papua and across the border in PNG. Pigs are used to pay the bride price and settle disputes, and are killed for all important ceremonies. The accumulation of pigs is an important aspect of social status for men, and much social interaction among men involves the trading of pigs.²³ The changes to the fundamental underpinning of highland life that occurred with the arrival of the sweet potato indicate that although people have lived in this area for millennia, the current structures of societies in this area are relatively recent constructions.

Wamena, the capital of the regency, is located on the Baliem and Wamena rivers at a height of 1,550m above sea level. The highlands region is cooler than the coastal region due to its altitude, with an average temperature of 19.6°C. The regency is usually wet, with an average of 129mm a month of rainfall.²⁴ The moderate climate and the fertile soils create the conditions necessary for a productive agricultural system. The success of this agricultural system in the region meant the highland valley areas supported higher population densities than the lowland region before the arrival of Europeans or Indonesians.

¹⁹ Personal communications to the author during his visit to the regency in August 2005 suggest that Lani society for example is slightly more egalitarian in terms of gender work roles than is Dani society.

²⁰ Butt (1998), p.93

²¹ Butt (1998), p.76

²² Butt (1998), p.76

²³ See Butt (1998), Chapter III, pp.66-114 for discussion on the role of pigs within Dani society.

²⁴ Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.3

Furthermore, the higher altitude reduces the incidence of disease and hence the mortality rates. Moore gives a population density of more than 100 per square kilometre for the fertile highland valleys, in contrast to densities of between 8 and 30 people per square kilometre for the lowland and mid-altitude spheres respectively.²⁵

Inter-group hostilities were noted by many early outside observers of social life in the Baliem valley. Heider and Gardner saw this as an integral part of Dani society, along with pigs, and it was a key aspect of their portrayal of the Dani in their influential works on this society that were published between 1964 and 1970.²⁶ Heider claims that violence is restricted to warfare within Dani society. He states that “probably one of the greatest shocks to the Dani in recent years has been the physical beatings administered to adults by police and military, and to children by schoolteachers.”²⁷ Heider suggests that the Dani people are gentle towards each other and towards children.²⁸

However, his claims are undermined by the major hostilities in 1977 between groups in the Jayawijaya regency. The conflict between two groups, the Western Dani and the Baliem Valley Dani, was conducted in a different way to the stylised battles that are recorded by Heider, with large numbers of deaths on both sides leading to intervention by the Indonesian military to stop further bloodshed.²⁹ Farhadian suggests there were between 600 and 1,000 deaths as a result of the military actions in this year. It appears that this has led to lingering

²⁵ Moore (2003), pp.41-42

²⁶ See for example Gardner, Robert, *Dead Birds* (videorecording), Warner Modular Publications, New York, 1964; Gardner, Robert & Karl G. Heider, *Gardens of war: Life and death in the New Guinea stone age*, Random House, New York, 1969, and Heider, Karl G., *The Dugum Dani : a Papuan culture in the highlands of West New Guinea*, Aldine, Chicago, 1970

²⁷ Heider (1997), p.88

²⁸ Heider (1997), p.88

²⁹ Butt (1998), p.79

distrust of the armed forces, with people not feeling at peace until now, as “so many Dani had lost their families and relatives in the struggle against Indonesia.”³⁰ There was further conflict between the indigenous population and the military in 1997 and in 2000. Farhadian suggests that the missionary activities in the area had an unintended consequence on the population, with those who had taken most strongly to the gospel being those who most strongly took to the freedom movement.³¹

By the late 1970s there had already been many changes to Dani society and culture, as documented by Larry Naylor in his research published in 1977. He suggests there had been a transformation of socio-economic activities in the regency. Pressure from the church and the government, along with the impact of the money economy, have altered the practice of ceremonies, trade systems, kinship practices, the growth of cash crops, and the halting of warfare between groups.³² There were also major changes to marriage patterns, with the prevailing pattern of polygyny having given way mainly to monogamy.³³

By the early 1980s, there had been development in the regency, although only to a limited extent. Tarrred roads had been built in Wamena between the airport and the regency head’s residence, as well as to the hospital area. There were also tarred roads heading from Wamena to Pyramid in the west and to Kurulu in the north.³⁴ However, these roads only connected towns in the vicinity of the regency capital, both of these roads being around 30 kilometres in length. The

³⁰ Farhadian (2005), p.28

³¹ Farhadian (2005), p.36

³² Naylor (1977), pp.204-208

³³ Naylor (1977), pp.209-210

³⁴ Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.5

1990 census reported no growth in the road system, with only 28 kilometres of tarred road in the regency at this point.³⁵

There were no longer distance connections to the Paniai lakes district or to either coast. Transportation to other areas was either by air or by foot. There were flights to Jayapura and occasionally to Biak operated by commercial airlines, but the vast majority of inter- and intra-regency flights were run by missionary organisations.³⁶

With no road transport to the regency, all goods for import and export are transported by air. This adds greatly to the cost of many goods within the regency, and disadvantages the exporting of goods to other parts of the archipelago. It also inhibits the movement of people in and out of the regency, with the relatively high cost of transport meaning in and out migration (temporary or permanent) is a high risk movement, only undertaken by those with access to reasonably large capital resources. This reduces the number of migrants able to move to the regency, but also diminishes indigenous people's chances of moving to larger cities outside the regency for employment or education.

Missionary organisations have been very important in this area, with missionaries introducing local people to many aspects of modernity and providing many of the services that are normally provided by governments, such as education, health and transport. Of the missions in the province, the most active organisation has been the US-based Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA).³⁷ Missionaries also were influential in illustrating the material wealth of

³⁵ *Jayawijaya dalam angka*, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayawijaya, Wamena, 1990, p.97

³⁶ Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.6

³⁷ Farhadian (2005), p.13

the outside world to the people in the highland areas. Farhadian points out that: “While the CMA missionaries went to share a spiritual gospel unencumbered by worldly entrapments, their contact was replete with, in the eyes of local Dani, unbelievable material wealth.”³⁸ This wealth was associated with Christian mission activities by local people. Naylor notes in his study in the late 1970s that “Christianity has made some progress, but the numbers are few and the vast majority continue to engage in the traditional ritual and magic.”³⁹ However, by the time of the author’s visit to the province in 2005, it was considered unusual among indigenous people to have ‘held to the old ways’, with Christianity being the belief held by almost all.

According to information from 1980, communication up until this point had not been managed by the Indonesian government, as the government telephone facility was not functional by 1981.⁴⁰ Instead, telephone communication was possible only on missionary-owned equipment.⁴¹ There had been little development of the private economy, with businesses in the province being small-scale cottage industries. These were mostly involved in food and drink production, construction and furniture production for Wamena.⁴² This area was one in which the census data from 2000 should be treated with care. The public disturbances that had occurred throughout the province in that year had been especially extreme in this regency. Terry Hull notes that this regency was one of the areas to experience the most serious problems in the collection of census data. He states that “Security problems in some areas meant that BPS could not carry out the field operations required for a house to house count of the

³⁸ Farhadian (2005), p.15

³⁹ Naylor (1977), p.213

⁴⁰ Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.19

⁴¹ Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.6

⁴² Kompilasi data kota Wamena (1983), p.5

population.”⁴³ The use of later publications from 2002 and 2006 will be used to confirm the accuracy of the figures used in this section, but it should still be considered that the 2000 figures are likely to be inaccurate to some degree.

⁴³ Hull (2001), p.105

Population figures

Given that there had been little exploration of this area by Europeans in the early part of the 20th century and an absence of any administrative structure in the region, it is unsurprising that the census conducted by the Dutch across their colony in 1930 did not cover what is now the Jayawijaya regency. The first figures on the population are from the Indonesian provincial Bureau of Statistics. These figures suggest that the population of the regency was 165,000 in 1968, 168,960 in 1969, 198,000 in 1970 and 174,872 in 1971.⁴⁴ There appear to be some inaccuracies in these figures, however. The round number for 1968 suggests an estimated population figure, and the rapid rise between 1969 and 1970, followed by an equally rapid fall in the following year all point to changes in the regency boundaries. The presidential declaration of 1969 gave formal status to the administrative divisions of the province.⁴⁵ It can be assumed that there were changes to the precise borders of Jayawijaya regency following this declaration.

The first census under the Indonesian administration in 1971 only covers the urban areas of Papua. There were few urban areas of Jayawijaya at this stage, with only 1,457 people being residents of these urban areas, less than 1% of the urban population of the province.⁴⁶ The national bureau only released figures for the urban areas, with the tables for rural areas being published with zeros in every table. However, those published by the provincial Bureau of Statistics in

⁴⁴ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1972, Daftar 3: Jumlah penduduk daerah propinsi Irian Barat dari tahun 1967 s/d 1971, p.5

⁴⁵ 'Pembentukan Propinsi Otonom Irian Barat dan Kabupaten-Kabupaten Otonom di Propinsi Irian Barat' ('Formation of the autonomous province of West Irian and the autonomous regencies of West Irian Province'), *Undang-Undang Presiden Republik Indonesia 12/1969 (Indonesian Presidential Declaration 12/1969)*, 10th September 1969, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/uu-dll/uu1969-12.html> in December 2008

⁴⁶ *Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya*, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974, Tabel 8: Penduduk menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan status perkawin (Table 8: Population by regency/municipality and marital status), p.27. Percentages calculated by author.

Jayapura also include figures on the rural population of Papua.⁴⁷ The figures below show the population of Jayawijaya in 1971, along with the sex ratio of men to women.

Table 9.1: Population figures and sex ratio, Jayawijaya regency, 1971⁴⁸

Jayawijaya	Male	Female	Total	Sex ratio
Children	42,301	35,457	77,758	119
Adults	48,141	48,973	97,114	98
Total	90,442	84,430	174,872	107

It can be seen that the sex ratio is fairly even for adults, while that for children is biased towards males.⁴⁹ The numbers do suggest that there had not been any large scale migration in or out of the regency that led to a shift in the sex ratio. These figures support the supposition that there were few migrants in total in the regency, that few migrants had arrived in the regency outside the urban areas, and that few Papuans had left the regency for work or study in other parts of the province or the archipelago.

The data on Wamena⁵⁰ (synonymous with the urban areas of the regency) suggests that the town grew steadily from the early figures given in the 1971 census. The population of Wamena was stated to be 3,602 people in 1975, rising to 4,459 by the time of the census in 1980.⁵¹ By 1980, the regency had a population of 220,677, a figure that was to increase to 335,166 by 1990

⁴⁷Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya (Angka Sementara), Biro Pusat Statistik Djajapura, Jayapura, 1972

⁴⁸ Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 (1972), p.2. Sex ratios calculated by author.

⁴⁹ For a detailed examination of this issue see Butt (1998), Chapter 6: Sex ratios and the values of infants, pp.174-192

⁵⁰ Kompilasi data kota Wamena Kabupaten Jayawijaya (1983)

⁵¹ Kompilasi data kota Wamena Kabupaten Jayawijaya (1983), p.9, Jumlah penduduk kota

according to the data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics.⁵² According to the data from the Jayawijaya Bureau of Statistics, however, the population of the regency was 353,277 in 1990.⁵³

Using the national figures, between 1980 and 1990, the urban areas of Jayawijaya grew from 4,459 people to 12,446. This corresponds to a 10.8% annual growth in the urban population between 1980 and 1990, compared to a 4.3% annual growth in the overall population of the regency.⁵⁴

In 1980, the sex ratio for the regency was 105.9 men for each 100 women. The figures for Wamena district are almost identical.⁵⁵ If the figures are broken down by age, however, it becomes apparent that there is enormous variation in the sex ratios in Jayawijaya between different age groups and different districts. One notably high sex ratio is in the Wamena district for the 10-14 age group, with 223 males for each 100 females in this age group.⁵⁶ With schooling for those of this age group almost non-existent outside Wamena, those in other areas of the regency wishing to study beyond primary level have to study in the city. It appears that the majority of children sent to continue their education are boys.

For the next age group up, the 15-24 year olds, the majority of the residents are female in almost every regency. The sex ratios are extremely low, with figures of 58 men per 100 women in Kurulu, 64 in Asologaima and only 84 for the regency

⁵² *Penduduk Indonesia : hasil sensus penduduk 1990*, Series L1, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1991, Table 2.1, Rata-rata laju pertumbuhan penduduk per tahun menurut kabupaten/kotamadya antara tahun 1980 dan 1990, p.348

⁵³ Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Table III.1, p.21

⁵⁴ *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Table 1.4, p.178

⁵⁵ Figure for Wamena district is 105.87 compared to 105.91 for the regency as a whole. Figures from *Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap*, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten, Jayawijaya, 1981, Table 1a: Penduduk Menurut Jenis Kelamin, p.1a

⁵⁶ *Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980*, Tables 9.x: Penduduk menurut kelompok umur, pp.14-16. Sex ratios calculated by author.

as a whole. Although less dramatic, the figures for the 25-49 age group are also low, with a sex ratio of 97.⁵⁷ These figures suggest that either there is migration of men of these ages out of Jayawijaya for employment and/or the contentions of aggression towards the indigenous population by the Indonesian military. These two possibilities will be explored by an examination of the material in the 1990 census in the next paragraph.

According to the national statistics bureau, 60% of the urban populace of Jayawijaya in 1990 were male.⁵⁸ This is a much greater percentage of men in the population than either the regency as a whole (51.8%) or for urban areas of the province (54.9%). Although the sex ratio in the regency is higher than the norm, this percentage of men in the population suggests a population with a large proportion of male migrants. This conclusion is supported by the data from the local bureau of statistics, which shows a much higher ratio of adults to children for Wamena than the regency as a whole, suggesting a migrant community with fewer or smaller families.⁵⁹ For the population according to age groups, the sex ratios are all over 100, varying from a high of 178 for the over 75 age group down to 102 for the 0-4 age group.⁶⁰ The low sex ratios that were noted in the 1980 census do not appear to have carried over to older age groups in this census, suggesting that these ratios were not caused by genocide. However, it is possible that the lower rates for men in the 1980 census were due to men not being present in villages as a result of actual or potential threats.

⁵⁷ Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980, pp.14-16

⁵⁸ All figures from Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Table 2.1, Rata-rata laju pertumbuhan penduduk per tahun menurut kabupaten/kotamadya antara tahun 1980 dan 1990, p.348

⁵⁹ There were 1.71 adults for every child in Wamena, compared to 1.30 adults for each child in the regency as a whole. From Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel III.4: Banyaknya Penduduk dewasa, anak-anak dirinci menurut jenis kelamin di kabupaten Jayawijaya tahun 1990 (hasil registrasi), p.24. Analysis of data by author.

⁶⁰ Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel III.a: Penduduk kabupaten Jayawijaya menurut kelompok umur tahun 1990. Percentages calculated by author.

It is unclear from the figures above whether male migrants in Wamena were from within or outside the regency. As Butt's work on the Dani suggests, very few rural-urban migrants from surrounding areas would be women, with women in Dani society bound by socio-cultural constraints to the home and food production.⁶¹ This suggests that most migrants from the rural areas of the regency itself would have been male. It is very likely that this would also apply to those from outside the regency or the province, considering the frontier nature of the area, especially at that time.⁶²

An indication that the population is increasing as a result of immigrants arriving from outside the regency is given by the figures on passenger arrivals and departures. As has been mentioned earlier, the only way to or from the regency (other than by foot) is by plane. The figures below show the figures on plane passengers from this period.

⁶¹ Butt (1998), Chapter 3: "We stand strong": Social life in the Baliem valley, pp.66-114 covers gender roles and relations within the dominant ethnic group in the regency, the Dani.

⁶² See figures on the sex ratio for the much more accessible and urbanised regency of Jayawijaya which confirm the male dominated migration patterns at this time. This pattern can also be seen in more isolated areas of other parts of the province such as Jayapura.

Table 9.2: Aircraft passenger arrivals and departures, Jayawijaya regency, 1987-1990⁶³

	Departures	Arrivals	Net
1990	24,758	26,432	1,674
1989	23,382	31,309	7,927
1988	23,752	27,359	3,607
1987	22,925	25,103	2,178

It is apparent that there are more arrivals than departures for all years covered by this publication. A small number of tourists do arrive by plane and leave by foot on treks to other areas of the province. However, with thousands more arrivals than departures each year, the small tourist numbers are insufficient to explain this phenomenon, and it seems certain that the majority of these extra arrivals are migrants to the regency.

By 2000, according to one Bureau of Statistics publication, the population of the regency had increased to 319,294, with an urban population of 14,745.⁶⁴ However, the regional Bureau of Statistics Papua publication titled *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000* states that the total regency population is 417,326, with an urban population of 17,987.⁶⁵ The difference in these figures appears to be due to the high level of non-responses and estimated responses in the province as a whole.⁶⁶ There is a substantial difference between these figures, but both

⁶³ Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Table VIII.3: Lalulintas pesawat dan penumpang melalui bandara Wamena tahun 1990. Net figures calculated by author.

⁶⁴ *Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Seri L2.2.30 (Population of Papua: Results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001, Tables 10.x, pp.67-75. Figures compiled by author.

⁶⁵ *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua: tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province: main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 01, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3. Percentages calculated by author.

⁶⁶ According to Suryadinata and colleagues the percentage of estimated and non-responses for Papua was 23.3%. This is the second highest provincial rate in the nation after Aceh (55.9%) and is ten times higher than the 2.3% rate of the nation as a whole. Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003

suggest the Jayawijaya region is an important centre of population for the island, with both sets of figures showing the regency's people made up nearly 19% of the total provincial population.⁶⁷

The lack of development in this regency is reflected in the low numbers of people living in urban areas. The chart below shows the changes in the percentage of the population living in urban areas between 1971 and 2000, comparing the Jayawijaya regency to the province as a whole. While the urban population increased during this period, it is still far less urbanised than the province as a whole. This low level of urbanisation and urban growth has limited the available employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector for residents. Due to the regency's distance from other centres, and its reliance on air travel for transportation to other areas, relocation to any other town entails a great deal of expenditure and financial risk.


This slow rate of development has often been attributed by the Indonesian government to the 'uncivilized' indigenous population. As Butt notes: "Discriminatory attitudes among Indonesians are widespread and are often expressed summarily in terms of Papuans who are 'not yet ready' for development, independence, and responsibility."⁶⁸ Analysis of the reasons behind change within the regency by Naylor suggests that the problematic factor has not been Dani people, but the agents of change, governmental and missionary. Naylor suggests that the approach to initiating change among Dani

⁶⁷ Percentages calculated by author from tables in the two materials mentioned above. For Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Jayawijaya makes up 18.8% of the population of the province, while for Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, the figure is 18.7%. *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua : tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province : main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002

⁶⁸ Butt, Leslie, ' "Lipstick Girls" and "Fallen Women": AIDS and conspiratorial thinking in Papua, Indonesia', *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.412-441, August 2005, p.420

people from both missionaries and the Indonesian government was paternalistic and patronising.⁶⁹ The ways in which these groups attempted to change social, cultural and power structures within the indigenous people were seen by Dani people as “a threat to their very existence”.⁷⁰

Chart 9.1: Urban population as a percentage of the area’s population, Jayawijaya and Papua, 1971-2000⁷¹



The population of Jayawijaya and the province as a whole continued to grow during the 1971 to 2000 period. As can be seen from the table below, the rate of growth of the urban areas was very high from 1971 to 1990. However, the urban population appears to increase much less rapidly between 1990 and 2000.

⁶⁹ Naylor (1977), p.257

⁷⁰ Naylor (1977), p.259

⁷¹ Figures compiled and chart created by author from Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Table 4, Persentase penduduk daerah kota menurut kabupaten/kotamadya hasil sensus penduduk 1971, 1980 dan 1990, p.468; Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Tables 10.x, Population of Papua by regency/municipality and ethnicity, pp.67-75 & Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 01, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3. The different sources for 2000 give slightly different percentages of urban residence and so both were included in this chart.

Table 9.3: Annual growth rate in Jayawijaya regency and the province of Papua, Urban and rural, 1971-2000⁷²

	1971-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000
Jayawijaya urban	13.23	10.81	3.75
Papua urban	5.17	5.27	3.88
Jayawijaya rural	2.71	4.51	1.53
Papua rural	1.27	3.65	2.88

It seems likely that the riots in the highland areas in 2000 led to many migrants (possibly thousands) fleeing from the area.⁷³ The figures also suggest that the rural areas growth slowed markedly in the 1990 to 2000 period. These figures would have been affected only slightly by the migrant exodus of 2000 due to the low levels of non-indigenous settlement in these rural areas. There are a number of possible different causes for this slow growth rate, including errors within census data or the difficulties of conducting a census in such isolated and rugged terrain. The figures certainly do not contradict the assertions by human rights activists that military activities have been part of a policy of genocide towards the indigenous population of Papua.⁷⁴ The figures are also consistent with migration within the regency or to other areas of the province. It is also likely that the changes are simply due to the changes to the census

⁷² Figures compiled and chart created by author from Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, table 8; Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, table 1.4, p.178; Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 01, pp.1-3

⁷³ See Chapter 5, pp.164-165 for more information on this mass exodus.

⁷⁴ See for example Wing, John with Peter King, *Genocide in Papua? - the role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua, August 2005; Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004

methodology and the lack of responses from many areas of this regency in the 2000 census, as noted earlier in this chapter and in chapter 7.⁷⁵

The figures from 2005 suggest that these figures are broadly accurate. By 2005, the Jayawijaya regency had been split into four districts: Jayawijaya, Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang and Tolikara. The combined population total for these areas was 473,261.⁷⁶ This would suggest a growth rate of the population of 2.5% per year if the data from *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli* is accepted, making this figure appear to be more valid than the figures published by the national statistics body in *Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*.

⁷⁵ See chapter 7, pp.41-45

⁷⁶ Penduduk Provinsi Papua 2005, table 03. Data combined by author.

Language

The first data on language used at home comes from the 1980 census. The figures are dramatic, with virtually all residents of urban areas of the regency using Indonesian at home (99.7%), while almost none of the rural residents used the national language at home (1.8%).⁷⁷ These figures suggest a deep division between urban and rural societies in the regency at this time. However, care must be taken in drawing conclusions from these figures as they appear rather extreme. It is possible that this discrepancy arises from a lack of clarity in the questioning or administration of the census. Those living in urban areas are more likely to use Indonesian as a *lingua franca* to communicate with others from other ethnic groups.

In the 1990 census, there are two tables which make evident the difficulty with utilising the 1980 figures given above. The question on mother tongue suggests that the urban population is almost equally split between those whose mother tongue is Indonesian and those with a 'native' language as their mother tongue.⁷⁸ In rural areas, the vast majority had a native language as their mother tongue, 95.7% of the population.⁷⁹ Other figures from the same census show different language usage patterns through the question concerning the language used at home. According to this question, 75% of urban residents used

⁷⁷ *Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980*, Seri S28, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1983, Table 08,x, pp.37-39, Population by regency/municipality, language used at home, and sex. Figures given above calculated by author.

⁷⁸ 51.6% of the urban population of Jayawijaya had a mother tongue of Indonesian, while 48.4% reported a native language as their mother tongue. *Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Seri S2.27, (Population of Irian Jaya: Results of the 1990 population census, Series S2.27), Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1992, Tables 08.x, pp.37-39: Population 5 years of age and over by regency/municipality, mother tongue and sex. Figures calculated by author.

⁷⁹ *Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990*, Tables 08.x, pp.37-39 (Population 5 years of age and over by regency/municipality, mother tongue and sex)

Indonesian at home, while only 3.5% of rural residents did.⁸⁰ These statistics suggest that the divergence in language use between urban and rural residents was nearly as stark as ten years previously and confirms that the general inference from the 1980 material was valid. However, education and contact had made a substantial reduction in the number of inhabitants who were unable to speak Indonesian. While in 1980 more than four out of five Jayawijaya residents could not speak Indonesian, by 1990 this had fallen to just over half of respondents.⁸¹

These figures show the impact of education on the indigenous population of the regency. The introduction of primary education to Jayawijaya by the Indonesian administration meant that the Indonesian language became far more widely understood. While more people in rural areas could use this language now, they continued to use local languages at home as would be expected. For indigenous people to develop an understanding of the Indonesian language was a part of becoming involved in the nation building project of the New Order. There was, however, a huge difference in language usage between rural areas and those in Wamena, a division in society that agrees with other data and suggests a relatively more modern urban society surrounded by a less modernised rural hinterland.

⁸⁰ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Table 10.x, pp.43-45, Penduduk berumur 5 tahun ke atas menurut kabupaten/kotamadya, bahasa yang dipakai sehari-hari dan jenis kelamin, Population 5 years of age and over by regency/municipality, language used at home and sex

⁸¹ Figures from Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990, Tables 08.x, pp.37-39 and Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Table 10.x, pp.43-45. Percentages calculated by author.

Religion

As with many highland regions, Christian ministers were among the first Europeans to visit and settle in Jayawijaya. The first priest to the area arrived by parachute in 1954, with other priests following shortly after.⁸² Christianity has become the majority religion within the valley since this time, with indigenous residents almost universally professing to be Christian.⁸³

The figures on religion from the 1971 census only cover the urban population of the regency. At this time there were only 218 non-Christian people in Jayawijaya, making up 15% of the urban population.⁸⁴ The majority of non-Christians were Muslim (195). However, there were 23 'other' responses. This 'other' category was in addition to the prescribed official religions,⁸⁵ suggesting the continuance of pre-Christian belief systems within the population at this time.

The figures from the 1980 census show a dramatic increase in the number of Muslims, with adherents of Islam within the population rising to 1,234, a six-fold increase.⁸⁶ These were still very small figures in comparison to the regency's population, making up only 0.6% of the residents. Out of these Muslim residents, virtually all lived in Wamena, with figures on the town showing 1,216

⁸² Quoted from 'The Dani in the Baliem Valley, http://www.livingstone.cz/tamtamy/?acc=etnicke_skupiny&lang=eng , accessed October 2005. The first Europeans settled in the area as late as 1954, from Heider, Karl, Grand Valley Dani (1997), p.2. Siegfried Zollner is a priest who settled in the Jayawijaya area in 1960, has written on the problems facing indigenous people in Papua, and is involved in the German West Papua network.

⁸³ Author's experience during visit to Wamena and the Baliem Valley, August 2005. Only one person claimed to "hold on to the old ways" in regards to religion, and this belief was gently ridiculed by other people present.

⁸⁴ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya (1972), Table 12: Population by regency/municipality and religion, p.47

⁸⁵ The New Order government officially sanctioned belief in six religions at this point: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

⁸⁶ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Table 5: Penduduk Menurut Agama, p.5

Muslim inhabitants. The regency's populace was still mainly Christian, overall, with 95% professing a belief in either Protestantism or Catholicism. Religion in the town and outside it was split, however. In the city, nearly one in four residents was Muslim, while outside the city fewer than 1 in a hundred was.⁸⁷

The main 1990 census publications did not include data on religion broken down by regency. However, these details are given in the provincial publication *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*.⁸⁸ The figures show that by 1990 there were 3,295 residents of a total regency population of 355,562 who were Muslim. While this represented a small percentage of the population, the probability is that these immigrants were concentrated in Wamena and represented a large percentage of the small urban area's populace. Unfortunately, the data is not broken down by district.

The 2000 census contains more detailed data than in any of the previous censuses. The division between the urban and rural areas of the regency in regards to religion is also evident in the figures from this latest census, with figures that are very similar to those from the 1980 census mentioned above. For urban areas, 27% of residents were Muslim, while in rural areas, only 0.5% were. The rest of the population was overwhelmingly Christian.⁸⁹

Further data produced by the regional Bureau of Statistics confirms this urban-rural split in religion. For the first time, the 2000 census covered ethnicity, with

⁸⁷ Data from Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Table 5: Penduduk Menurut Agama and Kompilasi data Kota Wamena Kabupaten Jayawijaya (1983), Komposisi penduduk menurut agama, p.12. Analysis of data by author.

⁸⁸ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990*, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya kerja sama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan daerah Tingkat I, Jayapura, 1991, Tabel IV.9.1: Jumlah umat beragama di propinsi Irian Jaya menurut kabupaten 1990, p.114

⁸⁹ Figures from Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Tables 06.x, pp.31-39, Population by regency/municipality and religion. Only 80 people in the regency self-identified as having a religion other than Muslim or Christian. Analysis of data by author.

the data on religion being broken down into separate tables for the population as a whole and for the indigenous population.⁹⁰ These tables show that while the urban population is nearly 30% Muslim, only 1.7% of the urban indigenous population is Muslim. An analysis of the figures shows that nearly all of the urban, Muslim population consists of non-indigenous people, with only 2.5% of these urban Muslim people being indigenous. It appears that for urban areas, almost all Muslims are migrants.⁹¹

The figures for rural areas are less starkly divided, although more unexpected, with the majority of Muslim residents being indigenous people.⁹² That there are so many indigenous Islamic residents is very surprising, given that there were almost none twenty years previously. Whether this figure is true or due to errors in the census process, it should not be thought that these figures show a dramatic and significant conversion to Islam among the rural Papuan population of Jayawijaya, however. The percentage of indigenous people who professed a belief in Islam was still only a small fraction of the indigenous population in rural areas, making up only 0.3% of the population.

⁹⁰ All figures taken from *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Tabel 05: Penduduk Menurut Wilayah Administrasi dan agama, perkotaan dan pedesaan, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25. Figures for the non-indigenous population and percentages calculated by the author.

⁹¹ Figures from *Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 05, p.22 and Table 05A, p.25. Analysis of data by author.

⁹² Of the 1,950 rural Muslim residents, 1,170 (or 60%) were indigenous.

Education

From the first census in 1971 to the latest census in 2000, the figures on education within the regency have shown very low levels of educational attainment in urban areas. In 1971, two out of three had not completed primary school education.⁹³ There were 16% of the population with primary school level education, 14% with secondary education and 2.4% with tertiary education.⁹⁴ This low level of education was reflected in the literacy figures. Nearly 30% of the urban population was illiterate. This compares to an illiteracy figure of 14% for the province as a whole.⁹⁵ The figures on student numbers show there was very little education in this regency. Out of the 125,100 students in the new province, only 7,834 were in Jayawijaya, 6% of the total enrolment numbers.⁹⁶ Considering that Jayawijaya was (and is) the largest regency in the province in terms of population, this shows that the Indonesian administration had only started to have any significant presence here.

By 1980, the education level in urban areas (to which the above figures correspond) had improved markedly. Only one in eight had not completed primary school (12.2%), with the figures of completion of both primary and secondary level being 43%. There was a decline in tertiary level education attainment as a percentage of the urban population, with only 1.7% of the

⁹³ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya (1974), Tabel 17: Penduduk Berumur 10 tahun keatas menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan pendidikan yang ditamatkan (Table 17: Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and educational attainment)

⁹⁴ All percentages calculated by author.

⁹⁵ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tabel 15: Penduduk berumur 10 tahun keatas menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan kepandaian membaca – munulis (Table 15: Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and literacy), p.60

⁹⁶ Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971, Daftar 23: Banyaknya sekolah/kursus, murid dan guru di propinsi Irian Barat tahun 1967 s/d 1971, p.24

population reaching these heights.⁹⁷ These education levels are all superior to those of the province as a whole. For rural areas, however, the situation was otherwise. Nearly three quarters of the rural population had not completed primary school education, and only 5% had gone beyond this level. The education levels in the rural areas of Jayawijaya are worse in all regards than those for the rural areas of the province as a whole.⁹⁸

These differences were reflected in the literacy rates. Urban areas had a very low level of illiteracy, with fewer than 5% of the population being illiterate. Rural rates were completely dissimilar, with 75% of men and over 90% of women being illiterate.⁹⁹ The difference in the urban and rural rates was the most dramatic of any regency in the province, with the percentage of illiterate people in rural areas being 18 times higher than the percentage of urban residents.¹⁰⁰ There was a huge divergence between areas of Jayawijaya, with the urban literacy rate for the regency being the best of any in the province, while the rural literacy rate was the worst.¹⁰¹

School attendance rates for those who were currently of school age were very low. The figures for the regency show that only 2 in 5 children between the ages of 7 and 12 were still at school.¹⁰² The rate for Wamena was far higher at 64%,

⁹⁷ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 06.x, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and educational attainment, pp.25-33

⁹⁸ All percentages calculated by author from data in Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 06.x, , pp.25-33

⁹⁹ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and literacy. Figures abridged from these tables and illiteracy by percentages calculated by the author.

¹⁰⁰ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51. Data analysis by author.


¹⁰¹ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 10.x, pp.43-51. Data analysis by author.

¹⁰² Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980, Table 6: Penduduk berumur 7-12 tahun menurut status sekolah, p.6. Percentages calculated by author.

while the most populated district (an area almost entirely populated by indigenous people) had a school attendance rate of only 33%.¹⁰³

The 1990 census also covered education and literacy. At this time, fewer than one in five urban residents had not completed primary school education, while four in five rural residents had little or no education. The chart below illustrates the difference between education levels in urban and rural areas at this time.

Chart 9.2: Jayawijaya regency, Education level, Urban and rural, 1990¹⁰⁴



The rates of illiteracy were similarly split by district, with rural residents being more than ten times more likely to be illiterate than urban residents. The illiteracy levels were 6% for urban areas and 69% for rural areas.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980, Table 6: Penduduk berumur 7-12 tahun menurut status sekolah, p.6. Percentages calculated by author.

¹⁰⁴ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Tables 06.x, pp.25-33, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and educational attainment. Chart created and percentages calculated from figures in this material by the author.

Along with the lower levels of educational attainment in rural areas are lower levels of school provision. If the figures on schooling in the regency in 1990 are analysed, it can be seen that the number of teachers to pupils is far lower in Wamena than in other, more remote, areas of the regency.¹⁰⁶

Table 9.4: Student to teacher ratio, primary schools, Districts in Jayawijaya regency, 1990¹⁰⁷

District	Student to teacher ratio
Wamena	12.90
Kurulu	15.19
Asologaima	16.60
Oksibil	21.90
Bokondini	22.52
Kiwirok	24.48
Regency total	25.06
Makki	26.44
Kelila	28.59
Okbibab	33.83
Tiom	34.02
Karubaga	38.43
Kurima	44.12

The student-teacher ratios in Wamena were more than three times better than in the outer districts, making it unsurprising that the level of literacy in the outer areas of the regency was lower than that in Wamena.

The 2000 figures show directly for the first time that the education level of indigenous people in the regency was at a low level. The majority of indigenous


¹⁰⁵ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Tables 12.x, pp.49-57, Population 10 years of age and over by regency/municipality and literacy

¹⁰⁶ Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel IV.3: Banyaknya sekolah, murid dan guru sekolah dasar di kabupaten Jayawijaya per kecamatan tahun ajaran 1990/1991, p.35 compared with population figures given in the same volume, Tabel III.4: Banyaknya Penduduk dewasa, anak-anak dirinci menurut jenis kelamin di kabupaten Jayawijaya tahun 1990 (hasil registrasi), p.24

¹⁰⁷ Jayawijaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel IV.3 and Tabel III.4. Analysis of data by author.

residents still had little or no education, with 85% not having completed primary school.¹⁰⁸ Only one in eight rural residents had completed primary school education or higher, with 6% of people having completed junior or senior high school. Only one in five hundred people had tertiary level education, with the majority of these people being in urban areas.¹⁰⁹

Chart 9.3: Indigenous education levels, urban and rural, 2000¹¹⁰




For this census, the education figures for indigenous people are given separately from the total figures. These figures show a far lower rate of education among indigenous people than among non-indigenous people. The chart below illustrates this difference in educational attainment. With only 13% of indigenous people having primary school education or beyond, compared to 43% of non-indigenous people, the opportunities for indigenous residents to join the non-agricultural sector appear limited.

¹⁰⁸ Percentages compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07A, pp.35-37

¹⁰⁹ Percentages compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07A, pp.35-37

¹¹⁰ Chart compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07A, pp.35-37

Chart 9.4: Educational attainment, Indigenous and non-indigenous, 2000¹¹¹



Analysis of these figures reveals the comparative gulf in educational attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous residents. If the figures are adjusted for the relative population sizes, it is clear that the education levels of non-indigenous people in this regency are disparate from those of indigenous people. For primary level schooling, indigenous people are half as likely again as non-indigenous people not to have completed this level, while the rates for completion of this level of education are only slightly in the favour of non-indigenous people, having a 20% higher chance of completing primary school. Non-indigenous people are nearly six times as likely to have completed secondary school as are indigenous residents, while for tertiary education

¹¹¹ Chart compiled by author from data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07 and 07A, pp.34-37

migrants are 35 times as likely to have completed degrees or diplomas at this level.¹¹²

The figures also show that the majority of the better educated members of the regency's residents were non-indigenous people. For urban areas, non-indigenous people made up two-thirds of the secondary educated residents (65%) and nearly four out of every five tertiary educated residents (79%). In rural areas, despite only making up 4% of the population, non-indigenous people constituted 42% of the tertiary educated residents.¹¹³ It seems clear that the non-indigenous population was far better educated in the province at this time. The division that is evident between urban and rural areas' education levels in previous statistical materials suggest that this superiority has existed throughout the period covered by this study.

¹¹² All figures in this chart calculated by analysis of data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07 and 07A, pp.34-37

¹¹³ All figures in this chart calculated by analysis of data in Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, tables 07 and 07A, pp.34-37

Employment

Due to the lack of Dutch figures on employment in this regency, the first figures on this subject come from the 1971 census. This data shows that there had been little development of a modern, cash economy by this point. The data on urban areas¹¹⁴ shows that less than 1% of the employment in the province was in the Jayawijaya regency.¹¹⁵ There were only 388 people working in the urban region at this point. The majority of work in the regency was in the community services sector, a sector that includes public service workers, with nearly two-thirds of employment being in this industry.¹¹⁶

By 1980, there had been a substantial growth in urban employment, with 1,220 people being recorded as working at the time of the census. There was much more employment outside the city as 83,485 people worked in the rural areas of the regency. Although there are no figures available for the regency itself, the provincial figures show that 75% of work was in the agricultural sector.¹¹⁷ Since there was much less development in Jayawijaya than in the province as a whole, it can safely be assumed that the vast majority of these people were engaged in subsistence agriculture. Analysis of these regional tables reveals the importance of literacy in obtaining employment outside the agricultural sector. Those in the non-agricultural sector were overwhelmingly literate, with only 19% of those

¹¹⁴ As mentioned previously, in many areas the data released by the Bureau of Statistics does not cover the population in the rural areas of the province.

¹¹⁵ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tabel 41: Angkatan kerja menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan lapangan pekerjaan (Table 41: Economically active population by regency/municipality and industry)

¹¹⁶ Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Tabel 41: Angkatan kerja menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan lapangan pekerjaan (Table 41: Economically active population by regency/municipality and industry)

¹¹⁷ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 39, p.144, Penduduk berumur 10 tahun ke atas yang bekerja selama seminggu yang lalu menurut kepandaian membaca dan menulis, jenis kelamin dan lapangan pekerjaan utama (Population 10 years of age and over who worked during the previous week by ability to read and write, sex and main industry)

working in these industries being illiterate.¹¹⁸ The agricultural sector was otherwise, with 69% of those working in this industry being illiterate.¹¹⁹

The assumption that agriculture was the dominant employment sector in rural areas of the regency is supported by the figures from the following census in 1990, with 97% of rural employment being in this industry.¹²⁰ These figures suggest that there had been almost no development of alternative employment outside the subsistence agriculture that predates the Indonesian administration of the regency.

In urban areas in 1990, the biggest employment sector was community, social and personal services. This sector includes public service employment and included 40% of the total urban workforce of 4,993 people.¹²¹ The next biggest industries at this point were agriculture and then wholesale trade, retail trade, restaurants and hotels, with 24% and 19% of urban employment respectively.

The figures for 2000 indicate further growth in the urban workforce. There were now nearly eight thousand workers in the urban areas of the regency, a 56% increase during the ten years since the previous census.¹²² Of these workers, 3,493 were counted as indigenous people.¹²³ This suggests there were 4,300 non-indigenous workers, 55% of the total urban workforce. The most important employment sector in the urban area was services, with 51% of workers being

¹¹⁸ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 39, p.144. Analysis of these figures to obtain the percentages of literacy by industry by author.

¹¹⁹ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Tables 39, p.144. The full title of this industry is agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery.

¹²⁰ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2.27, Tables 34.x, pp.202-210, Population 10 years and over who worked during the previous week by regency/municipality and main industry

¹²¹ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2.27, Tables 34.x, pp.202-210, Population 10 years and over who worked during the previous week by regency/municipality and main industry

¹²² Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 08, pp.38-40, Penduduk berumur 15 tahun ke atas menurut wilayah administrasi dan jenis kegiatan selama seminggu yang lalu

¹²³ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Tables 08A, pp.41-43, Penduduk asli berumur 15 tahun ke atas menurut wilayah administrasi dan jenis kegiatan selama seminggu yang lalu

employed in this industry. In rural areas, subsistence agriculture continued to be almost the only industry, with over 97% of respondents working in this sector.¹²⁴

The regency figures published do not include data connecting employment and education attainment. The figures for the province as a whole, shown in Table 8.5 below, indicate that urban employment is strongly correlated with education level. In rural areas, the majority of workers still had low education levels. This is not surprising considering the dominance of subsistence agriculture in these areas. In contrast, more than three quarters of workers in urban areas had secondary level education or beyond. It will be assumed that the figures for the Jayawijaya regency were not dramatically different from the provincial ones, with it being most likely that there would have an even greater difference between urban and rural areas.

¹²⁴ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 27.x, pp.172-180, Population 15 years of age and over by main industry, regency/ municipality, urban/rural and sex, 2000. Figures analysed by author.

Table 9.5: Population of Papua working in the previous week, by educational attainment, as percentages, 2000¹²⁵

Educational attainment	Urban	Rural
Did not complete/not yet completed primary school	5.1	53.5
Primary school	17.7	27.1
Secondary school	63.7	18.3
Tertiary	13.5	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0

These low levels of educational attainment disadvantage those from rural areas, giving those from outside the urban areas fewer opportunities to become involved in the modern, cash economy. Those who do leave rural areas are unlikely to be able to get anything other than lowly-paid manual labour. Considering the difficulties and financial expense of transport from most areas of the regency to Wamena or to farther cities on the coast, the low rewards of such employment is not likely to tempt many to leave their villages.

¹²⁵ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 25.x, pp.154-162, Population 15 years of age and over by educational attainment and type of activity during the previous week. Figures analysed by author.

Ethnicity

As has been mentioned earlier, the latest census in 2000 included for the first time information on ethnicity within the nation. The data on Papua is broken down by regency, showing the ethnic composition of Jayawijaya for the first time. The table below shows the percentages of the main ethnic groups in the regency in 2000.

Table 9.6: Population of Jayawijaya by ethnicity, Urban and rural, 2000¹²⁶

Jayawijaya	Papua	Jawa	Toraja	Bugis	Batak	Other	Total
Urban	44.8	14.6	9.8	6.7	3.3	20.7	100.0
Rural	97.4	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	2.4	100.0


It can be seen that there are sizeable populations of several migrant groups in the urban area. Out of these groups, the Javanese are the most important ethnic group, making up one in seven urban residents. The next most important groups are both from the island of Sulawesi, Torajan and Bugis. In combination with other ethnic groups from this island, people from Sulawesi constitute 22.5% of the urban population.¹²⁷ The rural figures match with those from earlier censuses, showing once more the very low rates of rural residence in this regency by migrants.

¹²⁶ Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 01, pp.1-3, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa. Figures abridged and percentages calculated by author from these tables. The term Papuan is used in the original tables. It should be noted that it is not stated in the census materials which groups are included in the other category. In the above table, for clarity, the other category also includes those who identified as Ambonese, Batak, Butonese, Keiese, Makasarese, Minahasan, Sundanese as well as the other category in the census table itself.

¹²⁷ The figures for ethnic groups from Sulawesi include the two groups given in the table above, Torajan and Bugis, along with Butonese (1.5%), Makasarese (1.4%), and Minahasan (3.2%). These figures are rounded to one decimal place, with the total for these groups being calculated using the unrounded figures.

If these figures are compiled into two categories, indigenous and non-indigenous, the disparate ethnic compositions of the urban and rural populations are apparent. The chart below illustrates these differences.

Chart 9.5: Ethnicity as a percentage, Jayawijaya regency, Urban and rural, 2000¹²⁸



As can be seen, by 2000 the indigenous population was a minority in the urban areas of the regency, while still being the vast majority in the rural areas.

This census also published life time migration data and inter-district lifetime migration stream tables which included data on migration between regencies within Papua.¹²⁹ These tables then augment the data from above on ethnicity to

¹²⁸ Data from Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table 01, pp.1-3. Data compiled into categories and percentages calculated by author.

¹²⁹ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78, Population by life time migration status, regency/municipality and sex and Tables 11a.x, pp.79-84, Inter-district lifetime migration stream

show the levels of migration, and its origin either from within the province or from other provinces.

Table 9.7: Population of Papua province and Jayawijaya regency, migrants and non-migrants, urban and rural, 2000¹³⁰

Place of residence	Non-migrants	Inmigrants	Total population	% migrants
Jayawijaya urban	9234	5539	14773	37.49
Papua urban	201343	221539	422882	52.39
Jayawijaya rural	302435	2162	304597	0.71
Papua rural	1076314	198788	1275102	15.59
Jayawijaya total	311669	7701	319370	2.41
Papua total	1277657	420327	1697984	24.75

The Jayawijaya regency had lower levels of migration than the provincial total, in both urban and rural areas. The most striking contrast between the regency and province in migration is the difference between urban and rural migration. While the provincial rate of migration to urban areas is over three times higher than the rate to rural areas in percentage terms, in Jayawijaya the percentage of migrants in urban areas is over 50 times higher than the percentage in rural areas. This was by far the highest difference in the rates of migration to urban and rural areas for regencies in Papua.¹³¹

There are also figures from 2000 on recent migration to the regency. This shows not only migration between provinces, but also between regencies. The table

¹³⁰ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78, Population by life time migration status, regency/municipality and sex. Abridged by author.

¹³¹ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11.x, pp.76-78, Population by life time migration status, regency/municipality and sex. Ratios calculated by author. The urban to rural ratio of migration as a percentage is 3.4 for the province as a whole and 52.8 for Jayawijaya. The next highest ratios for regencies are 7.6 for Biak Numfor and 6.5 for Yapen-Waropen.

below shows the top ten areas of residence for the population of Jayawijaya regency five years before this census.

Table 9.8: Number and percentage of people in Jayawijaya regency by their place of residence five years previously, 2000¹³²

Place of residence five		
years ago	Total	%
Jayawijaya	396,120	98.99
Jawa Tengah	613	0.15
Puncak Jaya	505	0.13
Jayapura	446	0.11
Manokwari	405	0.10
Nabire	353	0.09
Merauke	309	0.08
Sulawesi	274	0.07
Jawa Timur	162	0.04
Sulawesi Tenggara	142	0.04

It appears from this chart that there was very little migration into the province. While this is true, the migration is almost exclusively to the urban areas of the regency, increasing the effect of this immigration. Of those who previously resided outside the regency, many were arrivals from other regencies of Papua: Puncak Jaya, Jayapura, Manokwari, Nabire and Merauke. There is no indication, however, on whether these incomers were return migrants or not. The most common origin provinces were Central Java, Sulawesi¹³³, East Java and Southeast Sulawesi. These places of origin for migrants to the regency match with the ethnicity data from above with one exception. The ethnicity figures show a significant percentage of the urban population self-identifying as Batak. The figures above do not include any data on arrivals from North Sumatra,

¹³² *Profil kependudukan Provinsi Irian Jaya Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002, Tabel 5.4: Jumlah Persentase Migran Risen Masuk Menurut Kabupaten/Kota, p.28. Figures ordered by the author.

¹³³ In the original data, which province in Sulawesi this refers to is unclear, but can be concluded to be Sulawesi Tengah.


which may point to chain migration patterns for migrants from this area or inaccuracies in the figures.

In total, there were 4,041 recent migrants in the regency, with 58% of these migrants coming from other parts of Papua. There were 1,702 recent migrants from outside the province.

The inter-district migration stream confirms the relatively low rates of migration to the regency by people from other areas of Papua, and by those from Jayawijaya to other areas of Papua. The chart below illustrates the lack of outward migration by those born within the regency. Only one in 38 of those men born in Jayawijaya had moved to another part of the province, and only one in 55 women.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Figures calculated by author from Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11a.x, pp.79-84, Inter-district lifetime migration stream.

Chart 9.6: Place of residence in Papua for citizens born in Jayawijaya, Male and female, 2000¹³⁵



Once these figures are adjusted for the different sizes of the populations of each regency, the data can show the comparative rates of migration from each regency. While Jayawijaya is the largest regency by population, making up nearly 20% of the total population of the province, its residents only made up 8% of the inter-regency migrants of Papua. This makes them nearly 60% less likely than the average Papuan to reside outside their regency of birth, the lowest rate of any regency's people.¹³⁶ This rate confirms the earlier supposition that people from this regency have generally not migrated to other areas for education or employment.

¹³⁵ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11a.x, pp.79-84, Inter-district lifetime migration stream. The vertical axis of the table has been shortened to enable the data labels for each residency block to be legible. Table abridged and chart created by author.



¹³⁶ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Tables 11a.x, pp.79-84, Inter-district lifetime migration stream. Analysis of the data completed by the author.

There are a relatively small number of people born in Papua who have moved to other parts of the archipelago. There were only 46,824 residing in other parts of Indonesia in 2000, only 3% of those born in the province.¹³⁷ The published figures do not break down these inter-provincial migrants by regency of origin. However, considering the low percentage of inter-regency migration by Jayawijaya born people mentioned above, it can be assumed that only a small number of these inter-provincial migrants were from Jayawijaya.

The breakdown of the data by ethnicity in 2000 also extends to the age composition of the society. The province's population was divided by age group for each ethnicity. The charts below show the age group pyramids for the major ethnic groups in the Jayawijaya regency. The figures for each of these ethnic groups was given separately in the census, and was combined by the author to give an accurate representation of all indigenous peoples in the regency.

¹³⁷ *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001, Table 11.a.9, pp.103-105. Figures and percentages calculated by author from these tables.

Chart 9.7: Age group pyramids, urban and rural, for Dani/Ndani, Lani, Yali and Ngalum residents combined, Jayawijaya, 2000¹³⁸



¹³⁸ Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30, Table 02, p.3. Data analysed, grouped and chart constructed by author.

There are notable differences between these charts. The pyramids have quite different shapes, with the rural chart having a squat shape. The different shapes of these graphs reflect the high birth rates in rural areas. There were low levels of rural males in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups. For the 20-24 age group the sex ratio was only 75 men per hundred women, while for the 25-19 age group it is 87. These figures are far below the average sex ratio for these ethnic groups of 110. This apparent lack of young males is a phenomenon that has already been remarked upon and does not necessarily reflect any significant societal change in the province. This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion.

Other information

The 1990 census included a question on common items owned by households.¹³⁹ These items included what were considered by the designers of the census to be examples of commonly owned items, and included a sideboard, a stove, a bicycle, a radio/Cassette recorder, a TV, a motorcycle, and a Car/motor boat. The percentages of these items owned by the populace gives an indication of their integration within the modern, cash economy and their relative wealth within this system. The table below includes the figures from this census that cover the Jayawijaya regency.

Table 9.9: Household items owned as a percentage of households, Jayawijaya, urban and rural, 1990 ¹⁴⁰

	Side-board	Stove	Bicycle	Radio/cassette recorder	TV	Motor-cycles	Car or motor boat
Urban	40.18	62.14	16.04	53.90	35.95	22.90	5.03
Rural	0.91	0.32	0.07	2.07	0.07	0.00	0.05
Urban + rural	2.10	2.19	0.55	3.64	1.16	0.70	0.20

The urban resident was 44 times more likely to own a sideboard than the rural resident, nearly 200 times more likely to own a stove, 26 times more likely to own a radio or cassette recorder and over 500 times more likely to own a television.¹⁴¹ With the very limited road system mentioned previously, the lack of bicycles, motorcycles and cars among the rural residents reflects not so much a wealth disparity, but rather their lack of usefulness to most in the villages.

¹³⁹ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2.27, Table 43.1-3: Banyaknya dan persentase rumah tangga menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan barang rumah tangga yang dikuasai (Table 43.1-3: Number and percentage of households by regency/municipality and household items owned), pp.247-249

¹⁴⁰ Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2.27, Table 43.1-3, pp.247-249

¹⁴¹ Figures calculated by author from figures given above.

Outside the limited road system, the mountainous terrain renders wheeled vehicles virtually useless for the majority of villagers. For the other items, these figures confirm inequality in the possession of modern, consumer goods between the rural and urban areas.

There are also published data from 1990 on television ownership across the province, broken down by regency. These figures show that there were only 779 televisions in Jayapura, representing only 2% of the sets in the province.¹⁴² As well as reflecting the relative poverty of the regency's inhabitants, the lack of such devices limited the power of this media to integrate the indigenous populace into the nation building project of the New Order government.

¹⁴² Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990, Tabel VIII.6.11: Jumlah pesawat, televisi yang terdaftar di beberapa kantor pos di provinsi Irian Jaya tahun 1990, p.246

Conclusion

In conclusion, the figures from the more recent censuses show a regency that is divided, with a migrant dominated urban area and an indigenous dominated hinterland. The urban areas of the regency, essentially Wamena, grew very rapidly from 1971 to 2000. The very small town grew into a much bigger town, increasing ten-fold from 1,457 to 14,745. This urban population was still small in comparison with the rural areas of the regency, which grew from 170,000 to 417,000. These figures do not suggest any genocidal reduction in the population of the rural areas. Since the regency has not been the site of any large-scale natural resources extraction to date, these figures support the assertion by John Rumbiak that “all abuses in West Papua were caused by military and police presence aimed at protecting mining firms, forest concessions and timber estates exploiting natural resources.”¹⁴³

The language figures from earlier surveys appear to have dubious figures on language use until the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The data from both these censuses suggest an increasing use of (or ability to use) Indonesian in the urban areas, suggesting an increasing migrant population. Those able to use the Indonesian language in rural areas increased in number, but there did not seem to be great numbers of first language speakers in these parts of the regency, supporting the conclusion that residents outside the towns were indigenous people.

The figures on religion also show a split between rural and urban areas. In the towns, the Muslim population increased from 15% of the population in 1971 to nearly 30% in 2000. The latest census also showed that the vast majority of

¹⁴³ Wing and King (2005), p.2 quoting John Rumbiak

these Muslim inhabitants were migrants, and it appears most probable that this was the case for Muslim residents in earlier censuses. This assumption is supported by the agreement of these figures with those on language usage, and confirms the rising numbers of migrants within the urban areas.

There were very low rates of education in Jayawijaya at the start of this period, with low educational attainment and high levels of illiteracy. There was an improvement in these indicators for urban residents, but rural residents had far lower rates of education and vastly higher rates of illiteracy. In fact, a comparison between the figures from 1980 and 2000 suggests that although there was a real rise in numbers within the education system, the education levels as a percentage of the population had actually decreased in rural areas in this period. The disparity in education between rural and urban areas remained stark.

The 2000 census illustrated the ethnic nature of this divide, with non-indigenous people having rates of completion at all levels of education that are many times higher than those of indigenous people. Non-indigenous people have completion rates for primary, secondary and tertiary level education that are 1.2, 6 and 35 times as high respectively as those of indigenous people, when adjusted for the relative population sizes. These disparities are partially due to non-indigenous people making up the majority in urban areas. Since rural residents have to travel (often great distances) to schools, rural children's ability to continue their education beyond a basic level is inhibited. Beyond primary level, most rural children would have to live outside their home village in order to attend school, an expense that is beyond the resources of many rural residents. The majority of rural parents were unaware of the fact that schooling

at primary and secondary level should be free in 2003.¹⁴⁴ Whether this was true in practice is a different matter. Additionally, the lack of non-agricultural employment in rural areas mean there are few models of success through education – for parents and children. These factors tend to dissuade parents from giving their children education above the primary level, even if financial consideration made it a possibility. Overall, non-indigenous people have far higher education levels than indigenous people.

At the start of this period, in 1971, Wamena was a small town, with very limited employment. It grew rapidly through the period, and correspondingly, the figures for urban areas show a sharp rise in employment. The majority of employment was within the non-agricultural sector. The service sector was the most important field, with more than half of all workers in the urban area working in this sector. The provincial figures show that employment in urban areas is connected to education level, with the better educated being far more likely to be working in non-agricultural sectors.

Meanwhile, the rural areas of the regency continued to be dominated by subsistence agriculture, with virtually no employment in any other sector. People in these areas had much lower levels of education, limiting the possibility of the indigenous people from these areas obtaining employment within the urban areas. Rather, the better educated, non-indigenous urban residents were in a much better position to obtain the non-agricultural jobs in Wamena.

¹⁴⁴ International Foundation for Election Systems, *Papuan Public Opinion Survey Indonesia*, accessed from http://www.ifes.org/publication/f9142e799420621ae2c846440ac840f8/Papua_Summary_Report_Final.pdf in January 2008, p.3

With their chances of employment in the only town in the regency restricted by the educated, non-indigenous population¹⁴⁵, the indigenous population of Jayawijaya is not benefitting from development in Papua. The low levels of ownership of basic household items in the rural areas demonstrate this lack of involvement in the cash economy. The relative abundance of such items among the urban areas, possessed by the non-indigenous majority in these areas, can do nothing but exacerbate negative feelings among the rural Papuan majority towards the urban migrant minority.

These figures from the census are borne out by observations within the regency.¹⁴⁶ In Wamena, almost all businesses appear to be run by migrants – migrants run and own virtually all shops, hotels, restaurants, drive the buses that run in the town and to nearby areas. Indigenous people have lower level employment in such jobs as becak driver¹⁴⁷, market sales of agricultural products, peddling indigenous artefacts to the few foreign tourists and labouring work on construction sites. One job that pays relatively higher wages for indigenous people is guiding foreign tourists. Even in this case, the larger, more lucrative trekking parties are often led by migrant guides, with indigenous porters doing the manual labour and receiving low wages. There are also jobs within the bureaucracy, with the local parliament and regency governor being Papuan. There is a great deal of resentment felt by the indigenous population at the perceived wealth of migrants, although people are wary of expressing such social envy openly.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Additionally, transport to the larger cities on the coast is prohibitively expensive for most rural residents.

¹⁴⁶ The observations in this section are from the author's visit to Jayawijaya regency, August 2005.

¹⁴⁷ A becak is a three-wheeled bicycle for local transport of people and goods, hard labour that is usually lowly-paid partly due to the high rents the drivers have to pay the owner of the vehicle.

¹⁴⁸ Jealousy towards the material prosperity of migrants was intimated to the author by indigenous residents, August 2005.

Ethnicity appears to play a part in limiting employment for indigenous people. As has been mentioned in chapter 3¹⁴⁹, Frans Pigome claims that employment within the Freeport mine is dependent on ethnic affiliation, with jobs being given by managers to others from their own ethnic group. This was also noted by the author on his visit to the regency. In conversation with a bus driver, the driver stated he had come to work in the regency as the owner of the vehicle was from the same home village in West Sumatra and had contacted people from this village offering employment. The data from the census shows that large numbers of migrants in urban areas come from only a few other regions of the nation, primarily Sulawesi and Java. Although there are some contradictions between different data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of migrants was certainly approaching (or has passed) the number of indigenous people in the urban areas of Jayawijaya in 2000.¹⁵⁰ With much employment being given to those from the same ethnic group as the employee, the chances of employment for indigenous people are diminished.

The political situation in the province ensures that the majority of the regency is not home to any non-indigenous residents outside a few scattered military posts. However, in villages that are along the few tarred roads, in areas with a military presence, there are migrant residents. The situation in these villages echoes that in Wamena, with shops and restaurants run by migrants. Beyond these outlying migrant settlements, the only incomers are missionaries, a group which play an important role in the administration in those areas with little or no government presence. It was suggested to the author that in those areas away from the centre of the regency, in practice there is no government administration, with villages being run entirely by the local missions.

¹⁴⁹Chapter 3, p.49

¹⁵⁰ See above, pp.25-29 of this chapter, for detailed figures on ethnicity in the regency. The figures for migrants in the urban areas of Jayawijaya vary between 37% and 55% of the total urban population.

Unfortunately, it was impossible for the author to investigate these claims in the current political climate. These observations all augment the demographic data from the census material, illustrating the gulf between the urban and the rural areas of the regency.

In summary, there are two Jayawijayas – a growing urban area increasingly dominated by migrants, and a rural hinterland still inhabited almost exclusively by indigenous people. The urban areas have comparatively better education, employment and ownership of consumer items, while the rural areas remain poor in education, non-agricultural employment, with few modern consumer goods. The regency's isolation means that moving to larger urban centres is extremely difficult for the rural poor. The migrant population in the regency's capital ensures that employment is limited for the rural poor. It is little wonder that the cash economy has yet to influence marriage patterns among the Dani. Butt suggests that the Baliem valley Dani have patterns of marriage that are similar to those found in the highlands across the border in what is now PNG in the early 1960s. Practices in the neighbouring nation had altered as cash wealth came into those societies by way of those returning from work in urban areas or from remittances.¹⁵¹ Migration to Jayawijaya from outside the province has caused a bottleneck for the indigenous population, making escape from a subsistence lifestyle to employment in the modern economy challenging.

¹⁵¹ Butt (1998), p.38

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The history of the region that is now the province of Papua is one of greater isolation from the rest of the world than for societies in the region to its west. This is partially due to the rugged geography that still today limits the development of a land transport system in the province. The more accessible coastal areas have become the most developed areas and the destination areas of the majority of migrants to the province. The less accessible highland regions were isolated into Dutch colonial times, with sustained contact with Europeans not occurring until mid-way through the last century. These factors led to the indigenous Papuans experiencing similar issues to indigenous peoples such as those in Australia and the Americas, with the lack of experience with the cash economy, writing and mechanical devices hindering many from participating in the new systems that were established by the Dutch. This was especially true for those from inland areas, while certain other groups were more easily able to adapt to the new structures.

The Dutch were slow to develop this outlying region of their East Indies colony before the Pacific War. The limited development that occurred did not allow the indigenous population to have many opportunities to increase their skills, with Chinese immigrants dominating the trading sector, and migrants from other parts of the colony taking the majority of the lower level administrative roles in government not taken by the few Dutch officials. These incomers, who were mainly from eastern Indonesia (nicknamed *amberi*, possibly from their putative origin of Ambon), were disliked by indigenous people. These two groups occupied a status above that of the indigenous people of the colony, with official acceptance of this status continuing until the departure of the Dutch.

Opportunities for indigenous people to receive formal schooling and gain employment in the government administration (the major non-agricultural employer) came about in the post-war period. The push for education and employment of Papuans came from such enlightened Dutch officials as Jan Van Eechoud and was supported by the Dutch parliament's decision to fund development in the province and to allow limited political participation by Papuans. While there were now far more Papuans with education and experience working within the cash economy, there was still discrimination in education, with the schools for Europeans' children being of a higher standard than the schools for the children of indigenous people.

The lack of education and employment during (and prior to) the Dutch colonial period limited the resources that were built up by indigenous people. In general, Papuans did not accumulate the monetary resources that would allow them to compete with migrant traders, and they did not build up the employment and education to compete with outsiders for positions in the public service. The handover of power transformed the colony from its relative isolation in the post-war period, with the arrival of thousands of officials and spontaneous migrants from the rest of the archipelago.

While the official line from the Indonesian government was that this new province would be quarantined from the effects of migration from the rest of the nation, the data from the census shows that was not acted on in practice. The figures show that there were thousands of migrants in the province by 1971, with a large number of these migrants having lived there since soon after the handover of power. Transmigrants were also brought to the province, with more than a thousand transmigrants having arrived in the colony even before

the Act of Free Choice in 1969.¹ This figure is actually higher than has been reported by other authors and was contrary to the pledges made by Indonesian government officials, with Saltford reporting that: "In 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio had pledged that West Irian would not be 'colonised' by the Javanese and there would be no transmigration to the territory from other provinces of Indonesia."² Reneging on this promise before the territory formally became part of the nation shows the lack of consideration for the possibility of Papuan people choosing not to remain part of Indonesia.

The population of the province has risen greatly during the period of this study, with the 1971 population of 923,440 rising to 2,233,530.³ While the rise in the population is certainly dramatic during this period, these figures should be taken in the context of the growth in the population across the archipelago. Using the figures across the archipelago from 1971 and 2000, the estimated annual population growth rate for Papua is 3.09%. This figure is higher than that of Indonesia as a whole, 1.83%. However, the province has lower growth rates than six other provinces, with the highest annual population growth rate being 4.25% in East Kalimantan.⁴

¹ *Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971*, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1972, p.19. See Chapter 7, pp.300-309 of the present study for full details.

² Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006, p.155

³ *Sensus Penduduk 1971*, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1971, Table 03: Penduduk menurut propinsi dan umur (Table 03: Population by province and age), pp.23-25 & p.xxx for total Papua population in 1971 including rural areas; *Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001, Tables 06.x, pp.31-39. Papua population figures for 2000 from *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 01, pp.1-3 as the figures from Penduduk Indonesia only included completed returns in this province which had high rates of estimation/non-returns. Growth rates calculated by author from this data.

⁴ Calculations by author. The figures for the newly created provinces of Banten, Gorontalo, Bangka and North Maluku were combined with those from West Java, North Sulawesi, South Sumatra and Maluku respectively for comparison purposes.

The urban population has risen fastest, going from 150,786 to 580,136. Migration has contributed to this growth, with 37,251 migrants of 1971 growing to 420,327 by 2000.⁵ This last figure is only the number of first generation migrants, however, with the total number of non-indigenous people being 772,684 or 35% of the total population.⁶ The majority of the migrants to Papua live in coastal areas, the areas of development and employment in the non-agricultural sector.

Initially, migration was predominantly male with two-thirds of migrants in 1971 being male. This had altered by 2000 with the percentage of female migrants increasing such that the sex ratio was close to parity for migrants from Java. These changes suggest migration patterns were changing to more permanent settlement of families rather than single men migrating to obtain work for relatively short periods. It is noticeable that the ratio for migrants from Sulawesi remained at a higher level, suggesting that the cultural orientation to *merantau*⁷ continues to influence migration from this area. Overall, however, with fewer migrants returning to their area of origin, it appears likely that the percentage of second and third generation migrants in the province will increase. The presence of non-indigenous people who have lived only in Papua increases the need for solutions to the problem that include this population.

There were also changes in the age composition of the population. It appears that the province has undergone a demographic transition, with lower birth and death rates at the end of the period than at the start. This reflects in part the growing urbanisation of the population, but it also points to the development

⁵ *Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000*, Seri L2.2.30 (Population of Papua: Results of the 2000 population census), 2001, Tables 11a.x, pp.79-84

⁶ Sensus Penduduk 1971, Table 24, pp.113-125; *Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000*, Table 01, pp.1-3. Percentages calculated by author.

⁷ The concept that youth should travel from their homeland to find employment, experience, their fortune before returning to their homes.

that has occurred in the province since 1962. It can be posited that the wider availability of contraception and the relatively higher levels of female education are also important factors.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this study on the characteristics of this migration and its impact on the economic, social and cultural conditions in the province will now be examined through sections examining the changes in education, employment, religion, language, representations and identity, ethnicity, genocide and colonisation.

Education

“After the transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indonesia, the primary task of Indonesia will be further intensification of the education of the people, of the combating of illiteracy, and of the advancement of their social, cultural and economic development.” – New York Agreement, Article XV, 15th August 1962.⁸

This study has shown that the education system in Papua has not equalised the pre-existing inequalities between indigenous and migrant residents of the province during the period of its incorporation into Indonesia. The education system in the province has developed and improved greatly since the departure of the Dutch, with the education level of the population of the region having risen enormously since this time. Before World War II, there were limited efforts by the Dutch to provide education to the population. This was to change in the post-war period, but by the final years of Dutch rule, only 55% of villages under administrative rule had access to a school. The numbers in schooling increased greatly under the new Indonesian administration from this low starting point with literacy rates rising and the levels of education reached by the population rising immensely since the Dutch left.

While these improvements to the education system are to the credit of the Indonesian administration, just over half the population had not finished primary school in 2000.⁹ Additionally, these improvements have not been evenly spread across the province. The literacy rates were lowest in the highland regencies, highest in the more developed, coastal regencies. By 1990,

⁸ ‘New York Agreement: Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)’, Free West Papua website, accessed from <http://www.freewestpapua.org/docs/nya.htm> in December 2007

⁹ The figures given in the conclusion are drawn from the material covered within the data chapters, 7-9, and further details, charts and tables, along with all references can be found within these three chapters.

only 3.8% of the urban population in Jayapura were illiterate, while in rural areas of Jayawijaya 60% of the population could not read. Additionally, within both coastal and highland regencies the rates for rural areas are also substantially lower than in urban areas. While in urban areas illiteracy had almost been eradicated, in rural areas one in three remained illiterate in 2005. The figures from all censuses show dramatic differences between the rates of literacy and educational attainment in urban and rural areas. The illiteracy rate in rural areas was five times higher than that in urban areas in 1980, eight times higher in 1990, and fourteen times higher in 2005. These differences are partially due to rural to urban migration, with the more educated members of rural communities moving to urban areas for further education and for employment. However, it is also caused by low levels of educational provision by the government in these areas. The 1990 data from Jayawijaya shows that the student to teacher ratio for the town of Wamena and adjacent districts was much lower than for the more isolated districts, with Kurima district having a student to teacher ratio more than three times higher than that of Wamena district.

Those in Jayapura were better educated than those in Jayawijaya in every census during the whole of the period examined. There were higher levels of educational attainment in Jayapura and other coastal regencies. Throughout this period educational attainment was higher in Jayapura than the provincial average. In 1971, nearly 30% of the population of Jayapura had second or tertiary education, while 23% did in Papua as a whole. By comparison, in Jayawijaya only one in three had finished primary level education at that time. While the gap between regions has closed somewhat for primary level education, 47% of Jayapura's population had secondary or tertiary education by 2000, while in Jayawijaya only 7% had. With the figures from all censuses suggesting that the education level of the province's population has improved

greatly during this period, the greatest progress in education has been seen in the coastal areas, areas which now have the lowest illiteracy rates, and higher levels of completion of primary, secondary and tertiary education.

Similar results were reported by Charles Farhadian in his work which focussed on Dani people. He suggests that higher education was the main cause for people moving to Jayapura.¹⁰ Being aware of the need for further studies to increase their future employment, they were forced to migrate far from their home due to the lack of higher education institutions in the highlands. Once in the capital, however, many students found themselves ill-prepared to live in the different environment. The main factors mentioned were the contrasts in climate and social environment, as well as the discrimination from migrants and other Papuans not from the highlands. Students also found themselves unready for the standard of education in Jayapura. Farhadian notes that: "Many urban Dani students find they cannot compete successfully against classmates from Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra, and other islands that have had a comparably long history of education."¹¹ These figures and observations all illustrate the concentration of education provision in urban, coastal areas, with far lower levels of educational provision and attainment in the rural, highland areas. The former areas are the destination areas for migrants to the province, while the latter areas have predominantly indigenous populations. This difference in residence suggests that the educational attainments of indigenous people are far lower than are those of the non-indigenous population throughout the time covered by the present study.

It should be noted that while these disparities in educational provision and attainment between different regions of the province are an important factor,

¹⁰ Farhadian (2005), p.57

¹¹ Farhadian (2005), p.58

other factors also appear to play a role in this difference, one being the culturally defined value placed on education. With lower levels of education among the indigenous population prior to the start of the period of Indonesian administration, there was less importance placed on the attainment of qualifications in the formal education system among some Papuan ethnic groups.¹² These lower levels of school education also meant that there were few indigenous people with tertiary level education.

It can be inferred from the data that there was a disparity in educational attainment between indigenous and non-indigenous people throughout the period of the study, with the 2000 census providing confirmation of this fact with data on education among indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Non-indigenous people were five times more likely to complete tertiary education than indigenous people, two-and-a-half times more likely to have completed secondary education, and 50% more likely to have completed primary level education.¹³

The figures from Jayapura regency in 2000 show that these differences are not simply due to the fact that indigenous people are more likely to live in isolated areas. While the difference in education levels between indigenous and non-indigenous residents was less dramatic than in the province as a whole, the differences were still very much evident. This data shows that even in this coastal, urbanised regency non-indigenous people were twice as likely as

¹² Some groups such as people from Biak-Numfor have placed high value on education, with higher levels of educational attainment among the indigenous residents of this area. People from this area have also been able to find employment in other parts of Papua. Missionaries established schools in these areas earlier also.

¹³ All figures calculated by author from *Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua : tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000* (Native population characteristics of Papua Province : main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002, Table 06 & 06A, Population 5 years and over by age group and highest education level reached, pp.28-31

indigenous people to have tertiary education, and 50% more likely to have completed secondary education.¹⁴

In many ways, the data suggests that in terms of educational success the indigenous population trails ten years behind the levels of the non-indigenous populace. The education system appears to have failed the indigenous population with this serious inequalities between the indigenous and non-indigenous residents of the province. In order to rectify this gap, the government needs to promote education in highland and rural areas, possibly through paying more to those who are willing to work in these more isolated regions to offset the higher cost of commodities in these areas, a hardship allowance perhaps. There also needs to be more supervision of the current teaching personnel, with some teachers in highland areas being paid while absent for extended periods from the area.¹⁵ Indigenous people in Papua face some of the difficulties faced by indigenous people in other parts of the world, and affirmative action to improve their level of participation in higher levels of education would help to provide more equality between indigenous and non-indigenous residents.

¹⁴ Data from Karakteristik Penduduk Asli 2000, Table07: Population aged 5 years or over by administrative district and highest education level achieved, pp.34-37

¹⁵ Author's observation during visit to Papua, August 2005

Employment

The growth that has occurred in education in the province has also occurred in employment, with the 47,000 registered workers in 1971 increased to 218,652 by 2000. The differences in employment across the province have similar patterns to those found in education, with divergence in the patterns in coastal and highland regencies, and in urban and rural areas. The census figures show that rural areas have been overwhelmingly agricultural throughout the Indonesian period, with the subsistence agricultural systems that had been utilised by indigenous peoples prior to this period continuing to be the way of life of the majority in these areas. In urban areas, the government was the biggest employer, with community services being the largest industry in these areas throughout this period, followed by trade. The majority of non-agricultural employment was concentrated in the coastal regencies, not coincidentally those areas with high rates of immigration.

Not surprisingly, employers in urban areas tended to preferentially employ those with higher levels of education. In general, those with higher level employment tended to have higher levels of education. The figures from the censuses of 1971, 1980 and 1990 all show clearly the connection between education and employment, with 80% of managerial and (increasingly) clerical posts being occupied by those with secondary and tertiary level education in 1990. Those with lower levels of education continued to be concentrated in the agricultural sector.

With indigenous people having lower levels of education as described in the previous section, their chances of employment are lower than are those of non-indigenous residents. The figures from 1971 show that the vast majority of those with tertiary level qualifications in the province were born outside it. In

all, only 6% of those with tertiary education were born in the province, with 59% of those with such educational attainment coming from Java.¹⁶ The figures point to the dominance of outsiders at the elite level at this early point of Indonesian control over the territory and confirm the observations of such writers as Peter Hastings, Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning.

The figures for 2000 are the first to include data on employment by ethnicity, showing the difference in employment between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. The most obvious differences were in trade, with non-indigenous people being four times more likely to be employed in this sector than indigenous people in urban areas and 16 times more likely in rural areas. Correspondingly, the relatively lower paid, lower status jobs in agriculture were mainly occupied by indigenous people. The dominance of indigenous people in urban employment was reflected clearly in this data, with nearly three-quarters of urban jobs held by non-Papuans. This is a sizeable percentage considering that indigenous people make up two-thirds of the province's total population. Non-agricultural employment in rural areas was also dominated by non-indigenous people. Despite comprising only 22% of the rural workforce, migrants made up 57% of the non-agricultural jobs. Just over half the jobs in the service sector were taken by non-indigenous people, two in three manufacturing jobs, and more than four out of every five trade jobs.

The two regions examined in the current study have vastly different levels of economic development, with comparisons between such disparate regencies not being related simply to the issue of migration. However, within these two regencies the figures from 2000 show that there was dominance of the non-

¹⁶ *Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya*, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974, Tabel 23: Penduduk menurut berumur 10 tahun keatas menurut tempat kelahiran dan pendidikan (Table 23: Population 10 years of age and over by place of birth and educational attainment), pp.99-107. Data categorised and percentages calculated by author.

agricultural sector in them both. This was not surprising for Jayapura considering the majority of the population were migrants. However, the relative rates of employment show that migrants have higher rates of employment in all non-agricultural sectors, rising to having five times the employment rate in the trade sector compared to the indigenous population. Even in the highland regency of Jayawijaya, more than half the urban workforce were non-indigenous people.

By 2001, the figures show a public service with far higher levels of education than those found in the population as a whole. The data from Jayapura in this year shows that almost all public servants in this area had either secondary or tertiary level education.¹⁷ While there are no figures on the ethnic composition of the public service, the far higher levels of education among the non-indigenous population mean that statistically they are more likely to be those getting many of these positions. However, the changes brought about by the regional and special autonomy programs (along with the division of the province) have resulted in a huge expansion in the number of higher echelon positions in the government. Moreover, political pressure for indigenous participation in the higher levels of government has meant that many indigenous people gained these positions, despite having lower levels of education.

This appears a dangerous approach, especially in the atmosphere of corruption endemic in the province. I suggest that promoting indigenous people based on their ethnicity rather than on merit is likely to result in several negative consequences (such as lower standards of administration and higher levels of

¹⁷ Figures calculated by author from *Kota Jayapura dalam angka 2001*, Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001, Tabel II.1.4, 2001, p.16 and *Kabupaten Jayapura dalam angka 200*, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001, Table 3.2.9, p.37

corruption potential outcomes) to the detriment of all other residents. As Hendrick Ajamiseba states: “While so called ‘development’ is taking place with the new governor and special autonomy is used for the elites our average voices continue to go unheard in West Papua. The disparity between the haves and have nots continue to widen.”¹⁸

The low levels of manufacturing in the province gave few opportunities for the less educated to find employment in urban areas. In 1971, only 4% of the urban population was employed in this sector, and the percentage was unchanged for the total population in 1990.¹⁹ While trade is an area of the economy that does not necessarily demand formal qualifications, most successful businesses are run by those with basic levels of literacy and numeracy.²⁰ Again, the relatively low levels of education among the indigenous population have prevented this group from taking advantage of trade opportunities throughout this period.

However, it is clear that education is not the only factor, with discrimination against indigenous workers being noted by observers such as US observers in 1964.²¹ Later observers such as Manning and Rumbiak suggested that there was discrimination against indigenous workers in the late 1980s, with employers hiring “what they regard as more reliable, harder working migrant labour.”²² These same factors were also mentioned to the current author during his visit to the province.

Research by Bandiyono and Suharto in 1990 found that inter-provincial migrants were more successful in socio-economic terms than were intra-provincial

¹⁸ Personal communication following message by Papuan human rights activist Hendrick C. Ajamiseba on reg.westpapua@lists.riseupnet mailing list, 15th February 2008.

¹⁹ *Penduduk Irian Jaya 1990*, Tables 25.x, pp.118-126

²⁰ Suharto, Edi, ‘Human Development And The Urban Informal Sector In Bandung, Indonesia’, *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 2 (December, 2002), pp.115-133, p.125

²¹ See pp.141-142.

²² Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.27

migrants or those indigenous to Sorong.²³ Migrants from outside the province were able to gain employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors, while Papuans were mainly employed in farming, transport and manual employment.²⁴ This survey supports the conclusions that have been drawn in the present study based on the macro-data.

Issues of land have been part of a number of conflicts including mining and transmigration between Papuans and the Indonesian government. New Guinean societies' concepts of land rights differed from those of European or Javanese societies. New Guinea societies, like indigenous Australian societies, did not usually have individual rights to land separate from the rights of their group. There was also no right to income from land utilised by others, "there was no landlord class in the pre-contact societies of Papua New Guinea".²⁵ There appear to be such issues in the money economy for indigenous people, with Susan Banki's paper suggesting that this communal attitude to land can be seen in indigenous attitudes to capital, hindering the accumulation of the funds necessary for the establishment and maintenance of small businesses.²⁶

There are notable differences in employment in the province, with the trend for indigenous people to have lower status, lower paid employment (mainly continuing to practise subsistence agriculture) evident throughout the period of Indonesian sovereignty. Manning and Rumbiak comment that the participation of indigenous people in the economy at that time was thwarted by "weak rural-urban linkages...limited urban experience and skills in commercial activities".²⁷

²³ Bandiyono & Suharto (1994), p.51

²⁴ Bandiyono & Suharto (1994), p.52

²⁵ Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p.3, quoting Ian Hogbin

²⁶ Banki, Susan, 'Trickle Up in Nepal and Irian Jaya, Indonesia', Trickle Up Project, New York, Unpublished paper, 2000, p.18

²⁷ Manning & Rumbiak (1989), p.22

This was also noted by Michael Rumbiak in his thesis on the Nimboran migration to Jayapura, suggesting that: "In urban areas Nimborans could not compete with schooled people from other groups and discriminatory practices, such as the connection system, have been practised in the selection of new labourers."²⁸

Nearly two decades later, these same reasons remain significant impediments to indigenous participation in the modern economy. The comparisons with other parts of Indonesia show that levels of intra-provincial migration are relatively lower than those found in other parts of the nation. In 2000, Papua was the only province for which migration from outside the province was more common than migration within the province.²⁹ This suggests that there indigenous people remained unable to find work in the urban areas of the territory, being outcompeted by inter-provincial migrants.

It appears that the indigenous population is unable to compete in the secondary and tertiary sectors, unable to find employment in urban areas or even to work in these sectors in the rural areas where three-quarters of the population are Papuans. This is unlikely to change without intervention to assist indigenous people in obtaining higher levels of education and help in starting small businesses. The 1990 Bandiyono and Suharto study mentioned earlier suggests that disparities in success between migrants and Papuans (both real and perceived) were the most important cause of psychological stress in their survey.³⁰ Without assistance in this area, the inequality in employment will continue to create tensions between migrants and Papuans, as well as contributing to feelings of being second-class citizens in their own land.

²⁸ Rumbiak, Michael, *Nimboran Migration to Jayapura, Irian Jaya, and Rural-Urban Ties*, Unpublished MA Thesis, ANU, Canberra, 1983, pp.24-26

²⁹ See pp.315-317

³⁰ Bandiyono & Sukarno (1994), p.52

Religion

Samuel Huntington's influential view of the majority of recent conflicts globally being due to the 'clash of civilizations' could be seen as relevant to the situation in Papua.³¹ Huntington claims that: "Fault line conflicts are communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations."³² While Huntington divides the island of New Guinea into Islamic and Western civilisations based on the national boundaries³³, this ignores the cultural continuities between those on either side of the border. For Huntington, problems in the province arise from the collision of the Islamic/Malay culture with the animist/Melanesian culture. He argues that demographic change is an important factor in such conflicts, with the rising percentage of 'non-Papuans' in the province being a classic instance of a shift leading to a perceived threat to indigenous culture.

In 1971, 22% of the urban population were Muslim, rising to 42% by 2000. As the non-Papuan group makes up 65% of the urban population it can be seen that as many as a third of migrants to the province are not Muslim. This is confirmed by the census data from 2000, which showed that only 66% of the non-indigenous population were Muslim. The figures disprove the claim that only Muslim migrants were allowed to move to the province. Religion figures for rural areas were not published in the 1971 census, but by 2000 less than one in five rural residents were Muslim. There were also great differences between religious affiliation in the two regencies covered. By 2000, 37% of Jayapura residents were Muslim, while less than 2% of Jayawijaya residents were. It can be concluded that the religious composition of the province is changing, primarily in urban, coastal areas.

³¹ Huntington, Samuel P., *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Touchstone, London, 1996

³² Huntington (1996), p.252

³³ Huntington (1996), Map 1.3, pp.26-7

However, for a number of reasons Huntington's view appears unrepresentative of the situation in the province and a poor model for the interactions between migrants and indigenous people. Firstly, this theory does not account for the fact that a substantial proportion of migrants living in the province are Christian. Secondly, there seems to be no differentiation by Papuan activists between migrants based on their religion. The complaints that migrants have swamped indigenous culture appear much more focussed on the political and the economic than on this area. The indigenous residents of the province may be overwhelmingly Christian, but they are also the group with less education and with fewer employment prospects.

Christianity does provide spaces for interactions between those from different groups, with church congregations including both indigenous and non-indigenous people.³⁴ This thesis has not been able to touch on the impact of churches and church organisations on developing networks of contact between ethnic groups in the province including inter-ethnic marriage as has been claimed by Siegfried Zollner.³⁵ There do not appear to be figures on such marriages published by statistical bodies in Indonesia. The church may play a role in the integration of Papuans into the nation through such interactions, a subject that could profitably be explored in the future.

While there have been isolated attacks on mosques in the province³⁶, the lack of any large-scale conflict between religious groups suggests that religion is not the main factor in the inter-group issues in the province. The Papuan Presidium Council (*Presidium Dewan Papua*) that was established by indigenous people to

³⁴ Author's observation during visit to the province, August 2005. See p.170 for more details.

³⁵ Zollner, Siegfried, 'The culture of the Papuans in transition: The threat posed by modernization – Javanization and discrimination' in Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005, p.60

³⁶ See 'Indonesia: Religious Freedom Report 1999', US State Department, accessed from http://atheism.about.com/library/irf/irf99/blirf_indonesia99.htm in December 2007

represent their issues included representatives from many strands of society in the province. This included representatives of all major religions in the province (Protestant, Catholic and Muslim) and also included a seat for migrant groups.³⁷

Lastly, while there has been inter-faith violence, violence has occurred between groups with no relation to religious affiliation. The hostility towards migrants in the Jayawijaya region in 2000 was not directed at Muslim settlers exclusively, with attacks on Christian migrants and newcomers from other regions of the province. As stated by *Kompas*: "For the people of Wamena, immigrants are people who are not indigenous to Jayawijaya."³⁸ This continues a pattern of xenophobia that was noted by Dutch officials such as Victor de Bruijn and Paul van der Veur, with the latter noting that:

This attitude had been analyzed by a 1948 commission which reported that the Papuans had remained unswervingly consistent in their rejection of the outside world: "No Indonesians, no Dutch, and no Japanese, only their 'own people' had been their cry; and, no other Papuans either, unless they were considered to belong to their own people."³⁹

In conclusion, while migration to the province has transformed the religious composition of the population, it does not appear that this is the main cause of significant tensions between those of different faiths, with economic inequities having had a far greater effect.

³⁷ Mote, Octavianus & Danilyn Rutherford, 'From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia's Troubled East', *Indonesia*, Volume 72 (October 2001), p.130. According to Mote and Rutherford, the seat for migrants was not occupied, although representatives of migrant groups attended the Second Congress.

³⁸ 'Nasib ribuan guru di Jayawijaya belum jelas', *Kompas*, 11/10/2000. Translation from the original Indonesian by the author.

³⁹ Van der Veur, Paul, 'The UN in West Irian: A Critique', *International Organization*, Vol.18, No.1, 1964, p.57

Language

The low-level insurgency against Indonesian rule of the province has continued since soon after the handover of power in the early 1960s, although this has recently become almost entirely a peaceful struggle.⁴⁰ An unusual aspect of this conflict is the language used by those on both sides is the same. The use of the Indonesian language by Papuan activists arises from the legacy of Dutch colonial rule, the Indonesian education system that uses this language across the province, and the lack of any pre-existing *lingua franca* that indigenous people could use to communicate between those who speak the hundreds of languages autochthonous to this region.

With low levels of trade and movement between groups in the area before (and during) the Dutch colonial period, no widespread language was used by those across the region.⁴¹ The slow spread of administrative control over the colony by the Dutch brought with it their language of colonial rule, Bahasa Melayu, as it did in the rest of the colony of the Dutch East Indies. While some differences in language developed during the period of dislocation between Dutch New Guinea and the new state of Indonesia, the common language remains. The Indonesian commitment⁴² to schooling across the province was to increase the spread of this shared language across Papua. The figures from all censuses show increasingly high levels of knowledge and use of this language. The percentage of those able to use Indonesian has been high in urban areas of Papua. In 1980 only 3% of the population were unable to use this language, with this

⁴⁰ See chapter 5 for discussion of this topic.

⁴¹ This is not to say there were no interactions between those of different ethnic (and language) groups, but rather that these interactions were often conducted by a small number of traders and often with neighbouring groups. See Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003, p.11 for a discussion of this issue.

⁴² See below for a discussion of the expansion of the education system in Papua after becoming part of Indonesia.

decreasing to less than 1% of the urban population being unable to use this language in 1990.⁴³ In rural areas, there was far less use of Indonesian, but the majority was still able to use Indonesian in both censuses.

The need to communicate using a shared language between different ethnic groups within the province has led to the irony of Papuan calls for independence from Indonesia using the national language for their calls for independence, using the same term as that used by anti-Dutch fighters of the 1940s, *merdeka*. The unofficial Papuan anthem, '*Hai Tanah Papua*' (O, my land Papua) also uses the Indonesian language and has similarities to the Indonesian national anthem, '*Indonesia Raya*'.⁴⁴

The use of the same language in Papua and across Indonesia tends to provide connections between people in the province and the nation beyond. The widespread use of the Indonesian language that has come with the growth of the education system ties Papuans to the rest of the nation. As Anderson suggests⁴⁵, the sharing of a language helps to form the idea of an imagined national community, a boundary of understanding that duplicates the boundary of the state. The frontier between the two halves of the island is solidified by the language division, with the differing colonially-derived languages used meaning that those in Papua can communicate more easily with migrants from Sumatra than with those living across the national border.

The feelings of solidarity that are claimed by activists between those on either side of the border are progressively weakened by the cultural divide that the

⁴³ Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980, table 07, pp.34-36.x & Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Tables 09.x, pp.40-42. Percentages calculated by author.

⁴⁴ This anthem's first lines are similar to that of the Papuan anthem, being '*Indonesia tanah airku*' in comparison to '*Hai Tanahku Papua*'.

⁴⁵ Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. and extended ed. London, Verso, New York, 1991

language division mentioned earlier brings. With the vast majority of the television, radio and newspapers in this areas using Indonesian, Papuans are pulled into the nation, become more dissimilar to the indigenous people across the border to the east.

Representations and identity

The representations of the indigenous population of Papua in published materials⁴⁶ illustrate the image of Papua and Papuans held both officially and by many of the rest of the populace of the nation. The official representations inform and illustrate the conception of Papuans held by other Indonesians. The picture is of an area that is legitimately a part of Indonesia with no reference to dissent from that view. This gives an image of a single cultural group, of Papuan people as a single ethnic group. This obliterates the huge diversity in language, practices, values and social structures that occur in this region.

These representations of 'the Papuan' are essentially negative, with many images of Papuans as primitive people. Papuans are seen by other Indonesians as a backward group, with a perceived lack of cultural sophistication as a unitary, primitive group without culture, relics of the Stone Age, the savage naked but for the penis sheath, or even the cannibal. Differences in skin colour, hair type and even staple diet are perceived by both migrants and indigenous people as illustrating fundamental differences between these groups. (This view of Papuan people as backward savages is held outside Indonesia of course, with John Rumbiak suggesting that this is the international perception of Papuan people⁴⁷, a view supported by Henry Kissinger referring to Papuans as Stone Age people in a memo supporting the Indonesian push to take over the Dutch colony in 1969.⁴⁸)

These views of Papuans disadvantage indigenous people in their interactions with those from other ethnic groups, especially in relation to employment, as

⁴⁶ Noted in chapter 6 of this study.

⁴⁷ John Rumbiak quoted by Flanagan, Martin, 'The exile who fights for the rights of all Papuans', *The Age (Melbourne)*, February 27 2003

⁴⁸ Lobe, Jim, 'Secret Papers Show Papuan Self-Determination Sacrificed to U.S. Courtship of Suharto', *OneWorld US*, July 12, 2004

mentioned earlier in this chapter. The lower levels of formal educational attainment and employment among indigenous people reinforce their perceived backwardness in the eyes of migrants. These issues are similar to those faced by many indigenous peoples around the world, such as the indigenous peoples of Australia.

The impact of negative perceptions of Papuans on employment meant that from the start of Indonesian government of the territory Papuans were not well represented in the modern economy, as noted by Garnaut and Manning in 1974⁴⁹ and by the author in 2005. Bruner's study on the relationship between ethnicity and employment in Indonesia found that there was a strong connection between the two, with employers favouring those from their own ethnic group.⁵⁰ With few indigenous employers, indigenous people are disadvantaged in obtaining work opportunities. This has been noted in the province by employee groups in relation to the Freeport mine workers, with supervisors hiring people from the same ethnic group as the supervisor.⁵¹

There has been NGO activity in the province to provide micro-credit to indigenous people, with the aim of assisting poorer people to establish business ventures.⁵² A paper from 2000 suggested that the prejudices towards the indigenous population were partly responsible for the low level of employment in this sector noted above. Papuans reportedly found obtaining credit from banks difficult as they were deemed unsuitable, even if they were able to satisfy

⁴⁹ Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, pp.36-37

⁵⁰ Bruner, Edward M., 'The expression of ethnicity in Indonesia', pp.251-280 in Cohen, Abner (Ed.), *Urban ethnicity*, Tavistock, London, 1974a

⁵¹ Pigome, Frans, 'Paths to Justice and Prosperity: West Papua 2007', organised by Indonesian Solidarity in association with the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), University of Sydney, and The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Technology, August 9th 2007, Sydney, Australia

⁵² Banki (2000). The Trickle Up Program aims to provide the resources to the world's poorest people to enable them to establish microenterprises.

other criteria for lending.⁵³ However, further research into the difficulties faced by indigenous people in obtaining employment through qualitative research in the province is necessary if the Indonesian government is serious about incorporating Papuan people into the nation through carrots rather than sticks.

The representation in both museums and textbooks suggest a lack of engagement from the Centre with Papua, and a homogenised conception of the province's people. It would appear that this has had a negative impact on migrant's perceptions of the indigenous population and on the feelings of shame and marginalisation mentioned by Farhadian.⁵⁴ However, these conclusions should be tempered by the fact that with both museums and educational materials it is unclear how great the impact of these representations is on the migrants to the province, or on the indigenous population. The lack of visitors to the museums visited in either Jakarta or Papua suggests that few Indonesians have gained their knowledge of the province through such institutions. It should also be noted that there are few museums in other parts of Papua, and it seems reasonable to assume that provincial museums in other parts of the nation do not have any exhibits related to Papua.⁵⁵

It is also likely that the textbook material examined may not have had a great impact on all but the most educated in the nation. The poor standard of education in the province and the lack of educational materials in these areas, especially in the densely populated interior as noted by Supangat⁵⁶, suggests few Papuan students are likely to have encountered such materials.

⁵³ Banki (2000), p.18

⁵⁴ See p.220 above.

⁵⁵ I have not seen any items related to Papua in any regional museums I have visited across the archipelago.

⁵⁶ See pp.274-275 above.

Nevertheless, the students who had seen such materials – museum and text, migrant and Papuan – are likely to be those with influence on others, the elites of both sides. The negative views of Papuans among other Indonesians appears to have had a deleterious impact on the employment chances of indigenous people within the important public service sector of the economy, a sector in which many have higher levels of education.

Anderson's theories on the role of museums as integrative devices does not appear to be borne out by the material presented in chapter 6. The lack of an attempt to integrate Papuan people into the nation is surprising and appears to be reflected in a concomitant lack of feelings of integration by Papuans, even by those who are involved in the national bureaucracy. Rutherford comments that "to the extent that Biaks pursued the foreign as a source of value, prestige, and authority, they managed to participate in national institutions without adopting national points of view."⁵⁷ Rutherford argues that her informants in Biak had not started to identify with the nation, that while they worked within the public service they still had an "open disdain for Indonesian national culture."⁵⁸ Mote and Rutherford list a number of prominent Papuans among the 'Team of One Hundred' who had strong links with the administration, but were part of this embassy to the President asking for independence.⁵⁹ That this is a wider perspective is shown by the Department of Internal Affairs report into a 'Papuan political conspiracy'. As Chauvel and Bhakti note, this government document suggested that "many of the Papuans who have achieved most in the Indonesian system were also identified as supporters of independence."⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Rutherford (2003), p.4

⁵⁸ Rutherford (2003), p.237

⁵⁹ Mote & Rutherford (2001), p.126

⁶⁰ Chauvel and Bhakti (2004), p.44. Also see their discussion of this document pp.44-46

The strength of Papuan identification held by those working within the national apparatus can also be seen in the lives of many of the leaders of Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule. The most famous to work within and subsequently against the system is Theys Eluay, who had campaigned for remaining part of Indonesia in the Act of Free Choice in 1997, been a Golkar politician for many years and had close associations with New Order forces.⁶¹ Arnold Ap worked as a curator for the state Cenderawasih University but was considered such a dangerous leader of Papuan resistance he was killed by security forces. Such actors have gone on to fight against this system, as have many other less well known Papuans who work within the government. Chauvel notes that in the Indonesian government report in 2000 on Papuan figures' support for independence included many political figures including the then governor, Jaap Solossa.⁶² As Chauvel notes, there is a: "common assertion that all Papuans, even those who serve the Indonesian state, in their heart of hearts are pro-'M' (Merdeka, or Independence)."⁶³

⁶¹ For an excellent exposition of the complex life of this leader, see Ipenberg, At, 'The life and death of Theys Eluay', *Inside Indonesia*, 70, Apr-Jun 2002, accessed from <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit70/Theys2.htm> in December 2008

⁶² Chauvel, Richard, 'The Backlash: Jakarta's secret strategy to deal with Papuan nationalism', *Inside Indonesia*, 67, July-Sept 2001, accessed from <http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/452/29/> in December 2008

⁶³ Chauvel (2001)

Ethnicity

Within census tables, indigenous people in this territory are sometimes categorised into a single ethnic group – Papuan – while migrants are categorised into a number of ethnic groups. This is partially due to the numerous ethnic groups within the province making fitting such large numbers of groups into tables difficult, but also reflects the issue raised above and in chapter 7 in relation to the representations of Papuans as a single, unified ethnic group. The New Order's wish to align ethnic affiliation with province is important in this regard, with the organisation of the houses at Taman Mini Indonesia Indah reflecting the Suharto era wish for order and simplicity – one province, one ethnic group – as mentioned previously.

While the educated elite had begun to self-identify as Papuan during the post-war Dutch period, this was an identification that had not spread to others in the province. As the data on the province shows, there was an influx of migrants to the province immediately after the handover of power to Indonesia by the UNTEA. The number of immigrants in the province has continued to steadily rise, with the figures showing increasing numbers of non-indigenous residents in the province. The figures from 1971 show nearly a quarter of the urban population (22.5%) had been born outside the province, a total migrant population of 33,923.⁶⁴ As has been mentioned earlier, by 2000, there were 772,684 non-indigenous residents of the province, composing 35% of the province's population.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Sensus Penduduk 1971 (1974), Table 23: Population by place of residence and place of birth, pp.101-102

⁶⁵ Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua 2000, Table 01, Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3

The interactions that migration has brought about between indigenous and incomers have resulted in the solidification of a supra-ethnic Papuan identity. In conversation, indigenous people refer to themselves and other indigenous residents as Papuans, with their ethnic identification usually being mentioned after this primary identity.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the migrants are referred to as Indonesians, a definition that suggests indigenous people feel alienated from the national identity.

The statistics documented in this thesis demonstrate that migration patterns have changed during the period of Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. While initially migration was male dominated and short-term, the sex ratio of migrants points to more longer-term, family group immigration. These changes, along with the length of time during which this migration has occurred, has resulted in large numbers of second and third generation migrants in the province. The figures from the 2000 census show that there were 420,327 residents of Papua born outside it, yet there were 772,684 inhabitants of the province who were classified as non-indigenous. This suggests that there were approximately 350,000 second-generation migrants in the province. Such a large population of non-indigenous people born in the province is certain to have a great influence on the future political direction of the region, reducing the possibility of independence. The importance of this group politically has been acknowledged by indigenous groups, with the inclusion of migrants in such political processes as the Second Congress.⁶⁷ The census categorised these second-generation migrants as belonging to non-indigenous ethnic groups. However, some of this group identify themselves as Papuan.⁶⁸ Further research

⁶⁶ Such identification is contextual, with ethnic group identifications such as Dani, Lani etc being used as a primary designation among Papuans.

⁶⁷ See footnote 23 above.

⁶⁸ Author's observation from visit to the province, August 2005. See p.71 for more details.

in the province itself could examine the range of political aspirations and ethnic identifications of residents from this group in order to evaluate their possible impact on future events in the province.

As noted in chapter 3, John Rex suggested there are three characteristics of group relations in which ethnicity becomes an important part of these interactions.⁶⁹ His first criterion is inequality between two groups. This study has examined the statistics on employment and education and shown that there is inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous residents in the province, and has been for the duration of the Indonesian sovereignty of the area. The second criterion is the possibility of distinguishing between groups by physical or cultural cues. Since these two groups tend to have different skin and hair types, this issue is often raised in conversation by those from both groups, along with cultural differences such as the eating of rice or sweet potato as a staple.⁷⁰ The third criterion is the justification of this discrimination through a theory, often biological. This form of justification can be seen in the books edited by S Budhi Santoso that were examined in earlier chapters,⁷¹ with ethnicity, race and skin colour being linked in this work. These differences are often seen as inherent by people from both groups, rather than cultural practices.⁷²

Ethnicity can have a political aspect as many theorists have pointed out.⁷³ However, the geographical distance from the centre in Indonesia, along with the relatively small population of the province, mean the province has little impact on the national political stage. Additionally, the existing political parties in Papua were outlawed at the assumption of Indonesian control in 1963. The

⁶⁹ See Chapter 3, p.45

⁷⁰ Personal observation by the author during visit to the province, August 2005.

⁷¹ See chapter 6, pp.210-212

⁷² Observation by the author based on travel and residence in the province and Indonesia.

⁷³ See for example Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*, Macmillan, Great Britain, 1996, p.23

regulations regarding parties throughout the nation only recognised ten parties, none of which had previously existed in the new province.⁷⁴ This political situation persists to this day, with parties only being sanctioned if they have a national structure, a requirement that tends to decrease the influence of regional or ethnic politics, especially for smaller provinces and ethnic groups.

The lack of political power in the nation as a whole is compounded by the lack of political independence in the province. During the New Order period, the province's governor was appointed by the Centre, with little room for autonomy. While this central control over the province has changed somewhat with the introduction of regional autonomy, the political power that the military has in the province⁷⁵ limits the power that the regional government has to wield. There are also the constraints on politics that come about through the high levels of corruption that are endemic to Indonesia at present, especially in areas far from the Centre.

One result of this pattern of migration to the urban areas of the province is that the impression is of Muslim dominance demographically. For the villager visiting the regency capital, the highland student going to study in Jayapura, or the foreign researcher, travel to these urban areas would suggest that the majority of the province's population were Muslim. The statistics show this perception to be false, with the percentage of Muslims at 37% in 2000, just over a third.⁷⁶ Such misconceptions seems likely to have contributed to the prevalent feeling among indigenous people of being swamped by migrants and of a threat to the existence of a 'Papuan' culture. However, this study has argued that in terms of

⁷⁴ Budiardjo (1988), p.17

⁷⁵ As exemplified by the military's ability to thwart the wishes of President Yudhuyono in respect of the US Congressman Faleomavaega. See p.20 for more details on these events

⁷⁶ See p.364 above.

education and employment the indigenous population has indeed been swamped and marginalised.

Genocide

With the publication of the Yale Law School report on Papua in 2004, a debate on whether genocide had occurred and was still occurring in the province was ignited in academic and activist circles. This is an important topic, with wide ramifications if the case were to be proved. Unfortunately the Yale report is of a low academic standard, with numerous errors detracting from its credibility. The report appears to be based mainly on the work of Robin Osborne and that of Budiardjo and Liong.⁷⁷ While both of these earlier works are well researched, it seems remiss of the authors not to utilise a greater variety of materials, as well as more recent ones. There are numerous claims made in the report, such as that the Baliem Valley is a major transmigration site, which conflicts with statistical information on the province from other sources. Such claims have been made by many Papuan figures as documented in chapter 5.

While the authors suggest that military actions in Papua were genocidal, this neglects the wider, national picture. The military actions that they describe include imprisonment of opposition figures, operations in support of mining and forestry operations, forcing indigenous peoples to relocate or provide labour. These are abuses of the human rights of the local people whose lives are disrupted, ruined or ended. However, these activities were not confined to this area or to this ethnic group alone. The issues in Papua are mirrored by such human rights abuses as the disappearance of the Javanese union activist Marsinah in 1993, the displacement of peoples to make room for the Koto Panjang dam project in Sumatra, and the trafficking of peoples from other parts of Indonesia to Papua for prostitution.⁷⁸ The report also suggests that

⁷⁷ Osborne (1985) and Budiardjo & Liong (1988)

⁷⁸ See 'Indonesia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005', *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, 8th March, 2006, accessed from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61609.htm> in September 2006

transmigration itself is a genocidal act. However, since Lampung is the destination area which has had the greatest number of transmigrants, it seems strange to single out Papua as an area of genocide by these means.⁷⁹ While Papua has received around 220,000 people up to 2000,⁸⁰ more than half of the population of Lampung in Sumatra were from Java as early as 1941.⁸¹ This is not to suggest that this form of migration has not had a negative impact, but that the use of the term genocide is hardly appropriate for this program.

There are numerous examples of the ways in which the military and administration appear to have mistreated the peoples of the archipelago, especially during the New Order period. While there appears to be racism towards Papuan peoples by many Indonesians, and the actions in Papua have been more extreme due to its frontier nature, it seems disrespectful to those who have suffered in other parts of the nation to accord a different status to the actions in Papua compared to those in other parts of the nation. A recent ICG report also suggests that the Yale Law Report is factually incorrect.⁸²

However, there is a strong belief among indigenous Papuans that there has been genocide within Papua, with the Yale report bolstering such beliefs. Many prominent Papuans have accused the Indonesian military and government of genocide. Tom Beanal, the President of the Papuan Customary Council⁸³ and

⁷⁹ See Cribb, Robert, *Historical Atlas of Indonesia*, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2000 for excellent visual representations of the characteristics of the transmigration program across the archipelago.

⁸⁰ McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural society in peril: migration, economic change and the Papua conflict*, East-West Center Washington, 2004, accessed from [www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in September 2005](http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications_in_September_2005), p.23

⁸¹ Hardjono, J.M., *Transmigration in Indonesia*, OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, p.20

⁸² International Crisis Group (ICG), *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, Asia Briefing No. 47, 23 March 2006, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4042&l=1> in March 2006, pp.8-9

⁸³ Wing & King (2005), p.47

Reverend Sofyan Yoman⁸⁴ have both stated that genocide is what is occurring in the province, as was mentioned in chapter 5. The 3rd Papua Customary Authority Meeting was a meeting of leaders from across Papua in Manokwari in February 2005. This authority issued a declaration, with one item of this pronouncement being that

We declare that there is strong indication of a process of ethnic cleansing (genocide) in Papua Land since the integration in 1969. Therefore the Third Papua Customary Authority Meeting urges the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the subject of Genocide, to send a Special Rapporteur to monitor and investigate the cases of human rights abuses in Papua Land.⁸⁵

The belief that the Indonesian state was intent on destroying Papuan people and culture was strengthened by such government decisions as the division of the province mentioned previously.

There have also been suggestions that the lack of young males in the census data demonstrates that there has been large scale genocide in the province.⁸⁶ However, there are a number of reasons to argue that this is not a valid conclusion. Firstly, it is certainly true that the figures in all censuses show lower numbers of males in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups.⁸⁷ However, if this were due to the deaths of men in these age groups, a correspondingly low sex ratio would be expected to be found in older age groups in later censuses as people aged. This was not observed, with the figures showing higher sex ratios than the

⁸⁴ Yoman, Sofyan, Systematic Genocide of the Peoples of West Papua under Special Autonomy, Jayapura, 14 May 2005, accessed from <http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/Genocide-under-autonomy.doc> in February 2008. Reverend Sofyan Yoman is the Chairman of the Alliance of Baptist Churches in West Papua.

⁸⁵ Wing & King (2005), p.53

⁸⁶ See for example Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002, pp.55-60

⁸⁷ See chapter 7, pp.230-247

expected ratio in these age groups. Secondly, lower sex ratios in these age groups were also found by the Dutch survey of 1961.⁸⁸

Lastly, this pattern of 'missing men' was not confined to Papua (or even to Indonesia). While not noted as an area of genocide, the British census of 2001 figures showed a short fall of 800,000 young men from predictions based on earlier census data. Not surprisingly, it appears that this was not in fact due to violence against this group. After questioning of these figures by statisticians and government authorities in the UK, the figures were revised, finding "190,000 people, mostly young men aged 25-34".⁸⁹ It appears that even in a mainly urbanised, developed country such as Britain, with far larger budgets allocated for this census than could be afforded by the Indonesian government, young men were not accurately represented. It seems highly possible that men in these age groups are simply not as likely to comply with government requests for information. In the case of Papua, with widespread distrust of the Indonesian government among indigenous people in the province, it is hardly surprising that many might not have complied with census gatherers. In addition, cultural factors such as women's unceasing work at or near the home, along with their child-rearing duties, mean they were more likely to be counted than men.

The lack of evidence in the census evidence for such claims of genocide are in accord with the views expressed by Chris Ballard, who suggests that the number of deaths that are suggested by many activist groups are much too high. There have been claims of up to 500,000 dead since 1962, with even 'conservative' estimates putting the number at 100,000. Ballard claims that these figures are

⁸⁸ Data from Groenwegen & Kaa (1964), p.70. Analysis of data by the author.

⁸⁹ Bowley, Graham, 'The last census?', *Prospect*, 92, November 2003, accessed from http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=5743 in February 2008

inflated and are not backed up by any hard evidence. He refers to the most exhaustive investigation into the number of OPM fighters and people in the area local to the Freeport mine, which found the number that could be confirmed as 220 between 1974 and 2001.⁹⁰ This figure may be an underestimate, but it does suggest that the scale of deaths that many indigenous figures and foreign activists have claimed are greatly exaggerated.

The analysis of the census data in the current research suggests that there has not been a large-scale reduction in the indigenous population even allowing for the unreliability of the census data.⁹¹ That such beliefs remain appears to be related to a number of issues; that indigenous people feel marginalised economically, socially and politically; the lack of openness in the province and distrust of the government, the human rights abuses that have occurred, and that indigenous people feel there is a threat to their culture. The following paragraphs will attempt to evaluate the importance of these areas in brief.

As Chauvel and Bhakti note, the control over the province has been one that has been achieved through military means. The military dominance has been noted by many observers. Charles Farhadian commented on the subjective result of this: "The massive numbers of Indonesian armed forces gives the impression that West Papua is perhaps the most densely militarized region in the entire country."⁹² There is a great deal of literature on the human rights abuses that have occurred in the province, and the reader is invited to examine some of this extensive coverage.⁹³

⁹⁰ Ballard (2002a), p.96

⁹¹ See discussion of census methodology in chapter 2 for details.

⁹² Farhadian (2005), p.54

⁹³ See for example Budiardjo & Liong (1988), Feith (2005), Jilani (2008), Osborne (1985), Wing & King (2005), Yoman (2005)

It seems clear that while these abuses have not been at a level to annihilate the indigenous population, the fact remains that many Papuans know people who have been subject to violence by the armed forces. The use of force to achieve control has resulted in a strong reaction against the incorporation of Papuan into Indonesia, with the rare times in which there has been freedom of expression in the province showing the depth of opposition to the current political situation.⁹⁴

Rumours have a great deal of power in shaping people's perceptions in the province. People's willingness to believe these inflated figures is indicative of the lack of belief in the official channels of information, with Papuans recognising the control over the media by government and military. As an example of the importance of rumours, the issue of troop deployment is relevant. According to Matthew Davies, this subject has been exaggerated by Papuan leaders and concerned organisations outside Indonesia at certain periods. He suggests that this tendency to believe rumours of inflated numbers of troops in the province has been used by figures within the military for political goals. Davies claims that "several NGOs, and prominent figures of the Papuan independence movement must take a great responsibility for a KOSTRAD 'coup' of sorts, fuelled largely by alarmist statements verging on hyperbole, and based on unexamined information."⁹⁵

That Papuans believe their culture to be under threat can be seen in the comments made by prominent figures quoted in chapter 5. Reverend Yoman has been quoted as saying that: "Genocide is not only about killing. It is also about seeing our culture and religion disappearing with the arrival of

⁹⁴ Chauvel, Richard and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's perceptions and policies*, Policy Studies No.5, East-West Center, Washington, 2004, p.viii

⁹⁵ Davies, Matthew N., *Indonesian responses to resurgent Papuan separatism: an open source intelligence case study*, ANU, Canberra, 2001, p.39

migrants".⁹⁶ The lack of cultural engagement towards Papuan cultures by the government has been noted in the representations chapter of the current study.⁹⁷ The suspicion that the government is not allowing Christian migrants to come to the province is an aspect that the current research finds not to be supported by the evidence,⁹⁸ but is widely held and contributes to the perception of being under attack.

While these aspects are important factors in the feelings of being under attack, the current study provides evidence for the injustices felt by indigenous residents of the province in the areas of education and employment. As Neles Tebay suggests, negative perceptions by non-Papuans have ensured that there is discrimination towards Papuans in employment. Tebay claims that this has led to "the presumption of incompetence and the assertion that Papuans cannot be trusted with jobs of responsibilities[sic], and need to be civilised".⁹⁹ The analysis of the data from the census in this thesis supports the perception that during the period of Indonesian control over the region Papuan employment has been at lower levels than migrant employment in non-agricultural sectors, with migrants dominating the modern economy.

One cause of this is the lower rates of education among Papuans, with the system not reaching the rural population adequately. Disadvantage has powerful effects psychologically. As Farhadian notes about members of one of the largest indigenous groups, "Dani strive to obtain positions of honor, respect, and prestige within their own communities."¹⁰⁰ Without more equality in opportunities with migrants in employment and the feeling that there is fairness

⁹⁶ Scarpello, Fabio, 'Papuans seek global support for UN peacekeepers, free elections', *South China Morning Post*, 22nd March 2007

⁹⁷ See chapter 6 for details on this issue.

⁹⁸ See religion section earlier in this chapter for details.

⁹⁹ Scarpello (2007)

¹⁰⁰ Farhadian (2005), p.8

in the acquisition of wealth, indigenous people will continue to feel part of an oppressed minority.

Colonisation

The Dutch period

There are many similarities between the present social and economic situation in the province and those noted by observers of the Dutch colonial period. The observations of J.S. Furnivall in the pre-Pacific war period are very relevant, with the societal reflections on Java at that time having notable parallels to the present of Papua. Furnivall states that:

in Java, nine-tenths of the Natives live in villages, but 80 per cent. of the Europeans live in towns, and 54 per cent in the larger towns with a population of more than 100 thousand....Substantial buildings are still few, but in Java 70 per cent of the Europeans live in brick houses, 38 per cent of the Chinese and only 4.5 per cent of the Natives. Again, we find that Europeans contribute 74 per cent of the tax on motor cars, whereas Chinese and Natives contribute only 17 and 9 per cent respectively. Thus the stress of conflicting interests which is found everywhere between Town and Country, Industry and Agriculture, Capital and Labour is complicated in Netherlands India by racial differences.¹⁰¹

The distribution of non-indigenous Indonesians in Papua mirrors that of Europeans in Java in the colonial period, with migration to the province being primarily an urban phenomenon as was concluded from the examination of the statistical data in chapters 7 to 9. Figures on floor types show similar differences as those noted by Furnivall in Java in the 1940s. The percentage of those with dirt floors not only varies between rural and urban areas, but also from coastal to highland areas. In urban Jayapura municipality, the centre of the province

¹⁰¹ Furnivall, J.S., *Netherlands India: A study of plural economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944, p.348

administratively, only 0.6% of households have dirt floors.¹⁰² In highlands rural Jayawijaya, more than half of households have dirt floors (52%). While there are no figures on flooring broken down by ethnicity, the dramatic disparity in ethnic composition of these two regions suggest that these differences reflect similar issues to those noted by Furnivall.

The major difference between the two periods is that of the scale of immigration to the region. The figures from the Dutch period show that all across the archipelago, there were very few Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. According to figures given by Furnivall, Europeans made up only 0.47% of the population of Java in 1930, but this fell to only 0.27% of the population in the Outer Islands. In contrast, as has been mentioned earlier, migrants made up just over a third of the population in 2000 (35%).¹⁰³ Such a disparity in scale ensures that these two periods are distinctly different.

It can be argued that these migrants are moving within their own nation for employment and business opportunities in the same way that people do in every country. The vast majority of migrants to Papua are not wealthy people. In contrast to the period of European colonialism, these colonists do not tend to employ 'native' staff, but rather work as bus drivers and market stallholders. It is important to remember that while the actions of migrants may have deleterious effects on the indigenous population of the province, this is not to attach blame to the many migrants who move to Papua in search of a basic living to escape from poverty in other parts of Indonesia.

¹⁰² All figures from *Penduduk Provinsi Papua: Hasil Survei Penduduk antar sensus 2005*, Seri S2.31, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2006, Tabel 38.x: Rumah tangga menurut kabupaten/kota dan jenis lantai terluas dari tempat tinggal (Table 38.x: Households by regency/municipality and primary floor material of dwelling unit), pp.155-157. Calculation of percentages by author.

¹⁰³ Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi 2000, Table 01 Penduduk menurut wilayah administrasi dan suku bangsa, pp.1-3

However, many of the issues facing the indigenous population of the archipelago under the Dutch are repeated for the indigenous Papuan population in the current period. In the Dutch colonial system, most commercial enterprises were run by 'Foreign Orientals'.¹⁰⁴ There were more Foreign Oriental residents in the Netherlands Indies than there were Europeans, making up 3.6% of the Outer Islands population in 1930.¹⁰⁵ Furnivall suggests that "the Natives were in effect excluded from the sphere of retail commerce, and had little chance therefore to develop commercial activities of a wholesale nature."¹⁰⁶ Similar issues of the exclusion of the indigenous population from the trade sector have been noted above in the employment section and in the statistical section of the current research.

Furnivall's assessment of the colonial system is of a structure with two fundamental characteristics. One is that "colonial relations are predominantly economic", while the second is that "the responsibility for maintaining order is assumed by the colonial power".¹⁰⁷ Both of these characteristics exist in the case of Papua. For the indigenous population, the lack of opportunities that has been noted in this current research is a continuation of the economic exclusion that they experienced under the Dutch in the pre-war period. The power and influence of the Indonesian military (TNI) in the province, its ability to maintain order, and its involvement in the suppression of the Papuan independence movement show similarities to the colonial relations of Furnivall.

¹⁰⁴ 'Foreign Orientals' was the term used to describe non-European, non-indigenous residents of the colony. The majority of these residents were Chinese, either by birth or descent.

¹⁰⁵ Furnivall (1944), p.409

¹⁰⁶ Furnivall (1944), p.406

¹⁰⁷ Furnivall, J.S., *Colonial Policy and Practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*, New York University Press, New York, 1956, p.8

The Indonesian period

The suggestion that the incorporation of Papua into the nation of Indonesia is a form of neo-colonialism has been made repeatedly since the transfer of power from the Dutch.¹⁰⁸ Aditjondro suggests that there is a vocal group of critics of Indonesian rule of Papua, seeing it as an act of colonialism. He suggests this group also believe that transmigration is “an act of genocide towards the indigenous Melanesian people”.¹⁰⁹ He claims that this group has no sympathy towards migrants to the province, instead seeing them as “willing instruments of Indonesia’s expansionistic tactics.”¹¹⁰ Such prominent Papuans as Tom Beanal have stated that the indigenous people were being colonised.¹¹¹ In contrast to the pattern in many other regions of the world, in Papua it is the Muslim citizens who are purportedly the colonists, while the Christian members of the population are the colonised. Hechter gives the following definition of colonial organisation.

Colonial development produces a cultural division of labour...development tends to be complementary to that of the metropolis. The colonial economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary commodities or raw materials for export....cities tend to be located on coasts with direct access to the metropolis....transportation systems arise not to spur colonial development – they are seldom built to interconnect the various regions of

¹⁰⁸ See for example the excellent discussion of this topic by Aspinall, Edward, ‘Selective outrage and unacknowledged fantasies: re-thinking Papua, Indonesia and Australia’, *Austral Policy Forum* 06-15, 4 May 2006.

¹⁰⁹ Aditjondro (1986a), p.24

¹¹⁰ Aditjondro (1986a), p.24

¹¹¹ Wing, John with Peter King, *Genocide in Papua? - the role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua, August 2005, p.47. See also the quote from a victim of the Wasior human rights abuse case, p.40, same volume.

the colony – but to facilitate the movement of commodities from the hinterland to the coastal cities.¹¹²

It should be noted that other theorists have disputed the internal colonialism model. Anthony Smith suggests that it is a static model, focussed too tightly on the economic aspects of the situation, and that it does not explain the ways ethno-political and historical causes influence the relationship between the centre and the periphery.¹¹³

However, the characteristics of internal colonialism noted above appear to apply to Papua. Urban development is mainly along the coast, only a minimal transport system has been developed and primary industry continues to be the main contributor to the provincial economy. According to figures produced by researchers at the University of Papua in Manokwari, around 70% of the logs from Papua are processed outside the province.¹¹⁴ So Papua is an exporter of raw materials, fitting with Hechter's definition of a colonial economy mentioned above. The balance of trade between the province and the nation as a whole is very much in favour of Papua, with a huge surplus of exports to imports. This is shown by figures from the 1980s¹¹⁵ and from the late 1990s¹¹⁶ which document the fact that exports were several times greater than imports throughout this period. Additionally, according to Yan Pieter Karafir of the University of Papua,

¹¹² Hechter, Michael, *Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p.31

¹¹³ Smith, Anthony, *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge, Cambridge, 1981, pp.29-37

¹¹⁴ Karafir, Yan Pieter, *Kondisi Ekonomi Makro Propinsi Papua: Perbandingan Dua Periode 1986-1991 dan 1996-2000*, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Pusat Penelitian Pemberdayaan Fiskal dan Ekonomi Daerah Universitas Negeri Papua, Manokwari, 2003, no page numbers in volume

¹¹⁵ See Karafir (2003), *Neraca Ekspor - Import Irian Jaya, 1986-1991*, unnumbered page

¹¹⁶ *Irian Jaya dalam angka 2000*, Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 2001, p.330 & p.334

more money flows out of the province than into it.¹¹⁷ Thus the export of the natural resources of the province does not benefit the indigenous residents.

Socially, the following description of the colonial society also seems to apply to the case of Papua, with the word Western being replaced by Indonesian.

The enclaves in colonial areas are urbanized, Western-oriented, cosmopolitan centers which become highly differentiated from their respective hinterlands, such that they may be considered appendages to the metropolitan economy and – to a lesser extent – culture. The existence of enclave-hinterland conflict in societies of the Third World is an important structural obstacle to the development of a fully national solidarity.¹¹⁸

As has been noted earlier in this study, the majority of the migrant population live in the urban centres of the province. These towns and cities are highly differentiated from their hinterlands as was shown by the statistical data earlier in this chapter in the sections on the economic, education, and socio-cultural fields. This is also evident at the more local level in the data on the regencies of Jayapura and Jayawijaya.

The gap in acquired possessions can be seen in the figures from the 1990 census on the household items possessed by those in different areas of the province. The figures show that there were only 48 televisions in rural parts of Jayawijaya regency, an area with a population of 342,950 at this time.¹¹⁹ In urban areas of the province there were 34,014 television sets for the population of 396,452. There were also very few radios, in highland areas, with only 2% of rural households in Jayawijaya having such a luxury item, compared to 67% of urban

¹¹⁷ Karafir (2003). According to this publication, "lebih banyak uang mengalir keluar dari pada yang masuk ke Irian Jaya." "More money flows out of Irian Jaya than flows in." Author's translation.

¹¹⁸ Hechter (1975), p.147

¹¹⁹ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri L1, Table 1.4, Penduduk menurut kabupaten/kotamadya dan jenis kelamin hasil sensus penduduk 1990, p.178

Jayapura households.¹²⁰ Television ownership is a status symbol, with those who have become well-off in highland regions installing satellite dishes on their house roofs. Such conspicuous consumption creates envy among neighbours, with the perception among indigenous people that the majority of dish owners are migrants fuelling inter-ethnic discontent.¹²¹ The lack of such items as televisions and radios is not altogether surprising in a region with electricity supplies mainly limited to urban areas. Without such items the populace in this area had (and still have) extremely limited access to the national media.

Being disconnected from the national media which was (and still is) true for the majority of the rural, indigenous population, will tend to inhibit the development of feelings of involvement in the nationalist project. The development of these feelings of communality is strengthened by exposure to the national media. As John Postill suggests “modern independent states are the prime ‘culture areas’ of our age [and] a range of media are integral to their formation and maintenance.”¹²² The national media includes recurring map images of the nation, news stories are divided into national or international stories that reinforce the boundaries between the in-group of the imagined national community and the ‘Others’ outside it. According to Chris Barker, “broadcasting brings major public events into the private world of viewers, and in doing so constructs a kind of national calendar which organizes, coordinates and renews a national public social world.”¹²³

The identification with characters in televisual dramas such as the soap operas (*sinetron*) that are popular across the archipelago encourages identification

¹²⁰ Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, p.178

¹²¹ Personal observation by the author during visit to the province, August 2005.

¹²² Postill, John, *Media and Nation Building: How the Iban became Malaysian*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2006

¹²³ Barker, Chris, *Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities*, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 1999, p.66

outside the local ethnic group or the supra-ethnic Papuan identity, the alignment of self-identity with the national identity. The lack of any significant Papuan presence in the Indonesian media¹²⁴ will lessen this identification, however. While Peter King suggests that “television viewers in Jakarta may imaginatively incorporate Irian into the nation”,¹²⁵ those in the highlands of Papua do not have the equipment to do the same.

Radio is a different medium to television, being more portable, more affordable and in some ways less bound to the nation state. As Monroe Price suggests: “Almost by definition, radio waves are not respecters of national boundaries.”¹²⁶ The radio broadcasts from Australia that could be received in this region were utilised by local people as sources of independent news, with reporting on these broadcasts sometimes conflicting with those from Indonesian radio and television broadcasters. There was no local station in the Jayawijaya region until one was recently established,¹²⁷ another example of the neglect of services in this region. While there were few radios in the rural areas of the province, these radios were an important connection to the outside world, with groups of people gathering to listen to news broadcasts at times of tension in the province. At the time of my visit to the province in 2005, people were extremely anxious to find out news regarding the ‘returning of OTSUS’ and gathered excitedly to find out if this was going to be reported on the national news – it was not which was greeted with great disappointment.¹²⁸ While in these ways

¹²⁴ Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988, pp.47-48

¹²⁵ King, Peter, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, p.11

¹²⁶ Price, Monroe E., *Television, the public sphere and national identity*, Oxford University Press, USA, 1995, p.6

¹²⁷ ‘In pictures: Papua gets connected’, BBC News report, accessed from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/07/asia_pac_papua_gets_connected/html/1.stm in December 2007

¹²⁸ Personal observation by the author during visit to the province, August 2005.

the radio was a centrifugal force, the radio soap operas that are listened to avidly by highland people appear to provide (Indonesian) characters that are empathised with. This empathy with (other) non-Papuan Indonesians is a force towards the feelings of commonality that Anderson claims to be a characteristic of nationalism.¹²⁹

As Hechter notes, “the internal colonial model states that political cleavages will largely reflect significant cultural differences between groups.”¹³⁰ This is another characteristic of the situation in Papua that conforms to this theory, with the cultural representations discussed in chapter 6 showing that such cultural differences are perceived to be present between groups by both indigenous Papuans and other Indonesians.

These characteristics of migration all accord with the internal colonialism theory explored in chapter 3.¹³¹ This model proposes that there will be significant complications to national development and to national unity due to a lack of justice and legitimacy that is perceived by those in the periphery.¹³² This is the case as exemplified by the large quantity of research and discourse on the legitimacy of Indonesian rule of the territory through the Act of Free Choice, the distrust that has accompanied the division of the territory into two provinces¹³³ and the symbolic return of the Special Autonomy package by the Papuan Customary Council in 2005.¹³⁴

Colonialist attitudes can also be seen in particular governmental programs undertaken during this period, with the plan to force the wearing of clothes

¹²⁹ Anderson (1999), p.3

¹³⁰ Hechter (1975), p.10

¹³¹ See chapter 3.

¹³² Hechter (1975), p.10

¹³³ See chapter 5, pp.159-160 for a discussion of this division.

¹³⁴ King, Blair A., *Peace in Papua: widening a window of opportunity*, CSR No.14, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 2006, pp.13-14

upon highland people in 1970 being an early example of attitudes of cultural superiority. This can also be noted in a program that was announced even before the province was formally part of Indonesia. Elson states that “Suharto announced in October 1969 a plan to assist Irian’s development by placing 200,000 Irianese children with Indonesian families.”¹³⁵ This program has strong echoes of the program which took indigenous children away from their parents in Australia, a fact that was acknowledged and apologised for by the Rudd government in February 2008. While Suharto’s intended program was never to go ahead, the attitude towards indigenous people appears identical to that of the originators of the ‘Stolen Generation’ policy.¹³⁶

Ernest Gellner views industrialisation as flowing like a wave over under-developed areas of the world. Gellner states that: “The wave creates acute cleavages of interest between sets of people hit by it at different times – in other words the more and less advanced.”¹³⁷ This model appears to fit the situation of Papua within Indonesia, with the territory’s people being hit by this wave of modernity much later than those in much of the rest of Indonesia as noted above. The advantages and disadvantages this gives different groups leads to areas of greater and lesser economic wealth. If the sets of people in these areas have cultural differences, these differences in advantage can lead to discrimination between groups, a cultural/ethnic division of labour and the potential for conflict. This model accounts for the ‘rebirth’ of ethnicities during the process of (post)-industrialization, with the disadvantaged group creating an identity in response to oppression by the advanced, dominant ethnic group. This

¹³⁵ Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001, p.179

¹³⁶ See Wilson, Ronald, *Bringing them home: report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families*, National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Australia), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 1997 for a full discussion of the Stolen Generation.

¹³⁷ Hechter (1975), p.38, quoting Ernest Gellner

identity is created “contemporaneously to legitimate demands for the present-day goal of independence, or the achievement of economic equality.”¹³⁸

In the case of Papua, the creation of a Papuan identity can be said to have started with the post-war period of Dutch rule, especially among the elite being trained at the new academies established at this time. However, the migration to the province that has occurred during the Indonesian sovereignty of Papua has solidified this supra-ethnic identification, with a strong Papuan identity being felt above being Indonesian by many indigenous people. As mentioned earlier, migrants to the province had advantages over indigenous people in relation to education and experience with the modern economy, as well as in terms of connections within the Indonesian administration. These advantages have led to inequalities in the province between migrants and indigenous people that have been instrumental in the creation of the political and social divisions between these two groups.

Independence is an unlikely event in the current political climate in Indonesia.¹³⁹ In order to legitimate the incorporation of Papua for indigenous people, the Indonesian government needs to address the social inequalities that have been illustrated by this study, especially the provision of education to the indigenous population. Without a greater parity in education, there seems little hope of greater parity in employment. If there is to truly be unity in the diversity of the province’s people, the social, cultural and economic development promised to indigenous Papuans by Indonesia in the New York Agreement needs to be honoured.

¹³⁸ Hechter (1975), p.39, quoting Ernest Gellner

¹³⁹ While an event hoped for by every Papuan I talked to, it is also a change which is not without its problems. For an examination of the possible implications of such a change see Aspinall (2006)

Reflections on the current research

Basing this research on Indonesian statistical data appeared at the outset of this research to be a compromise based on the impossibility of conducting research in Papua at this time. However, the vast amount of data that was contained in the census data, along with the great deal of additional information published by the provincial and regency statistical bureaus, meant that many original conclusions could be drawn about the changes to the region's society throughout the period of Indonesian sovereignty.

It is always tempting to make inferences based on other sources. This is especially the case in relation to such an emotive issue as Papua. The questions over its status as part of Indonesia, the human rights issues, and the influence of activist literature combine to make this subject one in which subjectivity is difficult for authors, as evidenced by the Yale Law School report. The current research has attempted to utilise the empirical data as the primary basis for the conclusions that have been drawn in order to assess the impact of migration as objectively as possible.

The conclusions that have been drawn challenge the claims of genocide in the province, but suggest that in total migration has been very strongly negative for the indigenous residents in the ways described above. The breadth of information on the topic has resulted in some important areas being beyond the scope of this study. Future work on health and on women's fertility patterns could provide further insight into the conclusions reached in the present study; on the alleged genocide in the province, and on patterns of social welfare among the indigenous and non-indigenous populations.

Many of the conclusions reached in the present study could be developed in complexity by additional work within the province. Such studies could include

surveys or questionnaires of both indigenous and non-indigenous residents with several areas of research being potentially crucial in understanding the dynamics of the province's society. It would be revealing to analyse residents' experiences in regard to education and employment through qualitative research; the difficulties faced by all groups of society, people's experiences of education in the province and the role of ethnicity in both these areas. The representations of Papuans noted in the current study suggest that prejudiced understandings of the province's indigenous inhabitants are likely to have played a part in their marginalisation in these fields, but further research in the province could evaluate the actual impact of such misconceptions.

Religion is another potentially revealing topic, with the interactions between ethnic groups based on a shared religion leading to more links between communities. It seems likely that some inter-ethnic links will strengthen in the future. The increasing number of second and third generation non-indigenous residents might play a role in determining the development of these links, as well as of the political future of the province. This group's role in mediating between the indigenous sphere and the national sphere has yet to be explored through academic investigation.

In conclusion, the current study appears to have disproved many presumptions made about the changes that have occurred to the province's society during the last four decades. While the valuable conclusions that can be drawn from the statistical data provide a strong foundation, this work needs to be augmented by qualitative research to investigate the complexities that are individual to the ongoing transformation of Papuan society.

Appendix A: Names and naming

Names have changed repeatedly in the island of New Guinea. This is just common experience for colonised areas, with most having had similar alterations to their place names. Names reflect and emphasise the power structure, with rulers illustrating to their subjects and themselves their dominance by the use of symbols such as titles, flags and anthems. New rulers change names to mark the change of rulership for the populace. The name change also serves to domesticate the exotic for the incomers. As Todorov states in regard to Christopher Columbus, “nomination is equivalent to taking possession.”¹ By naming these places, as well as by raising their flags and making proclamations, these explorers felt they were now the rightful owners of these lands.

Three names for the island and its peoples in various combinations have been most common: New Guinea, Papua and Irian. The independent republic occupying the eastern half of the island uses both of the first two terms, being named Papua New Guinea. The western half of the island was West New Guinea in colonial times, became Irian under Indonesian rule and is currently Papua.² These first two names (New Guinea and Papua) reflect the European colonial presence and dominance, with both being conceived and adopted by European explorers. The name Irian reflects the dominance of the latest immigrants, those from the rest of Indonesia.

New Guinea was one of the early names applied by Europeans to the island. When Inigo Ortiz de Retes travelled along the north coast as far as the

¹ Todorov, Tzvetan, *The conquest of America*, Harper Perennial, translator Richard Howard, New York, 1984, p.27

² It is unclear at this time what the legal status of this province is, with this region being treated administratively as part of Papua in some cases, as a different province in others. I have decided to include the whole of the western half of the island in the designation Papua.

Mamberamo River in 1545, he named it 'Nueva Guinea'. While this seems to refer to the people's resemblance to those of Africa,³ it may simply be referring to their black skin.⁴ The name was used in European maps by 1569.⁵ While de Retes claimed the island for the King of Spain, Spain never had a colonial presence on it. The colonial rulers of the western half of the island, the Dutch, named their possession Netherlands New Guinea, often being referred to as West New Guinea. The name Guinea was widely used in the eastern half of the island, historically in both the German and British/Australian colonies, and presently as part of the republic's title.

There appears to be no indigenous word for the island as a whole used by those who lived on it before the time of European contact.⁶ This is unsurprising given the small scale of many Papuan communities before modern times and the low levels of long-distance travel amongst most of the indigenous population. One exception to this rule seems to have been Biak, an island in the north of the Cenderawasih Bay. The people of this island have historically been involved in inter-island trade and travel which may explain their role in providing names for the island.⁷

Irian was considered by some indigenous people a more acceptable name than Papua in the period following the Pacific War. This term did not have the

³ Bone Jr., Robert C., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, Cornell, New York, 1958, p.9

⁴ At this time, the word Guinea was used to refer to sub-Saharan, coastal West Africa. The word is apparently of Berber origin, from the word *aguinaw*, or *gnawa* meaning 'black man'. From 'Origins of Names of African Countries', Indigenous People of Africa and America website, accessed from http://www.ipooa.com/african_country_name_origin.htm in January 2008

⁵ 'Historical dates – in Chronological order', accessed from http://www.koteka.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=34 in June 2006

⁶ 'Re: Name Change to West Papua', input to reg.westpapua mailing list, 19 December 1999, accessed from http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/Re_NameChangeWP.html in April 2006

⁷ See Penders, C.L.M., *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002, pp.127-128. This is not to imply that communities were untouched by the outside world, but simply that there was comparatively little travel by the indigenous peoples and little inter-ethnic interaction.

negative connotations that the name Papua carried for some Papuans.⁸ The term Irian seems to have come from Biak, though there is considerable debate on the meaning and origin of this term, with different writers claiming that it was either a pro-Indonesian acronym or an existing indigenous term that was then turned into an acronym by Indonesian propagandists.

Frank Kaisiepo, the Papuan delegate at the Malino conference in 1946, introduced this term into more widespread use at this conference.⁹ Moore claims the name means “to rise”¹⁰ while other meanings within regions of Biak include “hot land”¹¹, “our land” or “band of slaves”.¹² Kaisiepo, originally from Biak, suggested it as a non-colonial name to replace the term New Guinea. According to David Webster, this title had resonances of the Koreri messianic religion for Biak people.¹³ Mote and Rutherford suggest that the acronym was chosen first, by an Indonesian nationalist Soegoro Atmoprasodjo. Mote and Rutherford claim that Soegoro suggested using this word to Frank Kaisiepo, and that “it seems likely that Soegoro and his students looked for an indigenous word after they came up with the acronym.”¹⁴

At this conference Frank Kaisiepo also advocated Papua becoming part of the new nation of Indonesia, as part of the Moluccan region, an announcement for which he was condemned by other Papuans on his return. Since it appears he was implicated in the pro-Indonesian movement, his position casts doubt on

⁸ Webster (1999), appendix A

⁹ See Lijphart, Arend, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p.11

¹⁰ Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003, p.3

¹¹ Taken as the title of his book on the island by John Ryan. Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970

¹² Webster, David, “...Sampai Merauke”: *The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-1962*, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, unpublished, 1999, appendix A

¹³ Webster (1999), appendix A

¹⁴ Mote, Octavianus & Danilyn Rutherford, ‘From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia’s Troubled East’, *Indonesia*, Volume 72 (October 2001), p.120, footnote 19

how widely accepted the term Irian was at this point.¹⁵ Certainly the connotations of this term appear to have become negative for many Papuans by the early 1960s. This arose from the use of the term by the Indonesians for propaganda purposes, especially prior to the handover of power to the UNTEA. Whatever its actual origins, according to Webster at this time: “The name Irian itself became a slogan, an acronym for Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti-Nederland (Follow the Republic of Indonesia anti-Netherlands).”¹⁶ After becoming a new Indonesian province, the name for the territory was initially changed to Irian Barat (West Irian) by President Sukarno in 1963. The name changed once more in 1973 when the next President, Suharto, renamed the province Irian Jaya – Victorious Irian. Symbolically, the occasion chosen to announce this change of appellation was the inauguration ceremony for the new Freeport mine.¹⁷

From 1961 onwards, pro-Papuan nationalists chose to name the territory Papua or West Papua. This term was prohibited under the New Order, with Mote and Rutherford suggesting its use was “taboo”.¹⁸ However, following the fall of Suharto, the push for independence by indigenous people led to a change of the province’s name from Irian Jaya to Papua as announced by President Abdurrahman Wahid in January 2000.¹⁹

Following this change, the name Irian has been reintroduced to the region with the splitting of the province by Presidential Instruction in 2003. While the three-

¹⁵ See Lagerberg, C.S.I.J., *Years of Reconstruction: New Guinea from 1949 to 1961*, Research and Microfilm, Maryland, 1963, p.33

¹⁶ Webster (1999), pp.21-22

¹⁷ Webster (1999), appendix A

¹⁸ Mote & Rutherford (2001), p.120

¹⁹ Webster (1999), appendix A; This name change was not endorsed by the MPR in 2000, see Bertrand, Jacques, *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2004, p.157, but endorsed this decision in 2001, see International Crisis Group, *Dividing Papua: How not to do it*, Asia Briefing No.24, Jakarta/Brussels, 9th April 2003, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1764> in February 2008, p.2. See also Mote & Rutherford (2001), p.120, footnote 19

way division envisaged by President Megawati did not occur following protests, the western end of the island did become (to some extent at least) a separate province, called West Irian Jaya.²⁰ Despite this administrative division, this thesis will cover the whole of this region formerly known as the Netherlands New Guinea for several reasons.

Firstly, this region has the shared history of Dutch rule before and after the Pacific War. Secondly, all the available data and writings cover this area. Thirdly, the establishment of West Irian Jaya province has been of a legally dubious and administratively confused nature. While the Indonesian Supreme Court has ruled the province illegal, it has condoned the continued existence of the province as it had a de facto administrative presence.²¹ Additionally, in some ways this is still not a full province administratively. There is no high court in the province, and even legal actions against voting irregularities in West Irian Jaya in March 2006 had to be decided in the Jayapura High Court.²²

Papua is the last of the three terms often used for the island and its peoples, a term that has a longer documented history than Irian. There are many conflicting claims concerning the meaning of the term Papua. A possible first usage of this term has been attributed to the Portuguese governor of the Moluccas, Jorge de Meneses, who was blown off course to the Bird's Head

²⁰ King, Blair A., *Peace in Papua: widening a window of opportunity*, CSR No.14, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 2006, pp.7-8

²¹ See Sullivan, Laurence, *Challenges to Special Autonomy in the province of Papua, Republic of Indonesia*, Discussion paper 2003/6, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 2003, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/sullivan-2003-ssgm-otsus.pdf> in February 2008 for the legal background to this division. Also, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, Asia Briefing No. 47, 23 March 2006, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4042&l=1> in March 2006, pp.3-4

²² Somba, Nethy Dharma, 'Result of Irian Jaya Election Challenged', *The Jakarta Post*, March 28, 2006

region in 1526.²³ Ploeg contends that the term was already in use as earlier than this, being on the map used by a European expedition to Banda in 1513.²⁴

There are claims that this name may have arisen from Tidorese usage²⁵, and was insulting, meaning slave.²⁶ The most repeated derivation appears to be from the Malay word, *papua* or *pua-pua*, meaning frizzy haired.²⁷ Sollewijn Gelpke comments on the various claims on the origin of the name, Papua. It has been suggested that the name derives from the word “*papua* or *puah-puah*, a Malay word meaning, ‘frizzly-haired’.”²⁸ Gelpke shows that this derivation is decidedly shaky, with most claims deriving originally from the 1812 Malay-English dictionary of Marsden.²⁹ It appears that the word was used in the early sixteenth century to refer to Halmahera or the islands nearby. This name was then applied to those from Biak and other islands in Geelvink Bay. Gelpke says that “the people referred to as ‘Papua’ in the sixteenth-century Portuguese and Spanish sources belonged almost exclusively to the Biak tribe – the seafarers of New Guinea.”³⁰ Sollewijn Gelpke, taking a lead from Kamma’s suggestion, claims that the term may have come from a Biak term, *sup i papwa*, meaning the land below the sun. This originally referred to the Bird’s Head and the islands west of there, and later became a term for the mainland also.³¹

²³ Webster (1999), appendix A; Souter, Gavin, *New Guinea: The last unknown*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1964, p.18

²⁴ Ploeg, Anton, 'De Papoea': What's in a Name?, *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology (TAPJA)*, Vol. 33(3), 75-101, 2002, p.76

²⁵ Mahdi, Waruno, 'After the West Papuan Congress', this text was sent out in six sections to several mailing lists on June 29 (1&2), June 30 (3&4), July 1 (5), and July 6 (6), 2000, accessed from <http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/afterWPC.html> in April 2006

²⁶ Ploeg (2002), note ii, p.94

²⁷ Ploeg (2002), p.76

²⁸ Gelpke, J.H.F. Sollewijn, 'On the Origin of the Name Papua', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 149, pp.318-32, 1993, p.

²⁹ Gelpke (1993), pp.320-322

³⁰ Gelpke (1993), p.326

³¹ Gelpke (1993), pp.326-327

The name Papua has since re-emerged as the term preferred by indigenous people on both sides of the border. This has probably occurred in part as a reaction to the use of the term Irian by the Indonesian government and in part to emphasise the cultural connection with Papua New Guinea, with the east rather than the west. The term 'Papua Barat' may also come from Biak and the Korori movement, with Webster suggesting that Franz Kaisiepo's cousin, Markus Kaisiepo, was the first to introduce this term.³² The term had different connotations for Indonesian observers however, with the Indonesian ambassador to the UN suggesting in 1961 that "Papuans means a people without civilization."³³

A further term that has been used to describe the territory is West Melanesia. Even more so than the title Papua, this name links the two halves of the island, along with the islands to the east. This reference to another European term³⁴ suggests a cultural connection between these places, a bridge across the imposed colonial border. That it has been principally used by pro-Papuan independence figures beginning with Nicolas Jouwe is compatible with such connotations.³⁵

As can be seen, the names given to the province/colony as a whole have changed on a number of occasions. Similarly, many of the names of cities, towns, mountains, rivers etc. have changed, some a number of times. In order to clarify the names that are used in this study for readers, a list of many of the names of places used within this thesis will be included below, along with a

³² Webster (1999), appendix A

³³ Webster (1999), appendix A

³⁴ Webster (1999), appendix A, states that this term was invented by Dumont D'Urville, a French explorer in 1832.

³⁵ Webster (1999), appendix A

short definition of each and/or the other names that have been used for this place.

Names

Amboina	Regency of Ambon in Netherlands East Indies
Bacan	Island in the Moluccas or Maluku to the south-west of Halmahera
Baliem Valley	Highly populated area of the highlands, focussed on Wamena, Jayawijaya
Biak	Island to the north of Papua in Cenderawasih Bay
Bird's Head	The western districts of the province, named due to the similarity of the map of the island of New Guinea to a bird
Dani	Also spelled Ndani. Largest ethnic group in Papua, originating from the Baliem Valley area
Geelvink Bay	Bay to the north-east of the Bird's Head region, currently called Teluk Cenderawasih/ Cenderawasih Bay
Halmahera	Largest island in Maluku
Hollandia	Name for Jayapura under Dutch rule
Humboldt Bay	Name for the bay surrounding Jayapura under the Dutch, named Yos Sudarso Bay by the Indonesians
Jayapura	Present name of the provincial capital, formerly Hollandia, meaning Victorious/Glorious Town
Kai Islands	Also Kei. A group of islands located to the south of the Bird's Head region
Kota Baru	Name for Jayapura between 1962 and 1963 during UNTEA period, meaning New Town
Lake Sentani	Large lake in the Jayapura regency, site of MacArthur's WWII forces airbase

Moluccas	Islands now called Maluku
NEI	Netherlands East Indies, Dutch colony which is the predecessor to the Indonesian state in area
Numbay (or Numbai)	Putatively the original name for the city of Jayapura. It has been suggested that this name for the city should be re-adopted
Onin Peninsula	Peninsula around Fak-Fak
Paniai Lakes	Also called Wissel Lakes, in the western highlands region
Schouten Islands	Dutch name for Biak-Numfor
Seram	Also Ceram in older texts. Large island in Maluku to west of New Guinea
Seram Laut	Also Ceram Laut in older texts. Small island located off the eastern tip of Seram.
Sukarnopura	Name for Jayapura between 1963 and 1968, meaning Sukarno Town
Ternate	Island in Maluku, close to Tidore with a long history of rivalry with it
Tidore	Island in Maluku, west of Halmahera
Wamena	Highland town, capital of Jayawijaya regency
Wissel Lakes	Large lakes in the western highlands, named by the Dutch after the pilot who spotted these lakes in 1936. Now called Danau Paniai, Paniai Lake
Yos Sudarso Bay	Name for the bay surrounding Jayapura, called Humboldt Bay under the Dutch. The name change remembered Captain Yos Sudarso, a deputy chief of the navy killed by the Dutch during Operation Mandala in 1962

Bibliography

Statistical materials (listed chronologically)

Groenwegen, Dr. K. & Dr. D.J. van de Kaa, *Resultaten van het demografisch onderzoek Westerlijk Nieuw-Guinea (Data from 1961 Dutch Demographic Survey)*, [EEG PROJECT 11.41.002], Books 1-6, Government printing and publishing office, The Hague, 1964-1965

Irian Barat dalam angka, 1964-1968, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1969

Irian Barat dalam angka, 1967-1971, Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Propinsi Irian Barat, Djajapura, 1972

Sensus Penduduk 1971, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1971

Sensus Penduduk 1971 - Hasil Pencacahan Sensus Lengkap bulan September 1971 di Propinsi Irian Jaya (Angka Sementara), Biro Pusat Statistik Djajapura, Jayapura, 1972

Sensus penduduk 1971: Penduduk Irian Jaya, Seri E: Volume 26, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1974

Irian Jaya dalam angka 1980, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 1981

Jayapura dalam angka 1980, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayapura, Jayapura, 1981

Penduduk Kabupaten Jayawijaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten, Jayawijaya, 1981

Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: Hasil Pencacahan Lengkap, Biro Pusat Statistik, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 1981

Kompilasi data Kota Wamena Kabupaten Jayawijaya, Propinsi Irian Jaya, Proyek Pembinaan Unit Perencanaan, Jayapura, 1983

McDonald, Peter F., *Pedoman Analisa Data Sensus Indonesia 1971-1980*, Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, Australian Universities' International Development Program, Canberra, 1983

Penduduk Propinsi Irian Jaya 1980: hasil sensus penduduk 1980, Seri S28, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1983

Jayawijaya dalam angka, Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayawijaya, Wamena, 1990

Irian Jaya dalam angka 1990, Kantor Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya kerja sama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan daerah Tingkat I, Jayapura, 1991

Penduduk Indonesia: hasil sensus penduduk 1990, Series L1, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1991

Penduduk Irian Jaya: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 1990, Seri S2.27, (Population of Irian Jaya: Results of the 1990 population census, Series S2.27), Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1992

Fertilitas, mortalitas, migrasi: Hasil Survei penduduk antar sensus (SUPAS), Seri: S3, Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 1995

Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2000

Irian Jaya dalam angka 2000, Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Irian Jaya, Jayapura, 2001

Kabupaten Jayapura dalam angka 2001 (Jayapura regency in figures 2001), Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001

Kota Jayapura dalam angka 2001 (Jayapura municipality in figures 2001), Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Jayapura, Jayapura, Indonesia, 2001

Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2001

Penduduk Papua: Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, Seri L2.2.30 (Population of Papua: Results of the 2000 population census), 2001

Estimasi fertilitas, mortalitas dan migrasi: hasil sensus penduduk tahun 2000, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002

Karakteristik penduduk asli Provinsi Papua: tabel-tabel pokok hasil pencacahan dan estimasi sensus penduduk 2000 (Native population characteristics of Papua Province: main tables results of the 2000 population census), Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002

Papua dalam angka 2002, Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, Jayapura, 2002

Profil kependudukan Provinsi Irian Jaya Tahun 2000, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2002

'Population and social statistics: Demographic Indicators', *National Statistical Office for Papua New Guinea*, http://www.nso.gov.pg/Pop_Soc_%20Stats/popsoc.htm and http://www.nso.gov.pg/Pop_Soc_%20Stats/Social/Health/health.htm, accessed May 2005

Penduduk Provinsi Papua: Hasil Survei Penduduk antar sensus 2005, Seri S2.31, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 2006

Maps

All maps used with the permission of PapuaWeb and according to their conditions of use which are available from <http://www.papuaweb.org/info/disclaimer.html>

'Batas administrasi baru untuk propinsi-propinsi Papua' ('New administrative boundaries for the provinces of Papua'), accessed from

<http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/pp/peta-hr.gif> in February 2008

'Perbatasan Papua dari masa ke masa' ('The borders of Papua through time'), accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/sejarah/veur-ng.jpg>

'Peta dasar Propinsi Papua' ('Basic map of Papua'), accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/p-pwb/papua-umum-57k.gif>

'Peta Pulau New Guinea' ('Regional Map of the Island of New Guinea'), accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/peta/p-pwb/ng-35k.gif>

Secondary Sources

Aditjondro, George, 'Why People Flock to Sorong', *Kabar dari Kampung*, No.20, April 1986 in *Indonesia Reports*, Culture and Society Supplement, No.21, June 1987

Aditjondro, George, "*Datang Dengan Kapal, Tidur di Pasar, Buang Air di Kali, Pulang Naik Pesawat*": Suatu telaah tentang dampak migrasi suku-suku bangsa dari Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara ke Irian Jaya sejak tahun 1962, (*Arrive by Ship, Sleep in the Market, Piss in the River, Leave by Plane*), YPMD, Jayapura, 1986

Aditjondro, George, 'Transmigration in Irian Jaya: issues, targets and alternative approaches.', *Yaal-Ambu*, 13(3), pp.23-40., September 1986a

Aditjondro, George, *Cahaya Bintang Kejora: Papua Barat dalam Kajian Sejarah, Budaya, Ekonomi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia*, ELSAM, Jakarta 2000

Ali, Kecia, 'Islam and Slavery', accessed from <http://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/Pages/islamandslavery.html> in March 2006

Andaya, Barbara Watson, *To live as brothers: Southeast Sumatra in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries*, University of Honolulu Press, Honolulu, 1993

Andaya, Leonard Y., *The world of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the early modern period*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 1993a

Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, Revised edition, Verso, London, 1991

Anderson, Benedict, 'Indonesian nationalism today, and in the future', *Indonesia*, No.67, April 1999, pp.1-11

Aspinall, Edward, 'Selective outrage and unacknowledged fantasies: re-thinking Papua, Indonesia and Australia', *Austral Policy Forum 06-15*, 4 May 2006

Assmann, K., 'Transmigration in Indonesia special reference to the ethnic national aspect', *Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika Zeitschrift*, 18 (6), pp.998-1010, 1990

Ballard, Chris, Anton Ploeg and Steven Vink, *Race to the Snow: photography and the exploration of Dutch New Guinea. 1907-1936*, Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, 2001

Ballard, Chris, 'The denial of traditional land rights in West Papua', *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 26.3, Fall 2002, accessed online through sfx at <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/csq/csq-article.cfm?id=1565> in May 2007

Ballard, Chris, 'Paradise betrayed: correspondence', *Quarterly Essay*, 8, pp.94-100, 2002a

Ballard, Chris, *Human Rights and the Mining Industry in Indonesia: a baseline study*, MMSD Working Paper No. 182, Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development., London, 2000b accessed at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?o=G00929> in November 2008

Bandiyono, Suko and Makmuri Sukarno, 'Migration to the city of Sorong, Irian Jaya', *Buletin Pengkajian Masalah Penduduk dan Pembangunan*, V(1-2), pp.45-56, Jan-May 1994

Bandiyono, Suko et al, *Mobilitas Penduduk perbatasan Irian Jaya di wilayah Jayapura*, PPT-LIPI, Jakarta, 1997

Banki, Susan, 'Trickle Up in Nepal and Irian Jaya, Indonesia', Trickle Up Project, New York, Unpublished paper, 2000

Barker, Chris, *Television, Globalization and Cultural Identities*, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 1999

Beanal, Tom, *Amungme: magaboarat negel jombe-peibe*, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, Jakarta, 1997

Bellwood, Peter, *Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian archipelago*, Academic Press, Orlando, 1985

Bellwood, Fox and Tryon, *The Austronesians: historical and comparative perspectives*, ANU, Canberra, 1995

Benedetti, 'Another mass protest in Manokwari', 17th June 2007, *WestPan*, accessed from <http://www.westpapua.ca/?q=en/node/483> in January 2008

Bertrand, Jacques, *Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2004

Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa and M.Hamdan Basyar, 'Dampak sosial, politik dan keamanan transmigrasi di Irian Jaya', *Buletin Pengkajian Masalah Penduduk dan Pembangunan*, V(1-2), pp.57-78, Jan-May 1994

Boomgaard, Peter, Freek Colombijn and David Henley (eds), *Paper Landscapes: Explorations in the environmental history of Indonesia*, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1997

Bone, Robert C., Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, Cornell, New York, 1958

Broekhuysen, Johan Theodorus, *De Papoea-migrant in Hollandia*, Bibliotheek der Rijks Universiteit, Utrecht, 1960

Brown, A.A. & Egon Neugerger, *Internal migration: a comparative perspective*, Academic Press, New York, 1977

Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan, *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Yale Law School, April 2004

Budiardjo, Carmel & Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: the obliteration of a people*, TAPOL, Surrey, 1988

Butt, Leslie, ' "Lipstick Girls" and "Fallen Women": AIDS and conspiratorial thinking in Papua, Indonesia', *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.412-441, August 2005

Butt, Leslie, *The Social and Political Life of Infants among the Baliem Valley Dani, Irian Jaya*, PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, 1998, accessed from Papua Web, http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/butt/_phd.html in August 2007

Castles, Stephen & Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration*, Third Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003

Chapman, Murray and Philip S. Morrison (eds) *Mobility and Identity in the Island Pacific. Special Issue of Pacific Viewpoint*, April 1985, 26(1), pp. 206-220

Chauvel, Richard, 'West New Guinea: perceptions and policies, ethnicity and the nation state', in Milner and Quilty, *Episodes*, OUP, Melbourne, 1998

Chauvel, Richard, 'The Backlash: Jakarta's secret strategy to deal with Papuan nationalism', *Inside Indonesia*, 67, July-Sept 2001, accessed from <http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/452/29/> in December 2008

Chauvel, Richard, *Essays on West Papua: volume one*, Working Paper 120, Monash, Victoria, 2003

Chauvel, Richard and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's perceptions and policies*, Policy Studies No.5, East-West Center, Washington, 2004

Chauvel, Richard, 'Divide and who rules?: Ethnic nationalism under siege in West Papua', *Inside Indonesia*, April-June 2004a

Chauvel, Richard, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation*, Policy Studies 14, East-West Center, Washington, 2005

Cohen, Abner, *Two-dimensional man*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974

Cohen, Abner (Ed.), *Urban ethnicity*, Tavistock, London, 1974a

Crocombe, Ron & Ali Ahmed, *Politics in Melanesia*, Suva, Institute of Pacific Studies, 1982

Davies, Matthew N., *Indonesian responses to resurgent Papuan separatism: an open source intelligence case study*, ANU, Canberra, 2001

Diamond, Jared, *Guns, germs and steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years*, Vintage, Surrey, 1998

Drooglever, Pieter Joost, *Een daad van vrije keuze: de Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht*, Boom, Amsterdam, 2005

Duara, Prasenjit (ed.), *Decolonization: perspectives from now and then*, New York, Routledge, 2003

- Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002
- Elson, R.E., *Suharto: a political biography*, Cambridge, Australia, 2001
- Emmerson, Donald K., *Indonesia beyond Suharto*, East Gate, New York, 1999
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, *Ethnicity and nationalism*, 2nd edition, Pluto Press, Chippenham, 2002
- Farhadian, Charles , *Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia*, Routledge, New York, 2005
- Feith, Anne Marie, *We don't want bullets... We can do this through talk: A Human Rights Response to Indonesian Rule in West Papua*, Master of Social Science (International Development) thesis, RMIT University, School of Social Science & Planning, June 2005
- Fengler, Wolfgang, Jasmin Chakeri and Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir, 'Is Papua Spending Its Fiscal Resources Wisely?', *The Jakarta Post*, 16 November, 2005
- Fenton, Steve, *Ethnicity: racism, class and culture*, Macmillan, 1999
- FitzSimons, Peter, *Kokoda*, Hodder Headline, Sydney, 2004
- Flanagan, Martin, 'The exile who fights for the rights of all Papuans', *The Age (Melbourne)*, February 27 2003
- Foss, Daniel A., 'Third and sixth century crises east and west', 1996, accessed from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/046.html> in March 2005
- Furnivall, J.S., *Colonial Policy and Practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*, New York University Press, New York, 1956

Furnivall, J.S., *Netherlands India: A study of plural economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944

Gardner, Robert, *Dead Birds* (videorecording), Warner Modular Publications, New York, 1964

Gardner, Robert & Karl G. Heider, *Gardens of war: Life and death in the New Guinea stone age*, Random House, New York, 1969

Garnaut, Ross and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: the transformation of a Melanesian economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974

Geertz, Clifford, *The interpretation of cultures*, Hutchinson, London, 1975

Gelpke, J.H.F. Sollewijn, 'On the Origin of the Name Papua', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 149, pp.318-32, 1993

Giay, Benny, *Menuju Papua Baru: eberapa pokok pikiran sekitar emansipasi orang Papua*, Deiyai, Jayapura, 2000

Giay, Benny, 'Towards a New Papua', *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2001, accessed from <http://insideindonesia.org/edit67/giay.htm> in August 2007

Goldscheider, Calvin (ed.), *Population, ethnicity and nation-building*, Westview, Boulder, 1995

Gouda, Frances, *Dutch culture overseas: colonial practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900-1942*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 1995

Graves, Joseph L., Jr., 'What We Know and What We Don't Know: Human Genetic Variation and the Social Construction of Race', accessed from <http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Graves/> in July 2007

Guibernau, Montserrat & John Rex, *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997

Guidieri et al (eds.), *Ethnicities and nations: processes of interethnic relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific*, Rothko Chapel, Houston, 1988

Hardjono, J.M., *Transmigration in Indonesia*, OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1977

Harris, Stephen V. & Colin Brown, *Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya problem of 1984*, Griffith University, Nathan, 1985

Hastings, Peter, *New Guinea: problems and prospects*, Cheshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1969

Hechter, Michael, *Internal colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975

Heider, Karl G., *The Dugum Dani: a Papuan culture in the highlands of West New Guinea*, Aldine, Chicago, 1970

Heider, Karl, *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*, Third Edition, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, 1997

Henderson, W., *West New Guinea: The dispute and its settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, USA, 1973

Herawati, Titi, *Studi pengembangan pemukiman untuk alokasi penempatan Penduduk daerah transmigrasi (APPDT)*, Pusat Penelitian dan pengembangan, Departemen Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman perambah hutan R.I., Jakarta, 1998

Hess, Janet Berry, *Art and Architecture in Postcolonial Africa*, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 2006

Heuken, Adolf, *Historical sites of Jakarta, Second Edition*, Cipta Loka Caraka, Jakarta, 1983

Hill, Hal (Ed.), *Unity and Diversity: regional economic development in Indonesia since 1970*, OUP, Singapore, 1989

Hooper-Greenhill, Eilean, *Museums and the shaping of knowledge*, Routledge, London, 1992

Howard, Michael C. and Naffi Sanggenafa (eds), *Indigenous peoples and migrants of Northern Papua, Indonesia*, Bangkok, White Lotus, 2005

Howe, K.H., Robert C. Kiste & Brij V. Lal (eds.), *Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the twentieth century*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1994

Hughes, Ian, *New Guinea Stone Age Trade*, ANU, Canberra, 1977

Hull, Terence H., 'First results from the 2000 population census', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol.37, No.1, 2001, 103-111

Huntington, Samuel P., *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Touchstone, London, 1996

Ilchman, Lasswell, Montgomery & Weiner, *Policy sciences and population*, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975

International Crisis Group, *Dividing Papua: How not to do it*, Asia Briefing No.24, Jakarta/Brussels, 9th April 2003, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1764> in February 2008

International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: ending repression in Irian Jaya*, Asia Report No.23, Jakarta/Brussels, 2001, accessed at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm> in January 2005

International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua*, Asia Report No.39, Brussels/Jakarta, 2002, accessed from

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1449&l=1> in February 2008

International Crisis Group, *Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, Asia Report No.53, Jakarta/Brussels, 5th September 2006a, accessed from

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4364&l=1> in February 2008

International Crisis Group (ICG), *Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue*, Asia Briefing No. 47, 23 March 2006, accessed from

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4042&l=1> in March 2006

International Crisis Group (ICG), *Indonesian Papua: A local perspective on the conflict*, Update Briefing, Asia Briefing Number No.66, Jakarta/Brussels, 19th July 2007, accessed from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4945&l=1> in February 2008

International Foundation for Election Systems, *Papuan Public Opinion Survey Indonesia*, accessed from

http://www.ifes.org/publication/f9142e799420621ae2c846440ac840f8/Papua_Summary_Report_Final.pdf in January 2008

Ipenberg, At, 'The life and death of Theys Eluay', *Inside Indonesia*, 70, Apr-Jun 2002,

accessed from <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit70/Theys2.htm> in December 2008

Ismail, Muhammad Gade et al., *Aceh, Jakarta, Papua: akar permasalahan dan alternative proses penyelesaian konflik*, YAPPIKA, Jakarta, 2001

Jaspan, M, 'The Tjenderawasih State University of West Irian', *Vestes* (The Australian Universities Review Journal of the Federal Council of University Staff Associations of Australia), Vol. VII, No.4, 1964, pp.262-268

Jaspan, M.A., 'West Irian: The first two years', *The Australian Quarterly*, June 9-21, 1965, pp.9-21

Jilani, Hina, *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders: Addendum, Mission to Indonesia*, 28th January 2008, A/HRC/7/28/Add.2, accessed from <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7session/A-HRC-7-28-Add2.doc> in February 2008

Kansil, Drs. C.S.T., *Sejarah Indonesia Untuk SMTP*, Jilid I, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta, 1987

Karafir, Yan Pieter, *Kondisi Ekonomi Makro Propinsi Papua: Perbandingan Dua Periode 1986-1991 dan 1996-2000*, Fakultas Ekonomi dan Pusat Penelitian Pemberdayaan Fiskal dan Ekonomi Daerah Universitas Negeri Papua, Manokwari, 2003

Kartodirdjo, Sartono, *Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru: 1500-1900 Dari Emporium Sampai Imperium*, Jilid (Volume) I, Gramedia, Jakarta, 1987

King, Blair A., *Peace in Papua: widening a window of opportunity*, CSR No.14, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 2006

King, Peter, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004

Kirch, Patrick Vinton, *The Lapita Peoples: Ancestors of the Oceanic World*, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 1997

Kirksey, S. Eben and Kiki van Bilsen, 'A road to freedom; Mee articulations and the Trans-Papua Highway', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)* 158-4 (2002):837-54, accessed at <http://people.ucsc.edu/~skirksey/writing/Road to Freedom BIJDR published.doc> in May 2007

Klein, Dr. W. C., *A comparison in colonial development: Trade in Australian and Dutch New Guinea*, Asiatic Review, London, 1937

Knauff, Bruce M., *From primitive to postcolonial in Melanesia and anthropology*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1999

Koczberski, Gina, George N. Curry and John Connell, 'Full Circle or Spiralling Out of Control?: State Violence and the Control of Urbanisation in Papua New Guinea', *Urban Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp.2017–2036, 2001

Kymlicka, Will, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford, 2001

Kymlicka, Will & Baogang He (Eds.), *Multiculturalism in Asia*, Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford, 2005

Lagerberg, Kees, *West Irian and Jakarta imperialism*, C. Hurst & Co., London, 1979

Lagerberg, C.S.I.J., *Years of Reconstruction: New Guinea from 1949 to 1961*, Research and Microfilm, Maryland, 1963

Lautenbach, Hendrika, *Demographic survey research in Irian Jaya*, Thela Thesis, 1999

Lijphart, Arend, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea*, Yale, New Haven, 1966

Lobe, Jim, 'Secret Papers Show Papuan Self-Determination Sacrificed to U.S. Courtship of Suharto', OneWorld US, July 12, 2004

Lonergan, Beth, *Exceptional souvenirs: museum displays and the idea of Indonesia*, unpublished Honours thesis, UNSW, 2002

Mahdi, Waruno, 'After the West Papuan Congress', this text was sent out in six sections to several mailing lists on June 29 (1&2), June 30 (3&4), July 1 (5), and July 6

(6), 2000, accessed from <http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/afterWPC.html> in April 2006

Manning, Chris and Michael Rumbiak, *Economic Development, Migrant Labour and Indigenous Welfare in Irian Jaya 1970-84*, Pacific Research Monograph 20, ANU, Canberra, 1989

Manning, Chris, 'Newcomers bring new ideas', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 136, No. 18, 30 Apr 1987, pp.42-43

Maxwell, Anne, *Colonial photography and exhibitions: representations of the 'Native' and the making of European Identities*, Leicester University Press, London, 1999

May, R.J. (ed.), *Between two nations: the Indonesia – Papua New Guinea border and West Papua Nationalism*, Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986

McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural society in peril: migration, economic change and the Papua conflict*, East-West Center Washington, 2004, accessed from www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications in September 2005

Miedema, Jelle & Cecilia Ode, Rien A.C. Dam (eds) with the assistance of Connie Baak, *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian Jaya, Indonesia : proceedings of the conference, Leiden, 13-17 October 1997*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1998

Miklouho-Maclay, Nikolai, *Travels to New Guinea*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982

Moore, Clive, *New Guinea: Crossing boundaries and history*, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2003

Mote, Octavianus & Danilyn Rutherford, 'From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of Primordialism in Indonesia's Troubled East', *Indonesia*, Volume 72 (October 2001), pp.115—140

Mrázek, Rudolf, *Sjahir: politics and exile in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y., Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994

Muhidin, Salahudin, *The population of Indonesia: regional demographic scenarios using a multiregional method and multiple data sources*, Rozenberg, Amsterdam, 2002

Munro, Catharine, 'Count reveals 312 tribes in Indonesian province', *Joyo Indonesia News*, AAP Newsfeed, July 16, 2002

Naylor, Larry L, *Culture Change and Development in the Baliem Valley, Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1977

Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs, *Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1961*, The Hague, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961

Oberai, A.S. & Manmohan Singh, H.K., *Causes and consequences of internal migration: A study in the Indian Punjab*, OUP, Delhi, 1983

Oey, Mayling, Migration and fertility in Indonesia, in Ilchman, Lasswell, Montgomery & Weiner, *Policy sciences and population*, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975

Olson, Steve, The genetic archaeology of race, *The Atlantic Monthly*, April 2001, <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/04/olson-p3.htm>, accessed November 2003

Oppenheimer, Stephen, *Eden in the east: the drowned continent of southeast Asia*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998

Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's secret war: the guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985

Otten, Mariël, *Transmigrasi: myths and realities - Indonesian resettlement policy. 1965-1985*, IWGIA Document No. 57, Copenhagen, 1986

Papastergiadis, Nikos, *The turbulence of migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity, Polity*, Cornwall, 2000

Pawley, Andrew, Robert Attenborough, Jack Golson and Robin Hide (eds), *Papuan Pasts: cultural, linguistic and biological histories of Papuan-speaking peoples*, ANU, Canberra, 2005

Pemberton, John, *On the subject of "Java"*, Cornell, Ithaca and London, 1994

Penders, C.L.M., *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002

Pigome Frans, 'Paths to Justice and Prosperity: West Papua 2007', organised by Indonesian Solidarity in association with the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS), University of Sydney, and The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Technology, August 9th 2007, Sydney, Australia

Ploeg, Anton, 'De Papoea': What's in a Name?', *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology (TAPJA)*, Vol. 33(3), pp.75-101, 2002

Postill, John, *Media and Nation Building: How the Iban became Malaysian*, Berghahn Books, New York, 2006

Pouwer, Jan, 'The colonisation, decolonisation and recolonisation of West New Guinea', *Journal of Pacific History*, 34(2), pp.157-179, 1999

Pressat, Roland, *Demographic analysis: methods, results, applications*, (translated by Judah Matras), Edward Arnold, London, 1972

Price, Monroe E., *Television, the public sphere and national identity*, Oxford University Press, USA, 1995

Rathgeber, Dr. Theodor (ed.), *Economic, social and cultural rights in West Papua*, The Evangelical Church in the Rhineland, foedus-verlag, 2005

Reid, Anthony (ed.), with the assistance of Jennifer Brewster, *Slavery, bondage and dependency in Southeast Asia*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1983

Reilly, Benjamin, 'Electoral and Political Party Reform', *Indonesia Update Conference 2006*, accessed from http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/activities/2006-07/D_P/2006_09_FA_INDO_THAI_Updates_Reilly_paper_INDO.pdf in January 2008

Rhys, Lloyd, *Jungle Pimpernel: The story of a district officer in Central Netherlands New Guinea*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1947

Robie, David, 'Papuan clergyman condemns Indonesia's 'genocidal' policies', *Te Waha Nui Online*, 18th August 2006 accessed from http://www.tewahanui.info/news/180806_wpClergyman.shtml in December 2008

Roosens, Eugen E., *Creating ethnicity: the process of ethnogenesis*, Sage, Newbury Park, 1989

Rowland, Donald T., *Demographic methods and concepts*, OUP, Oxford, 2003

Rumania, Nana, 'Truant teachers caught off guard in West Java', *Jakarta Post*, 12th June 2007

Rumbiak, Michael, *Nimboran Migration to Jayapura, Irian Jaya, and Rural-Urban Ties*, Unpublished MA Thesis, ANU, Canberra, 1983

Rutherford, Danilyn, *Raiding the land of the foreigners*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003

Ryan, John, *The hot land: focus on New Guinea*, Macmillan, Melbourne and Sydney, 1970

Ryan, Stephen, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995

- Saltford, John, *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations involvement in West New Guinea during the 1960s*, PhD thesis, University of Hull, 2000, accessed from http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/s123/saltford/_phd.html in May 2006
- Saltford, John, *The United Nations and the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: the anatomy of betrayal*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003
- Savage, Peter, 'The nationalist struggle in West Irian: the divisions within the liberation movement', *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, vol.14, no.2, June 1978, pp.142-148
- Scarpello, Fabio, 'Papuan seek global support for UN peacekeepers, free elections', *South China Morning Post*, 22nd March 2007
- Sharp, Nonie in association with Markus Wonggor Kaisiepo, *The morning star in Papua Barat*, Arena, North Carlton, 1994
- Sharp, Nonie, *The rule of the sword: the story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, 1977
- Siegel, James T., *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997
- Simatupang, T. B., 'An Indonesian Christian View of the West Irian Question', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No. 4. (Jun., 1962), pp. 28-32
- Simmons, Alan, Sergio Diaz-Briquets & Aprodicio A. Laguian, *Social change and internal migration: a review of research findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 1977
- Simon, Julian L., *The economic consequences of immigration*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989
- Smith, Anthony, *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge, Cambridge, 1981

Smith, Robert Ross, *The War in the Pacific: The approach to the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II Series, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1953, accessed from

<http://www.papuaweb.org/dlib/bk1/approach/> in March 2006

Smitha, Frank E., 'Rome's Decline and Christianity's Ascent, to 306 CE', accessed from

<http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch23.htm> in March 2005

Sollewijn Gelpke, J.H.F., "The report of Miguel Roxo de Brito of his voyage in 1581-1582 to the Raja Ampat, the MacCluer Gulf and Seram", *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde*, 150, pp.123-145, 1994

Somba, Nethy Dharma, 'Result of Irian Jaya Election Challenged', *The Jakarta Post*, March 28, 2006

Souter, Gavin, *New Guinea: The last unknown*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1964

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State*, Macmillan, Great Britain, 1996

Suharto, Edi, 'Human Development And The Urban Informal Sector In Bandung, Indonesia', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 2 (December, 2002), pp.115-133

Sullivan, Laurence, *Challenges to Special Autonomy in the province of Papua, Republic of Indonesia*, Discussion paper 2003/6, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 2003, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/sullivan-2003-ssgm-otsus.pdf> in February 2008

Sumule, Agus, *Protection and Empowerment of the Rights of Indigenous People of Papua (Irian Jaya) Over Natural Resources under Special Autonomy: from legal opportunities to the challenge of implementation*, Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Working Paper No. 36, ANU, 2002

Supangat, Suharini, *Indonesian School as Modernizer: a case study of the Orang Lembah Baliem Enculturation*, Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University. Ann Arbor UMI, 1986

Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003

Swadling, Pamela, *Plumes from paradise: trade cycles in southeast Asia and their impact on New Guinea and nearby islands until 1920*, PNG National Museum and Robert Brown, Hong Kong, 1996

Taylor, Jean Gelman, *The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983

Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly, 'The Indonesian nationalists and the Japanese "liberation" of Indonesia: visions and reactions', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, March 1996 v27, n1, p1 (18)

Todorov, Tzvetan, *The conquest of America*, Harper Perennial, translator Richard Howard, New York, 1984

Van der Heiden, Peter, *Netherlands New Guinea (West Papua)*, website material based on *Vademecum voor Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, 1956*, ("Handbook on Netherlands New Guinea, 1958"), 2005, accessed from <http://www.vanderheijden.org/ng/index.html> in May 2006

Van der Kroef, Dr. J. M., *The West New Guinea Dispute*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958

Van der Veur, Paul W., *Education and social change in colonial Indonesia*, Athens, Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1969

Van der Veur, Paul W., *Search for New Guinea's Boundaries: From Torres Strait to the Pacific*, ANU, Canberra, 1966

Van der Veur, Paul, 'The UN in West Irian: A Critique', *International Organization*, Vol.18, No.1, 1964, pp.53-73

Wallace, Alfred Russel, *On the Trade of the Eastern Archipelago with New Guinea and Its Islands*, (S65: 1862), accessed from

<http://www.wku.edu/~smithch/wallace/S065.htm> in March 2005

Webster, David, "*...Sampai Merauke*": *The Struggle for West New Guinea, 1960-1962*, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, unpublished, 1999

Wessel, Ingrid & Georgia Wimhöfer (eds.), *Violence in Indonesia*, Abera, Hamburg, 2001

White, Paul and Robert Woods, *The geographical impact of migration*, Longman, London, 1980

Widjosiswoyo, Drs Supartono, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia Dan Sejarah Dunia: 3*, PT Intan Pariwara, Jakarta, 1991

Wilson, Ronald, *Bringing them home: report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families*, National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Australia), Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 1997

Wing, John with Peter King, *Genocide in Papua? - the role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people*, West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua, August 2005

Yoman, Sofyan, Systematic Genocide of the Peoples of West Papua under Special
Autonomy, Jayapura, 14 May 2005, accessed from

<http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/Genocide-under-autonomy.doc> in February 2008

Yoman, Socratez Sofyan, 'West Papua: Voice of the West Papuan Church seeking
protection for native West Papuans', 30th June 2008, accessed from

http://www.infopapua.org/artman/publish/article_1777.shtml in December 2008

Author not stated

30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, Author unknown, Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada
(publisher), Jakarta, Volume 2, 1985 & Volume 4, 1985

'Chronology: Significant Dates in Irian/New Guinea History',

<http://www.irja.org/history/chronology.htm> accessed February 2006

'The Dani in the Baliem Valley', accessed from

http://www.livingstone.cz/tamtamy/?acc=etnicke_skupiny&lang=eng in October 2005

'Digger History', accessed from <http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts->

[periods/ww2/pages-2aif-cmf/fuzzy-wuzzy.htm](http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/pages-2aif-cmf/fuzzy-wuzzy.htm), in May 2005

'Faleomavaega and Congressman Donald Payne call upon African nations to request
UN review of West Papua', US House of Representatives Press Release, 16th December
2005, from

http://www.house.gov/list/press/as00_faleomavaega/westpauadec16.html,

accessed August 2007

'Faleomavaega disappointed with his visit to Biak and Manokwari Papua, Indonesia',

News Release, Congressman Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, Territory of American Samoa, U.S.
House of Representatives, 17th December, 2007

Global Witness, *Paying for Protection: the Freeport mine and the Indonesian security forces*, Global Witness, Washington D.C., 2005

'Golkar's Yorrays challenges Irian Jaya Barat results', Papua Prospects, 28th March 2006, accessed from http://indonesiannewguinea.blogspot.com/2006_03_01_archive.html in January 2008

'Historical dates – in Chronological order', accessed from http://www.koteka.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=34 in June 2006

'A history of Jayapura', accessed from <http://www.governpub.com/Bee-H/Hollandia.php> in February 2006

'History of West Papua', accessed from <http://www.wpngnc.org/history.htm> in February 2008

Holland in Hollandia, Van Hoeve, 's-Gravenhage, 1948

'In pictures: Papua gets connected', BBC News report, accessed from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/07/asia_pac_papua_gets_connected/html/1.stm in December 2007

'Indonesia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 8th March, 2006, accessed from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61609.htm> in September 2006

Indonesia Indah, Yayasan Harapan Kita / BP3 Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Jakarta, 1995-1998, series of 10 volumes. Various editors, including S Budhi Santoso

Indonesia – Irian Jaya: Welcome to Jayawijaya and Merauke regencies, Tourism Division Level 1 Region, Irian Jaya, 1985

'Indonesia: Population and administrative divisions', *The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names*, accessed from <http://www.pcgn.org.uk/Indonesia-%20Population&AdminDivs-%202003.pdf> in October 2007

'Indonesia: Religious Freedom Report 1999', US State Department, accessed from http://atheism.about.com/library/irf/irf99/blirf_indonesia99.htm in December 2007

Indonesia: The transmigration program in perspective, World Bank Country Study, The World Bank, Washington, 1988

'Indonesian court annuls establishment of new province in Papua', *Asian Political News*, 15th November 2004, accessed from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2004_Nov_15/ai_n6368152 in January 2008

'International Religious Freedom Report 2006', released by the United States of America, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, September 2006, accessed from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71341.htm> in May 2007

An interview with Brigham Golden, (Columbia University / Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Papua), published in *The Van Zorge Report on Indonesia* (Vol. VIII No. 3—February 21, 2006), accessed from *Kabar-Irian Irian News* - 4/17/06 (Part 2 of 3) at <http://www.kabar-irian.info/pipermail/kabar-irian/2006-April/000787.html> in February 2008

'Joint Statement by Papuan Religious Leaders', Jayapura, West Papua, 15 September 2005, Australian Indigenous Law Reporter website, accessed from <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/2005/84.html> in February 2008

'Kami Bangga Hitam dan Keriting Oleh: Putu Fajar Arcana', *Imparsial*, 12 September 2005, accessed from <http://www.imparsial.org/news/index.php?year=2005&month=9&action=READ&lang=id-8859&id=news-1127722683> in January 2006

'Losing Papua', Editorial, The Jakarta Post, 20th March 2006, newsletter from [Kabar-Irian] Irian News - 3/21/06 (Part 3 of 3), accessible from <http://www.kabar-irian.info/pipermail/kabar-irian/2006-March/000778.html> in February 2008

'Luas Wilayah Provinsi Papua menurut Kabupaten/Kota' (Area of Papua by Regency/Municipality), *Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics Papua Province)*, accessed from <http://www.papua.go.id/bps/dda%202001/BAB%20I%20LETAK%20GEOGRAFIS/Luas%20Wilayah%20Provinsi%20Papua%20menurut%20Kabupaten.htm> in September 2007

'Members of Congress Urge President Yudhoyono of Indonesia to Open up Access to West Papua; Ongoing Human Rights Abuses Condemned', Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights

East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) report, accessed from <http://www.etan.org/news/2005/09papua.htm> in February 2008

'Millions expected for Notting Hill Carnival', *Daily Telegraph*, 29th August 2005, accessed from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.ihtml?xml=/news/2005/08/28/ucarnival.xml&DCMP=OTC-Autonolnk> in November 2007

'Municipalities and Districts, Jayawijaya Regency', Petra Christian University website, accessed from <http://www.petra.ac.id/eastern/irian/cities/jayawija/pilamo.htm> in September 2005

Museum Nasional website, accessed from <http://www.museumnasional.org/collections.html> in January 2006

'Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam', *Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua (Central Bureau of Statistics Papua Province)*, accessed from <http://www.bps.go.id/profile/aceh.shtml> in September 2007

'Nasib ribuan guru di Jayawijaya belum jelas', *Kompas*, 11/10/2000 accessed at

'New York Agreement: Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)', Free West Papua website, accessed from <http://www.freewestpapua.org/docs/nya.htm> in December 2007

'The Online Papua Mouthpiece', accessed at <http://www.westpapua.net/news/00/05/14MAY.HTM> in May 2006

'Origins of Names of African Countries', Indigenous People of Africa and America website, accessed from http://www.ipaaa.com/african_country_name_origin.htm in January 2008

'Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua's Central Highlands', Human Rights Watch, Volume 19, No. 10(C), July 2007, accessed from <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/papua0707/papua0707webwcover.pdf> in February 2008

'Pembentukan Propinsi Otonom Irian Barat dan Kabupaten-Kabupaten Otonom di Propinsi Irian Barat' ('Formation of the autonomous province of West Irian and the autonomous regencies of West Irian Province'), *Undang-Undang Presiden Republik Indonesia 12/1969 (Indonesian Presidential Declaration 12/1969)*, 10th September 1969, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/uu-dll/uu1969-12.html> in December 2008

'Re: Name Change to West Papua', input to reg.westpapua mailing list, 19 December 1999, accessed from http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/PAP/Re_NameChangeWP.html in April 2006

'Serious shortage of teachers in West Papua', *Cenderawasih Pos*, 6th October 2008

Taman Mini Indonesia Indah website, accessed from <http://www.tamanmini.com/tentang/sejarah> in September 2005

'Undang-undang Republik Indonesia, Nomor 21 Tahun 2001: Tentang Otonomi khusus bagi provinsi Papua', Meninbang d, accessed from <http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-id.html> in January 2006

'Value of the Guilder', accessed from <http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate.php> in January 2007