Running on Empty

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'Modernising' the British and Australian labour parties

Andrew Scott

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For Eleanor and Madeleine

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Introduction

There is great interest among Australian Labor politicians today in the recent success of British Labour under Tony Blair and in learning the lessons of his shaping of 'New Labour' and returning the party to office.

The major changes which have occurred in the British Labour Party since Blair's accession to the leadership in 1994 and his sweeping election victory in 1997 have generated much discussion of the relevance of British Labour's rethinking to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and in particular the notion that Tony Blair's so-called 'Third Way' represents a good option for the ALP to now adopt.

This interest is the latest in a long history of links and changing cycles of comparison between these two parties, which this book examines in depth, in order to put the current Australian interest in Britain's 'New Labour' into proper context.

Tony Blair himself has close personal connections with Australia which have recently been well documented. He lived in Adelaide, South Australia as a young child from 1955–58 while his father was lecturing at the university there. In his days as a student at Oxford University from

1972–75, Blair became a very close personal friend of two Australians: Geoff Gallop — who later became an academic, then Minister of Education in the Western Australian Labor Government, and is now leader of the Western Australian ALP — and Peter Thomson — an Anglican clergyman and mature-age theology student who heavily influenced the young Blair's philosophy and the emphasis which he would later place on the concept of 'community'. Blair visited Australia in 1982, prior to his becoming a parliamentarian, to see these two old friends. During the visit he gave a guest lecture to Gallop's students at Murdoch University on the state of the British Labour Party. This twenty-three-page document is the first record of the 'modernising' themes he would later pursue as the Labour Party leader, and Blair's biographer goes so far as to say that:

> It is possible to trace the death of Clause IV [the British Labour Party's long-standing formal commitment to 'common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange'] to Perth, Western Australia, in 1982.[1]

Blair also became better acquainted during that visit with Kim Beazley, whom he had met and got on well with at Oxford and with whom he continued to maintain contact in their subsequent political careers. Beazley was at the time a young federal Labor MP and would later become deputy prime minister of Australia and then national leader of the ALP following its 1996 election defeat. In 1982 he introduced Blair to the then leader of the ALP, Bill Hayden, and to Hayden's two successors, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating.[2]

The following year, 1983, was a year of marked contrasts in the fortunes of the British and Australian labour parties. The ALP under Bob Hawke swept to power whereas British Labour under Michael Foot crashed to its lowest vote for more than 60 years. Hawke was visiting Britain on the eve of the June 1983 general election there as part of his first overseas trip as prime minister and would

later — like many other commentators — contrast the pragmatic and electorally attractive ALP with the divided and anachronistic British Labour Party, writing that:

> While the Australian Labor Party led the way in bold deregulatory reforms from 1983 onwards, it was not until the February 1993 conference of the British Labour Party, held not long after another crushing defeat, that it changed its platform to resemble something like that of a modern, relevant party.[3]

Indeed, the immediate electoral success which had followed the ALP's sudden change of leader from Hayden to Hawke in February 1983 generated media pressure in Britain for Foot to similarly stand down in favour of Denis Healey not long prior to the June 1983 election,[4] a proposition which Foot very seriously considered.[5] There were letters in *The Guardian* and *New Statesman* after the ALP's election to government in 1983, along the lines that Hawke's victory:

> proved that modern socialists could take on arch-conservatism and beat it at the polls. We in Britain should draw the obvious lesson from the Australian model and modernise now.[6]

Labour MPs made their way to Australia and marvelled at the confidence of the Antipodean 'socialists'. 'You are still fighting old battles', they were told by Hawke's people.[7] The election victories which continued for the Australian Labor Party throughout the 1980s encouraged many people in Britain to hail it as a model for the rebuilding of British Labour. Leo Panitch has described how Australia became 'a new vogue' alongside the mainstays of Sweden and Austria for those who superficially referred to successful foreign examples of corporatist incomes policies.[8] The interest was still strong enough in 1989 to prompt Graeme Duncan, an Australian political scientist then teaching in Britain, into writing a pamphlet pointing out some of the defects in the ALP model.[9]

Also in 1983, Geoff Gallop was back at Oxford conducting research at Nuffield College into the British Labour Party. Blair, now a Labour MP, was naturally interested in hearing from Gallop the details of the ALP's success and its contrast with the fortunes of his own party.[10]

Neil Kinnock, leader of the British Labour Party from 1983 to 1992, recalls that:

> I had repeated invitations to go to Australia; always intended to go [but] never got round to it. But I did send Gordon Brown and Tony Blair to spend some time in Australia because I thought they were the next generation and it was important that they had contact given my repeated desire and intention to come which, as I say, was never fulfilled.[11]

Blair and Brown, then up-and-coming shadow ministers, came to Australia in 1990. Blair took the opportunity to meet with Gallop and Thomson again, and he also struck up a particularly good rapport with the then treasurer Paul Keating in a long and lively meeting.[12]

The level of British Labour interest in Australia, while strong, had ebbed and flowed through the 1980s with stronger enthusiasms at various times for other foreign models such as the Swedish Social Democrats and the US Democrats under Clinton. Interest in Australia rose again, however, after the ALP's fourth re-election in 1993 under Keating, and as the party in Britain itself moved closer to the prospect of regaining office.

Peter Mandelson, the principal backroom architect of Blair's overhaul of British Labour, was impressed by the ALP's 'very tough economic and taxation policies', and 'close but nonetheless disciplined … [and] carefully presented relationship with the trade unions'[13] in the 1980s. Blair, who had succeeded John Smith as leader after Smith's sudden, unexpected death in May 1994, took an even stronger direct public interest in the Australian Labor Party after becoming leader, and during 1995 he

visited Australia twice, in July and December, the second time mainly to catch up with his old friends.[14] But on both occasions[15] he took the opportunity to meet with and learn from Paul Keating and other ALP figures.

Soon after Blair's first 1995 visit his deputy, John Prescott, also visited Australia and launched a campaign of mutual assistance between the two labour parties to secure the votes of expatriates in their respective national elections. Denis MacShane, a British Labour MP, wrote a *Guardian* feature article titled 'The left-wing wizards of Oz' about the 'compelling model' of the Australian Labor government.[16] Prescott visited Australia again in 1997, this time as deputy prime minister of Britain.

The ALP now looks to British Labour in its quest to regain government, just as the British Labour Party looked to the ALP from the early 1980s until their own return to office in 1997 (and even since then, on some specific issues such as employment policies and programs).

In the 1960s the ALP had also looked to the British Labour Party as a model. In 1964 the British Labour government of Harold Wilson was elected, and then in 1966 re-elected with a huge increase in its majority in the same year the Australian Labor Party under Arthur Calwell crashed to its second lowest vote for more than 60 years. Commentators in both countries then contrasted the new-look, moderate and successful British Labour Party with the old-fashioned and struggling ALP.[17] In the early to mid-1960s British Labour, first under Gaitskell and then under Wilson, seemed to provide a model of 'modernisation' and success.

From Margaret Thatcher's election in 1979 until John Major's defeat in 1997, many people in Australia viewed the British labour movement's ordeal under the Tories as a portent for what the Australian labour movement would go through under a future Liberal/National Party administration. Accordingly, detailed attempts were made to come to terms with the strategic implications which the

Thatcher decade might have for the future viability of Australian trade unions.[18]

There were also many delegations and enquiries into the implications of the British Conservative government's aggressive program of privatisations.[19] The then Evatt Research Centre reproduced part of a major study, *Privatisation in Western Europe*, which had been prepared in April 1988 by the European Trade Union Institute, and then in a major study of its own emphasised how the Australian privatisation push had its ideological origins in the free market economics associated with Thatcher's political ascendancy in Britain.[20]

The purpose of this book is to put these various intermittent and superficial comparisons into a more coherent historical perspective, to go beyond the transient similarities and differences and substantially compare the two labour parties, so as to rectify the gaps in their knowledge of each other and to satisfy some of the unresolved curiosities about the real similarities and differences between these two parties. This is done by studying their long historical links, investigating previously unearthed archival records, uncovering episodes of past contact between the labour movements, personal interviews with key players, and comparisons of relevant data.

By comparing labour party experiences in two countries, the book aims to make it possible to identify some issues as more important than others, and come to firmer conclusions and clearer insights about the nature of each party's problems and prospects than is possible when the analysis is confined, as is usual, to just one country. A recent comparative study covering Britain, Europe and North America, *Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies*, found that while there were many common sociological and ideological trends working against the political organisation of labour in these countries, nevertheless the labour parties were not passive recipients of social change and could shape their own destinies through good strategic thinking, organisation and leadership.[21]

Although the labour parties of Britain and Australia are close relatives, share most things in common and have a long history of interaction which has recently been resumed, there has not always been regular contact between the parties in recent decades, nor a detailed mutual knowledge of one another's affairs. Indeed the two organisations have often known little of one another beyond the casual and short-term comparisons that are intermittently made. This lack of *comprehensive* contact between British Labour and the ALP at key times since the 1960s, when Britain began moving away from the Commonwealth and towards Europe, is ironic given the clear parallels between the two parties' experiences in this period.

The precise timing of the key events for the parties in the period since the 1960s may have differed, but they have both had to contend with the same essential challenges in these decades. The reversal in the respective parties' fortunes between the 1960s, the early 1980s and then the mid-1990s shows the danger of generalising about political change from too close a proximity to events, and, conversely, the value of analysing developments over a reasonably long time-frame.

The focus in this comparison is the 'modernising' of the two labour parties. Since the late 1950s the British and Australian labour parties have recurrently struggled with (and over) their perceived need to 'modernise'. A clash between 'modernisers' (or 'revisionists') and 'traditionalists' has been identified as a key axis of division in both British and Australian labour parties at various critical times since the 1960s.

Modernisation by definition involves the removal of some features of the past. The corollary of the drive by some in the two parties for 'modernisation' has been the assertion by others of the need to respect and uphold 'tradition'. In Australia under the Hawke and Keating governments of 1983–96 there was a particularly vigorous debate both within the party and among academics about

whether the government was in line — and whether it ought to be in line — with Labor tradition.[22]

Paul Kelly portrayed critics of the economic policies pursued in Australia in the 1980s, with whom he personally disagrees, as 'sentimental traditionalists'.[23] This exemplifies the hidden meanings of the terms 'moderniser' and 'traditionalist'. Raymond Williams has pointed out that, when applied to institutions, the terms 'modernise', 'modernist' and 'modernisation' are 'normally used to indicate something unquestionably favourable or desirable', whereas the term 'traditionalist' is 'almost always dismissive'. Williams rightly counsels that 'as catchwords of particular kinds of change the terms need scrutiny' and this is all the more true if they purport to be neutral terms of classification. [24]

To some extent this clash between 'modernisers' and 'traditionalists' is part of a much wider debate between the advocates of inexorable scientific 'progress' and those who question whether this so-called 'progress' represents in reality an advance in the human condition at all. The term 'progressive' is often counterposed to 'conservative', but, as Williams also notes, 'it is certainly significant that nearly all political tendencies now wish to be described as 'progressive' ... [which] is more frequently now a persuasive rather than a descriptive term'.[25] Since he wrote those words, the conventional indicators of 'progress' have come under increasingly substantial criticism.[26] The real electoral backlash at the 1996 election against the 'modernisation' of the Australian Labor Party, followed by the rise of support for Pauline Hanson, is in large measure a protest against the notion that the particular kind of economic 'rationalist' change which has been imposed does, in fact, represent real social progress.

Following their loss of office after achieving much as national governments in the years after World War Two, the labour parties in both Britain and Australia suffered successive election defeats and became increasingly uncertain about what they stood for amid major social change.

While the decline initially seemed more serious in Britain than Australia in electoral terms, in Australia the uncertainty about ideological direction was exacerbated, and the ALP's electoral stocks greatly damaged, by the formal split in the party over communism in the mid-1950s.

Hugh Gaitskell's efforts to revise British Labour's formal goals following the party's third consecutive general election defeat in 1959 were undertaken in the name of 'modernisation'. The associated ideological debates led by Tony Crosland were implicitly about adapting traditional Labour goals to an evidently substantially different and modified capitalism to that known in the 1930s.

The quest for 'modernisation' upon which many of the most prominent figures in the two labour parties have embarked since the 1950s has affected every facet of the two parties, including their formal ideologies and relations with trade unions, the social bases of their support, the policies they have actually pursued in office, and their internal divisions and organisational structures.

The policies pursued by the Wilson Labour governments in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s and by the ALP under Gough Whitlam in Australia were infused with the language of modernisation, novelty and change. On Labor's return to office in Australia in 1983 under Bob Hawke and especially Paul Keating, the 'modernising' of the ALP was given new meaning and scope. With Tony Blair's accession as prime minister in Britain in 1997 under the mantle of 'New Labour' — following 18 years of ideological and internal division in Opposition — the 'modernisation' of the British Labour Party has reached its apogee and has attracted renewed interest.

The concept and implications of 'modernising' labour parties requires detailed and critical examination, and a comparison of the cycles of the British and Australian labour parties since the 1960s shows that the term in fact obscures many very different kinds of political change, some positive and others negative. This book seeks to cast

new light on the character of the changes which have occurred — and argues that the reflex instinct to keep 'modernising', to change for change's sake, is depriving the two labour parties of their essential ideological fuel, and leaving them literally running on empty.

To compare the British and Australian labour parties since the 1960s it is first necessary to establish the longer-term basis for their comparability. The first chapter therefore outlines the essential similarities, links and differences which evolved between the two parties from their nineteenth century origins up to the 1960s.

1

Similarities, links and differences between the parties to the 1960s

Similarities

When viewed in a world-wide context the British and Australian labour parties stand out as essentially similar. In no other country are there trade union-based parties of comparable duration or strength. The Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party and Norwegian Labour Party are almost as old and have been electorally more successful (owing to the ingrained divisions between the parties of the political Right there). However, they resemble the socialist and social democratic parties elsewhere in continental Europe more than they do the British and Australian labour parties, in several important respects.

In contrast to the typical course of events in the European nations, where a socialist or social democratic party preceded and supervised the formation of trade unions, both the British and Australian labour parties grew out of a pre-existing and relatively strong and independent union movement. Whereas the European socialist and social democratic parties today rely upon a mass individual membership, both the British and Australian labour parties

continue to rest predominantly upon trade unions in their structure and for their finances.[1] Where the peak union leaderships of France, Italy and other nations of western Europe are divided into several different organisations along political lines, the unions to which both the British and Australian labour parties remain attached are formally unified in one national structure.

The only party which is really comparable with the British and Australian labour parties in all these details, and has a long history as a major political force, is the New Zealand Labour Party, but it is a comparatively young organisation. A labour party did not emerge in New Zealand until 1916 and even then grew at a slow pace,[2] whereas the British and Australian labour parties both emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century, amid essentially similar circumstances.

Both the British and Australian parties were created by the efforts of trade unionists, who had recently suffered a devastating industrial defeat, to create a political voice for an expanding and increasingly self-conscious working class. Momentum for each party's creation was strengthened by the militant 'new unionism' which had developed from the late 1880s in both Britain and its colonies as new groups of 'unskilled' workers, previously excluded from the ranks of the traditional craft unions, became organised. The concept of 'new unionism' to describe this phenomenon was itself imported to the Australian colonies from its original British context. The early development of the labour parties was particularly similar in Britain and the colony which later became the state of Victoria, where a strong colonial liberal culture delayed the formation of an independent labour party until later than in New South Wales and Queensland.

The society of the Australian colonies from which the Australian Labor Party sprang was substantially that of a transplanted Britain. British social relationships, institutions, ideas and individuals had been in large measure transported across the globe. The immigrants sought to

surround themselves with familiar landmarks from London and other 'home' cities: thus for example a St Paul's Cathedral was built in Melbourne, a Hyde Park was laid out in Sydney and many names of streets, suburbs, towns, and even states (as in *New* South Wales) replicated those at home.

Following the dispossession of the Aborigines, the logic of Britain's imperial expansion dictated that the bulk of the colonies' population throughout its first century would be made up of British convicts and immigrants. Colonial society inherited allegiance to the British Crown and laws, and reproduced many features of Britain's cultural customs and hierarchy of social classes.[3]

In both Britain and Australia over the first fifty years after the labour parties' formation the working-class was strong and self-conscious enough for each to establish itself as one of the dominant parties in an essentially two-party system. This was in contrast to all other countries except New Zealand. In the USA no labour party ever established itself. Although one has long existed in Ireland it has not moved beyond minor party status, owing to the issue of religion and some unique historical factors in that nation's politics. There was a small Labor Party of Northern Ireland from 1924 which supported the link with Britain but which fell away following the formation of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labor Party in 1970, which is the majority voice of Catholics in Northern Ireland, but which remains a minority party overall. In the Netherlands, a Labour Party was formed in 1945 but this is not a party based on trade unions; in Israel a Labour Party did not of course exist until the state's own formation in 1948; and in Canada, although the New Democratic Party eventually emerged as a labour party in fact if not in name, it also has not progressed beyond third-party status. In the many other countries which now have labour parties the parties are likewise relatively recent inventions.[4]

As labour, rather than socialist or social democratic, both the British and Australian parties have nominally

sought to represent a particular class more than a partic-
ular ideology. As a result both have been seen as prag-
matic in purpose and as lacking the clear ideological
direction of left-of-centre political parties in some other
countries. A similar constellation of ideas and organisa-
tions was present at both parties' formations. The prin-
cipal ideas in each case included those of William Morris[5]
and Henry George, and the principal organisations
included the Social Democratic Federation, the Socialist
League and the Fabian Society.

In the British Labour Party a distinctive democratic
socialist philosophy evolved during the first decades of the
twentieth century. A diverse set of new influences overlaid
the existing nineteenth century labourist assumption that
workers under capitalism tend to be deprived of the
wealth they create, and that there needed to be action by
the nation state therefore to redistribute that wealth.
These new influences included: Marxism; the strategic
gradualism of the Fabians; ethical socialism and allied tra-
ditions of radical and Nonconformist Christianity; the
writings of R.H. Tawney; the ideas of syndicalism, as mod-
ified by G.D.H. Cole into guild socialism; and the pro-
posals for state intervention and welfare provision put
forward by Keynes and Beveridge. The outcome, by the
1930s, has been described as a 'corporate socialism' which
in the 1940s substantially reshaped British society as the
Attlee Labour government carried out the nationalisation
of some major industries, the creation of a welfare state
and intervention along Keynesian principles to guide eco-
nomic activity.[6] The ALP for the most part derived its ide-
ology from a similar amalgam of influences.

An overview of the histories of the British and Aus-
tralian labour parties since their inception presents many
obvious parallels. Both parties became divided over the
question of conscription during World War One. The
British Labour Party's adoption of a socialist objective in
1918 was followed by the ALP's adoption of a similar
formal goal in 1921. Detailed references were made to the

contemporary British socialist thinker G.D.H. Cole on both sides of debate at the ALP Conference in that year[7] — one of several examples of the influence Cole's ideas were to have in Australia,[8] although Cole himself was far more interested in New Zealand than Australia.[9]

There are clear parallels between Britain's Ramsay MacDonald labour governments of 1924 and 1929–31 (prior to his defecting in August 1931 to lead a National government from 1931–35) and both the Billy Hughes ALP government of 1915–16 (prior to his defecting to lead a National Labor Party government from 1916–17 then a Nationalist Party government from 1917–23), and the much more contemporaneous defection of Joe Lyons, in May 1931, from a leading role in the Scullin government to lead a new anti-Labor political party in Australia.

The labour governments in Australia from 1941–49 and in Britain from 1940–45 (as 'junior' partner in the coalition) and from 1945–51 (as majority government) were essentially similar. The Chifley government adopted much the same approach as the Attlee government in using the Beveridge White Paper on Full Employment as the basis for building a welfare state in the years after World War Two. Both governments also sought to extend state ownership and create a more equal society. Both were constrained by the conditions of post-war austerity and had to invoke unpopular measures such as rationing, which contributed to their electoral defeats in 1951 and 1949 respectively. Both governments lost office in 1949–51 for essentially similar reasons, and then entered a long period of opposition and ideological uncertainty. Australia by this time had become more like Britain (and other western nations) in developing an advanced industrial base.

Links

These similarities in the origins and development of the British and Australian labour parties have arisen in large measure because of direct links between the two parties

and between the two movements from which they emerged. Immigrants from Britain have played a key role in shaping the Australian labour movement for much of its history.

Both labour parties can trace their ancestry to the great upheaval in Britain generated by the industrial revolution from the late eighteenth century. Australia's colonisation grew out of this early period of British industrial expansion, which was a time of acute poverty and distress for multitudes of people forced off the land into a new and alien discipline of wage labour in the factory or mill.

Many of the convicts transported from the crowded industrial cities of the British Isles to the open-air prisons of New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land and (later) Western Australia from the 1780s, were victims of this shift to a new kind of class-divided society. A small but significant number had become conscious political opponents of the new order. The most famous of these were the 'Tolpuddle Martyrs': six agricultural labourers from a small village in southern England who in 1834 were transported to the Australian colonies for seven years, in effect for trying to form a union to oppose cuts in their wages.[10] A tradition of trade union struggle forged in Britain in response to industrialisation was substantially transferred to the colonies now being settled on the other side of the world.

The successive waves of assisted and free immigrants who began to arrive from the 1830s also brought grievances and radical attitudes with them in their search for a sunnier and more prosperous land. The huge influx of migrants into the Australian colonies brought about by the gold rush of the 1850s included numerous individuals who were determined to create better prospects in the new world than those they had left behind in the old. The activities of this generation of migrants were particularly crucial in winning political democracy in the colonies and in moulding the future character of Australian society and the Australian labour movement.

Trade unionists who had been born and brought up in the British Isles frequently sought to recreate familiar forms of union and political organisation in the Australian colonies in the mid-nineteenth century. Among workers in the coal industry, for instance, as Robin Gollan writes:

> The origin of unionism in the Australian mines scarcely needs explanation. The idea came with British miners from Britain, and the purposes and attitudes generated in Northumberland, Durham, and Fifeshire, were as appropriate at Newcastle on the Hunter as at Newcastle on Tyne. Methods of working the coal, the life in mining villages, and the outlook of the management were imported direct from England.[11]

British influences on and links with Australian trade unions were particularly strong in the early craft unions, including the printing trades,[12] and the engineering trades.[13]

Regular instalments of 'Australian news' were also flowing to the British parent Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons in the mid-nineteenth century at the very time that Australian stonemasons were leading the world in winning the eight-hour day.[14] Close and formal British connections to Australian unions in the building trades continued well into the twentieth century.[15]

By 1922 the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (ASW) in Britain, however, decided that 'the relationship between Britain and Australian Carpenters and Joiners' Societies would appear to be, when probed, purely of a sentimental character'[16] and formal ties were severed.

Nevertheless, links between the two movements, in the form of Commonwealth trade union structures, persisted right up until the 1970s in the case of one of Australia's most important unions, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, later named following several amalgamations the Amalgamated Metal Workers (and, for a time, Shipwrights) Union and now, following further amalgamations, known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU).

Many other British migrants to Australia in the mid-nineteenth century had been affected by the movement for the People's Charter in Britain. Chartism gained considerable influence in Australia, evident for example in the demands of the rebels at the Eureka Stockade in Ballarat, Victoria in 1854.[17]

Among the institutions which were transplanted from nineteenth century Britain to the Australian colonies were many directly associated with the labour movement, such as craft unions, co-operative societies and friendly societies. Mechanics institutes, promoted by the improving middle class for the education of the working class, are still dotted through inner-city suburbs and country towns. A Workers Educational Association (WEA) was formed in Australia in 1913 based on the earlier British body of the same name and it made a substantial impact in several Australian states between World War One and World War Two. The traces of early friendly societies are also still visible. In Melbourne, for instance, the Masonic-linked Grand United Order of Free Gardeners still functions out of a building at the top end of Elizabeth Street, and the Foresters Hall, with its ornate Coat of Arms and motto 'Unitas, Benevolentia, Concordia' still stands opposite the State Library of Victoria in La Trobe Street. Traces can also be found in the full, historical names of those seemingly modern financial institutions like the IOOF — short for the (Manchester Unity) Independent Order of Odd Fellows,[18] with its Melbourne head office still located until very recently just near the Trades Hall and Methodist chapel on 'the labour movement corner' of Victoria and Lygon Streets, Carlton South — and health insurance companies like IOR — short for the Independent Order of Rechabites. The British migrants who became particularly strong in the coalmining districts of New South Wales from the 1870s also recreated local community cultural institutions along similar lines to their home communities in the North of England.[19]

Into the twentieth century

In 1889 great solidarity, including crucial financial support, was given by a very wide cross-section of Australians, led by trade unionists, to the striking London dock workers.[20]

Activists in the British labour movement were, in turn, significantly influenced by the democratic achievements in Australia and New Zealand, seeing those countries together as amounting to a 'social laboratory for the world' in the early twentieth century.[21] There was a remarkable procession to Australia of many of the most prominent activists in the British labour movement in the years from 1880 to 1910. The visitors included Harry Champion, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Tom Mann, George Lansbury (though he was not then a leading figure in British Labour), Ben Tillett (who won adulation among Australian unionists for his leadership of the London dock strike), Ramsay and Margaret MacDonald, and Keir Hardie.[22] Tillett and the MacDonalds reached very different conclusions from their observations of the Australian arbitration system. Whereas Tillett repeatedly urged the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) to take it up, and succeeded at least in bringing about the introduction of Victorian-style Wages Boards in the UK as 'Trade Boards' under an act of 1909, Ramsay MacDonald was very hostile to arbitration and considered it inappropriate to British conditions.[23]

A number of ornate and reverential colour certificates, in the style of trade union banners, were presented to Keir Hardie by the Sydney Labor Council, the Women's Political Labor League — which praised Hardie for his support of women's suffrage — and various Western Australian labour movement organisations during his visit to Australia in 1907–08.[24]

Hardie's leading biographer has described how:

> In Australia he felt thoroughly at home. It contained a powerful labour party with strong trade union roots ...

> Hardie enjoyed the earthy, democratic atmosphere ... On
> the other hand, he noted other features of a labour-run
> Australia that were less happy — ... [such as] the reluc-
> tance of arbitration courts to grant wage increases, [and]
> the rise of a jingo and militaristic spirit amongst such
> labour men as Billy Hughes. A working-class government
> was not necessarily a pacific one, as Hardie saw ... On the
> 'white Australia' policy, Hardie wrote cautiously, 'Time
> alone will tell'.[25]

Hardie himself reported on the details of his travels in the
Labour Leader of 28 February, 6, 13, 20 March and 10 April
1908. In addition to Tom Price, extolled by Hardie in his
Labour Leader article of 6 March for being a Welsh stone-
mason who had risen to become premier of South Aus-
tralia, Hardie, as Morgan notes, 'met many old friends ...
[and] resumed contact with Tom Mann ... and with H.H.
Champion [both leaders of the London dockworkers'
strike] ... There was also Andrew Fisher, a former Ayrshire
collier, now ... Prime Minister ... who was later to visit
Hardie in his Merthyr constituency'.[26]

Most of the British visitors brought with them — and
their Australian hosts shared — an exciting sense that
despite the great distances between them they belonged
to *one* common movement, which was spreading to all
corners of the earth. Thus Tom Mann entitled his 1903
tract, informing Australian unionists of the experiences of
their British and other overseas counterparts, *The Labor
Movement in Both Hemispheres*. Mann, a leading figure in
the formation of Britain's Independent Labour Party
(ILP), migrated to Australia and lived there from
1902–10, continuing his efforts to build a strong political
labour movement from the time of his arrival in his new
country, and considerably influencing the Australian
labour movement in a more internationalist direction.
Later he would return to England to make his mark as a
militant syndicalist union leader.

There were also visits and migrations to Australia by
leading British suffragettes. Adela Pankhurst, for instance,

part of the famous English suffragette family, came to Australia in 1914 at age 28 and was involved in feminist, left-wing and then other causes there for the remainder of her life.[27] The comparatively early winning of the vote for women in Australia attracted intense interest among feminist campaigners in Britain in the early twentieth century. Australia featured prominently and regularly in the reports upon 'Women in Other Lands' in the publication *Votes for Women*, edited by F. and E. Pethick Lawrence, from 1907–12, and likewise in the reports from 'Our Sisters Abroad' in *The Labour Woman*, a very outward-looking internationalist publication in the years 1913–21.[28] The Women's Industrial Council in London published a pamphlet in 1906 entitled *Labour Laws for Women in Australia and New Zealand*,[29] and in 1911 leading Australian suffrage campaigner Vida Goldstein was a guest of the Pankhursts as part of their campaign for the vote for British women.[30]

The Social Democratic Federation, Socialist League and Fabian Society which were formed in the Australian colonies were based on the London models and were instigated by English immigrants who had recently been involved in the original organisations in London.

It is often forgotten, amid popular conceptions that the early Australian labour movement was a product of the Australian legend and home-grown nationalism, that only one-third of the Labor MPs elected to the New South Wales Parliament in the historic 1891 election were native-born. The majority of these first labour parliamentarians in Australia were British-born immigrants who had only recently arrived; in contrast, the New South Wales population as a whole was around two-thirds native-born by that time, and a clear majority of the non-Labor MPs were native-born.[31] Typically these British migrants were young men from working-class backgrounds who had left in their early to mid-twenties. Among them was Joseph Cook, a committed Methodist and trade unionist who emigrated from England to work as a coalminer in New South Wales

before being elected to the State Parliament. Cook was one of four future prime ministers of Australia and two future state premiers who migrated to Australia as young men with humble British backgrounds in a five-year period,1883–88, and who became involved in the ALP — although Cook, unlike the others, left the ALP before he became prime minister. The others who served for a time as Australian Labor prime ministers were J.C. (Chris) Watson (who was born in Chile, but whose stepfather, with whom he grew up, was a miner who had emigrated from Scotland to New Zealand), Andrew Fisher, a coalminer, and W.M. (Billy) Hughes; while the future premiers were William Holman (New South Wales), initially a cabinet-maker, and Tom Price (South Australia), a stonemason and Rechabite.[32] (Forty years on, a senior British Labour Party official could 'still recall the thrill that some of us had when Chris Watson was first elected Commonwealth Prime Minister'.[33]) Another British immigrant was the so-called archetypal 'bush' unionist W.G. Spence, whose own upbringing, due to his emigrant father's background as a stonemason and Presbyterian in Britain, reflected the craft union and associated cultural influences typical among the nineteenth-century Nonconformist Liberals who later turned to Labour in Britain. One reason for the high proportion of early Australian Labor MPs being born in Britain, as compared with non-Labor MPs, was the experience of established forms of trade union organisation they gained from their early years in Britain compared with the inexperience of the colonials. The British immigrants to Australia in the mid- to late 1880s also included some other figures who would become very influential in the Australian labour movement, such as the radical journalists William Lane and Henry Boote.

Nearly 60 of the 445 people who were ALP members of the national parliament from Federation to 1981 were born in the British Isles, and the great majority of these were born in England and Scotland.[34] They included Frank Anstey and J.J. Dedman. There are also many state

parliamentarians.[35] Three federal or national secretaries of the ALP have been British immigrants: F.E. (Joe) Chamberlain, Cyril Wyndham and Gary Gray. Leading figures in the trade union movement were also British migrants, including Charles Crofts, the first secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) established in 1927; Albert Monk, ACTU president from 1934–43 and 1949–69 and secretary 1945–49; and John Ducker, the Ironworkers Union powerbroker who became secretary of the New South Wales (NSW) Labor Council from 1975–79, president of the NSW ALP from 1970–79 and member of the NSW upper house from 1972–79. It is also sometimes forgotten, amid the tendency to view the ALP and particularly its New South Wales branch as always having been Irish Catholic and ambivalent towards the British Empire, that from its formation right up until the 1917 conscription crisis Nonconformists of British backgrounds were a much more sizeable and influential group in the party than were Roman Catholics from an Irish background.[36] The continuing influence of British traditions and individuals upon the Australian labour movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is epitomised by Andrew Fisher, who was a Presbyterian and teetotaller. Fisher had been a local official of the Ayrshire[37] Miners' Union which Keir Hardie founded in Scotland in 1886.[38] The progress of the Fisher labour government in introducing old-age pensions was closely followed in Britain, including in the pages of the *Labour Leader*,[39] and his rise to the Australian prime ministership generated great pride in his native Scotland. In 1911, when Fisher went as prime minister of Australia to the Colonial Premiers' Conference in Britain, the Labour Party formed a special sub-committee to organise a reception and entertainment for him[40] and the Ayrshire Miners' Union gave a dinner in his honour on 18 May 1911.[41]

Jack Lang (a mentor to Paul Keating) was one Australian labour politician who disliked any links with Britain. Lang — who became famous for playing to anti-

British sentiment by campaigning against the Bank of England financiers whose policies were imposed on Australia in the 1930s Depression — in his memoirs asked the question:

> Why has it been that Labor leaders who have gone to London have returned to their own country no longer fitted to lead a Labor Party? ... on Boxing Day 1912, Holman went off to London ... That was the end of Holman as the Labor radical. He thoroughly enjoyed being duchessed. He was away six months ... The London trip left its mark ... I have always believed it was responsible for the Holman of 1917. He no longer thought in terms of what his followers were wanting in Grenfell or Cootamundra. He was always wondering what they were thinking about him in Mayfair. Three weeks after Holman returned to Sydney, McGowen tossed his resignation in across the Cabinet table. He had had enough. McGowen lost his head in the clouds of the Coronation. Holman lost his Labor soul in the soirees and dinner engagements of London society. They were just the forerunners. Other Labor leaders were to follow in precisely the same path. Hughes was to be next ... it is a sad truth. Labor has lost far more leaders in London than in the hurly burly of Australian politics.[42]

Several very interesting pamphlets written by H.A. Campbell, who evidently worked as an organiser with the Labor Party in Western Australia, were published in Britain around the end of World War One: one, c.1917, entitled *Socialism in Practice: What Labour Governments have Accomplished in Australia and New Zealand*, published by the Glasgow Reformers Bookstall, a copy of which survives in the Mitchell Library, Glasgow; another evidently slightly later pamphlet titled *Socialism at Work in Queensland*, published by the National Labour Press, Manchester, a copy of which survives in the Marx Memorial Library in London; and a third, *Banking, Finance and Currency: The Case for State Banking* published in 1919 by the Independent Labour Party in London, which, among other things, 'gives an interesting account of the

Commonwealth Bank of Australia' and a copy of which survives among the ILP papers at the British Library of Political and Economic Science.

In 1919, the then premier of Queensland, T.J. Ryan, gave evidence to the Sankey Commission in Britain about Queensland's experience of public ownership, and a copy of a book outlining the achievements of his government from 1915 was evidently presented by Ryan as Queensland premier to the British Labour Party's then Deputy Secretary, J.S. Middleton.[43]

The 'Damned Scotsmen' who became prominent in mining unions in coalfields centres such as Victoria's Wonthaggi from the 1920s to the 1940s, continued the tradition established by their forebears in Newcastle, New South Wales.[44] Solidarity between British and Australian unionists was featured again in the 1925 Seamen's Union 'Strike across the Empire', involving Seamen's Union President Tom Walsh, the husband of Adela Pankhurst.[45] The Australasian Trades Union Congress of 1921 sent fraternal greetings to their British Trades Union Congress comrades who were meeting at the same time, and expressed 'admiration of the magnificent stand taken by the miners of Great Britain at a critical period of working-class history'. The same resolution was affirmed later in the year by the ALP Federal Conference.[46]

Arthur Henderson asked the ALP to send a delegation to join those going from the British Labour Party and Trades Union Congress to an International Labour Conference in Geneva in July 1920, but practical problems prevented the ALP's chosen delegate, Queensland Labor premier E.G. 'Ted' Theodore, from taking up this offer.[47] The Australian Labor Party did, however, send a representative to each of the six British Commonwealth Labour Conferences, held in 1925, 1928, 1930, 1944, 1947 and 1957 (the last held at Dorking in England).[48] A seventh conference, planned for 1962, did not eventuate although there was a meeting of socialist party leaders held, at Harold Wilson's initiative, at which Australia was represented.

Even in the early decades, however, the British Labour Party's international vision was probably directed more towards Europe and the United States than the dominions. In the 1930s both labour movements were, independently, deeply concerned with the Spanish Civil War, dispatching volunteers to fight for the anti-fascism cause, although the British Labour Party was, according to James Jupp, far more engaged than the ALP, with the Australian contingent coming more from the Communist Party (CPA).[49]

British interest in Australian Labor achievements was still alive in the 1930s, although the hugely impressive program of social security and other reforms undertaken by Michael Savage's labour government in New Zealand meant that much more attention was directed there. In 1935 the *Daily Herald* dispatched a special correspondent to New Zealand who toured for four months (after travelling there via the US and Canada) and who contributed an enthusiastic three-part series of articles on how Savage's government was showing the way to a new order.[50] In December 1936 the New Fabian Research Bureau published a pamphlet called *Labour Rule in New Zealand*, by Walter Nash, Minister of Finance, Customs and Marketing in Savage's government.[51] Then, in January 1937, the Labour Party issued a pamphlet entitled *New Zealand's Progress under Socialism*[52] and an article, 'New Zealand Labour Gets Things Done', in *The Labour Bulletin*, No. 5, January, 1937.[53] Nash gave several lectures in London to audiences including prominent Labour Party and Fabian Society identities. On 15 December 1936, for instance, he addressed a meeting of the Study Committees of the Empire Parliamentary Association held in the Association's Rooms at Westminster Hall on the topic of 'New Zealand: Recent Legislation and the Outlook on World Affairs'. This meeting was chaired by Clement Attlee, the recently elected leader of the British Labour Party.[54] Attlee later contributed the foreword to a study of *Socialism in New Zealand* in 1938, declaring that 'we in this country have for many years regarded New Zealand as a laboratory of social experiment'.[55]

Australia generated much less interest in this period, although Douglas Jay did comment favourably on the progress made in redistributing wealth in Australia, along with New Zealand, through progressive taxation, in his important 1937 book *The Socialist Case*.[56] Hugh Dalton, at the time a young economist and Labour MP, and later to be the first Chancellor of the Exchequer in the post-war Attlee government, visited Australia and New Zealand on an extended working holiday in 1938, following a year as chairman of the British Labour Party. Following a visit there in the same year, Ernest Bevin commented that 'In Australia and New Zealand great progress has been made in social services'.[57]

Herbert 'Doc' Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs in John Curtin's wartime ALP government, travelled to Britain in 1942 to participate in the British War Cabinet and to put Australia's case for more assistance in fighting the Pacific war. During this visit Evatt was cheered by the Labour Party conference when he addressed them on the co-operation of the British and Australian people in the war effort, and when he anticipated the social programs which British and Australian labour governments would implement once victory was gained.[58] Evatt told the conference that:

> If we are to progress together one thing is plain, and I ask you to consider it. The present relations between the labour organisations of the British Commonwealth of Nations must become more intimate. It is only right and proper that the labour movements in all British countries should plan for the future together. I hope that steps to establish a closer liaison will be taken by you and taken soon.[59]

After World War Two

To a great degree Evatt's hope was realised. The International Secretary of the British Labour Party, William Gillies, acted on his call and within three months was able

to dispatch a telegram to the ALP general secretary, D.L. McNamara, quoting Evatt's words and reporting that the:

> National Executive Committee British Labour Party agree with holding Conference of political labour parties in British Commonwealth and would welcome proposals [from] your Executive as regards time place composition agenda and any other relevant observations or material.[60]

The similarities in the programs subsequently implemented by the Attlee and Chifley governments were no mere coincidence. The 1944 Commonwealth Labour Conference discussed social security policy and problems of post-war reconstruction[61] and issued a manifesto, 'From a People's War to a People's Peace',[62] which sketched the shape of the post-war world the two labour parties wanted to build. There was considerable contact between the two governments and their advisers. The Australian Labor government gave £25 million to help the British Labour government rebuild after the war, and the broader Australian labour movement also actively mobilised its resources in a 'Help Britain' drive. Chifley and Stafford Cripps, the second Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Attlee government, forged a close personal relationship. Hugh Gaitskell, who succeeded Cripps as Chancellor in 1950, described Chifley's Labor government as 'extremely loyal and firm'[63] to Britain in maintaining petrol rationing, in contrast to Robert Menzies' Liberal Opposition, who, he recorded:

> are said to have got in to a considerable extent because of their promise to de-ration. To give any rash promise was, of course, the height of irresponsibility, since they must have known that they could only carry it out at the expense of the sterling-dollar balance.[64]

The Australian union official F.J. Riley wrote on a copy of a report mentioning the 1949 elections which he sent to the British Labour Party's international secretary of the time, Denis Healey, that the election 'is a fascinating con-

firmation of how the Chifley government's loyalty to British economic interests caused its downfall.'[65] Not everyone in the Chifley government wanted to be quite so loyal and firm. Netta Burns, an Australian who went to work for the British Labour Party from 1947–49 and later became a senior, long-standing staffer of Australian Labor government ministers, recalls that:

> sometime during the Whitlam government I was told by one senior politician that he had told Chifley in 1949 not to keep petrol rationing, which Chifley had done at the instigation of the British Labour Party because 'You can't trust the Brits', and so there probably was a lot more Irish anti-British sentiment around than I was aware of. I didn't mix in those circles.[66]

And serious differences did emerge between the foreign policy positions of the Attlee and Chifley governments, and the two individuals in charge of them, Bevin and Evatt.[67] Evatt, like many of the Left in the British Labour Party at that time, wanted to pursue a more independent middle course between the Soviet Union and United States than did the very strongly pro-American British foreign secretary, Bevin.

The ideologies expounded by Beveridge and Keynes filtered through to a number of Australian labour politicians, including Theodore, who was evidently the first person in Australia to obtain a copy of Keynes' 1930 book *A Treatise on Money*, a copy of which, hot off the presses, was flown to him from London by W.G. Robinson, a mutual acquaintance of both Theodore and Keynes.[68]

Curtin and Chifley's adviser, H.C. 'Nugget' Coombs, visited London with Evatt in 1943, met personally with Keynes and became the key intellectual architect of post-war reconstruction in Australia, heavily influenced by the parallel project in Britain, especially following Curtin's return from Britain in 1944 where he had been greatly impressed by the Beveridge White Paper on Full Employment.[69]

Netta Burns told me how she and others in the era after World War Two saw the British Labour Party as 'a very idealistic Party compared with ... [the] Labor Party as we saw it here'.[70] The ALP, she said:

> didn't seem to have the planning and inspiration of the British Labour Party which had got in ... in 1945 and with a tremendous platform in which we all believed on nationalising, and ... liberation of India, a whole lot of things which I don't think had hit the ALP ... what it had was a theory, it seemed to us it had a theory and it had the people who wanted to go along with it there and actually get something done.[71]

She also described how she was 'absolutely addicted to these beautiful sixpenny pamphlets' the British Labour Party published 'that told you how the world should be run'.[72]

Australian historian Geoff Serle was another who spent time in Britain and was very attracted to the British Labour Party in this period. He was at Oxford after the war and wrote in *The Australian Observer*, a contemporary publication about Britain, in which there was a regular column about the British Labour Party and what the Attlee government was doing, and which served as a medium through which ideas and influences from British Labour percolated and became seen as a credible alternative to the communist ideology then popular among Australian radical intellectuals.

The influence of British migrants and their traditions in Australia would continue after World War Two with a new wave of working-class migrants, some of whom were regularly labelled in the 1970s by conservative politicians and commentators as 'pommy shop stewards', bearers of 'the British disease', and criticised for their apparent disproportionate prominence in industrial disputation. The postwar generation of British immigrants did not, however, influence Australian labour movement activity as greatly as their forebears, although particular geographical concentrations of British immigrants have continued

to be important in the Australian labour movement. Western Australia, for instance, actively recruited tradesmen from Britain in the 1970s and many of them became active in trade unions after arrival there. Notable British migrant concentrations include Elizabeth in South Australia,[73] Dandenong and the La Trobe Valley in Victoria,[74] in addition to the Wonthaggi township, Whyalla in South Australia,[75] and Rockingham in Western Australia. Unions such as those in the metal and building trades have continued to draw on an influx of militant British workers for their activists and officials.

James Callaghan, the future Labour prime minister of Britain, visited Australia in 1958–59 and proved himself a perspicacious observer of the local political events and personalities. He found the ALP:

> very demoralised as a result of the last election ... all discussions are dominated by talk about the Catholic issue ... The breakaway Catholics claim that the Labor Party is communist dominated; from my observations I should say this was simply not true ... they were talking about another six years in Opposition as they feel at present they cannot win the next election. Nevertheless there are a number of younger men of ability who are coming to the forefront ... [including] Gough Whitlam, an MP for Sydney ... Menzies, with whom I had a long session, is just coasting along after his electoral victory. I could get very little serious conversation with him and, by all accounts, he simply is not working very hard. He is much more interested in the Test matches.[76]

Callaghan also reported that:

> Through the whole period I was there, I was given an overwhelming reception because of the regard in which the British Labour Party is held. Perhaps the most useful service that I did was to be the guest of honour at a dinner at which about 15 of the top Labor Party and Trade Union leaders sat down, some of whom had not sat down with each other for a very long time. I thought perhaps the best way to help was to give them a frank account of the

> internal difficulties through which we had passed and
> how we had surmounted them, in the hope that it would
> encourage them to do the same in the future ... The Aus-
> tralian Labor Party is anxious to preserve close links with
> us and Evatt suggested that we should have another con-
> ference like the Dorking Conference within the next year
> or two.[77]

Clement Attlee also visited Australia in 1959 to promote
the cause of world government, with which he was then
preoccupied.[78]

Many labour movement thinkers in Australia would
look to Britain for guidance in their efforts to refashion
socialist ideology to the unfriendly climate of the 1950s
and to adapt the ALP to the organisational and electoral
demands of the 1960s. Strong mutual awareness and close
contact between the two labour movements was sustained
until at least the middle of that decade, when it declined
somewhat, to be picked up again from the early 1980s,
though this time driven by British interest in what the Aus-
tralian Labor Party had achieved.

Differences

Once we move from a global perspective upon the two
parties, however, to look beyond their obvious similarities
and links and subject them to more searching scrutiny,
intriguing differences soon become apparent.

Although the Australian colonies substantially repro-
duced the social structure of nineteenth-century Britain,
they were by no means a complete replica. Nearly all British
visitors to the colonies in the second half of the nineteenth
century remarked on their comparatively democratic and
egalitarian atmosphere. Two of the most famous descrip-
tions were made by two Englishmen: John Askew and
Henry Kingsley. Askew declared that in Australia:

> Such was the amazing amount of wealth which had fallen
> into the hands of the working classes, that society was

turned upside down and once for all in the history of the world (in point of wealth at least), 'Jack was as good as his master', and in some cases, far better.[79]

Kingsley complained that the colonies were a 'Working Man's Paradise'.[80]

Studies of the early colonial population have depicted it as a 'radical' fragment of the parent society[81] and there is no doubt that the Australian colonies inherited the various contending features of British society in a different balance and that this crucially affected the course of the labour movement in the two countries. Australia as a new settler capitalist country had a much weaker ruling class than Britain and the role of the state was also inevitably greater in a new country with new infrastructure needing to be built up.[82]

The disproportionate influence of radical immigrants, the early achievement of the eight-hour day and manhood suffrage, relatively high wages and more equal income distribution in both the nineteenth and into the twentieth century[83] and greater possibilities for upward working-class mobility than in the Old World, encouraged the sense of Australia as a fairer society than Britain. There were and continue to be less divisions along the lines of accent, dress and manners in Australian society than in Britain. D.H. Lawrence wrote of his visit to Australia in the 1920s that:

> There was really no class distinction. There was a difference of money and of 'smartness'. But nobody felt *better* than anybody else, or higher; only better-off. And there is all the difference in the world between feeling *better* than your fellow man and merely feeling *better-off*.[84]

While there was extensive industrialisation from the 1920s and after World War Two, Australia did evolve as essentially a pastoral economy rather than an advanced industrial economy like Britain. Manual workers were therefore less numerous in Australia. The extent to which they were less numerous is difficult to precisely quantify, given the frequently changing and very different occupational clas-

sifications used in the two countries in the censuses which were conducted to the mid-twentieth century, but the evidence suggests that 75 per cent of the occupied population were manual workers in Britain in 1911[85] compared with 53 per cent in Australia in the same year.[86] Within the ranks of manual workers, occupations such as shearing were proportionately more important in the Australian workforce and union movement than coalmining. There were many more Catholics in Australia than in Britain.[87] There was greater *geographic* — as well as social — mobility in Australia. There were different patterns of land ownership, with more small land-holders in Australia.

While comparative studies have demonstrated that Australian workers earned higher real wages in the nineteenth century than in Britain, and continued to do so into the twentieth century, many working-class British immigrants nevertheless found only hardship and disappointment, such as those (including George Lansbury[88]) who arrived in the Depression of the early 1890s.

Henry Lawson expressed the aspiration that British immigrants and convict settlers had for a fairer society in Australia when he wrote how:

> Our fathers toiled for bitter bread,
> While idlers thrived beside them;
> But food to eat and clothes to wear
> Their native land denied them.
> They left their native land in spite
> Of royalties' regalia,
> And so they came, or if they stole
> Were sent out to Australia.[89]

However, he also strongly challenged the idea that Australia was free of the injustices of the Old World, when he penned the lines that:

> They lie, the men who tell us,
> For reasons of their own,
> That want is here a stranger,
> And that misery's unknown.[90]

William Lane also became disillusioned with the idea of Australia as a 'Working Man's Paradise' and he bitterly satirised this notion in his novel of that title,[91] in contrast to his earlier high hopes.

James Bryce later argued that Australia was in fact *more* of a class society than Britain in that its class relationships were more singularly economic, were less tempered by traditions of deference and paternalistic responsibility, and therefore had produced a more assertive working class than in Britain.[92]

Appleyard assessed that 'average earnings ... were about 25 per cent to 30 per cent higher in Australia than in the United Kingdom between 1948 and 1960'[93] but nevertheless I came across a large number of letters in the course of this research, from British immigrants to Australia, who were disappointed and aggrieved at the conditions of life in their new country and particularly about the standards of accommodation in the hostels they encountered after arriving there.[94] These letters contain important and often passionately expressed anecdotal material to counterbalance the dominant view that Australia has been a relative paradise for British immigrants. A good overall perspective of the positives and negatives in the experience of post-war British migrants, which can probably be applied more generally, came out of my interview with John Ducker, who emigrated from Hull, Yorkshire in 1950 at age 18 with his parents, worked as an ironworker and later became a very powerful figure in the Federated Ironworkers Association and the New South Wales ALP:

> There is a process of adjustment ... Pommies *would* get offended about being called Pommy bastards ... it was a reflection ...
>
> Things *were* different. The local fish and chip shop was different, it usually didn't have vinegar. So some sort of said 'Oh, this isn't like home'. Now the first rule about anywhere is there is settling in and accepting the way it is. Not at the risk of your own sort of values or culture, but a reasonable accommodation ...

Life *was* tough. We weren't well off or comfortable and we had our share of problems with housing, which sometimes was horrific ... But still ... all the sense of freedom, the sense of opportunity that you could move around a bit, the basic living standards were better than the UK, climate, all those features.

And what about the view that Australia had less of a class-divided society than Britain — do you think that was accurate?

Well, yes, I mean, to say that Australia's a classless society is not having travelled to the Eastern Suburbs too much in recent times. But nonetheless it is possible to cross all sorts of supposed boundaries and barriers ... there's certainly a good deal more basic democracy in Australia. I mean I think one of the things still to this day is people are prepared to stand up and speak up for what they think is right and don't believe in being pushed around too much. Whereas in Hull you didn't have great expectations because there was no point in having them.

So there really is more mobility here?

Yes.[95]

The introduction of industrial arbitration in Australia following the great strikes of the 1890s was in clear contrast to developments in Britain and this had major long-term implications for the two movements' relative futures.[96] Together with the fact that a tradition of shop steward autonomy from union officialdom became less widespread in Australia than Britain, the more centralised form of Australian wage determination had major effects on the relative capacities of later labour governments in each country to implement incomes policies. The British Labour Party inherited a long working-class tradition of suspicion towards the state, based on centuries of oppression, whereas in the comparatively new environment of Australia where the state was playing a visibly useful practical role, the ALP was less suspicious.

Another absolutely crucial difference, the importance of which is hard to overrate, was that the Australian nation was created as a *federal* system in which states' rights were extensive, thus creating formidable constitutional imped-

iments to the programs of future Labor governments at the national level and making it very difficult for the ALP to function as a truly national party, whereas the British Labour Party never had such impediments.

While socialist ideas from Britain were widely disseminated in the colonies, particularly in the 1890s, their impact was offset by other influences. Australians may have been more receptive to the American thinker Henry George and his ideas for a single tax on land than the British were, because of a widespread resentment of the wealth and power held by the large landholders in the colonies: the 'squattocracy'. The land tax featured in early ALP programs, and Edward Bellamy was also a very prominent influence in Australia,[97] but not in Britain.

The much higher numbers of Roman Catholics in colonial society than in Britain meant that Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum* had considerably more influence upon Australian Labor's early ideology than it did upon British Labour. The welfarist strand of Catholic social teaching was reflected in the platforms of the colonial labour parties. When you could invoke the authority of the pontiff to support the rights of workers against bosses, it was scarcely necessary to turn to more radical sources of support.

Although Fabian Societies were established in Victoria and South Australia in the 1890s on the London model, they did not have the same continuous activity nor anywhere near the same range and depth of influence upon the ALP's policy as the British Fabian Society, and its associated organs such as the New Fabian Research Bureau and the Fabian Colonial Bureau, did on the British Labour Party. The Fabian Society's papers at Nuffield College, Oxford reveal an incredible array and detail of Fabian policy output in Britain, ranging from stances which Labour governments should adopt on all aspects of global affairs, to appropriate socialist policies for agriculture, to the fine details of implementing change in the London electricity industry. By contrast, no Fabian Society

existed at all in Australia between 1910 and 1937, and it was not until the 1960s that the Australian Fabians began to publish a series of pamphlets and to directly influence ALP policy. Some indication of the relative activity of the Fabians in the two countries, and, more generally, of the extent of intellectual debate in the two labour movements, is given by the fact that by the end of the 1990s the British Fabian Society had published nearly 600 tracts whereas the Australian Fabian Society had published fewer than 60. Another handicap to the Fabian Society in Australia was that it became perceived as a creature on the Right of the labour movement to a greater extent than the Fabian Society in Britain. This may have partly been due to the general atmosphere of distrust and paranoia about any new thinking due to the ascendancy of the Old Left in some quarters of the ALP after the 1950s split, which had led to the formation of a breakaway, anti-communist Democratic Labor Party (DLP).

The naming of the party as the '*Australian* Labor Party' rather than just the 'Labour Party' as in Britain reflects the greater importance of nationalism for the founders of the colonial parties. Nationalism was inherently easier for Australian Labor to embrace than it was for British Labour, because in the colonies nationalism could often be associated with anti-imperialism, whereas for the British it usually meant pro-imperialism, a terrain which the Tories could much more comfortably occupy. The respective parties' choice of symbols is revealing. From 1980–94 the ALP used a stylised national flag as its symbol and has continued since to use a similarly apolitical *national* logo, whereas the British Labour Party in the 1980s chose a *red* rose to replace the old red flag.

Nevertheless, the nationalism which Australian Labor embraced was very ambivalent: characterised on the one hand by great pride in 'the British race' and desire to preserve Australia as a British community free from 'contamination' by coloured races; yet at the same time opposing the conferral of 'imperial' British honours. As has often

been pointed out, it was a labour prime minister who pledged support for Britain in World War One: 'Australians will stand beside our own to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling', proclaimed Andrew Fisher.[98] The mixed feelings about Britain had been expressed many years earlier by Marcus Clarke when he called, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the winning of the eight-hour day in Australia, to:

> Cheer for Australia, comrades,
> And cheer for Britain, too;
> Who loves them both will not be loth
> To give each land its due ...

> But never let our sons forget,
> Till mem'ry's self be dead,
> If Britain gave us birth, my lads,
> Australia gave us bread![99]

The frequent omission of the letter 'u' from the spelling of 'labour' in the Australian Labor Party from the mid-1890s reflects the greater orientation towards the United States of America which the 'new' and rising bush unions had compared to the older, British-derived and city-based craft unions.[100] The 'new' unions saw the US as a more modern and progressive nation than the 'Old Country'. The shedding of the letter 'u' thus signified one of the ALP's earliest attempts at 'modernisation' and a point of differentiation from the British Labour Party.

Electoral success

The much earlier achievement of a wide franchise in Australian elections (the Appendix to this book sets out a detailed chronological comparison) facilitated the faster rise of labour as a political party and parliamentary presence in Australia as compared to Britain. A campaigner for women's suffrage in New Zealand in the early 1890s described how there were 'fewer ancient barriers to break down than in England'[101] and the same was true in

Figure 1.1: The rise of the labour vote in Britain and Australia to 1960

achieving a democratic franchise more generally in both Australia and New Zealand. If the 'franchise factor'[102] was important in the rise of British Labour after the right to vote was finally widened to most men and women there in 1918, it was also absolutely crucial in explaining the very different pace of developments in the British and Australian labour parties' first fifty years. In New South Wales and Queensland in particular the ALP as a parliamentary force developed considerably in advance of the emerging independent labour organisation in Britain. And, as Figure 1.1 shows, there was also a much faster growth in national electoral support for the ALP than for British Labour.[103]

Compulsory voting was introduced in Australia in 1924 and had positive effects for the Australian Labor Party vis-a-vis Britain (and will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 3).

The absence of a long-established two-party system in the colonies, as compared to Westminster, meant that the field which Australian Labor entered in the 1890s was

*Figure 1.2: Periods of labour government in Britain
and Australia, 1900–59*

1900   1959

MacDonald   Attlee

1900   1959

Watson   Fisher Hughes   Scullin   Curtin Chifley

 Junior Coalition
Partner

 Minority
Government

 Majority
Government

much more open. The ALP did not have to break the
mould of existing politics in order to advance. To this day
a three- rather than essentially two-party system has per-
sisted in Britain, but in Australia since the 'Fusion' of the
Liberal Protectionists and the Free Traders in 1909 there
has always been an essentially two-party system (counting
the Liberal and National coalition parties for electoral pur-
poses as one conservative party). Labour is the youngest of
the major parties in Britain, but the oldest in Australia.

All of these factors facilitated the early ascension of
Labor into government in Australia. Figure 1.2 shows the
periods when labour parties were in office in Britain and
Australia prior to 1960.

The British Labour Party had a taste of office as junior
partner in Asquith's and then Lloyd George's Liberal-led
coalition government during World War One, but did not
itself form a minority government until 1924, whereas the
Australian Labor Party did so in 1904. British Labour did
not form a majority government until 1945, whereas the
ALP did so in 1910.

The early Australian national labour governments formed under Watson (in 1904) and Fisher (in 1908–09, 1910–13 and 1914–15), as has most famously been noted by Lenin,[104] implemented many of the policies (such as those for social insurance and old age pensions) which were being implemented by a *Liberal* government then in office in Britain, although the Fisher governments also took distinct initiatives such as setting up a 'people's bank' — the Commonwealth Bank — in 1911.

The fact that the ALP attained office relatively early has in turn been singled out as the cause of some unique short-term difficulties and long-term defects of the party. For instance, in Australia World War One divisions in the labour movement over the conscription issue became very serious because the ALP was a majority government and thus it was a Labor prime minister who tried to impose the policy upon an implacably opposed movement. In Britain, by contrast, Labour was only a junior coalition partner, and its senior representative in the cabinet, Arthur Henderson, was able to avoid direct conflict with the many in the movement who opposed Asquith's efforts to introduce conscription. The ALP's early conquest of office has also been blamed for producing a party more pragmatic and less open to philosophical debate than other parties which had longer periods in opposition in which to refine their ideas.[105] In general it is true to say that the Australian Labor Party's thought developed in a less sophisticated fashion than British Labour's, based heavily upon a simplistic hostility to bankers, or the 'Money Power'.[106] The visiting French socialist Albert Metin, early in the twentieth century, was one of the earliest to comment on this, famously characterising the Australian labour movement as upholding a 'socialism *without* doctrine'.[107] Many other observers since have commented on, and successive generations of activists have experienced, the comparative lack of an intellectual life in the Australian labour movement as against the British (and even more so as against the European) movements. The theme of greater com-

mitment to ideas and debate about ideas in the culture of the British Labour Party keeps coming up in every generation, as will be seen. This also applies to myself. My own interest in British Labour started to strengthen from the mid-1980s because of the attractions of its journal of debate and ideas, *New Socialist*, which offered something of a contrast with the very pragmatic and policy-reversing path which the ALP was then rapidly starting to go down. Many in the British Labour Party, however, express surprise when you suggest that they have an active intellectual culture. They constantly compare themselves to the continental European social democratic parties in this respect and find themselves lacking.

Hugh Dalton wrote of his 1938 visit to Australia that:

> Here they have too few intellectuals in the L[abour P[arty]; at home we have too many and too talkative and too scribblish (Rowse, Cole, Laski). These semi-crocks ... would cut no ice with these Aussies.[108]

Such views were shared at the highest levels of the Australian Labor Party leadership, including Ben Chifley. According to Jim Cairns, when he left for England in 1951 to conduct research into the links between the British and Australian labour movements:

> Mr. Chifley told me that in going to England for a year's research and study I had a great opportunity. He said that 'academics not lawyers' had done much, and far more in England 'to clarify Labour ideals'. In Australia, he said, 'we have only picked up what has happened elsewhere'. I said that a Frenchman had written ... that in Australia it was 'socialism without doctrines'. Chifley said, 'No doctrines and no socialism either'. He said that what we have done here was just very practical ... badly enough needed, but it can become just more money, and even with the chance of never losing your job it is still money and jobs. It is up to you people who have had an education to show how we can do something about ideals. They have done that in England.[109]

In Australia since the time that Chifley was prime minister, 'the light on the hill' is the phrase most frequently used when people try to encapsulate what the ALP stands for. Chifley first used this phrase in the context of arguing that the labour movement really *did* stand for something more than just short-term material or personal gain.[110] 'The light on the hill' was the longer-term ideal towards which everyday efforts were supposedly directed. It was an insistence that there *was* some ultimate purpose, rather than an explanation of exactly what that purpose might be.

Accordingly 'the light on the hill' is really a rather defensive image. Its usage does not highlight *what* the ALP's ideological goals *are*, but instead suggests just how pragmatic the mainsteam activities of the party are that a declaration that there really is some higher purpose should be required. The phrase, then, perhaps fits in with Metin's judgement that what the Australian labour movement really exhibited was a very pragmatic 'socialism *without* doctrine'. It is nevertheless too simplistic to dismiss Australian Labor as non-ideological, given the interest by the bush unionists and others in thinkers like William Morris, Henry George and Edward Bellamy, and the role which was played by Nugget Coombs and also Lloyd Ross in the post-war reconstruction years.

There was however a comparative lack of an intellectual life in the Australian labour movement, which may simply reflect characteristics of the broader Australian society. Britain's greater size makes it able to support a more open and vibrant intellectual life, manifested for instance in a larger number and wider range of broadsheet newspapers including literary supplements. Within the range of mainstream British newspapers there has long been some distinctly pro-Labour daily publications, such as *The Guardian*, the *Observer* and the *Daily Mirror*, and the weekly magazine *New Statesman*, in contrast to the more narrowly and tightly controlled Australian media. The availability of these publications for the participation of labour movement thinkers has helped to fertilise

greater debate within the British labour movement than the Australian. In Australia there has also long been a tendency for university-based intellectuals to be remote from mainstream Australian culture, and little in touch with local political developments, in contrast to Britain.[111] There was no Australian parallel to the London School of Economics founded in the late nineteenth century by the Webbs (although the Australian National University formed after World War Two was envisaged by Coombs as fulfilling a somewhat similar role). Nor was there any Australian equivalent to the formation and development of Ruskin College, Oxford from 1899, though there were Labour Colleges in Sydney and Brisbane as well as the Victorian Labor College which was founded in Melbourne in 1917,[112] which has survived ever since (albeit as a marginal and idiosyncratic entity) and which did make contact with the National Council of Labor Colleges (NCLC) which had been spawned in Britain by Ruskin College.[113]

There has not continuously been a Labour Research Department (LRD) in Australia as there has been in Britain since 1912, although one did exist in Sydney in the 1920s. A Labour Resource Centre was set up in Victoria in 1976, clearly modelled on the British LRD and, indeed, emulating in minute detail the format of the LRD's publications. This Centre was renamed the Labour Research Centre following a controversy in 1988 but folded in 1993. There was an Australian attempt to set up a Left Book Club in 1942 after the successful 'parent' body in Britain established by Victor Gollancz in 1936, and the Australian Left Book Club was clearly active for some time at least,[114] although it attracted less of a following and had less of an impact in Australia than the British original.

Trade unions long tended to play a quite different ideological role in the British Labour Party than they did in the ALP. Whereas in Britain the union leaders were traditionally a moderating influence on the more socialist proclivities of the constituency party members, in Australia socialist ideas have historically been stronger in many of

the union leaderships than among members of the ALP branches.[115] The complicity of the ALP's leaders in the 1916–17 conscription crisis led to a deep trade union distrust of the politicians.[116] This meant that the syndicalist ideal of replacing parliamentarians altogether with a system of government by large industrial unions made much more headway in the mainstream Australian trade union movement than it did among British union leaders during the 1920s[117] and even earlier.[118] This traditional difference between the parties in the ideological role of their affiliated unions persisted until the late 1960s.

Jupp has commented that the British Labour Party developed a middle-class leadership much earlier than the ALP.[119] The precise details of this can be seen in Table 1.1, which shows the national parliamentary leaders of the two parties, the highest level of education they reached and their main occupation(s) prior to entering parliament.

The horizontal lines through the table mark the times when each labour party moved away from electing rank and file (and usually blue-collar) workers as their leaders, who may have progressed to hold office in the labour movement but who had little or no formal education beyond 'elementary' school (in Britain) or 'primary' school (in Australia), to electing instead people with significantly higher formal qualifications and with more 'professional' political career paths who usually had no experience of what it was like to be a manual worker or 'ordinary' wage-earner.

The British Labour Party made this departure in 1935 whereas the ALP could not truly be said to have done so at the national level until 1951 (and if the subsequent election of Calwell as Evatt's successor is interpreted as a partial return to the earlier pattern, then the shift did not fully occur until Whitlam's accession in 1967). The 'middle-classing' of British Labour also occurred much earlier and more deeply through the parliamentary party than in the ALP.

Table 1.1: Labour party leaders, highest educational level reached and principal occupation(s) prior to entering Parliament

| Year	Leader	Education	Employment
BRITAIN			
1906–08	Keir Hardie	Elementary	Miner
1908–10	Arthur Henderson	Elementary	Iron-founder then Labour Party secretary
1910–11	George Barnes	Elementary	Engineer
1911–14	Ramsay MacDonald	Elementary	Journalist then Labour Party secretary
1914–17	Arthur Henderson	Elementary	Iron-founder then Labour Party secretary
1917–21	Willie Adamson	Elementary	Miner
1921–22	John Clynes	Elementary	Gasworker
1922–31	Ramsay MacDonald	Elementary	Journalist then Labour Party secretary
1931–32	Arthur Henderson	Elementary	Iron-founder then Labour Party secretary
1932–35	George Lansbury	Elementary	Labourer, then businessman
1935–55	Clement Attlee	Tertiary	Army officer in WWI, then social worker
1955–63	Hugh Gaitskell	Tertiary	University lecturer
1963–76	Harold Wilson	Tertiary	Civil servant, economist and university lecturer
1976–80	James Callaghan	Secondary	Clerk, white-collar union secretary, then merchant naval officer during WWII
1980–83	Michael Foot	Tertiary	Journalist
1983–92	Neil Kinnock	Tertiary	Adult education teacher
1992–94	John Smith	Tertiary	Barrister
1994–	Tony Blair	Tertiary	Barrister
AUSTRALIA			
1901–07	Chris Watson	Primary	Printer
1907–15	Andrew Fisher	Primary	Miner
1915–16	Billy Hughes	Some secondary (and later tertiary)	Shopowner, union secretary, (and later barrister)
1916–22	Francis Tudor	Primary	Felt-hatter
1922–28	Matthew Charlton	Primary	Miner
1928–35	James Scullin	Primary	Grocer, journalist, union organiser
1935–45	John Curtin	Primary	Union secretary, journalist
1945–51	Ben Chifley	Some secondary	Train driver
1951–60	Bert Evatt	Tertiary	Barrister, judge
1960–67	Arthur Calwell	Secondary	Public servant
1967–77	Gough Whitlam	Tertiary	Barrister
1977–83	Bill Hayden	Tertiary	Police officer
1983–91	Bob Hawke	Tertiary	ACTU president
1991–96	Paul Keating	Secondary	Union research officer
1996–	Kim Beazley	Tertiary	University lecturer

After World War Two

Another significant difference is that the Chifley Labor government was less successful than the Attlee government in its nationalisation and welfare program (and thus the relative success rate of the two movements was reversed from this period, in favour of Britain, and probably continued to be so right up until the 1980s). Australia delivered much less sizeable welfare outlays than Britain.[120] The Chifley government was unable to establish a National Health Service (ironically the British Medical Association had more influence in Australia than in Britain in resisting a national health scheme) or carry through the nationalisation of major industries. The British Labour government's relative success was due partly to the constitutional impediments in Australia, and partly to the fact that the ALP program was much less ambitious in the first place.[121]

In one respect, however, in its attempt to nationalise the private banks, Chifley's government was more ambitious than Attlee's, which, though it created a state-owned Bank of England (analogous to the ALP's earlier formation of the Commonwealth Bank in 1911), regarded it as too risky to even attempt nationalisation of private banks. The British Labour Party's lesser emphasis on bankers in turn stemmed from the fact that the 1930s depression was less severe there than in Australia, with the unemployment rate peaking at 22.5 per cent in Britain in 1932 compared with 29 per cent in Australia in the same year[122] and the banking system staying relatively stable, with savings always being able to be accessed.[123] Popular memories of the banks' role were correspondingly less bitter. In Australia hostility to the banks was especially widespread in rural areas, and the ALP, unlike the British Labour Party, emerged in many ways as a party of rural working-class protest.

Attlee's government was also more successful than Chifley's in containing industrial disputation. Figure 1.3

Figure 1.3: Working days lost through industrial disputes in
Britain and Australia 1941–59

compares the number of working days lost in Britain and
Australia from 1941 to 1959.[124]

In part this comparative industrial peace in Britain was
because the Communist Party had gained greater influ-
ence in the Australian trade union movement. Another
significant reason was the close personal relationship
which Ernest Bevin, who was the Minister for Labour in
the coalition government from 1940–45, as a recently very
senior trade union official was able to forge in govern-
ment with the union leaders. It is no coincidence that the
only other period of labour government in Britain or Aus-
tralia in which very few days would be lost through indus-
trial action would also be one in which a senior
government figure (in this case the prime minister, Bob
Hawke) had recently been the paramount union leader.

Although the Australian legend built around the
shearers and stockmen of the 1890s lingers on in popular
imagination, the degree of urban concentration has long
been as great in Australia as Britain.[125] However, the
pattern of Australian urban settlement has differed from

that of Britain, in that it has centred on a few large cities, particularly along the eastern coast, whereas Britain has a more densely and evenly distributed population. In Britain there are numerous medium-sized cities centred on mining or manufacturing, whereas in Australia, with some exceptions such as Wollongong, Newcastle and Geelong, this is not the case. James Jupp believes that this has shaped some of the differences between the British and Australian labour movements, in that the Independent Labour Party tradition of involvement in local government in Britain tended to be strongest in the strong local community culture of medium-sized towns in the North of England and in Scotland rather than in the metropolis of London.[126]

Approximately 30 per cent of Britons owned or were paying off their own home in the 1950s, whereas twice as many were in this position in Australia. Ownership of private cars, motorcycles and telephones was higher in Australia than Britain from 1947 to 1960 and the difference increased in Australia's favour over this period. Similarly, household ownership of refrigerators and washing machines was very much higher in Australia than in Britain. In the category of consumer durables, only the ownership of television receivers was higher in Britain than in Australia, and this was probably due to the relatively late introduction and spread of television in Australia.[127]

Whereas in Britain the leadership of the Labour Party worked closely during the 1950s with right-wing trade union leaders against the Communist Party, in Australia Evatt vigorously defended the civil liberties of the Communists and thus found himself in alignment with the party's left wing and opposed to the leaders of the right-wing unions. Because the Communist Party had made more headway in the Australian union movement than among British unions in the Cold War years — amongst the miners, for example — the ALP split fundamentally over this issue. British Labour underwent its own divisions between Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan, and was out

of office from 1951–64, but it was better able to contain and earlier curtail these divisions than the ALP, and thus was more stable organisationally, and effective electorally, in the 1960s. Although the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) became a mass movement in Britain from the late 1950s, and unilateral nuclear disarmament was adopted as Labour Party policy in 1960 (before being rescinded the following year), in general the Cold War was more divisive in Australia than in Britain, perhaps because of the strong Catholic ideological current in the Australian labour movement and the high numbers of Irish Catholics in its ranks, reinforced by high levels of Eastern European migration to Australia after World War Two, and also because Menzies was particularly adept and ruthless at exploiting the issue, more so than the British Tory politicians. One reason that British labour politicians have been more able than ALP figures to openly use the term 'socialism' may be that the clear articulation of a distinct democratic socialist tradition in Britain distinguished this term from 'communism' and the Soviet Union in the public mind to a much greater extent than in Australia.[128]

Organisational differences

Several organisational differences between the parties also need to be noted. Whereas the Labour Party in Britain was created as a formal confederation of trade unions, constituency parties, socialist societies, the ILP and Co-operative Party, the Australian Labor Party was based only upon unions and individual members of local branches.

Union affiliations occur only at a state level in the ALP whereas they are made at both local and national level in the British Labour Party. Structurally, this has meant that the unions long had more direct power at the British Labour Party Annual Conference than they do at the ALP National Conference. However, because the Australian unions have tended historically to be more to the Left

than the British Labour Party's affiliated unions, it has been the ALP in which unions have actually been inclined to exert their power more.

British unions have also traditionally directly 'sponsored' many Labour members of parliament and thus have had a more direct formal relationship with Labour parliamentarians than have Australian unions.

Another organisational difference is the higher degree of caucus discipline and control in Australia. Labor parliamentarians cannot vote against the party line as they can in Britain within specified (and contested) limits. The considerably larger number of members in the House of Commons than Australia's House of Representatives has made it logistically harder to enforce controls.

The 1905 ALP Federal Conference also resolved to depart from the long-standing Westminster tradition whereby the prime minister personally chooses the ministry. Since then, in Australia the full Labor caucus has elected the ministry while prime ministerial power has been limited to the allocation of portfolios.

The strong principles of caucus control in the early ALP, compared to the British Labour Party, meant that the ministry was elected by the full caucus both in opposition *and* in government, not personally selected by the party leader. Proposals to adopt the ALP procedure in Britain were explicitly rejected in 1914[129] and even after Ramsay MacDonald's defection in 1931 his successor was able to ignore formal constraints, drafted by the 1933 Labour Party Conference, on the leader's discretion to select frontbenchers. Attlee firmly believed:

> that the method of the Australian Labor Party, whereby a number of members are elected by the Caucus and all that is left to the Prime Minister is to fit the pieces into a jig-saw puzzle as best he may, is quite wrong.[130]

Harold Wilson later concurred, calling the ALP method an 'unworkable system adopted ... under the guise of democracy'.[131]

A further organisational difference, flowing from federalism, is that whereas the British Labour Party's formally supreme policy-making body is a *mass* conference, Australia's is a small federal conference, elected from 'mass' conferences at the state level, and therefore is a further stage removed from rank-and-file opinion and from direct, unmediated block voting by trade union delegations. Right up until 1969 the media were excluded from ALP Federal Conferences, a situation without parallel in Britain, where the Labour Party's Conferences had long been open to the public.

Distrust of parliamentary leaders may also explain the fact that the Australian Labor Party's supreme policy-making body, the Federal Conference, made no provision for the inclusion of party leaders in the first 65 years after its creation in 1902. Indeed, the Federal Conference retained the same structure for all those years — 36 delegates, six from each state, regardless of population size. 1967 saw the Conference expand to seven delegates from each state. From 1969, at Whitlam's insistence, the size of the conference was expanded to 49, with the addition of the four federal parliamentary leaders, an increase of one in each state's entitlement, and the addition of one delegate each from the ACT, the Northern Territory and the Young Labor organisation. It was not until the 1979 National Committee of Inquiry and the 1981 National Conference that the ALP faced up to some of the other challenges of reorganisation such as the need to have a formula for National Conference representation which reflected the huge differences in the sizes of state and territory populations. However, even the 1981 conference adopted compromise solutions and only expanded the size of the National Conference to 99 delegates, rather than the 300 or more suggested by the National Committee of Inquiry. In 1981 it was finally agreed that each state's entitlement should be calculated according to its size, so that New South Wales now had 24 delegates compared with Tasmania's nine. The Territories now had two

delegates each. Attempts at further enlargement and other reforms of the National Conference were blocked in 1991 but they eventually won through in 1994 when the size of conference was again doubled. It remains to be seen whether this and initiatives such as the introduction of some 'fringe' style conference activities such as the Manning Clark Memorial Lecture at the 1994 Conference make the ALP National Conference more like the grander British Labour Party event.

All of these differences between the British and Australian Labour parties which evolved in the first half century and more of their existence would influence their respective destinies as they set about 'modernising' in order to face the new challenges of the 1960s.

2

Ideological revision since the 1960s

It was in the early 1950s, following their immediate post-war achievements in office, that both the British and the Australian labour parties suffered successive election defeats and became increasingly uncertain about what they stood for. It was also in this period that seeds of 'revisionism', or 'modernisation', started to sprout. An important debate began in the 1950s in Britain, and soon carried to Australia, around the theme that capitalism was now substantially different from the harsh beast known in the 1930s, and that traditional socialist objectives needed to be rethought accordingly.

There were attempts to reform the British Labour Party's organisational structure and to stem its membership decline after the 1955 election defeat, when the (Harold) Wilson committee on party organisation was appointed, and its report presented in September of that year. In spite of opposition, it was decided to publish a revised version for debate at the 1955 conference.

The Left's Aneurin Bevan dismissed the Wilson report thus:

> They were going to increase the number of organisers,
> streamline the machinery and make the car go faster. He
> was not sure that he wanted to go faster, if he were going
> over a precipice. He wanted to have a more precise idea
> of where they were going.[1]

Bevan's dismissiveness reflects the fact that whereas in the
1930s the momentum in Britain for 'rethinking' Labour's
traditional goals had come from the Left, now the Left
came to resist the calls for 'modernisation' and played the
role of defending traditional ideology. The momentum
for 'rethinking' shifted to the Right.

The Revisionist Right, 1950s–1970s

The seeds of the revisionist ideas in Britain were first spread
in the early issues of the *Socialist Commentary* journal, pub-
lished from the early post-war years by elements on the
Right of the British Labour Party organised as the Socialist
Vanguard Group, later the Socialist Union. These germi-
nated with the publication of *New Fabian Essays* in 1952. In
Australia a book of Fabian essays, *Policies for Progress*, was
published in 1954, co-edited by Geoff Serle, and inspired by
the preceding British publication.[2]

The debate continued in Britain in 1953 with the
appearance of Roy Jenkins' book *Pursuit of Progress*. The
first avowed 'revisionist' to enter the discussion, however,
was John Strachey, with his book *Contemporary Capitalism*,
published in 1956. What later became the seminal 'revi-
sionist' text was also published in 1956: C.A.R. Crosland's
The Future of Socialism. Another important text from
outside Britain was John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent
Society* (1958). A further important contribution was the
book by Mark Abrams et al, *Must Labour Lose?* (1960),
which grew out of an opinion poll survey for *Socialist Com-
mentary*, and which presented empirical evidence in
favour of the view that Labour should distance itself from
the trade unions, broaden its image beyond being a
working-class party and move away from reliance on state

nationalisation and planning in order to win elections in the 1960s. Other key texts included Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (1960) and Douglas Jay's *Socialism in the New Society* (1962).

Strachey emphasised the capacity for the new capitalism, in contrast to the old, to be beneficially regulated by a democratic state. He pointed to the impartiality and competence of the rising new class of professional managers, who he believed would act in accordance with the needs of the people rather than in the interests of the owners.[3]

Crosland built upon the tentative ideas of earlier 'revisionist' thinkers[4] to argue that, in addition to the rise of a non-owning class of salaried executives, the new capitalism was characterised by a greater role for the state; wider and more evenly distributed affluence; the pervasive presence of collectivist and non-capitalist ideology, with practical expression in the form of a strong trade union movement; and that there was now a less rigid class structure.[5] Accordingly, the market economy could no longer be regarded as inherently unjust and unworkable, and Labour should move away from the objective of nationalising privately owned industries, in favour of welfare provision and selective state intervention to promote equality. Crosland later argued that because the working class (as he defined it) was shrinking in size, the Labour Party's identification with that class should make way for more of a national, and less of a class, identity.[6] In this he prefigured the political strategy of national 'consensus' pursued by the British Labour Party under Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Australian Labor Party under Hawke in the 1980s. The ideas of Crosland and the other 'revisionists' affected the ideologies of the British and Australian labour parties, and the programs which the next labour governments to take office in the two countries would pursue, to varying degrees.

In the British Labour Party it was widely accepted by the early 1960s that traditional ideological goals needed to be revised. The election of Hugh Gaitskell as party leader in

1955 guaranteed the revisionists a major influence. Gaitskell had been associated with the *Socialist Commentary* group since the late 1940s and was himself to write a Fabian tract in 1956 titled *Socialism and Nationalisation,*[7] in which he downplayed the continuing value of nationalisation as a policy option. In October 1959, immediately following the party's third consecutive electoral defeat, Gaitskell met with a number of key figures, including Crosland, Douglas Jay, Hugh Dalton and Roy Jenkins, and discussed options for a number of fundamental changes to the Labour Party, including distancing the party from the trade unions, changing its name, ditching further nationalisation and even allying or merging with the Liberal Party.[8] At the Annual Conference of the Labour Party the following month Gaitskell tried but failed to delete Clause IV from the British Labour Party Constitution. He argued that Labour in practice had 'long ago come to accept ... a mixed economy in which case ... had we better not say so instead of going out of our way to court misrepresentation',[9] and he 'wanted Labour to stand for a view of socialism on public morality against the acquisitive values of traditional capitalism'.[10] In both these respects he took an identical stance to that which Tony Blair would take 35 years later.

Clause IV Part (4), which had been adopted in 1918, stated that one of the central party objects was:

> to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.

Although Gaitskell was unable to remove this, the National Executive Committee (NEC) in 1960 did issue a statement which 'reaffirms, amplifies and clarifies party objects in the light of post-war developments and the historic achievements of the first majority Labour govern-

ment'.[11] On the question of common ownership, the NEC statement implicitly noted that such ownership would not be universal. It sought, instead, 'an expansion ... substantial enough to give the community power over the commanding heights of the economy'. It also noted that:

> Common ownership takes various forms, including state-owned industries and firms, producer and consumer co-operation, municipal ownership and public participation in private concerns. Recognising that both public and private enterprise have a place in the economy it believes that further extension of common ownership should be decided from time to time in the light of these objectives and according to circumstances, with due regard for the views of the workers and consumers concerned.[12]

The 1960 statement also put forward a detailed and up-to-date list of other Labour Party objectives, in order to tackle the perception that the party's constitution was silent on many pressing modern questions. The statement rejected 'discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed', asserted 'the right of all peoples to freedom, independence and self-government', and aspired 'to build a world order within which all will live in peace ... to work unceasingly for world disarmament, the abolition of all nuclear weapons ... for social justice ... democracy in industry ... [and] the happiness and freedom of the individual'.[13] This statement, however, had less enduring status than a formal clause of the party constitution, and as such tended to fade somewhat from collective memory.

In Australia the wording approved by the 1921 ALP Commonwealth Conference declared the party's Objective as 'the socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange' and its methods as:

> Socialisation of industry by:
> (a) The constitutional utilisation of Industrial and Parliamentary machinery;
> (b) The organisation of workers along the lines of Industry;

(c) Nationalisation of banking and principal industries;

(d) The municipalisation of such services as can best be operated in limited areas;

(e) Government of nationalised industries by boards, upon which the workers in the Industries and the community shall have representation;

(f) The establishment of an elective Supreme Economic Council by all nationalised industries;

(g) The setting up of Labor research and Labor information bureaux and of Labor educational institutions in which the workers shall be trained in the management of the nationalised industries.

There was always an ambiguity about these goals, however, for the same Conference passed by a simple majority a resolution:

(a) That the Australian Labor Party proposes collective ownership for the purpose of preventing exploitation, and [only] to whatever extent may be necessary for that purpose.

(b) That wherever private ownership is a means of exploitation it is opposed by the Party, but

(c) That the Party does not seek to abolish private ownership even of any of the instruments of production where such instrument is utilised by its owner in a socially useful manner and without exploitation.[14]

This resolution became known as the 'Blackburn Declaration', after its mover, the Victorian delegate Maurice Blackburn.

Over subsequent decades a series of qualifications were added to the ALP Objective. At the 1927 Commonwealth Conference the references to nationalised industry boards and the Supreme Economic Council were deleted and the list of industries to be nationalised was restricted to: banking, credit and insurance, monopolies, shipping, public health, radio services and sugar refining. At the 1948 conference the Blackburn Declaration was reaffirmed, and at the next conference, in 1951, a new 'Interpretation' of the Objective was adopted to express the

reservations which Blackburn had in 1921. This new Inter-
pretation read:

> The Australian Labor Party proposes socialisation or social
> control of industry and the means of production, distribu-
> tion and exchange [only] *to the extent necessary to eliminate*
> *exploitation and other anti-social features of industry, and anti-*
> *social features of the processes of production, distribution and*
> *exchange.*[15]

The 1955 conference incorporated the 1951 Interpretation
into the wording of the Objective itself, which now read:
'the Socialisation of Industry, Production, Distribution and
Exchange ... to the extent necessary to eliminate exploita-
tion and other anti-social features in those fields'. Then, at
the 1957 conference, the word 'democratic' was inserted
before 'socialisation' so that the ALP was now committed to
'the *democratic* socialisation of Industry, Production, Distrib-
ution and Exchange to the extent necessary to eliminate
exploitation and other anti-social features'.[16]

While there had been no attempt to delete the social-
isation objective in toto as in Britain, the ALP Objective
had, in fact, been modified more substantially by the
1960s than the British Labour Party's clause on common
ownership.

The ALP, like the British Labour Party, also sought to
supplement its old socialist objective with a *new* set of rel-
evant principles and objectives. At the 1953 Federal Con-
ference the ALP adopted a 'Preamble to the Federal
Platform Setting out the Nature and General Philosophy
of the Party' which emphasised its patriotic loyalties, its
democratic and constitutional methods and adherence to
principles of civil rights and the separation of powers, and
which spelt out its commitment to 'the utilisation of the
powers of government to maintain full employment ... to
abolish poverty ... and to ensure freedom from want'.[17]
However this preamble did not include some of the
crucial points in the British Labour Party's 1960 state-
ment, such as rejection of racial discrimination and the

embracing of democracy in industry. It was not until 1981 that the ALP picked up those points, with a new and more thoroughgoing overhaul of its objectives.

And whereas major *policy* revisions were made in the early 1960s in the British Labour Party in keeping with the broader ideological review, these did not occur until the end of the decade in the ALP. Most importantly, the public face of the ALP remained a 'traditionalist' one in the person of Arthur Calwell, whereas in Britain Gaitskell and then Wilson projected a very new leadership image. In part it was the 1955 split that tended to inhibit the spread of 'revisionism' in the ALP, by reinforcing the 'Old' Left ascendancy, and by fostering a climate in which anybody who questioned any aspect of conventional wisdom risked being branded a traitor. Another reason for the British labour movement's earlier preparedness to adopt new ideological principles was the relative receptiveness of some of the key British trade unions' moderate leaders to the revisionists' case, in contrast to the more 'traditionalist' and left-leaning leaderships of the Australian Labor Party's union affiliates at that time. The British labour movement's traditionally more active intellectual life was also an important factor.

The revisionist debate did nevertheless make some contemporary impact in Australia. John Burton, in his pamphlets *The Light Glows Brighter* (1956) and *Labour in Transition* (1957), took up G.D.H. Cole's definition of socialism and outlined a position very similar to the British revisionists. The argument about British Labour's need to adapt to social change outlined by the party's long-time general secretary Morgan Phillips, in his pamphlet *Labour in the Sixties*, was carried to Australia by one of the young organisers who had worked under Phillips at Transport House. Cyril Isaac was involved in organising the 1957 Commonwealth Labour Conference, at which he recalls that:

> there was to be a statement of objectives and aims. Bear in mind I'd been told to cosset the Australians. I got to like them, I think they got to like me. And I was frank and

honest with them the same way they were with me. And
Joe Chamberlain drew up this list and he showed it to me
and he said 'Cyril do you think this'll go down all right?'
And quite frankly I was appalled by it. It was the last
century ... And I saw him and I said well you'd better get
Morgan's committee to go through it. He said 'what do
you think?' and I said 'it's not what I ... think, I'm only a
humble servant of the Party'. Anyway I saw Morgan before
him and said 'Joe Chamberlain's going to show you this
document, for heaven's sake be polite'. Unfortunately
Morgan was a heavy drinker. When Joe showed it to him,
did he rip it to pieces! It was as much as I could do to keep
the Australians there! It was only Evatt's influence that
kept both of them there.[18]

Cyril struck up a friendship with Evatt at the 1957 confer-
ence and Evatt asked him to accompany him on the tour
of Europe which he was on the threshold of making.

I got a liking for him. I don't care what anybody says about
the Doc. He was a very likeable and in many respects a very
genuine man. I think he's been maligned by history ... I
said I'll check it with Mr Phillips and see if that's all right
because I've got a job to do, so I checked it with Morgan
and he said 'oh yes, that's all right, that's a sensible thing
to do, I've no objections to that', so off I went ... And when
he came back he said 'would you like to go to Australia,
I've got a vacancy on my staff'. Now I knew nothing about
his staff ... If I had I might have changed my bloody mind!
So I sort of thought about [it] and I talked it over with
Morgan Phillips and a couple of people in the Party office
for whom I had respect and they said 'that's all right, go
out for two years — in those days you went out for two
years you see ... And they said 'After you've done your two
years you can come back and there'll be a place for [you]
here and you'll be better acquainted. Anyway I got married
when I was there[19] ...

and he stayed. He also changed his surname to Wyndham,
reputedly at Chamberlain's suggestion to avoid anti-
Semitic prejudices in the Australian labour movement.[20]
After leaving Evatt's staff on Evatt's retirement from poli-

tics he became the Victorian, and later the federal, ALP
secretary, before leaving the ALP in acrimonious circum-
stances in 1969 and breaking off all contact with the party
thereafter (to the point where it took me considerable
effort to track him down to Newcastle, New South Wales,
and then to persuade him to be interviewed to impart his
unique and vital vantage point on comparisons between
the British and Australian labour parties). After he came
to Australia, Wyndham kept in close touch with develop-
ments in the British Labour Party, regularly writing to its
Commonwealth officer, John Hatch, to request pamphlets
from 'home', including Gaitskell's 1956 Fabian tract,
Socialism and Nationalisation.[21] In 1959, Wyndham
expressed to Hatch his general perception of the intellec-
tual superiority of British Labour:

> Unfortunately, the Party here does tend to be isolationist.
> There is really very little of a Federal spirit let alone an
> international one. The few that do try to break through
> the parochialism of the majority find it very hard indeed.
> I endeavour to make some contribution circulating the
> little material I receive from home. While most of the
> Members have the opportunity of reading some of the
> daily English papers, few of them take that chance of
> broadening their outlook.[22]

Wyndham saw considerable merit in Gaitskell's ideolog-
ical rethinking, although he did not agree with him in
every particular.[23] He referred in glowing terms to
Phillips' pamphlet *Labour in the Sixties* in his efforts from
1962 to encourage the ALP to form closer links with non-
manual unions,[24] and Crosland's ideas about the irrele-
vance of class ideology in the new age of affluence filtered
through to him via Phillips. In 1965, for instance,
Wyndham told the ALP that:

> The Party ... alienates many unionists by assuming that
> they think in the same way as they did twenty years ago.
> References to the 'workers', the 'working class' and the
> 'underprivileged' are just so much meaningless and some-

> times offensive jargon in modern society. A glance at the
> Taxation Commission Reports shows that not all the cars,
> all the boats and all the holiday homes are owned by 'the
> bosses'. In any case, many of the underprivileged are not
> organised or eligible to be organised in Unions.[25]

Wyndham's ideas and mooted reforms, including to move
the ALP to being a genuinely national party as the British
Labour Party always had been, met with strong resistance
however. Elements in the Australian labour movement
keen to force the pace of ideological rethinking were
among the organisers of a 1963 visit by Tony Crosland,
during which he explicitly pushed the ALP's need to 'mod-
ernise' as the British Labour Party had recently done.
Crosland was officially brought out under the auspices of
the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, part of an
international anti-communist organisation which pub-
lished the Cold War journal *Quadrant*, and which was keen
for the ALP to hear one of Crosland's main messages: the
need unequivocally to repudiate Marxism. Plans for
Crosland to meet formally with B.A. Santamaria during the
visit were altered following consternation from Race
Mathews that such a meeting would be used by the DLP as
'support for a long-standing argument that they, and not
the Labor Party, are the true custodians of the labour tra-
dition and of social democracy in this country, and that
this ... was in some way recognised by the party in
Britain'.[26] Nevertheless Crosland did meet privately with
Santamaria, and Santamaria's *News Weekly* reported promi-
nently on the visitor's 'sane view of the Labor movement'.[27]
Also involved in this tour were reformist ALP figures Peter
Samuel, a lecturer in political science at Monash University
and publisher of the journal *Dissent*, and James Jupp, then
at Melbourne University.

Crosland was on record as regarding the ALP, along
with the French and Japanese socialist parties, as one of
the few 'fundamentalist' socialist parties in the western
world.[28] Instead of broadening their appeal and over-
hauling their basic programs in response to social change

since World War Two — as all the other, more successful
'revisionist' socialist parties had done — these three
parties, he argued, had 'clung obstinately either to
outworn Marxist dogma or to a purely sectional class
appeal'.[29] In an address to the Melbourne University ALP
Club on 'Politics in the Affluent Society' Crosland pref-
aced his remarks with the qualification that they only
applied to British and European labour parties. This was
recognised, however, as a diplomatic fiction, as several of
his remarks had very direct relevance to controversies then
current in the ALP. He stated for instance that it is 'a ...
great advantage ... that the British Labour Party is not pas-
sionately anti-intellectual, so we have rather a large middle-
class vanguard'.[30] He lauded Gaitskell for defying the
supposedly binding 1960 British Labour Party Conference
decision in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. He
emphasised the need to win 'the battle against the old
Left' for control of labour parties.[31] And he strongly urged
that such parties 'should have the pragmatic and not the
doctrinal view of nationalisation. I don't think that any
labour party which is doctrinally committed to wholesale,
one hundred per cent nationalisation of the means of pro-
duction, distribution and exchange is going to win elec-
tions in the 1960s', Crosland stated.[32]

According to one of the organisers of the Crosland
visit:

> The most valuable thing he did was to get over the very
> simple idea — one not yet appreciated by the bone-heads
> who revolve around the V[ictorian] C[entral] E[xecutive]
> — that it is possible to be ... strongly anti-Communist and
> yet have progressive ideas about race relations and
> humanist issues and radical proposals for social reform
> and re-organisation. He quite staggered a lot of them by
> outlining proposals far more radical than they had ever
> dreamt of for nationalising urban land, abolishing public
> schools, [and] levying capital gains and wealth taxes.[33]

In his Melbourne University address Crosland emphasised
that politics in the 1960s was less about the old issues of

class and more about a number of new issues: including education, and in particular educational opportunity; consumer protection; and urban planning to counter continual suburban sprawl. 'A Left-wing party', he argued, 'ought to be able to win elections on these newer issues because these problems will not be solved without a great expansion of government control, of government spending and sometimes of government ownership'.[34] However 'the essential condition of Socialist parties winning elections is that such parties adapt themselves to the new society. There is a great temptation not to adapt, not to modernise, but to go on talking the language of thirty years ago' in which case 'a labour party has no hope whatever of winning an election'.[35] A labour party had to:

> update its policies, language, phraseology and attitudes to define its ideas of equality and social welfare in the terms of 1963. The party has got to be genuinely radical on the new issues. It must be a party which really has up-to-date ideas about the rate of growth, about educational reform, about the consumer, about ... planning, a party which is supported not only by manual workers, but also by the rapidly growing number of white-collar workers.[36]

It is remarkable how closely this prescription foreshadowed the eventual platform and orientation of the next ALP government to take office in Australia, under Gough Whitlam. Whitlam had entered parliament in 1953 and the publication of Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* in 1956 might be expected to have had a significant effect on his ideas. Crosland met twice with Whitlam during his 1963 visit and recalled a 'long talk' with the then deputy leader of the Opposition as 'extremely well worthwhile'.[37] Whitlam himself insists though that Crosland and his ideas had 'bugger all'[38] influence upon him. Burchell has rightly noted however that the policies of the Whitlam government, as developed by the Fabian Society and others between 1967 and 1972, were 'eminently Croslandite'[39] in content, while Whitlam's close assistant Race

Mathews has identified Crosland (along with Galbraith) as the main intellectual influences on Whitlam's outlook and actions.[40]

Following his return to Britain Crosland indicated that he was still 'anxious ... to further the cause of democratic socialism in Australia' and to this end he encouraged his Australian contacts to highlight and publicise those points from his book *The Conservative Enemy* which would be 'most useful in the present ALP situation'.[41]

The election of the Wilson government in 1964 after thirteen years that British Labour had spent in opposition increased the appeal of British Labour to the ALP as it too set about trying to regain office. In March 1965 Harold Wilson as prime minister contributed a foreword to a book by Arthur Calwell (which was entitled *Labor's Role in Modern Society* but which was in fact a rather defensive attempt to grapple with many clearly unwelcome social changes pressing upon the ALP in the 1960s). Wyndham wrote to Len Williams in September 1965 that:

> We have followed very closely the great work of the Wilson Labour Government whose activities have been an inspiration to all of us here.[42]

The year 1966 marked the high point of the ALP looking to British Labour as a model, as the ALP slumped to its worst defeat since 1931 just as the British Labour government was re-elected with a massively increased majority. Early in the following year Arthur Calwell issued to Federal ALP MPs and party officers copies of extracts from the report of the 1966 British Labour Party Annual Conference, which highlighted the strong finances of British Labour, 'in marked contrast to the poverty stricken condition of the Federal Executive and the State Branches of the Australian Labor Party'.[43] The report also showed the healthy condition of British Labour's individual and affiliated membership. Calwell (although most probably it was Wyndham who drafted the document) commented that:

I know of no comparable figures for the Australian Labor Party, but it would be interesting if figures for the ALP could be compiled *to show how far behind our British comrades we, in Australia, find ourselves.*

It would be an interesting and rewarding exercise if we, also, could greatly improve the membership, the finance and the affiliation of all trade unions in Australia to our Party.[44]

Also that year, Race Mathews distributed his discussion paper 'What Is To Be Done?', in the Victorian ALP, in which he commented that:

Research and political education are activities barely touched upon by the existing central apparatus of the ALP ... Yet Labor Parties in other countries take this area of their activity very seriously indeed. In 1964 the British Labour Party had a total of fifteen full time staff working in research and associated fields ...

and quoted at length from the report of the Wilson Committee on British Labour Party Organisation, 'Our Penny Farthing Machine', substantial parts of which had been republished as a supplement to *Socialist Commentary* in October 1965 due to its recommendations having been largely ignored. Race Mathews, in his 1966 discussion paper aimed at reinvigorating the Victorian ALP, sought in particular to highlight the parallel problems in the two labour parties in their treatment of new members and the precariousness of their financial bases.[45]

The goal of nationalisation quietly receded from the parliamentary ALP's prime policy objectives (as distinct from the party platform's nominal philosophical commitments) following the failure of the Chifley government's attempts at nationalisation owing to constitutional obstacles erected by the High Court. Such impediments did not exist in Britain, where accordingly, despite some controversy, the goal lasted longer: witness the Wilson government's nationalisation of steel in the late 1960s. The 1963 Federal Conference deleted from the ALP's Principles of

Action the clause seeking 'control of banking and credit by the Parliament of the Commonwealth',[46] but the ALP continued to formally uphold policies to nationalise banking and various industries in Australia during the 1960s although the party's parliamentary leadership always made it clear that these policies could not in fact be implemented. A committee which included Whitlam, the South Australian ALP leader Don Dunstan, and Cyril Wyndham, excluded shipping and insurance from the party's official policy targets for state acquisition although they did not disturb banking, the 'untouchable holy cow'[47] for ALP 'traditionalists'. The ALP's constitutional inability to nationalise may indeed have been an eventual tactical advantage in the party's modernisation, in that it rid Australian Labor governments of an ideologically symbolic but electorally cumbersome policy.

Although they started much later, the revisionists were eventually more successful in Australia than in Britain, for as well as making policy changes they succeeded in making fundamental reforms to the party's structure, curtailing the strength of the unions. Following the death of Gaitskell and as a result of Wilson's more conciliatory approach to internal party controversies, the British Labour Party 'modernisers' did not entrench similar changes to those which were later enforced by Whitlam from 1967 through, inter alia, his intervention in the Victorian Branch and reduction of the union block vote from 90 to 60 per cent of nearly all ALP State Conferences (whereas it remained at 90 per cent of British Labour Party Annual Conferences until the 1990s). The ALP developments therefore anticipated by some 25 years the efforts by British Labour Party leaders to reduce the size of the trade union block vote at their Annual Conference, efforts which were not consummated until the ascendancy of Tony Blair, who bears some resemblance to Whitlam in that both are barristers who have demonstrated an ability to autocratically impose change on reluctant party machines. The failure of the British ideological mod-

ernisers to entrench structural changes in the Labour
Party — in the context of an unprecedented swing to the
Left by key unions from the late 1960s amid a more mili-
tant wage bargaining climate, together with a general
party backlash against the Wilson and Callaghan govern-
ments — would later come back to haunt them.

The 1960s moves towards 'modernisation' were
reversed in the British Labour Party in the 1970s and early
1980s amid general party turmoil,[48] whereas they were
consolidated in the ALP. Neil Kinnock, on taking over the
British Labour leadership in 1983, was obliged to start
afresh on a long and thoroughgoing process of party mod-
ernisation in order to win back the trust of a very sceptical
electorate,[49] whereas Hawke and Keating were able to
reap the continuing benefits which Whitlam's structural
overhaul of the ALP had conferred upon the leadership.

The 'New Left' of the 1960s

The first 'New Left' which emerged in Britain from the
late 1950s, following the disillusionment of many formerly
committed communists after the Soviet invasion of
Hungary, made considerable impact on Labour Party
thinking in the 1960s. The New Left was sharply critical of
the direction which the revisionist Right had taken the
Labour Party. Key figures in the British New Left were E.P.
Thompson,[50] with his articulation of 'socialist humanism',
Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall,[51] Ralph Miliband and
Perry Anderson.[52] As a member of the New Left partici-
pating in the debates of the late 1960s, Williams published
a penetrating critique of the British Labour Party's 'mod-
ernisation' which is worth quoting here at length. Apart
from the fact that he used the word 'men' rather than
'people', his comments remain exceptionally pertinent
today. Williams asked:

> [W]hat did modernisation mean? In the first place, it meant
> overcoming inefficiency — the cause to which all the weak-
> nesses of the British economy were attributed ... [But inef-

ficiency] cannot be separated from the gross inequalities, in terms of opportunity and reward, the immense discrepancies in terms of power, authority and control, between those who manage men and those who sell their labour. Neither can it be abstracted from the whole drive to consolidate a new capitalist economy ... If we want to test the validity of modernisation as an economic panacea, we have to see it in its real context; as not a programme but a stratagem; part of the language and tactics of a new capitalist consolidation.

Modernisation is, indeed, the 'theology' of a new capitalism. It opens up a perspective of change, but at the same time it mystifies the process, and sets limits to it. Attitudes, habits, techniques, practices must change: the system of economic and social power, however, remains unchanged. Modernisation fatally short-circuits the formation of social goals. Any discussion of long-term purposes is made to seem utopian, in the down-to-earth, pragmatic climate which modernisation generates. The discussion about 'modernised Britain' is not about what sort of society, qualitatively, is being aimed at, but simply about how modernisation is to be achieved. All programmes and perspectives are treated instrumentally. As a model of social change, modernisation crudely foreshortens the historical development of society. Modernisation is the ideology of the never-ending present. The whole past belongs to 'traditional' society, and modernisation is a technical means for breaking with the past without creating a future. All is now: restless, visionless, faithless: human society diminished to a passing technique. No confrontation of power, values or interests, no choice between competing priorities, is envisaged or encouraged. It is a technocratic model of society, conflict-free and politically neutral, dissolving genuine social conflicts and issues in the abstractions of 'the scientific revolution', 'consensus', 'productivity'. Modernisation presumes that no group in the society will be called upon to bear the costs of the scientific revolution — as if all men have an equal chance in shaping up the consensus, or as if, by some process of natural law, we all benefit equally from a rise in productivity. 'Modernisation' is thus a way of masking what the real costs would be of creating in Britain a truly modern society.[53]

In Australia a New Left also emerged, albeit later and in a rather different mould (and in Australia the term is now more widely used to describe a strand of revisionist historiography than a political grouping). Among its leading figures was Humphrey McQueen, with his landmark 1970 critique of Australian radicalism and nationalism, *A New Britannia.*

The 1970s

By the 1970s revisionist ideas in the British Labour Party were in crisis. The high levels of economic growth and widespread social affluence on which they were predicated had receded: unemployment *and* inflation had returned in abundance, in defiance of Keynesian theory; poverty had been rediscovered; and inequality was visibly rising rather than falling.

In 1975 the initiative for ideological rethinking in the British Labour Party returned to the Left with the publication of Stuart Holland's book *The Socialist Challenge.* The material which made up the book had been presented to committees of the Labour Party National Executive between 1971 and 1974 and was extensively written into Labour's *Programme 1973* and the party's two 1974 election manifestos. The case for major change in Labour policy put forward by Holland had met with strong minority opposition inside the party, and Anthony Crosland in particular had criticised the main features of the analysis in a new book, *Socialism Now,* published in 1974. Holland directly refuted the key premises underlying Crosland's earlier work, pointing to the reduced role for the state and for democratic control since the rise of powerful multinational corporations. He argued for public ownership of key firms and new forms of state intervention to counter the control which was being exercised by the multinationals without regard for the interests of the nation-state. In particular he sought to tackle the regional inequalities being generated within nations by the multinationals. To guard against cor-

poratism in these new agencies of state intervention he also insisted on new measures for industrial democracy, and on planning agreements between government, unions and large corporations to regulate working conditions and future investment plans. By 1976 Holland's ideas had formed the basis of an 'Alternative Economic Strategy' (AES) promoted by the Labour Party Left in Britain.

In Australia meanwhile, the then Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) launched a campaign for a 'People's Budget' and a 'People's Economic Program' which replicated the British AES. In 1977 the union brought Holland out to Australia to promote his arguments and to deliver the inaugural Tom Mann lecture. His ideas heavily influenced key figures in the Australian Left such as Laurie Carmichael, the leading communist official of the Metal Workers' Union at this time, as they sought to develop new programs and strategies following the trauma of the Whitlam government's dismissal. In particular, Carmichael regarded Holland's idea of planning agreements, and what he understood as the legislative implementation of these by the Labour government in Britain, as 'extremely interesting'[54] in that they 'guarantee to the workforce full rights to knowledge of the ongoing five year cycle of internal planning of the enterprise'.[55] He was also strongly in support of the fact that 'Holland joins together the concept of increasing public ownership with increasing worker control in industry'.[56] Carmichael commented:

> To advocate nationalisation in the old sense without looking to greater democratisation from within in a genuine way would not attract support ... Nationalised industries are just as bureaucratic and authoritarian as private industry, so the joining of those two concepts seems to me to be a particularly important one and a very creative one.[57]

Holland's arguments influenced the argument of *Australia Uprooted*, the first of a series of accessible, magazine-style pamphlets generated by research staff working with

Carmichael in the AMWU, and published by the union
from the mid-1970s. Links were also forged at this time
between Stuart Holland and an AMWU officer named Max
Ogden, and between Ogden and his British counterpart in
advocating industrial democracy, Mike Cooley, a Greater
London Council member who had promoted the indus-
trial democracy cause in Lucas Aerospace. Ogden visited
Britain in 1978 and with Cooley and Holland met with
Tony Benn.[58] Another Australian advocate of Holland's
ideas, including in particular his notion of 'revolutionary
reforms', was Bob Connell.[59] Holland's ideas are evident
also in the urban and regional development policy
adopted at the 1979 ALP National Conference. The extent
of the British influence generally on the Australian Left's
rethinking in these years is further evidenced by the publi-
cation of a piece by British union leader Hugh Scanlon on
'Workers' Control and the Transnationals' in a 1980 col-
lection of essays on *Australia and World Capitalism*.[60]

Within a few short years however, the British influ-
ence on this section of the Australian labour movement
had been completely supplanted by new, Scandanavian
influences.

Both British and Australian labour parties have at times
looked to the Scandinavian model of social democracy as
a way of transcending their political problems, embedding
better workers' rights and social welfare entitlements, and
generally moving beyond the limitations of Anglo-Saxon
economic and political culture. This tendency had a very
long history. The playwright and Fabian Society luminary
George Bernard Shaw brought the Norwegian dramatist
Henrik Ibsen to London in the 1890s. In 1937 the Fabian
Society in Britain held a conference on the theme 'This
Socialist Sweden'.[61] Looking to the Swedish model was
associated with Tony Crosland and the Right of the British
Labour Party in the 1950s. However, the ranks of 'Swe-
dophiles' in the early 1980s were swelled by an influx from
the Left — including Eric Hobsbawm in Britain, and
Winton Higgins and Laurie Carmichael in Australia.

Revising the ALP Socialist Objective, 1980–82

British influences remained strong, however, on the activities of some other important individuals in the Australian labour movement as they made preparations for a labour government's return to office. The campaign by Gareth Evans from 1980 to update the ALP's socialist objective was very similar to Hugh Gaitskell's efforts from the late 1950s to delete Clause IV from the British Labour Party's constitution, although Evans, while certainly aware of the importance of the preceding 'talismanic' debate over Clause IV in the British Labour Party, emphasises that he was not seeking to emulate it, in part because he was looking for a consensus outcome in contrast to the divisiveness which had characterised the earlier debate in Britain.[62]

Evans was well versed in the literature of the British Left of the 1960s, especially the writings of Crosland and the articles in the *New Statesman* of that era, and when he inaugurated the *Labor Essays* series in Australia from 1980 he brought something similar to that British Labour tradition of debate into the ALP. His formation of a Society of Labor Lawyers in Australia was specifically influenced by the pre-existence of an organisation of that name, and of other socialist societies of people from other professions, as officially affiliated organisations of the British Labour Party. He was one of (at least) six ministers in the Hawke and Keating governments who had spent a significant amount of time in Britain in preceding decades, and one of five who had studied at Oxford University. These five were Evans, who studied politics, philosophy and economics in 1968–70, when the second Wilson government was in office; Michael Tate, who took an MA in theology there, and three Rhodes Scholars. They were Hawke himself, who undertook a B Litt thesis on the Australian industrial relations system, from 1953–55; Neal Blewett, who did an MA and D Phil and then taught at Oxford, from 1957–63, the period of revisionist agitation in the

British Labour Party; and Kim Beazley junior, who was there from 1973–76, in the latter stages of the third Wilson — and the early stages of the Callaghan — governments. John Button also spent time in Britain, briefly working as a research assistant for the TUC in 1959 on industrial health and safety issues and helping Richard Crossman, then a shadow minister, develop superannuation policy for the British Labour Party.

This was the period leading up to British Labour's third consecutive election defeat and the Clause IV controversy, but the young John Button mostly had other priorities at the time.[63] Button recalls in his memoirs that as a student in Melbourne before going over to England:

> Instead of talking I read about politics, taking my reading guide from the *New Statesman*. I read R.H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, and then his *Equality*. Tawney was a large figure in the strong intellectual tradition of the British Labour Party. I tried to understand what the post-war Labour government had done in Britain in social security, health and employment, some of the issues which Tawney had identified as crucial.
>
> The leading political figures on the Left of British politics seemed erudite and articulate compared with most of their Australian counterparts. Prominent amongst them was Aneurin Bevan, a former Welsh coalminer. Intelligent, self-educated, a persuasive orator, and the spirited leader of the British Left, Bevan had been health minister in Clement Attlee's post-war Labour government. I read a review of his book *In Place of Fear* in the *New Statesman* in 1952 and arranged for it to be sent to me from London. It arrived in my study like a breath of fresh air. With its mixture of idealism and commonsense, it seemed to contain the key to rational political endeavour. I was slowly becoming a student of politics. Bevan's advice to people like myself was clear and explicit.[64]

Button especially liked Bevan's advice that 'the student of politics must ... seek ... integrity'.[65]

Neal Blewett did take an active interest in Gaitskell's

reforms in his lengthier time in Britain. When asked whether his later formation of the journal *Labor Forum* in the mid-1970s in South Australia was an attempt to introduce some of the intellectual culture of the British Labour Party to the ALP, he agreed:

> that the British Labour Party has always been much more given to real ideological argument ... the ... intellectual element has always been much more prominent, and in a sense it's difficult to see the Australian Labor Party, with a couple of individual exceptions like Evatt, having much of that quality until really probably in the 1970s. And so *Labor Forum,* and other efforts like that, were very much designed to encourage that kind of activity in a party which was already changing [and] would ... move in a direction which would be in a way more like the English party, in terms of a combination of both trade union representatives and representatives of the chattering classes or the intellectual classes — teachers and lecturers and people like that, which had *always* been a very strong element in Britain, for a long time.[66]

Blewett, along with Button and Ducker, was also one of the leading members of the ALP's National Committee of Inquiry which reported in 1979 with a number of substantial quality discussion papers analysing the ALP's predicament and possible future directions, and which among other things recommended a move towards a larger (more British-style) National Conference for the ALP.[67]

The Challenge of the New Right

The emergence of the so-called New Right, or aggressive neo-liberalism, has been noted since at least 1968, when David Collard published *The New Right: a Critique,* Fabian Tract no. 387. However, it was not until the 1980s that the New Right, with their reliance on the anti-collectivist ideas which Hayek and Popper had been espousing since the 1930s, and the monetarism articulated by Milton

Friedman more recently, moved to the fore of public policy and debate in the English-speaking world. In so doing the New Right were fortified by the general intellectual resurgence of neo-classical economics. The ascendant position which Marxists and the Left in general had gained in the humanities departments of academia since the end of World War Two had not led to effective interventions in public debate or practical programs for implementation as public policy. The expansion of the universities had led to an absorption and 'academicisation' of the radical intelligentsia, and to a decline of the *public* intellectual,[68] while the Left did not have the resources available to the Right from business to set up think-tanks. The ascendancy which the New Right gained in setting the political agenda in the West and particularly in the English-speaking countries in the 1980s highlighted just how weak the links were between the thinking undertaken by left-wingers in the universities and the activities undertaken by left-wing political practitioners.

By the 1980s the disciples of the New Right had gained dominant positions in the upper echelons of the civil services.[69] Their corporate-funded think-tanks in Britain and Australia had built up a prolific output which gave them great influence over the actions of incumbent governments, urging a new free-market agenda of privatisation, deregulation and fiscal stringency, irrespective of which political party was nominally in office.

In Britain a number of ideological research institutes helped put together the program of Thatcherism. They included the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the first market-oriented think-tank, founded in 1955 by businessman Antony Fisher after he read a simplified version of Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, and still functioning today. Then came the Centre for Policy Studies, founded by Keith Joseph in 1974 to further develop the IEA's work, and to steer its general economic analyses into proposals for government policy; the Adam Smith Institute, founded in 1976 mainly by graduates of St Andrew's Uni-

versity, with the similar purpose of being the 'policy engineers' to the IEA's 'pure scientists';[70] the Conservative Philosophy Group; a discussion forum focused on bringing neo-liberal economic policies into the Conservative Party mainstream in response to perceived shortcomings on the part of the Heath government; and the Social Affairs Unit, founded in 1980 to apply the IEA's free-market analysis to social policy in order to try to dismantle the welfare state.

In Australia similar think-tanks with similar agendas proliferated by the early 1980s. The oldest Australian think-tank, the Melbourne-based Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) was founded in 1943, had long promoted conservative and liberal ideas and in the 1980s became an integral part of the general free-market dominance of the era. John Hyde — a federal Liberal MP in the late 1970s and early 1980s who left politics disenchanted by the prospects of achieving radical right-wing reforms because of the prevalence of what he saw as a middle-of-the-road consensus, and who founded the Australian Institute for Public Policy to help steer political debate further to the Right — became the executive director of the IPA in 1991 upon the amalgamation of the two organisations. Former treasury secretary John Stone and former deputy treasury secretary Des Moore became research fellows at the Institute in Melbourne. Moore became particularly prominent in attacking the financial performance of the Victorian Labor government of 1982–92 in its latter phase under Joan Kirner and in developing and promoting the initial agenda of the Kennett Liberal/National Party government elected in 1992. Gerard Henderson, one time IPA director in New South Wales, broke with the organisation in 1987 to found the Sydney Institute, expressly to take up a position slightly to the Left of the IPA.

Another right-wing Australian think-tank influential in the 1980s was the Centre for Policy Studies established at Monash University in 1979 by Professor Michael Porter, perhaps modelled on the British think-tank of the same name, and which continued to receive a sizeable annual

grant from the federal government under Labor despite the controversial nature of its National Priorities Project, which advocated massive reductions in government spending and changes in taxation. In 1987, however, the federal government's grant was withdrawn. Porter then established a new body, the Tasman Institute, with corporate funds and without links to Monash University, to continue his push for smaller government, deregulation and privatisation. The National Institute of Labor Studies at Flinders University, established as a small Institute of Labour Studies in 1972 by labour economist Keith Hancock and initially identified with a group of pro-incomes policy Keynesians at Flinders and Adelaide Universities, became particularly keen on labour market deregulation after Richard Blandy took the helm in 1980 and continued to be so under Judith Sloan after Blandy left to head the University of Melbourne's Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research in 1991. The Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research had itself been something of a left-of-centre think-tank under Peter Brain until the early 1980s, when it was restructured by the university and a new director was appointed. Brain then went off to form the National Institute for Economic and Industry Research, which inter alia undertook work for the ACTU in the 1980s. Another centre of some influence in propagating a pragmatically interventionist alternative to the free market in the area of industry policy in the 1980s was the tripartite, government-funded Australian Manufacturing Council.

In an ALP which had lost confidence in the prospects of implementing 'traditional' Labour policies since the dismissal of the Whitlam government and with the apparent failure of Keynesian economics in the 1970s, the so-called New Right came to define the agenda of the new Hawke government to a greater extent than did the party's policy traditions, in part by default, owing to the absence of a credible left-wing alternative economic strategy. This process was particularly evident in the sphere of industrial relations. The formation of the H.R.

Nicholls Society in the mid-1980s and its vociferous cam-
paign against centralised wage-fixing caused a short-term
media and political furore about the New Right, although
at first their proposals to drastically cut minimum award
wages seemed far outside the political mainstream. Within
a few years, however, the move to decentralised enterprise
bargaining became the dominant theme in industrial rela-
tions policy.

The ALP in Office from 1983

As Labor prime minister from 1983–91 Bob Hawke often
made a virtue of his party's new-found 'pragmatism', con-
trasting it with the wilful 'ideological' agenda of his oppo-
nents. Labor's supposedly pragmatic, 'non-ideological'
approach, however, in fact incorporated large slabs of the
conventional ideological wisdom of the day, which was
that of the New Right.

   To some extent the ALP's shift onto the terrain of free-
market liberalism in the 1980s had been foreshadowed by
the decision by the Whitlam government in 1973 to
sharply cut tariffs across the board, and by the contrac-
tionary budget brought down under that government in
1975 by Bill Hayden as treasurer. A 1982 Fabian Society
pamphlet on tariffs[71] also to some extent prepared the
ground for the Hawke and Keating governments' free
trade approach. In the 1980s in Australia, however, in con-
trast to the British Labour Party, much of the 'rethinking'
on economic policy and privatisation was not gradually
worked through in party councils during opposition, and
canvassed in articles and debates, but rather was suddenly
imposed from the top down during periods of govern-
ment. This made it particularly traumatic and inexplicable
to the rank and file. Indeed, one of the values of a British
comparison with the Australian labour movement is that in
Britain there has been explicitly spelt out, either in past
Labour Party debates, or in contemporaneous actions of
the Thatcher government, many of the intellectual bases

of the things that have in practice been done in Australia. Hence the comparison is an ideal means of illuminating some of the hidden assumptions behind and weaknesses of the positions which, for instance, the Hawke and Keating governments actually took — such as privatisation, and the notion that we have to create more wealth before we can begin to worry about redistribution of the considerable existing wealth. The controversy in the ALP in the 1980s and early 1990s over the Hawke and Keating governments' privatisation of public assets certainly echoed the British Labour debates of the 1950s about the relevance of nationalisation. The absence of a tradition of ideological debate and reassessment in the Australian Labor Party made its members and supporters very unprepared for the abrupt jolt to 'traditional' Labor policies delivered by their governments in the 1980s and early 1990s.

A major difficulty which people with left-of-centre economic views got into in Australia during the 1980s was that their free-market or neo-liberal opponents were able to claim the mantle of economic 'rationalism' with little effective opposition. That they could do so was a measure of the uncertainty and diffidence which had gripped the Left since the apparent failure of Keynesian economics in the 1970s. The consequences were severe, for once one concedes the mantle of 'rationality' to one's opponents it becomes very difficult to argue effectively against them. To describe a particular group as 'rationalists' suggests that there is only one type of rationality, when in fact people can come to widely varying conclusions on the basis of equally rational arguments. It also implies that opposing groups are irrational. The principal exponent of the deregulatory, privatising and laissez-faire policies imposed in the 1980s, Paul Keating, when asked about the criticisms of these policies, which had come to be known in Australia as 'economic rationalism', showed his one-dimensional understanding of the term when he replied:

> Yes, but what do we want — economic irrationalism? Say,
> 'oh, yes, well let's adopt economic irrationalism, let's do
> irrational things'. That'll really advance the country.[72]

Some of the very people who agitated most strongly for
the Australian Labor Party to update its ideology in the
late 1960s later considered that the process of aban-
doning long-held principles had gone too far, and had
caused the party to lose its way and become dangerously
dependent on the ideas of the New Right. Wyndham for
instance says that:

> I am still a dedicated democratic socialist but I would not
> touch this Labor Party with a fifty foot barge pole. It's the
> most disgraceful betrayal of ideas ... I find it very difficult
> to vote for them, very difficult indeed, because I think
> they've done enormous damage.[73]

John Cain, a key member of the reforming Participants
faction in the Victorian ALP in the late 1960s, and
premier of Victoria from 1982 to 1990, likewise cannot
understand why the Hawke government 'embraced so
quickly notions so foreign to basic Labor philosophy' such
as 'the continuing shift of the burden of taxation to those
less well-off ... [and] the apparent obsession to sell public
monopoly and service assets, often to corporations
outside Australia'. In his eyes, these were actions which
had made 'the hands of Labor voters quiver when they
vote at federal elections'.[74]

Don Dunstan, who alongside Whitlam was a central
ALP reformer in the late 1960s, and South Australian
premier in the 1970s, declared himself in the 1990s to be:

> distressed at the degree to which some sections of the
> Labor Party ... have embraced ... Friedmanite economic
> concepts in place of those which have been traditional in
> the Labor Party and which I still believe to be right: and
> that is that the capitalist system will not work unless there
> is a government determined to intervene where necessary
> to see that a market economy is still serving the social
> needs of the populace effectively. In order to do that, not

only must there be selective intervention, but there must be a significant public sector which then affects the standard of behaviour of the private sector.[75]

Barry Jones implored the ALP's Special National Conference in September 1990 to realise that:

> a party cannot survive simply on the basis of a commitment to economic efficiency, political pragmatism, and a particular set of leaders. It must have an ideology too. I agree that that ideology has to be redefined and updated, but it has to be there.
>
> A party without a history is a contradiction in terms ... It will be difficult, probably impossible, to recruit people to join a Labor Party on the basis that it repudiates its past and believes only in ... the market ... lower levels of government activity ... and higher budget surpluses.[76]

From the time of the Whitlam government until the defeat of the Keating government in 1996 the ALP mainstream tended to clothe itself in the garb of reform and 'modernisation'. Any views that were seen as backward-looking or clinging to the past tended to become very marginalised, and this was particularly true under Paul Keating. As treasurer, Keating dismissed both the Left in his own party and the Opposition as being trapped in the past. Keating was in temperament very like the British Labour Party revisionists of the late 1950s, in wanting to put forward programs which were radical and reformist in the *present* sense, rather than just conserve and uphold *past* democratic socialist achievements, however fundamental these may have been.

He received some support in some strands of the Left. David Burchell, who had returned from Britain in the mid-1980s after being very much inspired by the 'New Times' analysis in *Marxism Today* (on which see below), became editor of the journal *Australian Left Review*. This publication — formerly in a journal format like Britain's *New Left Review* after which it was originally named — was revamped by Burchell into a magazine format along similar heretical lines to *Marxism Today*. Burchell wrote in its pages of 'Paul

Keating's great achievement for the ALP' being 'to win the mantle of modernisation for Labor' during the 1980s in contrast to British Labour's identification with the past.[77] He, along with other critics, was hostile to the British Labour leadership and the ALP Left's tendency to assert 'traditional Labor values', in part because he regarded such language as code for an idealised masculinist past before Labour parties began to adapt to feminism, multiculturalism and other fundamental social developments.[78]

The 'Effervescence of Ideas on the Left of the Party'[79] in Britain in the Early 1980s

In Britain meanwhile, in the face of the New Right onslaught of the 1980s, calls for British Labour's 'modernisation' resurfaced, and they did not come only from the party's pragmatic Right. Among the most forceful critics of British Labour for its failure to understand and adapt to the world of the 1980s were the former communists associated with the journal *Marxism Today*. Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques argued that there was now a new era of 'post-Fordist' production and 'New Times' in general to which Labour must adapt or inevitably perish.[80]

The British had begun a further, very vigorous bout of ideological reassessment towards the end of the Callaghan government's time in office and following its loss of government in 1979. In one of the central texts in this debate, Eric Hobsbawm in *The Forward March of Labour Halted?* argued for a realistic appraisal of what the Labour Party in government could achieve given the sweeping sociological changes which had loosened the party's underpinnings. Other leading members of the New Left of the 1960s, such as Raymond Williams, Ralph Miliband and Perry Anderson, did not go down the same revisionist road as Stuart Hall. For his part John Kenneth Galbraith in the 1990s issued a book with a very different slant than his *The Affluent Society* of the late 1950s: *The Culture of Contentment*.

Whereas the old revisionists such as Crosland had at

least pushed for equality as a central policy goal the revisionists of the 1980s and 1990s discarded such aims as incompatible with a free-market economy. A figure such as Roy Hattersley, once a Croslandite 'revisionist', thus became a 'traditionalist' figure on the Right because of his consistency in holding out for the goal of equality.

Abandoning Clause IV

Under the leaderships of Neil Kinnock and John Smith from 1983–94, after all the abandonments of controversial policies such as unilateral nuclear disarmament and progressive taxation, and after all the ebbs and flows of a political decade, British Labour was criticised by many as having little more to offer than the same pragmatism which the party had exhibited when last in government; in the desperate hope of being elected. The experience of opposition had made being elected to government seem to be the only priority; whereas remembrance of government had made many people wonder why they ever bothered to get there. Labour's problem in the early 1990s was seen as being that it no longer believed in *any*thing and thus could not excite *any*body new into voting for it. While it had divested itself of some of the policies and structural features which alienated the crucial middle ground of the electorate in the 1980s, it had not dealt with the longer-term problem of restoring enthusiasm in its heartlands.

For decades the British and Australian labour parties had been advised by the mainstream opinion leaders to deal with social change by getting rid of old-fashioned ideological baggage: to travel light and respond to specific political circumstances as they arose. The trouble now was that, in hastening to take this advice, they had discarded not just the excess and unfashionable ideological luggage, but their essential basic clothing, so they were now running on empty: naked, exposed to the hostile elements, buffetted by the chill winds of right-wing economic 'rationalism', and desperately needing to put on some

new clothes — or even find their unfashionable old ones — in order to stay alive.

It was at this point of apparent ideological exhaustion that Tony Blair entered the picture, promising a new wave of modernisation unprecedented in its scale. 'Parties that do not change die',[81] he declared. And in a dramatic, and wholly unexpected, finale to his first leader's address to a Labour Party Annual Conference — which I personally witnessed and which I will analyse in detail, along with the reactions to it, as a key exposition of the themes he would subsequently develop, including in his 1998 pamphlet *The Third Way*[82] — Blair in Blackpool in 1994 tackled head-on the view that Labour no longer stood for anything and no longer knew what it believed in. He declared that under his leadership there would be:

> No more ditching.
>
> No more dumping.
>
> Stop saying what we don't mean.
>
> And start saying what we do mean, what we stand by, what we stand for.
>
> It is time we had a clear, up-to-date statement of the objects and objectives of our party ...
>
> And if it is accepted, then let it become the objects [sic] of our party for the next election and take its place in our constitution for the next century.
>
> This is a modern party living in an age of change. It requires a modern constitution that says what we are in terms the public cannot misunderstand and the Tories cannot misrepresent.
>
> We are proud of our beliefs. So let's state them. And in terms that people will identify with in every workplace, every home, every family, every community in our country.[83]

The immediate import of this was that the hallowed Clause IV of Labour's constitution, which nominally committed

the party to 'common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange', was to go. This move was probably designed to symbolise to the media, and to the voters of southern England, the strength of Blair's determination to 'modernise' British Labour. The backdrop to his conference speech proclaimed 'New Labour, New Britain'; and at the time it was even suggested that the term 'New Labour' would henceforth replace 'Labour' on all official Party literature (which it subsequently has).

Of course the slogan 'new Britain' was itself at least 30 years old. Harold Wilson used it when he led Labour to victory in the 1964 election. Tony Blair's declaration at the 1994 conference that 'there is an information revolution under way' and that Labour will invest 'in the new electronic satellite and telecommunications technology that is the nerve centre of a new information economy' was also very reminiscent of Wilson's famous early 1960s pledge to create a 'new Britain', 'forged in the white heat' of a technological 'revolution'. This theme was carried considerably further in Blair's second leader's address to a Labour Party Annual Conference. In Brighton in 1995 Blair revelled in the idea that a 'combination of technology and know-how will transform the lives of all of us': 'technology can make it happen' in 'the electronic age'; 'we want every home to be wired up in new Britain'; we have a 'goal of ensuring that every child has access to a proper laptop computer' (a bit like when Gough Whitlam was asked to give an example of his view of equality: 'I want every kid to have a desk, with a lamp, and his own room to study'[84]); and 'technology ... should be part of every school's curriculum'. Blair proposed a 'University for Industry' and declared 'we can use technology to create regional centres of excellence in specialist care, directly linked up through our superhighway proposals, to local hospitals and surgeries'.[85]

The question of 'common ownership' or more specifically *state* ownership has always been the most divisive ideological question in the two labour parties. The British

Labour Party's agonising in the 1980s and early 1990s over whether or not to take back public utilities sold off by the Thatcher and Major governments, and whether or not to keep Clause IV, like the ALP battles over privatisation in the same period, merely continued this long-standing trend.

Blair was not the first leading British Labour Party figure since Gaitskell to propose the recasting of Clause IV. Under Neil Kinnock's leadership steps were taken towards a redraft, with Roy Hattersley producing a lengthy statement of aims and values which was not, however, proceeded with. Changes of actual *policy* took place under Kinnock's leadership, with a move from the traditional emphasis on nationalisation to the new and more variegated concept of 'social ownership' and with an avoidance of any specific commitments to renationalise most of the public utilities sold off by the Tories. These changes were trumpeted to the ALP when Neil Kinnock's adviser, the Australian-born Patricia Hewitt, visited Australia to address an Evatt Foundation conference on the eve of the ALP's 1990 Special National Conference called to ratify the Hawke Government's decision to sell Australian Airlines and 49 per cent of Qantas, and to introduce a competitor to Telecom. In a newspaper article she noted that:

> The British Labour Party has been in opposition for 11 years, the ALP in government for eight. Both are wrestling with the future of state ownership, which for a long time was synonymous with socialism itself.

She went on to argue that:

> In Britain, Mrs Thatcher's extensive privatisation program has forced Labour to go back to first principles about nationalisation. Here, the Labor Government, faced with an urgent need to modernise the economy, has initiated a controversial program of privatisation itself. Power and powerlessness produce different questions. In Britain, Labour now has to ask: why renationalise? Here the question, particularly from the Left, is: why privatise? ...

> Labour in Britain and in Australia are right to review
> their policies ...
>
> The British Labour party now has a clear view of the
> (limited) role that social ownership can play in the post-
> Thatcher economy. The ALP needs to be equally clear
> about why and where it supports state ownership.[86]

The changes in British Labour's *policies* under Kinnock were
not, however, enshrined at the more symbolic, *constitutional*
level. When Blair, as a shadow cabinet member, proposed a
redraft of Clause IV on the National Executive Committee
in 1992 he gained no support.[87] In 1993 another shadow
cabinet member, Jack Straw, issued a pamphlet in which he
proposed a new Clause IV that read, in part:

> ... Labour wants and works for a society:
>
> ...where the power of the community is used to advance
> the interest of the individual and the family, and where
> individual liberty is enhanced by collective provision;
>
> ... Labour believes that:
>
> a) markets should be the servants and not the
>   masters of the community;
> b) economic activity should promote the wealth,
>   welfare and employment of the people;
> c) to secure these ends the community should inter-
>   vene through appropriate measures of regulation,
>   control and public ownership.[88]

John Smith, however, in keeping with his cautious and
inclusive style of leadership, resisted pressure from Straw
to redraft the clause. After leaving the leadership Kinnock
himself also put forward an alternative form of words, in a
television program, as follows:

> The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party which
> works for the full civil, social, economic and cultural
> freedom of all human beings and for their right to partic-
> ipate in the decisions affecting their lives.
>
> To this end Labour is committed to using the power

of the community, exercised through pluralist democracy, accountable government and just laws to:

- foster the sustainable production of wealth;

- secure equality of opportunity;

- ensure equity and high standards in the provision of care and security, and

- safeguard citizens, workers, consumers and the environment against exploitation.[89]

Right-wing MP Giles Radice had also not long previously issued a Fabian pamphlet arguing that the very best way for Blair to demonstrate the Labour Party's transformation would be to replace Clause IV.[90]

The initial response to Blair's speech from the 1994 Labour Party Annual Conference was to rebuff the leader. A motion to reaffirm Clause IV, which had been placed on the agenda prior to any knowledge of the contents of the leader's speech, was debated despite the strenuous efforts by Blair's minders to force its withdrawal. A card vote on the motion saw it narrowly carried[91] with the support, among others, of the Transport and General Workers' Union. It was widely acknowledged, however, by both the delegates and the press, that this was a hollow victory, and that there was little prospect of holding the line on Clause IV once the debate over a new clause got going.

Some of the initial reactions to Blair's surprise move revealed the variety of views about what the Labour Party's commitment to socialism really meant: did it mean state ownership, as many took Clause IV to specifically denote, or was it something quite different? Bill Jordan of the Engineering Union showed that his understanding of socialism was essentially *moral* when he declared that Clause IV 'was never about socialism, it was about *economics*'.[92] Stuart Bell MP emphasised the need for a redefinition of common ownership which enabled the worker to participate and said that Labour's new industry policies enabled this. Bell also pointed out that Labour had only ever nationalised 8 per cent of industry; and argued (dubiously) that it was public

ownership of gas and electricity which enabled the Thatcher Government for ideological reasons to raise prices and in other ways politically manipulate those utilities.[93]

As the debate opened up in 1994–95, a large number of widely varying drafts for a new Clause IV were put forward. That submitted by Stephen Pollard, research director of the Fabian Society, seemed to be an ambit claim for market forces. It read in part:

> ... The Labour Party seeks to develop a fair society where resources are allocated in the most efficient way possible. It believes that, since the market is the only reliable means to that end, all relevant decisions should be taken according to the workings of the market [!]. It believes that state control is justified only where other forms of ownership are incapable of delivering the efficient allocation of resources ...[94]

By contrast, the draft put forward by a group of 'soft' Left MPs, supported by the *Tribune* newspaper and *New Statesman and Society* magazine, read:

> The Labour Party seeks to create a democratic socialist society in which all individuals have the opportunity to discover their full potential and create their own destiny, and everyone has the right to be meaningfully employed or occupied.
>
> The Labour Party believes the power of government must be used in favour of those without power themselves, especially those without power to meet their basic needs, and the resources of nations must be managed and distributed as the people determine, not allocated by the caprice of greed and private privilege or the whims of private capital.
>
> In pursuit of those objectives the Labour Party will mobilise the power and resources of government and the community to obtain the most equitable distribution of income, wealth, power and influence that is achieveable.
>
> Labour will:
> - Promote a prosperous and fully employed economy through a mixture of government intervention and

private innovation, based upon the widest possible spread of democratic control and ownership. The party recognises there is a role for both market mechanisms and public ownership and provision to secure prosperity and justice.

- Use public spending to overcome inequalities and promote high quality services available to all on the basis of need.
- Develop a fair and progressive tax system based on the ability to pay.

Both the 'hard' and the 'soft' Left were internally divided over whether to rally to the defence of the old Clause IV or whether to put forward a new form of words more in keeping with their own outlook than one to be solely drafted by the leadership. Publicly, all leading hard Left figures, including Tony Benn, Arthur Scargill and Dennis Skinner, rejected any change to Clause IV, although privately Ken Livingstone had argued that it would be best to participate in the redrafting process to ensure a good formulation emerged with clear commitments to public ownership and control.[95] A sizeable bloc of Labour members of the European Parliament also signed a statement supporting retention of Clause IV. They emphasised that 'common ownership' as expressed in Clause IV was 'not a synonym for nationalisation' and they restated Sidney Webb's comments about the many diverse forms of common ownership. They also recalled that:

> when ... Hugh Gaitskell sought to revise the Party's objectives, a twelve point statement was produced which was, at the time, frequently described as 'the New Testament,' in contrast with the 'Old,' as represented by the 1918 version. Clause IV was to be retained as the historic touchstone. This provides a precedent which we should follow today.[96]

In the new Clause IV ultimately adopted at a special conference of the party in April 1995 the inevitable compromises involved in the process of drafting it are plain to see. It reads that:

1. The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that by the strength of our common endeavour, we achieve more than we achieve alone so as to create for each of us the means to realise our true potential and for all of us a community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few, where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and where we live together freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect.

2. To these ends we work for:

- a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership and cooperation to produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for all to work and prosper, with a thriving public sector and high-quality public services, where those undertakings essential to the common good are either owned by the people or accountable to them

- a just society, which judges its strength by the condition of the weak as much as the strong, provides security against fear, and justice at work; which nurtures families, promotes equality of opportunity and delivers people from the tyranny of poverty, prejudice and the abuse of power

- an open democracy, in which government is held to account by the people; decisions are taken as far as practicable by the communities they affect; and where fundamental human rights are guaranteed

- a healthy environment, which we protect, enhance and hold in trust for future generations.

3. Labour is committed to the defence and security of the British people, and to cooperating in European institutions, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and other international bodies to secure peace, freedom, democracy, economic security and environmental protection for all ...

Tony Blair's 'Third Way'

Blair, an Anglican Christian, had previously outlined a belief in ethical socialism, or 'social-ism', and had

expressed a desire to recover the tradition of ethical socialism in the British labour movement. Although he has been hailed as Labour's arch-moderniser he himself has spoken much about *returning* the party to what he portrays as its original values of cooperation and community.[97] His sense of social obligation is evident in the phrase in the new Clause IV that 'the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe'. Blair's original draft had Labour committed to work for a 'dynamic *market* economy'[98] but the soft Left had a victory in removing the word 'market' from this formulation. It also won on public ownership, with the commitment that 'those undertakings essential to the common good are either owned by the people or accountable to them', and on full employment, with the inclusion of the words 'the opportunity for all to work and prosper'.[99]

Tony Blair has taken up many themes normally monopolised by the conservatives. In his calls for 'One Britain', Blair has gone some way beyond the familiar unifying, patriotic rhetoric of Harold Wilson and Bob Hawke, into an *ethical* dimension. He complained that the Tories:

> spent 16 years tearing apart the fabric of the nation. Tearing apart the bonds that tie communities together and make us a united Kingdom[100]

and that:

> Socialism ... is a moral purpose to life ...
>
> We aren't simply people set in isolation from one [an]other ... but members of the same family, the same community, the same human race ...
>
> our challenge ... is not just economic. It is social and it is moral. Look at the wreckage of our broken society ...We have to have the courage to build a new civic society, a new social order ...
>
> Let us rouse ourselves to a new moral purpose for our nation.[101]

These could be dismissed as just pious words, but a glance at the details of Blair's background suggests that they go

deeper than that. His credentials for the Labour Party lead-
ership largely rested on his performance as shadow home
secretary, when he succeeded in supplanting the Tories as
the party of law and order through skilful but very harsh —
and some would say reactionary — rhetoric against perpe-
trators of crime. He continued this theme as Labour leader,
declaring that 'Law and order is a Labour issue today',
promising 'thousands of extra police officers on the beat in
our local communities'[102] and affirming that:

> I believe in being tough on crime. Some would say that
> those are the moral values of the old-fashioned and the
> Right. Don't let the Tories claim these values as their own
> — they are our values.[103]

Underpinning this stance on law and order and his attrac-
tion to communitarian ideas is a distinctly conservative
Christian social philosophy:

> Parents have duties[104] ...
>   [T]he best two crime prevention policies are a job
> and a stable family ...
>   [We] cannot be morally neutral about the family. It is
> the foundation of any decent society.
>   Behind strong communities lie strong families.[105]

Blair goes so far as to play to deep and ill-informed com-
munity prejudices in promising to give 'single parents the
chance not to live on benefit'[106] but to get 'off welfare and
into work'[107] and he also attacks a favourite target of the
social conservatives: school teachers. 'If they can't do the
job, they should not be teaching at all'.[108] His belief in the
need to restore a sense of 'community' and to stress social
responsibility may sound fine in the abstract, but the spe-
cific announcement in his 1994 Labour Party Conference
speech for instance that for unemployed young people
Blair wants 'a new civilian service ... a voluntary national
task force of young people given constructive tasks to do'
sounds a bit too close to the conservative agenda of
unpaid 'work for the dole'.

In his 1995 Labour Party Conference speech Blair declared that 'we should open up the markets in communications and technology. Yes, a market solution ... full and open competition everywhere'.[109] Yet on the other hand we should 'sweep away the dogma of the market in transport and the environment ... Not wait for the free market'.[110]

A positive feature of Blair's rhetoric, however, is that it makes some acknowledgement of the depth of young people's disillusionment with the direction of western society, and the *spiritual* dimensions of the crisis facing young people today. In his speech to the 1995 Labour Party Annual Conference, Blair said that:

> We enjoy a thousand material advantages over any previous generation; and yet we suffer a depth of insecurity and spiritual doubt they never knew ...
>
> Mine is the generation with more freedom than any other, but less certainty in how to exercise it responsibly. It is the generation that knocks on the door of a new millennium, frightened for our future and unsure of our soul.[111]

This message accords with research findings on young people's views of the future and has great relevance to the generation which has grown up in an era which has featured a higher incidence of family (including extended family) breakdown than ever before, the loss of many support networks, a return of mass unemployment (particularly among the young), a lesser sense of being rooted in a local community or belonging to any particular place, and a bewilderingly rapid pace of technological and social change.

In research for an Australian Science and Technology Council project on youth's expected and preferred futures for Australia in 2010, Richard Eckersley found that young people want:

> a future that pays more attention to the human, spiritual dimensions of life ... [They] spoke about a sense of loss or separation from nature ... an innate spirituality that gets educated out of them in our culture.[112]

This finding builds on the message from earlier research work on youth attitudes. In a 1984 survey, the Australian government found that there was a 'new traditionalism' among young people:

> If it was true that rebellion and rejection of parental values characterised young people in the 1960s, a genera-tion later sees a return to traditional goals and aspirations. Young Australians in the 1980s aspire to regular employ-ment and family situations, and the work ethic among a clear majority is apparent. The 'new traditionalism' of the 1980s is marked by the desire for safety, security and insu-larity in an increasingly doubt-filled environment.[113]

This theme was further developed by Eckersley in a bril-liant 1988 paper for the Commission for the Future, titled *Casualties of Change: the Predicament of Youth in Australia.* He argued that high unemployment and in particular the heavy losses of full-time jobs for young people, and divorce rates at four times the levels which applied in the 1950s and 1960s, were part of general cultural, economic and technological changes which had generated stress with which many young people felt they could not cope. He found that feelings of hopelessness, bitterness and a low self-esteem were widespread among young people.[114] These had led to a ten-fold increase in the incidence of depressive illness among young people since the war, and a trebling in the rate of suicide among young men since the 1950s.[115] Eckersley argued that young people's 'sense of unease is undoubtedly heightened by ... the conflict that results between the "global village" we now live in and our tribal origins'.[116] He concluded his *Casualties of Change* report with the observation that:

> In examining the problems faced by young people, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that we are seeing among a small, but growing section of the community, evidence of the sort of cultural disintegration experienced by indige-nous peoples such as the Aborigines, Maoris, American Indians and Eskimos, when they come into sustained

contact with western industrial society. The shock of change and the destruction of their traditional way of life and world view, lead to high levels of apathy, suicide, drug abuse and crime ...We are seeing all these things increase among young Australians.[117]

Eckersley also cited more general research findings:

that many people feel that life has become too complicated and that things are changing too fast. People believe they are losing the power to control their own lives, and yearn for a return to a simpler, more natural lifestyle, and clearer, more certain values and beliefs.[118]

Here he was referring to the work of Hugh Mackay, who has continued to develop this theme since. In a 1986 study Mackay uncovered:

one inescapable conclusion ... that Australians believe they are losing control over their own destiny. Particularly in the large metropolitan areas of Sydney and Melbourne, people feel as though there is so much change going on around them that they are able to exert less influence than ever over the shape and structure of their own lives.[119]

Many opinion polls conducted by Mackay and other commercial organisations since then have attested to the growing strength and political salience of this uncertainty and sense of powerlessness.

The encroachment of market forces into aspects of life in which they are not appropriate, such as football, has exacerbated these feelings of uncertainty and powerlessness. In Australia, for instance, commercial considerations have dictated the demise of the traditional Victorian Football League (VFL) clubs South Melbourne and Fitzroy. The notion of a national competition and the necessity for elimination of some of the century-old football teams from Melbourne's inner suburbs may make perfect sense commercially but they neglect the real nature of public support for those teams, which has to do

with tradition, tribal loyalty and parochial identification with the places those teams come from, as the Footscray Football Club demonstrated to the then VFL bosses in 1989 when, by mobilising its western suburbs supporter base, it successfully resisted an attempt to merge it. In Britain Tony Blair has responded to and articulated community concern about similar encroachments of the all-pervasive market into the sporting arena, arguing that:

> Football remains the people's sport. But for many people it is becoming too costly ... you cannot take the fans for granted. There is a market, certainly, but there is a community too, and football clubs are a vital part of it ... basic decent values should not be compromised, whatever the commercial pressures ... [we cannot allow] the corrupting effect of commercialism and greed on the idealism that sport represents to so many people.[120]

Interestingly, in this respect Blair is making much the same critique as Marx and Engels did of capitalism in *The Communist Manifesto*, for reducing all relationships to money, leaving 'no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment".' He is echoing the moral criticism of modern capitalism, of the spiritual void beneath its veneer of contented affluence, which was one of the themes of the New Left in the 1960s, drawing on the early, humanist Marx.

According to one leading British thinker, far from feeling inhibited about seeming conservative, Labour should openly proclaim a kind of left-wing conservatism. In a paper published in *New Statesman and Society*, Anthony Giddens, a renowned social theorist, counselled against the pursuit of further 'variations on the socialist project, seeking only to "modernise" it or bring it up to date'. Instead, he argued, the Left should respond to the damage to the social fabric and to people's lives caused by free-market economic policies, by pursuing programs aimed at rebuilding family solidarities, promoting the well-being of children, and enhancing democracy

through the creation of greater visibility, and open public dialogue in government. Above all we should be 'concerned with repair, conservation and care ... [so as] to enhance social solidarity, protect continuity and connect past, present and future generations', Giddens wrote.[121]

In addressing the theme of reinventing the Left, Giddens, unlike most other commentators, did not focus so much upon the Left's ideological problems as upon the deep split which had opened within the Right, between conservatives and neo-liberals, over the free-market economics which was so destructively dominant everywhere in the world during the 1980s. This split, he argued, presented the Left with many opportunities. Giddens then clearly recognised the contradiction between Tony Blair's rhetoric about the need to recreate a sense of 'community' and his parallel enthusiasm for a 'dynamic market economy'. Though he agreed with Blair that we should seek to 'recreate communities, and ... stress duties and obligations' he sought to develop this view by arguing that 'we must work with different models of social cohesion than the notion of community today'. He asserted that there is today a 'new individualism' which is not the undiluted enemy of social solidarity but which instead 'is a mixture of positives and negatives' and which 'Labour should seek to harness ... [but] at the same time separate ... from the operation of market forces'. This meant, in his view, embracing 'cosmopolitanism' and identifying socialism with an attitude of care. These ideas of Giddens were spelt out at length in his book *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics.*[122]

Similar ideas were being canvassed by other left-wing thinkers — for instance by Trevor Blackwell and Jeremy Seabrook in their book *The Revolt Against Change: Towards a Conserving Radicalism.*[123] In his more recent writings since the election of Tony Blair as prime minister, in particular his treatise *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy,*[124] Giddens has shifted somewhat politically, glossing over the contradictions between market economic policies and social cohesion in an apparent attempt to give greater

philosophical respectability to the Blair agenda. But the contradictions he pointed to in his earlier writings remain very real and unresolved.

The common way of classifying political tendencies, as 'conservative' or 'radical', was always too simple to convey the detailed content of different political, social and economic philosophies, and it became especially confusing with the political fragmentations and realignments of the 1980s and 1990s.

In Britain it was the free-market economic policies of the New Right embraced by Margaret Thatcher which were portrayed as the 'radical' force in politics. The Left meanwhile tended to turn towards communitarian ideas to express its concern that the existing fabric of society was being torn asunder by unfettered market forces. In Britain, philosopher John Gray moved from support of the New Right in the early 1980s to criticism of its undiluted economic liberalism and support for a kind of 'communitarian liberalism', which placed him closer to the new Labour leadership than the Tories with whom he had previously been associated.[125]

In Australia it was the Right of the ALP which used the rhetoric of 'reform' to promote many of the New Right's policies. By contrast, Left opposition to these policies in both cases was increasingly expressed in terms of defending 'traditional Labor values'. Changes in the Right outside the ALP have seen some of the most 'conservative' commentators on social, defence and foreign policy issues, such as Robert Manne (the former editor of *Quadrant* magazine), B.A. Santamaria and Malcolm Fraser substantially concur with left-wing concerns about the damage to society caused by implementation of New Right economic policies. In common with the Socialist Left and many unions, these Old Right figures have condemned high unemployment caused by rapid tariff cuts, the run-down of manufacturing industry and deregulation of the financial sector. At the same time they remain starkly opposed to the Left on moral and military matters.

The other common way of delineating different political positions, to label them as 'Left' or 'Right', is also problematic. The only reason that the radical or progressive side of politics is called the Left is that it happened to be on that side of the chamber (viewed from the chairperson's seat) that members of the radical party in post-revolution France chose to sit one day in 1837. Had those members wandered across to the other side of the hall, the terms forever would have been reversed — with the label 'Left' being used to denote the supporters of fascism or capitalism or conservatism, and the label 'Right' being applied to the supporters of communism, socialism or radical change. The fact that these terms derive from no more than 'an accident of parliamentary seating',[126] points to the need to seek more precise and illuminating categories.

Tony Blair's 'modernisation' of the Labour Party has drawn on the efforts made from the late 1980s in the British Left to respond to the ascendancy of the New Right think-tanks by similar efforts to channel left-wing ideas into public policy proposals for a future Labour government. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), set up in 1988, was central to this. Another left-wing think-tank, Demos, with less close ties to the Labour Party leadership, more associated with the former *Marxism Today* camp now constituted as the Democratic Left, was founded in 1993 and has been one of the principal popularisers of communitarian ideas in the British Left.

In Australia from the late 1980s there was a similar rearguard reaction on the Left to the dominance of the New Right think-tanks. The most important venture was the conversion from 1988 of the Evatt Foundation from an apolitical charitable body into a think-tank for the Australian labour movement. The Evatt Foundation was established in 1979 by grants from several state Labor governments, trade unions and some businesses, partly to be a Labor-oriented counterpart to the earlier established Menzies Foundation. From 1984 the Evatt Foundation received an annual grant of $250,000 from the federal government and from 1993

this was indexed. The amount was reduced by the new Howard government after its election in 1996, though not abolished, but the foundation has nevertheless found it difficult to consolidate its position. The ALP's future ability to shape its own distinctive policy direction will require the greater mobilisation of such bodies.

Part of Blair's project was that Labour needed to 'modernise in full a new welfare state'.[127] In this, he sought to adopt the agenda put forward by the Commission on Social Justice. In December 1992, as one of his first acts as leader, John Smith set up this commission. Its stated purpose was to broadly review the Labour Party's social and welfare policies and to revise and update the premises of the 1944 Beveridge White Paper on Full Employment. Its actual political purpose, however, was more specific. As Smith's chief of staff, Murray Elder, confided in a letter to the ALP national secretary, Gary Gray, the commission was:

> a response to the difficulties that arose from the perception of us as the 'tax and spend' Party at the last election.[128]

Elder advised Gray, in advance of his impending visit to Australia, that:

> The work of the Commission will be critical to the rethinking that the Party will be doing in the next few years. I am aware that you have made major changes in just these areas and would like to know more about them — and not least how they have been received both in the Party and in the country [and also] how interventionist should a modern social democratic government be.[129]

Introductory material about the Social Security Review conducted in Australia from 1986–90 under Brian Howe as minister for social security was provided to Elder during his Australian visit. A full set of the papers from this review was later forwarded from Howe's office to the Institute for Public Policy Research in London, where the Commission on Social Justice was based. In its final report the com-

mission advocated the implementation in Britain of several major initiatives which had been taken by the ALP government since 1983. These included the introduction of a Jobs, Education and Training (JET) scheme to get unemployed single parents into jobs. In support of this the commission noted that:

> Australia has pioneered a JET programme for lone parents which has, over the last five years, reached nearly half of that group, significantly raising levels of training, employment and earnings amongst its clients. Savings have consistently outstripped targets and are now close to the overall programme costs. Indeed the programme has been so successful that the Australian government is now considering extending it to the registered long-term unemployed.[130]

In his address to the Labour Party Annual Conference in Brighton in 1995, Tony Blair indicated that a Labour government would introduce this scheme.

The commission also took up the ALP government's 1988 policy decision to require tertiary education graduates to repay part of the costs of their higher education so as to fund more student places. In seeking to allay concerns that such a move might impede the entry to university of students from poorer backgrounds the Commission declared that:

> In Australia, a sensitively designed Higher Education Contribution Scheme [HECS] appears to have had no impact on university entry rates of less affluent students.[131]

This was meant to be a positive statement that the HECS had done nothing to *worsen* the representation of people from low-income backgrounds among participants in higher education. Critics however could quite validly point out that by the same token it meant nothing had been done to *improve* that representation — something which surely ought to be a goal of any body aiming for social justice.

The Commission on Social Justice also endorsed the

initiatives for occupational superannuation to supple-
ment the state-provided pension undertaken by trade
unions under the ALP government, noting that:

> In this country many unions ... are applying the lessons
> learned by Australian practice to develop industry
> schemes for their members.[132]

A central ideological question which now confronts the left-
of-centre parties in both Britain and Australia is whether the
future lies in a *return* to the 'traditional' post-war democratic
socialist philosophy and Keynesian economics, as some are
arguing,[133] or whether that option has been rendered obso-
lete by economic and social change, as the 'New Realists' on
the Left have tended to argue, and that the future therefore
must lie in a post-Keynesian solution. The Left is funda-
mentally divided over this strategic question. Its most 'mod-
ernising' tendency believes *so* much has changed that *none*
of the traditional objectives or strategy can be maintained.
We cannot, for instance, focus on wealth redistribution until
we first ensure that more wealth is created. By contrast the
Left's most 'traditional' section believes that virtually *none* of
the old objectives and methods have been rendered invalid
by changes in circumstance.

Neither of these positions is adequate. The character
of the working class *has* changed and its living standards
have risen; but at the same time the extent of inequality in
society, far from diminishing, has increased. Since 1973
some of the assumptions of Keynesianism *have* been shown
to be flawed, but there is still a need for intervention and
sufficient expenditure by the state to manage demand and
create the conditions for employment growth. Will Hutton
has recently demonstrated with striking force in the British
context the validity of the central premises of Keynes in his
counter-attack to the neo-classical monetarists.[134] The
future ideological coherence of the British and Australian
labour parties will depend on successfully and specifically
adapting these premises, particularly in the new, ever-
present context of 'globalisation'.

3

The changing social bases of the two parties

An integral part of the 'modernisation' of the British and Australian labour parties since the 1960s has been the transformation of their own memberships and the building of new bases of electoral support. Major shifts occurred in the occupational character of each labour party's membership from around the time of the accession of the Wilson and Whitlam governments to power, with people from middle-class occupations becoming disproportionately present.[1]

The moves to reduce the trade union block vote in Australia in the late 1960s and in Britain in the early 1990s took place partly to accommodate the reality of an ascendant middle-class individual membership demanding a bigger say in party policy formulation. There have been notable divisions between union-affiliated members and the members of individual local branches (in Australia) or constituency parties (in Britain) which have impelled reviews of both parties' organisational relationship with the unions, resulting in extensive changes in this relationship recently in the British Labour Party and regular, recurring calls for further, similar change in the ALP.[2]

The shifts in the social composition of the labour parties raise the question whether the approach to social democracy practised in the 'modern' labour parties is inherently linked to a narrow, professionally-educated base of political activists and is inherently exclusive of the less highly formally educated people who used to participate to a greater extent in the parties. However, the disproportionate presence of individual members of *public sector* and white-collar unions in the ALP in recent decades may in one sense be analogous to the earlier heavy involvement of blue-collar workers from local government authorities and from public utilities such as the railways, in the sense that both have a direct vested interest in the effects of government policy.

John Button told a Centre Left seminar in 1988 that if you asked Labor voters what the issues were they would nominate wages and superannuation whereas ALP members would say uranium mining.[3] Comparable claims have been made in Britain, although a detailed survey of British voters and Labour Party members disputes the view that the party members' outlook is substantially out of kilter with that of Labour voters.[4] The successful campaign under Tony Blair's leadership to substantially increase the party's rank and file membership was in part designed to bring in more ordinary workers and rank-and-file trade union members to make the party's membership more representative of the 'mainstream' electorate.

There appears to remain, though, a real difference between party members, however many, and activists; between the quantity of party members and the quality and level of their contribution. The more active and long-standing members — as distinct from the newer, 'book' members recruited through low membership fees and often in association with socially oriented events, such as through workers' clubs in working-class areas — still tend to be more middle class and ideologically oriented.

Electoral Support

The first sources of information for comparisons of the
British and Australian labour parties' changing bases of
electoral support are the actual results of the elections
they contested. Direct comparisons of the performance of
the two labour parties in the lower houses of their respec-
tive parliaments at national elections are impeded by the
different methods of voting in the two countries — non-
compulsory and first-past-the-post in Britain, versus com-
pulsory and preferential in Australia — but are
nevertheless worth attempting. Figure 3.1 shows that in
1966 the British Labour Party polled better than the ALP
but on every other occasion, before and after, the ALP
continued to receive a higher proportion of votes than
British Labour until Blair won government in 1997.[5]

Figure 3.1: The primary labour vote in Britain and Australia since 1960

British Labour's fragile electoral position following loss of
support in the 1970s was made very much more fragile by
the formal split and breakaway of the Social Democrats
from the party in 1981. Continuing disunity thereafter, the
inappropriate leadership of Michael Foot, and the Falk-

lands War all helped to devastate British Labour electorally at the 1983 general election, and the party recovered only some of this lost support in 1987 and 1992.

Labour parties, with their historic suspicion of war and their association with peace movements and non-hawkish defence and foreign policies, are inherently vulnerable to well-timed jingoistic 'khaki' election campaigns. In Australia, this occurred to devastating effect in 1966 over the ALP's opposition to troops being sent to Vietnam; in Britain, the Conservative government's reaping of the benefits of its war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands was one factor in the 1983 election result.

There is no parallel nor precedent in Australia for the extreme plummeting of British Labour's support in 1983. Even in the ALP's comparable periods of disunity — such as at the 1955 and 1958 elections following the split and break-away of the DLP, and greatest electoral weakness, as in 1966 — the party's primary vote did not fall below 40 per cent; whereas in Britain in 1983 the vote fell well below 30 per cent.

Figure 3.2: The conservative parties' primary vote in Britain and Australia since 1960

Figure 3.2 in turn reveals that although the British Conservative Party won all four elections held from 1979, they attracted a smaller proportion of the electorate's vote than that which the Australian conservative parties (that is, the Liberal and National coalition parties) attracted in their five consecutive election defeats from 1983 to 1993.

The Australian conservative parties have polled better than the British Tories in every election since 1972, but they have held office for little more than half the time of their British counterparts in this period.

The explanation for this lies partly in the differences between the electoral systems of the two countries and partly in the much greater support for third parties in Britain than in Australia since 1970. Figure 3.3 shows that the principal difference between British and Australian voting trends in this period was the sharply higher level of support received by 'other' parties in Britain from 1970 — although this gap narrowed noticeably in 1998 with the surge in support for Pauline Hanson's new One Nation party in Australia.

Figure 3.3: Other parties' primary vote in Britain and Australia since 1960

Effect of Different Electoral Systems

The fact that Britain's votes are cast in a first-past-the-post system prevents the major parties from benefiting from the flow of preferences from these minor parties. While preferential voting worked to the detriment of the ALP in the 1950s and 1960s, through the passing on of the DLP preferences to the Liberal Party, in the 1980s the ALP benefited from the return of second preferences from those voters who, particularly in 1990, protested against the direction of the Labor government by casting their primary vote for the Australian Democrats or the Greens.

Would the British Labour Party have won more postwar elections if they had been conducted under the Australian system of preferential voting rather than first-past-the-post? There is evidence that the 1992 general election would have produced a hung parliament rather than a Tory majority if preferences could have been expressed between the various parties. However, the same evidence shows that more Liberal Democrat preferences would in fact have gone to the Conservatives than to Labour so there would have been little direct advantage to British Labour at that poll from preferential voting.[6]

Concern about the fact that the Tories had won government in their own right in consecutive general elections despite holding little more than 40 per cent of the popular vote prompted a push for electoral reform in Britain during the 1980s, led by the Charter 88 organisation and the Liberal Democrats. This campaign, however, tended to focus on proposals for proportional representation and for electoral pacts between Labour and the Liberal Democrats rather than on proposals for preferential or compulsory voting. The pacts were advocated in particular because of evidence that many non-Tory voters were engaging in 'tactical voting', that is, voting for the party best placed to beat the Conservatives, which in the south of England was almost invariably the Alliance or later the Liberal Democrats, rather than Labour. The

push for proportional representation and pacts was con-
demned by many in the Labour Party as defeatist for sug-
gesting that the party's problems of declining support
under the existing electoral system were permanent
rather than temporary, but some leading figures inside
the Labour Party did respond positively to the campaign.
The most prominent of these were Robin Cook and Ken
Livingstone. A Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform
was established which by mid-1994 had won the support of
2,200 Labour Party members and more than 60 Labour
MPs. More parliamentarians were mobilised in opposi-
tion, however, with a First Past the Post Campaign
launched in 1993 with the support of 86 Labour MPs,
mostly from Labour's safe northern constituencies.[7]

In 1990 the Labour Party annual conference resolved to
establish a Working Party on Electoral Systems, which was
chaired by Professor Raymond Plant and which in its final
report in 1993 rejected both proportional representation
and first-past-the-post. The Plant Committee narrowly
rejected the adoption for the House of Commons of the
'Alternative Vote', or preferential voting as used in the Aus-
tralian House of Representatives, in favour of another more
limited method of preferential voting, the 'Supplementary
Vote', under which in effect only first and second prefer-
ences, rather than lower preferences, would be counted.[8]
John Smith himself opposed this recommendation but
committed Labour to holding a referendum on the future
of the electoral system for the House of Commons during
the first term of the next Labour government. This decision
was confirmed by the 1993 annual conference, which also
carried a union-backed resolution resolving to 'uphold the
first-past-the-post system'.

Labour's opposition to proportional representation
hardened once the soar in the party's opinion poll ratings,
especially in the south of England, after the election of
Tony Blair as leader in 1994 showed that victory was now
well and truly possible without it. Blair himself as prime
minister nevertheless has declared in favour of an Aus-

tralian-style 'Alternative Vote', or preferential voting, and is expected to hold a referendum in the life of the present British parliament to bring about electoral reform at least to this extent.[9]

What Effect has the System of Voluntary Rather than Compulsory Voting Had on Each Party's Support?

David Butler wrote in the early 1970s that the common perception by well-informed Australian observers that the absence of compulsory voting in Britain was a major electoral impediment to the Labour Party was simply not borne out by the evidence.[10] Butler himself is far from dogmatic on the point, however, conceding, inter alia, that the low (less than 70 per cent) registration on the electoral rolls of young blacks in the East End of London, and the generally low registration of immigrants from 'New Commonwealth' countries, does reduce British Labour's potential voting base.[11] And Butler's own data in the Nuffield studies of elections since the 1970s has tended to confirm the view that low turnout in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas has hurt Labour. Data from the British Election Study and from official polling station records at the 1987 general election give a more accurate picture than earlier studies, and show that:

> Both class and income have significant relationships with turnout ... [and] The common belief 'that those in the highest income and status brackets participate most in politics' is ... shown to be true.[12]

They also confirm that there is 'a very marked relationship between youth and non-voting', with only 66 per cent of 18–24 year olds on the electoral register voting compared with 89 per cent of 45–64 year olds.[13]

The think tank Demos, in research for a report on young people's values in the late twentieth century,[14] found that nearly half of all 18–25 year olds in Britain did

not vote at the 1992 general election.[15] The fact that this meant that a huge proportion of the total youth population (including potential Labour voters) was not participating at the most basic political level, led Demos to advocate introduction of 'Australian-style compulsory voting'[16] to Britain. British Labour MP Peter Hain has also argued for introduction of compulsory voting in Britain, writing that 'the Australians do not complain of their rights being denied through their system of compulsory voting and nor should the British'.[17]

There is a widespread view that many 'traditional' Labour voters did not bother turning out to vote in 1970 due to disappointment with the Wilson government and that few were regained in later elections,[18] and, even in Blair's 1997 victory:

> On average just 68 per cent turned out to vote in the average Labour seat, compared with 74 per cent in the typical Conservative one, a larger gap than ever before. Labour's heartlands, then, were distinctly lukewarm about their party's surge to victory.[19]

The 'turn-out' factor has clearly been of some significance in robbing British Labour of working-class support since 1970, and Labour figures have regularly shown concern about the large numbers of adults not registered to vote.[20] The fact that British general elections are held on weekdays rather than at the weekend as they are in Australia has also hurt Labour, making it harder for working people, particularly those with little autonomy in their jobs, to make it to the polling booth. The poll tax introduced by the Thatcher government in 1989–90 also prompted some people (who were much more likely to be Labour-inclined than Conservative) to remove themselves from the electoral register, lowering the number of seats won by Labour in 1992.[21]

As well as bolstering the reliability of the ALP's core vote, compulsory voting in Australia may have tended to make the ALP take the safe seats for granted and focus its policies on middle-class swinging voters in marginal seats

to a greater extent than the British Labour Party, which has had to reaffirm its basic ideology in order to ensure the faithful voters in the heartland seats actually have something to come out and vote for.

Electoral Campaigning

There have been regular exchanges between the British and Australian labour parties in their respective election campaigns and a few significant records of these contacts have been traced.

It has been suggested that Neil Kinnock's campaign theme in the 1992 general election in Britain, 'It's Time for a Change', consciously borrowed the famous Whitlam 'It's Time' slogan used by the ALP in the 1972 Australian election, and that the British campaign also borrowed the US-style presidential politics and a touch of evangelism from the Whitlam precedent.[22] This may be overstated, though Neil Kinnock's senior adviser at the time, Australian-born Patricia Hewitt, was certainly conscious of Australia's successful precedent.[23]

In Britain the Conservative Party was, until 1997 at least, universally acknowledged to be superior to Labour in the techniques and general professionalism of election campaigning. In Australia, however, while the Liberal Party did hold the edge in this respect in the 1950s and 1960s, from 1983–93 the ALP was widely acknowledged to be the superior campaigner.[24]

The parents of Gary Gray, the ALP national secretary from 1993–2000, migrated to Australia from Rotherham, a town near Sheffield, Yorkshire, when he was aged eight, and he grew up with them in Whyalla, South Australia, where 'the branch was virtually a little enclave of Yorkshire and Lancashire'.[25] Gray made an extended visit back to his birthplace in 1985–86 and worked for a British Labour MP in that time. After becoming an ALP official he established close links with leading British Labour Party campaigners, including Peter Mandelson. According to his

observation, the British Labour Party 'do things differently but appropriately to their circumstances ... Printed materials were very, very wordy, but again that's within the British political culture, the idea of providing the election manifesto and all that is something that here people would look at you very oddly for. There they would look at you in an odd way if you didn't do it ... [And] you can't compare their five-minute party political broadcasts to our 30–second [commercial] TV grabs'.[26]

In both countries modern methods of election campaigning have tended to emanate from the United States. While Harold Wilson's campaigns in 1964 and later were successfully conducted, the British Labour Party did not become fully receptive to American campaigning methods until Bill Clinton's presidential run in 1992, in which a number of British Labour Party officials participated. In Australia, however, the ALP had opened up to modern, American presidential style campaigns much earlier, in the early 1970s. The razzamatazz of the ALP's 'It's Time' campaign in 1972 followed a visit to the US by the party's then federal secretary, Mick Young. Whitlam tended to look to Canada and the US rather than Britain for guidance in modern election campaigns and techniques.

When David Combe's delegation of ALP organisational officials visited Britain as part of a world tour in June 1978 they found the British Labour Party in a 'shambles' with little to offer in election campaign ideas. Combe was evidently much more impressed with the Canadian New Democratic Party.[27]

At the 1993 annual conference of the Labour Party in Britain, some 200 people attended a fringe meeting at which the ALP UK Society (and the US Democrats Abroad[28]) screened some television advertisements from past election campaigns. The British audience was struck by the precision and 'punch' of the Australian advertisements in comparison with the more staid political advertisements to which they were accustomed. They were particularly impressed by the advertisement used in the

1993 Australian election campaign against John Hewson's planned Goods and Services Tax (GST).[29]

The British Labour Party had established a Labour International organisation in 1993 following legislation by the Conservative government to enfranchise British citizens living overseas. The Tories no doubt thought that this move would be advantageous to them electorally; and Labour needed to neutralise any such advantage. The first thing the Labour Party did was to give voting rights on internal party matters to its *own* members living overseas (something which the Tories had not done). Labour then set out to win the votes of approximately 10 per cent of the 2.5 million British people entitled to vote in British elections then estimated to be living abroad.

Labour International had by 1994 some 600 members in Europe and the US. At that point an Australian branch was formed with the active assistance of the ALP UK Society. John Prescott, together with Kim Beazley, formally launched an agreement during Prescott's 1995 visit to Australia to provide mutual assistance between the two labour parties to secure the votes of expatriates in their respective national elections.[30] At least one branch of the British Labour Party has now been formed in Australia — in Rockingham, Western Australia, where one in three residents is British born.[31]

There are estimated to be up to two million British nationals living in Australia alone, or more than 10 per cent of the total Australian population. Approximately eight million people in Britain have relatives living in Australia. Of these British nationals in Australia, up to half a million are still eligible to vote in British elections. Their congregation in particular geographic areas, and the fact that many are manual workers and members of Australian trade unions, mean that efforts to win votes for the British Labour Party from within Australia would be likely to reap rewards. In addition to notifying British citizens of their new voting entitlements through public notices and advertisements, one means of making direct contact with

them which has been considered is by obtaining country of birth and/or international transfer details of members from the records of particular trade unions, such as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union. Such efforts would restore long-standing links between the two countries' labour movements in these quarters.

In an incisive analysis of the lessons for Australia from British Labour's defeat at the 1992 general election, a document among the papers of Gary Gray (then ALP Assistant National Secretary) emphasised that:

> The idea that governments lose elections was proved wrong by the British result on April 9. During his 16 months in office unemployment climbed ... [but] Even if Britain blamed John Major for the recession, they were fearful that a Labour Government would make it worse.
>
> *Incumbents will survive when there are doubts about the alternative.*[32]

This message was directly relevant to the ALP as it planned its 1993 re-election campaign. The Keating government was in an almost identical position to the Major government, having presided over a recession, undergone a change of leadership after a long period of government under one prime minister, and facing an opposition with policies, particularly on taxation, which could be portrayed as hitting the hip pocket of voters and raising doubts about the future at a time when voters were feeling acutely insecure. The document argued that:

> Whatever we do we have to be competitive on tax — people are more likely to behave conservatively at times of recession than they are in ordinary times.[33]

The ALP's successful election campaign in 1993 had certainly absorbed well the lessons of their kindred party's defeat in 1992.

Conversely, by the time the 1996 Australian election came around there were, according to one astute observer, Neal Blewett, signs that in Britain:

> Tory politicians, while wanting their coalition cousins in
> Australia to win, hoped for a Labor victory as it would
> augur well for long-serving governments, such as their
> own.
>
> And while Labor felt a kindred spirit with Mr. Keating,
> they were eager for the 'It's Time' factor to work, as this
> underlies their own strategy.[34]

Indeed, the British Labour Party had dispatched a senior
adviser, Fraser Kemp, to participate in the Keating re-
election campaign and he took back detailed strategic
lessons from the defeat which influenced Blair's 1997
campaign.[35] According to Kemp, during the 1997 British
election campaign:

> Some of the slogans they (the Liberals) used, we have
> used. The whole question of the length of incumbency of
> government is a very powerful argument for opposition
> parties to use, so there is a similarity about the elections
> ... John Howard played a very careful game in the cam-
> paign ... And ... Tony Blair is also being cautious.[36]

David Butler reinforced the importance of the 1996 Aus-
tralian lessons for Blair's 1997 campaign, stating that:

> Senior Tories are telling me that, while everybody's
> talking about the influence of Bill Clinton and his cam-
> paigns in 1992 and 1996 on Tony Blair, don't forget about
> the impact of John Howard and his victory ... Howard
> didn't show his hand too much. He didn't announce what
> he had planned for departments or key personnel. I think
> Tony Blair is showing he has learned about what hap-
> pened in Australia and from John Howard.[37]

There was also great enthusiasm from Australian Labor
politicians to be involved in the 1997 British election cam-
paign and to impart its lessons, particularly the benefits of
a mass membership and centralised, professional cam-
paigning techniques, back home.[38] This reawakened
interest in British Labour continued a trend which had
begun with the rise of Blair, and prompted state Labor

parties which had gone into opposition in the early 1990s (in Tasmania then Victoria and then nationally) to conduct 'Labor Listens' campaigns, just as Neil Kinnock had initiated in Britain following the 1987 election defeat.

Social Versus Political Explanations of Electoral Difficulty

The Thatcher government in the 1980s actively sought to engineer the social conditions for its continued electoral ascendancy. The government's policy of allowing the tenants of council houses to buy the house they had previously rented, at a price far below the going market rate, was strikingly successful. According to a Gallup survey for the BBC following the 1983 election, 59 per cent of the people who had voted Labour in 1979 and who then bought their own council house switched from Labour in 1983.[39]

In stark contrast to the situation in the 1950s, by the 1990s nearly as high a proportion of Britons owned or were paying off their own houses as Australians.[40]

In privatising the formerly public utilities of gas, electricity, water, etc, the Thatcher government also actively encouraged people to purchase personal shares in these enterprises. In 1987 the Tories boasted that nearly one in five British adults was a share owner, a greater number than belonged to trade unions,[41] although this figure has declined since due to turnover — the 'mums and dads' passing them on to larger investors. By contrast, in Australia in 1988 less than one in ten Australian adults directly owned shares, and this proportion had increased only modestly, to just above one in ten, by 1991.[42]

However, the Hawke and Keating governments' decision to privatise a substantial part of the Commonwealth Bank and to encourage the public to purchase individual shares in this formerly publicly-owned bank substantially increased the proportion of Australian adults who became shareowners after 1991. The float of shares from

the newly privatised Qantas and Australian Airlines con-
glomerate contributed to a continuing rise in the pro-
portion of Australian adults who were direct shareholders
and the figure had risen to 20.4 per cent in 1997 (close
to Britain at 21.4).[43] The float in June 1997 by the Howard
government of one third of the newly privatised Telstra
(formerly the fully government-owned Telecom), being
five times the scale of the Commonwealth Bank float in
terms of take-up numbers, drove the proportion of Aus-
tralian adults directly owning shares up to 31.9 per cent
by October 1998.[44] The sell-off of a further 16 per cent of
Telstra in October 1999 means that there will be a con-
tinued rapid rise in direct share ownership in Australia.
The optimistic forecasts often made by the proponents of
'popular capitalism' — the advocates that Australia
should become 'the greatest shareowning democracy in
the world' — however, overlook the fact that the rise in
share ownership is mainly in high-income households
and that most shares may well end up in institutional
hands as occurred in Britain.

Most public attempts at explaining the marked decline
in the level of the British Labour Party's electoral support
after 1966, and its defeat in four consecutive elections
from 1979, took their cue from the Thatcherite initiatives
and tended to emphasise sociological factors such as
increases in home ownership and decreases in unionisa-
tion and the blue-collar proportion of the workforce.
However, the level of the Australian Labor Party's electoral
support stayed relatively stable, and the party won five con-
secutive elections over the very same period, amid similar
demographic trends and indeed in a society with even
higher rates of home ownership and less of a blue-collar
presence in the workforce. Although blue-collar employ-
ment has fallen sharply as a proportion of total employ-
ment in both Britain and Australia since World War Two, it
remains higher in Britain than in Australia — still over 40
per cent of all people employed in Britain in 1996,[45] com-
pared with 33 per cent in Australia in that year.[46]

James Jupp argued (in 1994) that the British Conservative Party is more entrenched in rural England, the suburbs and the South East region of England ('which has been Tory for 100 years') than the Liberal Party of Australia is in its strongholds. He emphasised that whereas Britain's dying periphery is Labour territory, such as Scotland, in Australia the dying periphery is, in contrast, National Party territory. Further, he pointed out, in seats which (judging by their socioeconomic character) the British Labour Party would not have a hope, and has typically run third, the ALP has actually won in Australia — such as the eastern suburbs of Melbourne. And whereas British Labour had not won rural seats outside Scotland and Wales since World War Two, the ALP had made some notable rural conquests, such as in New South Wales.[47] All this is in marked contrast to the tenor of Jupp's own comments back in 1964 when he argued that 'the main difference between the British Labour Party and the ALP is that the British party is much better'.[48]

Caution is clearly required therefore in writing off the prospects of a party's political turnaround over time. And widespread assumptions that *all* the demographic trends were running against Labour in Britain are clearly now exposed as wrong. The party's increasingly pro-European stance from the early 1980s (which came about in part because of the protection offered by European industrial standards under Jacques Delors against the Thatcher and Major governments), and its contrast to the Tories' increasingly xenophobic position, could not but help Labour consolidate support among the growing generation of younger voters for whom the Continent is much more familiar and inviting than it was to their parents. And the growing enfranchisement of ethnic minorities in Britain has also helped (and is likely to continue to help) Labour electorally.

On two of the three principal criteria which Hobsbawm in *The Forward March of Labour Halted?* uses for measuring the long-term health of the labour movement —

the rate of trade union membership and the level of active membership of left-wing political parties — Australia has fared as bad as or worse than Britain. Yet according to his third criterion — the labour vote — Australia has generally performed much better than in Britain. A comparison of the two labour parties' electoral performance therefore leads to a querying of the importance of objective sociological trends, and a much greater emphasis upon political and ideological factors in explaining the divergence in the levels of their voting support.

Anthony Mughan has hypothesised that Britain's relatively poor economic performance from the 1950s to the 1980s compared with Australia may have made British voters there more likely to vote according to the state of the economy, and he has demonstrated that British voters were indeed considerably more likely than Australian voters to vote according to hip-pocket-nerve issues and in particular inflation in this period.[49] Labour's incumbency in Britain during some of the periods of sharpest increases in inflation may therefore have done much to damage the party's support.

To compare the social bases of the two parties' support it is necessary to turn from the actual election results and their geographical composition, and to examine such comparable data as is available from academic surveys and commercial opinion polls. Comprehensive and comparable opinion polls as to the character of the two parties' support bases are not available prior to the 1940s. Those presented by Alford show that from the early 1940s to the late 1950s both labour parties continued to depend primarily on blue-collar support, with approximately two-thirds of manual workers in both countries consistently supporting the labour parties. They also show, however, that the ALP was more prompt and more successful than British Labour in gaining electoral support from non-manual workers.[50]

The advent of the British Election Study in the early 1960s, Don Aitkin's Australian surveys in the late 1960s

and 1970s, and an Australian Election Study series from the early 1980s makes it possible to undertake some comprehensive comparisons of the social bases of the two labour parties' support over recent decades.[51]

The overall fall in British Labour's electoral support in the 1980s was so great that Labour could not even muster majority support among trade unionists. This led some to focus on the decline of Labour's support among its traditional core groups and in particular the defection of skilled manual workers. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, in analysing the 1992 general election, however emphasised that 'the crucial message for the Labour Party is that its unpopularity over the last thirteen years has ... taken the form of across-the-board losses of support among **all classes alike**'.[52] They argued that:

> It was simply never the case that Margaret Thatcher was particularly good at appealing to the skilled working class (the opinion pollsters' famous C2s) whom she somehow managed to detach from Labour. In truth, during the 1980s the skilled working class continued to support Labour as strongly (or as weakly) as the unskilled working class did, and substantially more strongly than any of the other classes. Of course, Labour's support among skilled workers dropped in the early 1980s, but it dropped comparably in all other classes too.[53]

They queried, then, the widespread view that there was ever in fact a *disproportionate* working-class defection from Labour under Thatcher.

Table 3.1 indicates that there was a steep drop in support for the British Labour Party from manual workers after the mid-1960s.[54] However, two of the greatest falls in fact occurred at the 1970 and 1979 elections following periods of Labour government. In Australia, the ALP had support from nearly two-thirds of manual workers when Hawke took office in 1983 but this fell to just half by 1990, jumped back up in the circumstances of 1993 and then fell well below half by the time of the party's defeat in 1996.

Table 3.1: Labour's support from manual workers in Britain and Australia (proportion of all manual workers surveyed, %)

Year	Britain	Australia
1961–2	57	64
1966–7	69	58
1979	51	63
1983–4	43	65
1987	44	59
1990	na	50
1992–3	50	61
1996–7	61	44

Although the Australian Labor Party's support held up considerably better than British Labour's in the 1980s, the ALP did experience notable fall-offs in working-class electoral support after taking office in 1983. This became particularly clear in 1988 with a sequence of by-elections in working-class or 'traditional', 'safe' Labor electorates. There were huge primary vote swings against the ALP of 11 per cent in Adelaide in February 1988 (causing the actual loss of the seat), 14 per cent in Port Adelaide the following month and 11 per cent in Oxley in October 1988. In the 1990 federal election, although Labor was returned, its primary vote dropped steeply and continued to do so in the opinion polls over the next two years (see Figure 5.6 on page 245). When Bob Hawke departed parliament soon after being deposed as prime minister, his formerly safe Labor seat of Wills in Melbourne's inner north was lost in a by-election in April 1992 to an independent candidate, Phil Cleary, standing as a 'traditional' Labor person opposed particularly to economic 'rationalism' and therefore to the left of the 'modern' ALP.

Senior ALP strategists nationally and in Victoria who had become extremely concerned about the party's eroded electoral base by the second half of 1991 moved decisively

after the Wills by-election for a change of political direction. The tentative steps taken from the time Keating became party leader and prime minister in December 1991 were consolidated, and this, together with the Liberal and National parties' adoption of a very unpopular tax policy and the extreme (even when modified) *Fightback!* manifesto on industrial relations, wages and health care, helped give voters at the 1993 federal election a wider policy choice than previously. Voters, especially in Victoria, could now see clearly the difference such policies did make to their lives as a result of the actions of the Kennett coalition government in that state and accordingly Labor's primary vote, particularly in working-class areas, bounced back strongly from its 1990 nadir. The shift by many Victorian workers from State to Federal awards to avoid the Kennett government's cutback of wages and entitlements dramatically highlighted the class differences between the industrial relations policies of Labor and Liberal.

The ALP in the October 1992 Victorian election campaign and also in the March 1993 federal election reorientated its campaign and election policies towards the people and the safe seats it had previously taken for granted. The key campaign objective was to convince blue-collar workers that there *were* in fact policy differences between the ALP and the Liberals. Polling showing a collapse in the ALP's base vote prompted the party to direct its advertising at regaining disaffected long-time Labor voters rather than swinging voters in marginal electorates.[55]

The appearance of the conservative parties' *Fightback!* manifesto in November 1991 ultimately proved a godsend to the ALP's efforts to win back support in its formerly 'safe' electorates, as it helped to produce a sharp two-party polarisation which by the time of the 1993 federal election ensured movement back to Labor in the 'heartland' electorates.

The Australian conservative parties had looked to Margaret Thatcher for ideological and electoral inspiration in the 1980s. At the 1993 election one of their slogans — 'Labor isn't working, nor are one million Australians' —

was directly borrowed from her 1979 campaign, and later, in 1996, they borrowed her 1979 'Enough is Enough' catchcry as part of their successful campaign to end a period of Labor government.[56] However, John Hewson, unlike Margaret Thatcher — and contrary to the explicit advice she gave to his predecessor as Liberal leader[57] — unveiled his policies, which were even more extreme than Thatcher's, *before* being elected to office. Up against a more disciplined labour party than Thatcher had confronted in 1979 and after, he was accordingly repudiated.

Thus the ALP managed, through the poor performance and extremist policies on the part of its opposition, to contain and reverse working-class discontent to a greater extent than had the Wilson government in 1970 — and enough to unexpectedly retain government at the 1993 election before being confronted with the full fury of disenchanted Labor voters when a credible alternative was finally presented at the 1996 poll. Gary Gray said in assessing the 1996 election result that

> After you've been through an election where you lose 600,000 people who are Labor voters largely by habit, there aren't very many more bitter pills that you can swallow.[58]

Table 3.2 highlights how the ALP has generally been much more successful than the British Labour Party in broadening its support beyond blue-collar workers since the late 1960s.

Perhaps because the British Labour Party has historically had a proportionally bigger blue-collar base upon which to draw than has the ALP, it has found it harder to adapt to the contraction of that base than has the ALP, which always had to go beyond that base and forge a variegated social coalition of support in order to attain an electoral majority. Upwardly-mobile voters from working-class backgrounds in Australia also seem to be more likely than in Britain to retain rather than discard their Labor loyalties when advancing occupationally, which may stem from the more rigidly defining, mutually exclusive nature

of Britain's class divisions (which many Australians, including Rupert Murdoch,[59] and New Zealanders, including Bryan Gould,[60] who have observed these divisions, have continued to comment upon).

Table 3.2: Labour's support from non-manual workers in Britain and Australia (proportion of all non-manual workers surveyed, %)

Year	Britain	Australia
1961–2	22	35
1966–7	28	25
1979	25	41
1983–4	16	46
1987	19	40
1990	na	38
1992–3	22	42
1996–7	40	36

The campaign for the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 galvanised the community of mostly professional, expatriate Australians then in London into action to form the ALP UK Society, and the dismissal of the Whitlam government strengthened their numbers and commitment. This was a good illustration of the wider socioeconomic trends delivering a new constituency to Australian Labor after Whitlam became leader in 1967.[61]

Stephen Knight found Australia's higher education system proportionately much larger and more accessible than that in Britain, in part because of expansion in the 1960s and 1970s,[62] and statistical evidence continues to support his impression. In 1994, 24 per cent of 18–21 year olds in Britain were enrolled in tertiary education compared with 29 per cent in Australia.[63] In 1995 there were 3,380 tertiary students for every 100,000 British people, compared with 5,401 for every 100,000 Australians.[64] In Australia there are no deeply entrenched barriers sepa-

rating Oxford and Cambridge from all other universities as there are in Britain. These features have helped promote greater mobility of people from working-class backgrounds into the professions in Australia than in Britain, a trend which continues to be noted in the sociological literature.[65]

To put the figures from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 into some relative perspective it should be noted that the British Election Study data also show that the proportion of blue-collar workers supporting British Labour *fell* by more than 12 percentage points in 1970 and the proportion of intermediate and routine non-manual workers fell nearly 1 percentage point, whereas support from professionals and managers in that year *rose* by more than 6 percentage points. In 1979 the proportion of blue-collar voters supporting Labour fell nearly 8 percentage points and that of intermediate and routine white-collar support fell more than 5 percentage points, while support from professionals and managers *rose* by more than 2 percentage points. While the proportion of blue-collar voters supporting Labour fell by 8 percentage points in the 1983 catastrophe this was not *disproportionately* great because the proportion of intermediate and routine white-collar support for Labour, and the proportion of support from professionals and managers also dropped on that occasion by 8 percentage points.

These trends would tend to support the view that when there were disproportionate blue-collar or broader 'working-class' defections from British Labour these were *politically* rather than sociologically determined, and that disappointment with the performance of Labour in office was a stronger motivating cause for the changes than supposed attractions to the lures of Thatcherism or inexorable sociological trends towards class convergence. Similarly, in Australia, as Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show, support for the ALP from manual workers fell by 21 percentage points between 1983 and 1996 compared with a fall of 10 percentage points in support from non-manual workers, reflecting disappointment with the Hawke government's general orientation towards middle-class swinging voters

at the expense of its core support over most of this period, and the pinpoint targeting of the voters in the decisive marginal seats.

To gain a further sense of the changing social bases of the two parties' support it is important to examine and compare the labour parties' support in each nation among women, young people and immigrants.

Women

Both labour parties have traditionally received less support from women than men. At the 1983 and 1984 federal elections the ALP appeared to close this 'gender gap' for the first time,[66] which was seen as an important component of its overall success. This finding was based on data from the ALP's own polling and from commercial opinion polls, some of which even suggested that a pro-Labor gender gap had been established. Patricia Hewitt recounts how in the British Labour Party:

> ... we looked very consciously ... [at] the way the ALP had specifically targeted women and their success in building a kind of pro-Labor gender gap ... [I]n 1988, a colleague of mine, Deborah Mattinson, who is very active in the shadow communications agency ... researched a presentation for Neil Kinnock and the Shadow Cabinet and the National Executive about the gender gap and Labour's position with women. And we drew quite explicitly in that on research on electoral strategy in ... Australia. There has been a whole wave of research leading up to what turned out to be Hawke's first election and I think probably the election after that which was used to position Labor in Australia as the party of [the] family. That was very, very interesting; we drew heavily on that, not just for that presentation, which then became a Fabian Society pamphlet, *Women's Votes: the Key to Winning.*[67]

The more comprehensive academic studies (of which unfortunately none were done for the 1983 or 1984 election) did not, however, confirm that the pro-conservative

gender gap ever actually closed, although it clearly did narrow significantly between 1967 and 1990. In the 1987 and 1990 elections the gender gap was nevertheless still alive in Australia, to the ALP's detriment, in part because of a shift of female voters' first preferences to the Australian Democrats, now standing to the ALP's left, particularly on economic and environmental policies.[68] In 1992 Paul Keating, alarmed by his poor standing among women voters, called on Dr Anne Summers, in a much-publicised move, to help improve it.

Hewitt indicated in December 1994 that the British Labour Party had also:

> ... in fact, very recently, in the last month ... taken a fresh look at the more recent wave of polling, research and electoral strategy which Anne Summers did, with Keating, amongst women. And we're developing some new work here partly triggered off by that.[69]

Despite Summers' efforts, at the 1993 federal election the traditional pro-conservative gender gap had widened again to the extent that the ALP's support from women was 6 percentage points less than that received by the Coalition parties.[70]

Table 3.3: The 'gender gap' in labour support in Britain and Australia[71] (percentage of male voters supporting Labour/Labor minus the percentage of female voters supporting Labour/Labor)

Year	Britain	Australia
1966–7	3	11
1979	0	7
1983–4	2	3
1987	0	4
1990	na	2
1992–3	1.5	6
1996–7	−1	5

Table 3.3 shows that, contrary to the impressions which some people had in the 1980s, British Labour has in fact done consistently better than the ALP in bridging the gender gap among voters.

Clearly, despite improvements, the women's vote has generally been an area of some vulnerability for both parties, but particularly the ALP. Work by Carmen Lawrence in Australia has highlighted the ALP's comparatively poor performance among female voters at recent elections in comparison with both British Labour and the US Democrats.[72]

Young People

Both labour parties have generally done better among young voters than in the older age groups since the 1960s. Harold Wilson's famous appearance alongside celebrated rock group the Beatles[73] was aimed at young voters, and the British Election Study indicates that he scored 56 per cent of the votes of 18–24 year olds in 1966. However, British Labour's support among young people fell drastically from the late 1970s as it did in other age groups; and while the 'Red Wedge' campaign undertaken by the party under Kinnock in the mid-1980s (involving popular musicians such as Billy Bragg who supported Labour at the time) may have helped to rebuild some young people's support, it was not until 1997 that the party appears (based on the initial studies of that election) to have recaptured majority primary vote support from young voters, due in part to Blair's own relative youth and image of being all about the future.

In Australia from the early 1950s the ALP polled less well than the conservative parties among young voters, but this changed after the ascension of Whitlam, and throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s Labor enjoyed an advantage over the Coalition parties in the youth vote, despite the unpopular decisions under the Hawke government to reintroduce tertiary education charges. In the 1993 election campaign Paul Keating appeared on the cover of *Rolling*

Stone magazine wearing 'shades' to cultivate the youth vote and associate the ALP with modernisation and the future (in a move reminiscent of Harold Wilson's Beatles appearance).

However, there were signs prior to the 1996 election that the ALP's advantage was narrowing among 18–24 year olds, despite their strong preference for Keating over Howard in terms of personality, and despite Keating's pushing of issues, like the republic, which might be expected to appeal to the young. The continuing high rate of youth unemployment at the end of Labor's term of office featured heavily in the conservative parties' television advertising. In particular the repeated footage of Paul Keating telling students to 'go and get a job', when there were clearly not enough jobs there to go to, counted against the incumbent government.

At the 1996 election Labor's support had evidently 'declined among those who entered the electorate most recently'.[74] Of all voters who had entered the electorate since 1988, only 36 per cent voted Labor in 1996 compared with 42 per cent for the Coalition parties.[75] Further tentative evidence has emerged that the ALP's standing has continued to deteriorate among young voters since then.

Part of the ALP's problem arose from the fact that all 18–24 year old voters in the 1996 federal election had only ever known a Labor federal government. Because this had been a time of great economic change, insecurity and entrenched youth unemployment, the government of the day tended to be blamed.

Individualism has also been more strongly promoted than ever in mainstream and youth culture in recent decades, giving today's young people a very different set of values than the more collectivist principles which helped build the labour movement's support base and institutional strength in earlier generations.

And the ALP's drastic shifts of ideology in recent decades have made it hard for younger voters to ascertain and identify with what exactly it is the 'modern' ALP really stands for.

Immigrants

In Britain those voters from ethnic minority groups who do register and vote have overwhelmingly favoured the Labour Party,[76] although they have received little notice. Australia has much larger numbers of immigrants, with first-generation immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds making up about 17 per cent of the population, compared with about 6 per cent in Britain,[77] and they have accordingly come to have a strong electoral presence.

Important differences have evolved in the character of multiculturalism in Britain and in Australia. Most of Britain's immigrants since World War Two have come from 'coloured' British Commonwealth countries like India and Pakistan, where the English language is widely spoken but where non-Christian religions such as Islam or Hinduism are dominant. By contrast, most of Australia's immigrants have come from 'white' southern and eastern European countries where the English language is not widely spoken but where Christian religions are dominant. Australia is more multicultural than Britain in the sense that it has a much higher proportion of migrants in the population; these migrants come from a much wider range of nationalities, and many more are from non-English-speaking backgrounds than is the case in Britain. In terms of colour and religious diversity, however, Britain has been more multicultural than Australia for most of the post-war period, although this has in more recent times been shifting with the rise in Asian immigration to Australia since the late 1970s.

The Whitlam government's embracing of multiculturalism led many of Australia's immigrants to become citizens and voters for the first time, and there has been clear majority support for Labor from migrants of non-English-speaking backgrounds, particularly Southern Europeans, since. There is also evidence of a very sharp rise in support for Labor among migrants from Asian countries following

the controversy over John Howard's 1988 comments during his first stint as leader of the Liberal Party, which helped Labor win the 1990 and 1993 elections.[78] The importance of the ethnic vote per se in Australia, however, has been queried by Nicholas Economou, who argues that the strong Labor support among migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds really just reflects their disproportionate location in working-class jobs and neighbourhoods.[79]

The 1996 election result was interpreted by many as a rebuff to the Labor government's support for multiculturalism and Aboriginal land rights, particularly with the election of an independent, Pauline Hanson, in the formerly Queensland Labor heartland electorate of Oxley, following her being disendorsed by the Liberal Party after attacking the government benefits received by Aborigines.

In one academic interpretation, Katherine Betts rightly identified 'economic rationalism' as responsible for the big drop in blue-collar support for Labor at the 1996 election.[80] However, she produced no evidence in her study to support her other assertion — that the fall-off in Labor's base vote was also caused by the party's support of multiculturalism or 'imposition of alien cultural ideas'.

The fact that two of the seats which Labor lost in 1996 in the states outside the south-east corner of Australia were to independent candidates — including Hanson — who had highlighted racial issues, became confused with the fact that the ALP lost 'traditional' blue-collar support more broadly, and it thus received disproportionate attention. In reality, the bulk of Labor's traditional blue-collar base is made up both of people born in Australia *and* immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds who were alienated not over racial issues but by economic restructuring which dislocated them from jobs and brought great uncertainty into their lives. There were disproportionately large anti-Labor swings in some of the most multicultural and blue-collar electorates of Australia in 1996, such as Fowler in the western suburbs of Sydney[81]

and Lindsay in outer western Sydney (which had a primary vote swing in excess of 18 per cent); in both these electorates the proportions of people born overseas and of tradespeople and labourers are both above the national average.[82] There were many more alienated traditional Labor voters in seats such as these than the much more talked about (and comparatively and atypically Anglocentric[83]) electorate of Oxley.

Critics of Labor's embrace of multiculturalism seem to overlook how frequently John Howard felt the need to apologise for his 1988 comments on Asian immigration after regaining the leadership in 1995 and in the lead-up to his victory at the 1996 election. It is unlikely that this was done out of pure remorse and without regard to opinion polling. The same is true for Jeff Kennett's assertive lobbying for the Greek vote in Victoria.

For the ALP to revive its blue-collar support it will be far more appropriate to change the party's macroeconomic policies and to keep in sight the big national issues, such as the need for greater certainty and security in people's lives, than to be distracted from this central task by those who would misrepresent the evidence on class and voting to advance their own, often long-standing agendas against migration and multiculturalism.

As Judith Brett emphasises:

> [While] Labor did not convince blue-collar Australia of its cultural agenda of multiculturalism and racial tolerance ... it has not convinced them of its economic agenda of deregulation, internationalisation and privatisation, either. What they see is declining income, rising unemployment and an increasingly uncertain economic future. This provides an opening for Labor to start to rebuild its support among working-class Australians without having to concede any cultural ground at all. Economic policies clearly distinguished from Mr. Howard's in giving a positive role to government in building industry and providing employment would quickly win back much of the support it lost.[84]

Regional Variations

One of the clearest differences between the discussions of the two labour parties' voting performances is the emphasis on the *regional* discrepancies in British Labour's level of electoral support which have opened up, particularly since 1955.

Britain has long had a sense of being acutely divided into 'two nations', the North and the South, and this became stronger than ever in the 1980s.[85] Australians do not generally have the same deep sense of being geographically divided, although some states such as Tasmania have been seen as economically 'backward'. In more recent times, however, Queensland and Western Australia were seen to be bouncing back far better from the economic recession of the early 1990s than Victoria and New South Wales were, leading to much commentary about an emerging phenomenon of two distinct nations as in Britain. A long-term trend of population shift to Queensland and Western Australia gave rise to discussion about the creation of a 'sun-belt' in those states as distinct from the old industrial 'rust-belt' areas such as Victoria and South Australia (the same terminology as was used to denote the rise of California and the decline of Detroit and various mid-western centres in the US).

The available comparative evidence from OECD research on unemployment rates between 1970 and 1991[86] and earnings from 1966 to 1987[87] endorses the common sense view that regional inequalities have been much greater in Britain than in Australia. This research is somewhat misleading, though, in that it compares differences between the six Australian states (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania) and two territories (Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory) with differences between the 11 regions of Britain (North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, South East, South West, West Midlands, North West, Wales, Scotland,

Northern Ireland). The Australian states arguably represent more coherent economic units than the British regions — they are more like self-contained nations themselves, within which very sharp socioeconomic divisions are likely to cancel themselves out when measured at the aggregate level by statisticians. The state governments in Australia also have more power than the local or regional authorities in Britain.

It is more accurate to focus on the inequalities *within* each state, or the plight of various regions *across* state boundaries. Growing statistical evidence has emerged of rising class divisions between the well-serviced inner suburbs and the relatively deprived outer suburbs of Australian capital cities,[88] as have well-informed expectations that this may lead to sharper regional inequalities in the forseeable future.[89] Certain regional centres — such as Newcastle, Wollongong, Broken Hill and Port Kembla in New South Wales; Geelong and the La Trobe Valley in Victoria; Whyalla in South Australia; and Burnie in Tasmania — which were set up around particular industries such as steel or mining and no longer need to employ anywhere near as many people as they did previously, are now identified as 'rust-belt' areas, with hugely disproportionate rates of unemployment, in the same way that centres like Manchester and Glasgow have been.

The most striking and relevant research is that reported by Bob Gregory and Boyd Hunter, which found that between 1976 and 1991 the differences between rich and poor neighbourhoods across Australia grew dramatically. The gap between the average real household incomes of the poorest and richest 5 per cent of neighbourboods widened by 92 per cent. Most starkly of all, a chasm opened up between the unemployment rate in the two types of neighbourhood. In 1976 around 75 per cent of males in all types of neighbourhoods were working. In 1991 only 37 per cent of males in the poorest 1 per cent of neighbourhoods were working compared with more than 60 per cent of males in the wealthiest 1 per cent of neigh-

bourhoods.[90] Yet the large-scale so-called 'race' riots —
although probably more acurately 'class' riots — which
flared during 1981 at Brixton in London and Toxteth in
Liverpool, and in 1995 at Bradford in Yorkshire, have no
parallel in Australia, and they demonstrate that the effects
of inequality are still greater in Britain than in Australia
and the grievances they generate are still more deeply felt.

The evidence suggests, though, that Australia is
moving towards British-style regional fragmentation, and
anecdotal impressions tend to support this. One well-
informed observer, Cyril Wyndham, says that in his early
years in Australia:

> ... the attitude of the [Australian Labor] Party ... was
> working class ... but I never really saw a working class in
> Australia. I'd seen miners' lodges in Wales and the slums
> of Gorbals and I'd never at that time seen anything to
> match that here.

Now, however, he believes such a class structure is devel-
oping in Australia. Real and growing geographic inequal-
ities in Australia are increasingly being recognised as
essential to tackle as a central policy concern.

In the 1950s and up to approximately the mid-1960s the
ALP's votes were seen as maldistributed in a similar way to
that in which the British Labour Party's were from 1979:
weak in certain regions (the states of Victoria and Queens-
land) and concentrated narrowly (in inner-urban industrial
suburbs). However, the regional deficiencies of the ALP in
the 1950s and 1960s were much less comprehensive than
the problems of the British Labour Party in the 1980s.

The ALP has tended, to a greater extent than the
British Labour Party, to supplement its core urban and
suburban blue-collar vote with white-collar workers in the
cities and suburbs while still maintaining substantial
support in *rural* areas, having emerged very strongly
among the rural working class.[91]

In terms of voting patterns, some regions of Britain
have always been strongly Labour: notably South Wales.

The development of more widespread regional discrepancies in British elections, however, dates from 1955, with perhaps the starkest trends being the sharp decline in Conservative Party support in Scotland since then, and the huge gap of 20 percentage points which opened up between the Labour vote in the North-West as compared to the South-East, between 1955 and 1992. Attention was first drawn to the phenomenon of widening differences in regional voting patterns by election analyst John Curtice and geographer Michael Steed, in 1964. These discrepancies may have narrowed somewhat in the 1970s, but in the 1980s a sharp divide emerged between British Labour's Scottish, Welsh and northern England 'heartlands' and the more prosperous Tory and Alliance voters (including, arguably, a disproportionately large number of skilled manual workers) in the south of England. While Essex has often been singled out as a stereotype of southern England in this respect, Labour was equally unsuccessful in the counties of Hertfordshire and Kent.

In the 1992 general election the Tories won less than 43 per cent of the national vote but took nearly 75 per cent of the seats in the south of Britain. A sea of blue still remains in the South-East region (outside Greater London) on electoral maps of Britain,[92] even after Tony Blair's emphatic 1997 victory, which was built largely on winning back for Labour the trust of voters in the south; it shows how ingrained Britain's regional electoral variations are. The Tories still hold more than twice as many seats as Labour in the South-East, despite Labour's overall 179–seat national majority in the House of Commons.

The Australian Labor Party's electoral support has remained reasonably strong and uniform across both old and new working-class areas, in contrast to the collapse of British Labour's vote among skilled manual workers which has been suggested in southern England from the 1980s to the mid-1990s.

However, at the 1996 election Labor was reduced to just two out of 26 seats in Queensland, and electoral

maps[93] of seats surrounding Brisbane were starting to look a little like the British electoral map did in the 1980s and early 1990s, in terms of the dominance of blue.

The stark disparity which emerged in the regional distribution of the Australian Labor Party's support in the 1996 federal election result came to be seen as a very serious concern, and British Labour's precedents in this respect are accordingly of some relevance. Kim Beazley pointed out several times soon after becoming party leader in 1996 that though the ALP still held 42 out of the 97 seats in the combined south-east of Australia (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT), it now held only seven out of the 51 seats elsewhere in Australia (Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory). This disparity was clearly so large that it warrants further analysis.

Table 3.4 sets out a state and territory breakdown of the ALP's two-party-preferred vote and its share of seats in the House of Representatives following the 1996 election, in descending order of support.

Table 3.4: Regional variation in ALP support at 1996 election

State/Territory	Proportion of vote (%)	Seats
ACT	55	3 (of 3)
Tasmania	51	3 (of 5)
Victoria	50	16 (of 37)
New South Wales	47	20 (of 52)
Northern Territory	49	0 (of 1)
Western Australia	45	3 (of 12)
South Australia	43	2 (of 12)
Queensland	39	2 (of 26)

Obviously Labor's support had never been uniform in the past either, including in its long period in government from 1983–96. The ALP won a landslide federal election in 1983

for instance, and was re-elected in 1984, without winning any seats in Tasmania. In the 1984 victory Labor also only won nine out of the then 23 seats in Queensland. From the mid-1950s to 1972 Labor regularly polled less in Victoria and Queensland than in most other States due to the particularly deep effects of the DLP split in those states.

Statewide variations can clearly oscillate according to short- or medium-term political factors. The rebuilding of the Victorian ALP from the late 1970s and the Queensland ALP in the 1980s boosted support there and the receding of the Franklin Dam issue in Tasmania after 1984 enabled Australian Labor to gradually win back seats there. Labor's loss of government in Victoria in 1992 and some subsequent unpopular actions of the Kennett government is widely regarded as helping the national ALP to win back seats at the 1993 election,[94] and in holding nearly all of them in 1996, contrary to the swing in other states;[95] this was in spite of the fact that the Victorian ALP itself had not done enough to win back any of its lost support at the state election held one month after the 1996 federal poll, when the Kennett government was very comfortably returned.

The imbalance in the ALP's vote in 1996 was still not as great as the regional discrepancies in Labour support in Britain, however, and Labor's winning back of six seats in Queensland and four seats in Western Australia in the 1998 election quickly redressed some of that imbalance.

But there have been other signs of a 'regional' effect in Australian politics whereby manual workers in the newer outer suburbs are much less inclined to be loyal to Labor than those who still live in older, traditionally Labor areas; this was seen, for instance, in the Victorian State elections of 1992 and 1996. The contrast between Labor voting in the federal and Victorian state elections of 1996 in some areas was very striking, ranging up to 10 percentage points in the growing outer suburbs of Melbourne such as Sunbury, Frankston East, Cranbourne and Bayswater. This showed how political factors — in this case the lingering credibility problem of the Victorian ALP

over its financial losses and industrial relations bungles when in office, together with Jeff Kennett's direct personal pitch for the blue-collar vote by his developmental pursuit of major new construction projects, his bringing of the Australian Formula One Grand Prix from Adelaide to Melbourne, and a Labor Party he cast as wishy-washy, wowserish greenie types — could override some people's traditional socioeconomic disposition to vote Labor.

It also raises an important question as to whether the apparent 'regional effect' stems not just from short-term political causes, including the standing of incumbent state governments, but also in part from more fundamental sociological and attitudinal differences between people living in different parts of the Australian nation, differences of a longer-term character. Many regard this as being the case in Britain — although the existence and extent of the so-called regional effect on skilled and other manual workers' voting patterns in Britain is hotly contested between geographers on the one hand and political scientists on the other. Ron Johnston and colleagues argue that there is a strong regional effect; whereas Ian McAllister argues that if there is any regional effect it is very slight and that it is the different *social* and economic structure of the regions which overwhelmingly determines their different voting patterns, rather than changes in the attitudes of the individuals who move there and somehow become affected by their new environment.[96] Others argue that the differences do not arise as much from sociological causes as first appears, pointing out that Labour's vote in the 1980s fell most in London, the region where *least* social change had occurred.[97]

The well-documented rise in regional inequality in Australia is probably relevant to the increasingly fragmented electoral map, and the linkages between these need to be further researched. The differences between the multiculturalism of Melbourne and Sydney and the comparative Anglocentrism of Brisbane and its surrounds are also very relevant to the differing salience of the race

factor in the 1996 federal election. The situation in South Australia, and the reasons for Labor's low support at recent polls there, is different from that in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory and it is arguable whether they should be lumped together at all. South Australia, with its historically sizeable manufacturing industry and liberal political culture, has always been seen as more like Victoria than other states, and has generally been regarded as one of the south-eastern states. The failure to regain more than one seat there in the national election of 1998, in contrast to the greater recoveries in Queensland and Western Australia, was widely regarded as due to political failures on the part of the state ALP machine, including its campaigning, rather than because of any distinct regional sociological factors.[98]

Of course the major cities of Australia, such as Sydney and Melbourne, have long been divided in terms of electoral geography. The official maps of recent federal election results show that the western suburbs in both Sydney and Melbourne are solidly Labor, the North Shore of Sydney is blue-ribbon Liberal, and the eastern suburbs of both cities tend to be more often Liberal than Labor. In Melbourne, the northern, western and south-eastern suburbs are solidly Labor whereas the eastern suburbs are Liberal.

The notion that the regional distribution of the ALP's support after the 1996 federal election was starting to parallel the North-South divide in British Labour's support seemed accurate at first. The two states in which the ALP vote was lowest, Queensland and Western Australia, were the two most dynamic states in the nation in terms of population growth. However, on other measures these were not necessarily the most prosperous states. Although Western Australia has long had a somewhat lower unemployment rate than the national average, for instance, Queensland has not; it has consistently had among the highest unemployment rates in Australia. And its population is ageing overall, swelled by an influx of retirees with its rate of growth currently diminishing.

British Labour's experience does indicate that regional demographic trends can lead to very deep and entrenched weaknesses in support. Labour parties clearly need to move with and respond to these cultural shifts, and to tackle the causes which give rise to regional inequalities in the first place.

The federal system in Australia has tended to promote some regional variation, particularly in the more volatile voting climate of recent years, and in turn the attitude to incumbent state governments has significantly shaped the outcome of federal elections. In the 1993 election, while the Goods and Services Tax (GST) component of the Coalition's *Fightback!* manifesto was the main factor in Labor's surprise victory, a voter backlash against the industrial relations policies of state Coalition governments in Victoria and Tasmania was regarded as partly responsible for the win. Keating was counting on a continuing backlash against the governments in Victoria and Western Australia in order to win the 1996 federal election but by then his government's credibility had been too far eroded for such factors to save it. The ALP's attempt to galvanise the 'true believers' against the sale of Telstra, for instance, during a crucial stage of the 1996 campaign, was undercut by the Coalition's highlighting of the inconsistency of Labor's own record on public ownership. As the official ALP election postmortem acknowledged:

> Labor's record on Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank raised questions about our candor and ideological commitment to public ownership. Selling off national icons was deeply unpopular and raised questions about what Labor stood for. Many of our own people didn't believe us when we said we wouldn't sell Telstra.[99]

'Other' Parties

The dramatic revival of the Liberal vote in Britain to nearly 20 per cent in the 1974 elections, after only once surpassing 10 per cent in the years since 1935, reflected

the ascendancy of the Left within the Labour Party at that time, which was very openly expressed in the Labour Party's official 1974 election manifesto. The Liberals' vote fell in 1979 (in favour of the Conservatives) but the defection of middle-of-the-road voters from Labour was consolidated in 1983 with the debut of the Alliance, between the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had recently been formed by four former leading Labor figures, (discussed in detail in the next chapter). The Alliance parties polled a quarter of the vote in 1987, and after merging in 1988 as the Social and Liberal Democrats and later shortening their name to the Liberal Democrats, they continued to poll quite well in 1992. Their support came because they offered a more moderate policy alternative to the Tories than did Labour and because Labour had not done enough to rehabilitate its own credibility to be seen as fit to govern Britain again. Once Tony Blair had set about his overhaul of the Labour Party, however, after taking the leadership in June 1994, the Liberal Democrats were left with little space on the centre ground of politics and thus had to find some room on Labour's left flank.

There are considerable parallels between this and the odyssey of the principal third party in Australian politics in recent decades, the Australian Democrats. Although in Australia there has been no third party of similar strength to the British Liberals historically, nor to their various reincarnations as the Liberals/Social Democrats/Alliance/Liberal Democrats since 1974, the Australian Democrats have succeeded in staking out a distinct portion of electoral territory since their formation in 1977. The nature of this territory has changed, however, according to what is left vacant by the two major parties. The Democrats were originally formed by a disaffected MP, Don Chipp, who had fallen out personally with Malcolm Fraser and thus had little prospect of attaining cabinet office by staying in the Liberal Party. The Democrats' initial success (they scored more than 9 per cent of the vote in the House of Representatives and 11 per cent in the Senate at the 1977 election) came essentially from the

support of small-L liberals who did not like Fraser's style nor the methods by which he had come to power, but who would not vote Labor because they continued to associate the ALP with images of economic chaos from the Whitlam government years. At this time it was these liberals who were left unrepresented by the two main parties.

The partial success of Bill Hayden's efforts to restore Labor's credentials as an economic manager saw the ALP make some inroads into the Democrats' support at the 1980 election, and once the ALP under Hawke and Keating shifted decisively to the right, it became apparent that it was no longer the small-L liberals but rather voters to the left of the ALP who were now left unrepresented by the two main political parties in Australia.

The Democrats altered their pitch accordingly. They increasingly embraced the peace movement (ironic given that Chipp had been minister for the navy during the Vietnam War) and focused their criticisms on the ALP for being too close to big business and big unions and not compassionate enough. These themes were given a new public face after Janine Haines succeeded Chipp as leader of the Democrats in 1986 and the Democrats' new emphasis was rewarded particularly at the 1990 election when they polled above 11 per cent in the House of Representatives and close to 13 per cent in the Senate, electing five new Democrat senators to bring their total to eight.

However, following this moment of their greatest success the Democrats went through a very self-destructive period, seemingly continuing the trend, which prevails in Australia to a greater extent than Britain, whereby third parties are unable to sustain their threat to the two-party system. The loss of Haines as leader, due to her failed attempt to transfer to the House of Representatives at the 1990 election, led to prolonged and personalised internal conflicts under Janet Powell's leadership during 1990–91, and the eventual election of a relatively ineffectual leader, John Coulter, who emphasised marginal environmental

issues more than the mainstream social democratic concerns on which Haines had focused so effectively in 1990. Thus the Democrats lost their golden opportunity to capitalise on the widespread disaffection with Labor, and their vote at the 1993 election plummeted below 4 per cent in the House of Representatives and barely more than 5 per cent in the Senate, with only two senators being elected in 1993. After the 1993 election the Democrats recovered some of their lost ground with the election as leader of Cheryl Kernot who, like Janine Haines, set about wooing voters disaffected by the ALP's shift to the right, and who positioned the Democrats on Labor's left flank. This was rewarded at the 1996 election when the Democrats vote went back up again, to nearly 7 per cent in the House of Representatives and nearly 11 per cent in the Senate, resulting in the election of five senators.

The shock resignation in October 1997 by Cheryl Kernot from the Democrats and the Senate to join the Labor Party and stand for a House of Representatives seat as an ALP candidate was correctly interpreted as reflecting (and also further promoting) moves by Labor in opposition to recover some of the people alienated by the economic 'rationalist' policies Labor had pursued in government in the 1980s and early 1990s and for whom Kernot had come to speak. Rod Cameron said at the time that:

> Most importantly, it's going to force Labor to decide what it actually stands for. It would inevitably have come down somewhere to the left [of the ground] that it's been occupying in the early 1990s, but Cheryl Kernot's transference will make Labor decide more quickly, more decisively and more cleanly. And, most importantly, she'll help communicate that new position to the electorate.[100]

This has not in fact happened however. The big boost to the ALP's primary vote following Kernot's entry to the party has dissipated not just as her personal profile has

diminished but also because the policy themes which she and others highlighted at the time she joined — 'moving away from pure market economics...to more government intervention and a bigger public service and job creation'[101] — have themselves been downgraded by senior ALP figures since October 1998.

Initial expectations that Kernot's defection would terminally damage the Democrats soon proved unfounded. The 1998 vote for the Democrats under new leader Meg Lees did fall back to just over 5 per cent in the House of Representatives and to 8.5 per cent in the Senate but four senators were elected for the party, consolidating its role as a crucial balance-of-power holder in the Senate. Early indications of the political position the Democrats would now take up, notably their decision to support the Howard government's Goods and Services Tax (GST) subject to food being exempted, in contrast to the ALP's outright opposition to the new tax, suggest that the Democrats will play a similar role for a while to that which they initially played under Chipp: moderating 'excesses' of an incumbent conservative government, standing 'sensibly' somewhere between the two major parties.

Both the Liberal Democrats in Britain and the Australian Democrats have benefited from the availability of 'tactical voting', although the actual form of tactical voting available has differed between the two countries. In Britain, the option has been taken by some people who would otherwise have voted Labour to support the Liberal Democrats because they have been better placed to beat the Conservatives under Britain's first-past-the-post voting method. In Australia, tactical voting for the Democrats has come into play in the form of many voters splitting their vote, casting one vote for one of the major parties in the House of Representatives and another for the Democrats in the Senate to curb the excesses of what their preferred governing party might actually do.

What the comparison between the Australian Democrats and Britain's Liberal Democrats essentially shows is

that the labour parties of each country attract a wide spectrum of electoral support, and if either goes too far to one end of that spectrum the voters at the other end may well choose to vote for another party. In the 1980s, British Labour's move to the left caused a widespread defection of right-leaning voters to the Alliance, whereas in Australia the ALP's move to the right prompted protest votes, at times for the Democrats, at times for other parties, including the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) in 1984 and at times for other candidates on the ALP's Left, such as Phil Cleary in Wills in 1992 and 1993.

The validity of this analysis is further confirmed if we briefly return (as in Chapter 1) to a three-pronged comparison with the next most relevant labour party — in New Zealand. There, Labour in government in the 1980s went even further to the right on economic issues than the ALP government had in Australia. As a result of this, a former Labour Party president, Jim Anderton, formed the New Labour Party. 'New Labour' in New Zealand, however, was not evidence of a Tony Blair-style move to 'modernisation' in order to dispel concerns about the party being too far to the left. On the contrary, it was a bid to represent the 'traditional' Labour voters who felt deserted by the right-wing direction of official Labour's economic policy.

The New Labour Party polled 5.4 per cent of the vote at its first election in 1990 and then, in an 'Alliance' with other minor parties, shot up to 14 per cent in the 1993 election. New Labour took the lion's share of the 1993 swing against the National government's economic policies, despite Labour's strenuous efforts to dissociate itself from its past actions in government and to project a more 'traditional' Labour image. As a result, the New Labour Party won the balance of power in the New Zealand Parliament. At the same election New Zealand voters agreed with its proposal to introduce a system of proportional representation for future elections, which helped keep Labour out of office for many years subsequently. The Alliance, led by the New Labour Party, could have become

a major political force in New Zealand's future, although the later temporary departure from politics, for personal reasons, of its charismatic leader weakened this prospect. The electoral wisdom of the ALP government's decision during 1991 to pull back from its previously uncompromising promotion of market economic policies was underscored by the fate of New Zealand Labour in 1993 after failing to do so.

The startling outcome of the 1998 Australian election is that, in terms of voting support, the Democrats are no longer the principal 'other' party. Instead, it is One Nation, which captured more than 8 per cent of the primary vote in the House of Representatives. This surge of support for the new party, compared with the very modest improvement in Labor's own primary vote, shows the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the mainstream political system and the policies which have been pursued by both major parties. This undercurrent swelled with the widespread rejection of the limited model for a new Australian head of state presented in the November 1999 republic referendum. The ALP needs to better recognise this trend, and its deep and wide-ranging causes, if that undercurrent is not to gather further momentum, and in particular the ALP needs to absorb the evidence that support for One Nation has come from blue-collar workers, people living on the fringes of urban areas:[102]

> Mainly men over 50 ... and people with little or no tertiary education. Most of them have jobs but fear losing them. In short they are the classic cast-offs of the new global economy — information-poor people who occupy none of the symbolic, transportable and uncommonly well-paid professions such as law, high finance and various consultancies — and have little chance of ever catching up.[103]

4

Factions and their meanings

The tide of modernisation since the 1960s has greatly altered the internal landscapes of the two labour parties, leaving new divisions and realignments in its wake.

In both Britain and Australia it has long been something of a cliché to say that the labour party is a 'broad church'. But this term does usefully convey the very wide range of beliefs which have at different times and in varying proportions coexisted in each party. Both labour parties, like most broadly based left-of-centre parties, have tended to be prone to splits. In Britain, the major split since World War Two occurred in 1981, leading to a loss of the most pragmatic and right-wing modernising elements in the party leadership, and perhaps for a time depriving British Labour of that cutting edge of electoral ruthlessness represented in the Australian Labor Party by New South Wales Right figures such as Paul Keating and Graham Richardson; although Peter Mandelson could be said to have filled that role in Britain since the mid-1980s.

In Australia the principal post-war fracture was the breakaway by the anti-communist DLP in the 1950s, leading to the loss (particularly in Victoria and Queens-

land) of a socially conservative but economically soli-
daristic strand in the ALP's ideological tradition, and
perhaps opening the way for a liberalism on social and
economic issues to gain greater support in the party
under Whitlam and subsequent leaders. B.A. Santamaria
claims in his memoirs that one of the priorities of his
'Movement' in 1953 was:

> an attempt to widen the horizons of some of the more
> thoughtful contacts formed among Labor men ...
> [through] a series of what would today be called 'semi-
> nars' ... I thought that ... it would be possible to accom-
> plish what the Fabian Society had accomplished in the
> British Labour Party, although on the basis of a different
> philosophy ... The three or four seminars held before the
> Labor split were highly successful ... Had the Labor split
> not eliminated the possibility of continuing with this
> enterprise throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Australian
> Labor might [not have fallen under] the control of a pro-
> fessional bureaucracy in the hands of parliamentarians
> who are today in the forefront of the move towards the
> philosophy of globalisation, deregulation and privatisa-
> tion. Under the aegis of Hawke and Keating the policies
> of Labor and the interests they served became indistin-
> guishable from those of the Liberals.[1]

When Bill Hayden as ALP leader visited Britain in
1980–81 on the eve of the formation of the new Social
Democratic Party, he met Tony Benn, Michael Foot and
Shirley Williams and was quizzed by Labour Party officials
about the ALP split of the 1950s.[2]

The entry in the full unedited typescript version of
Benn's diaries indicates that Hayden was interested in the
special conference of the party to be held in a few days
time, after which the announcement of the Social
Democrats' defection was made.[3] While few other details
of this contact were recorded or are now available[4], the
British Labour figures were presumably seeking to esti-
mate, from Australia's precedent, the extent and dura-
tion of damage which their own imminent split might

cause. Eric Heffer later wrote an article in *The Times* seeking to draw out the Australian lessons for those contemplating a breakaway from British Labour. His piece, which is likely to have derived in part from his discussions with Hayden, highlighted particularly how it was the party which broke away, rather than the parent party, which eventually ceased to exist.[5] The religious dimension of the party split in Australia has no parallel in Britain. Most of those who left in the ALP split were Roman Catholics and most of those who stayed were not, although many Catholics did stay in the party, including leading figures such as Arthur Calwell and Fred Daly. This meant that the conflict between Catholicism and Freemasonry (which was still alive in some craft unions such as the plumbers' union) became an element in the factional divisions between Right and Left, particularly in the Victorian ALP, over subsequent decades.

Cyril Wyndham was surprised at how widespread religious hostilities were in Australia compared to Britain, where anti-Catholicism was confined to certain areas such as Bermondsey, Glasgow and Liverpool. He believes that bigotry towards Roman Catholics, especially over State aid to Catholic schools,[6] caused as many problems for the ALP as the Vietnam War did in the 1960s. Such prejudice would have been seen as wrong in the British Labour Party, and furthermore, he asserts, any persons revealed as Freemasons would have been thrown out of the party because in Britain the Masons were still exclusively the preserve of the upper-class[7] — although this is not in fact an accurate characterisation.[8]

In both the British Labour schism of the early 1980s and the Australian Labor split of the mid-1950s, both parties lost a significant section of their former constituency; and both events could be judged to have added a decade at least to the parties' subsequent terms in opposition.

Both splits created an atmosphere of deep suspicion among those party members who had stayed loyal, and a

hostility to any consideration of the questions which most interested the breakaways. In Britain in the 1980s, for instance, two of the most contentious issues, because of their association with the agenda of the SDP, were electoral and constitutional reform. In Australia in the 1960s the most divisive question in the ALP was State aid. Efforts by anyone to reunite the fragments in the years following the splits — no matter how essential this might have been from an objective electoral standpoint — were discouraged. In both cases it took more than a decade before serious discussions occurred at leadership level with a view to reconciliation.

In Britain, although many individuals and groups inside the party advocated tactical voting and an anti-Tory alliance between Labour and the breakaway Social Democrats, it was not until 1994 with the election to the leadership of Blair, 13 years after the split, that serious overtures for electoral unity with the S/LDP began to be made.[9]

In Australia it was in 1968 — also 13 years after the split — that ALP officials Pat Kennelly and Lance Barnard entered into secret talks with two leading DLP members. They did so, at the height of the conflict between Whitlam and Cairns in the federal Parliamentary Labor Party in the late 1960s,[10] reportedly in an attempt to create a situation where the ALP would again split — with a mainstream Whitlam-led party to be backed by the DLP and a left-wing labour party under Cairns to be separated out and pushed onto the political sidelines. These efforts came to nought, however, when Whitlam declined to take the ultimate step. The scenario may only have been averted by his narrow victory over Cairns for the leadership.[11]

Cyril Wyndham contends that:

> If the Split hadn't happened, the ALP under Santamaria's influence would have ended up like the Christian Democrat parties of Europe, would have lost its identity as a labour party and become essentially a party of small-holders.[12]

Instead, however, the ALP eventually went down the path of liberalism, and the old union-based industrial 'groupers' who defected to the DLP in Australia found some common ground with the 'Pledge' and some other left traditionalists against the economic *liberalism* which pervaded the ALP and ACTU leadership's policies.[13]

The British Labour split was less serious than the ALP split in the sense that in Australia the DLP took a number of affiliated trade unions with them, whereas the British SDP attracted none. However, the British split was more serious than the Australian rupture in the sense that four very prominent leadership figures stood at the head of the breakaway SDP, whereas no leader of any national significance went with the DLP. And, as the previous chapter showed, the negative electoral consequences of the 1981 British Labour split were far more fundamental for the party's core primary vote, which went below 30 per cent in 1983, than the Australian schism was for the ALP, whose primary vote always stayed above 40 per cent, though the DLP did take much of the Catholic vote in Victoria and, through direction of its preferences to the Liberal Party, played a crucial role in stopping the ALP from gaining government between 1955 and 1972.

In addition to these overt splits, the two labour parties have at all times contained important and often highly organised internal groupings, or 'factions'. Officially, these factions are frowned upon in each party, though in practice they are permitted. In each case, too, membership of the factions amounts to only a very small proportion of the total party membership, but to a very high proportion of the *active* party members.

The term 'faction' is inherently negative. It conjures up images of furtive manoeuvring by shadowy figures, more suited to intrigues around the Elizabethan royal court than to open, modern parliamentary government. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the word 'faction' is still used 'always with imputation of selfish or mischievous ends or turbulent or unscrupulous methods'.

It is perhaps surprising then that in both the British and Australian labour parties various ideological groups have readily embraced this term to label their activities. Indeed, under the Hawke and Keating governments in Australia some even argued that factions had turned from a liability into an asset, in that they enabled the inevitable internal conflicts of the party to be managed in an organised fashion, in contrast to the endemic disunity between prominent individuals in the Liberal Party over the same period. Against this positive assessment there is a concern that the factions have undermined democracy for party (including faction) members by narrowing power into the hands of a few chieftains, and by robbing the various groups of any real ideological content, reducing them instead to divisions over which individuals share the spoils of power. Critics of the Australian Labor Party's growing factionalism include former deputy prime minister Frank Crean, former Victorian premier John Cain, and former South Australian premier Don Dunstan, who has commented that:

> The party has become factionalised to an extraordinary degree and the factions are not really around ideological differences in a great, widely based reform party. They're really about cronyism and personal power ... The majority of rank and file members rightly feel excluded from any say in that sort of power structure. The official organs of the party are no longer the places where decisions are made. Decisions are made in backrooms by deals being done by faction bosses. And when that also centres on the party office itself, then the party is in grave disaster.[14]

In both labour parties, the factions are certainly far from representing clear-cut ideological differences. For a start, their descriptions often include a geographical, as well as an ideological, component. Thus in the British Labour Party socially conservative Labourites from the party's North of England heartlands are contrasted with the culturally radical individuals from London. And in the ALP

the New South Wales Right and Left are seen as quite different from the Victorian Right and Left.

To identify the essential ideological and strategic divisions which have existed in the British and Australian labour parties, it is necessary then to separate these from other divisions based on geographic territory, idiosyncratic individual personalities, and also tribal loyalties. There are three fundamental differences between British and Australian labour party factions which need to be identified at the outset.

Firstly, whereas in the British Labour Party factions amount to fluid and overlapping currents, almost always associated with journals of debate and ideas, the ALP's factions, especially in recent decades, are more rigid — organised in effect as mutually exclusive parties within parties — with more formalised internal rules and processes and are rarely associated with journals of debate and ideas.[15] Though British factions have executive committees, they do not have disciplinary procedures as the Australian groupings do. The term 'faction' itself tends to be used less frequently in discussions of the British Labour Party than of the ALP. In part the generally lesser factionalism in Britain may be because most Labour MPs are directly sponsored by trade unions, and therefore rely on these rather than factional arrangements for their self-survival. Factionalism, however, is very strong in the British Labour Party in particular areas, such as London and Merseyside. It has also been strong at particular times — for instance, in the rigidly disciplined Militant Tendency when that entryist group gained a grip in parts of the Labour Party in the early 1980s, and in the groups which were mobilised at the time to counter Militant.

A second general difference is that organised factions in the British Labour Party have mostly represented shades of opinion on the Left of the party, whereas the Right have generally been content to be in the non-factionalised mainstream of the party. This is in contrast to

Australia, where the Right has, since the inception of formalised factions, almost always been as tightly organised as the Left.

A third fundamental variation is that since World War Two in Britain there has tended to be a separation between the groups of parliamentarians and the groups of extra-parliamentary activists, whereas in Australia the MPs are more often members of the *same* faction as the activists and theoretically are required to carry out, in caucus and in parliament, the decisions taken by the whole faction. This difference reflects the general structural difference between the two labour parties (the genesis of which was discussed in Chapter 1) whereby, unlike Britain, MPs in Australia are part of a strictly binding caucus, and are theoretically the mere delegates of the wider labour movement, rather than having some latitude to act as individuals.

International Reference Points

One way of identifying the nature of the various groups in each labour party is to examine the international reference points to which they turn for political comparisons and inspirations.

For the 'soft left' in both the British and Australian labour parties, if an overseas model exists at all it is most probably Sweden. The most detailed manifesto associated with this group is the 1987 *Australia Reconstructed* document. This report on a trade union and government delegation to Scandinavia and Western Europe was essentially an attempt to bring some of the fruits of the Scandinavian social democratic parties' success to Australia.

For the *Marxism Today* associates in Britain, and for the former CPA members of the Socialist Forum in Australia, the achievements of the Eurocommunists in Italy, and particularly in the municipalities such as Bologna where the Communists were in government for long periods and where they pursued innovative and decentralised industry

policies, also provided a model.[16] Those former Communist Party members who went into the Democratic Left in Britain and the Socialist Forum in Australia had long championed the Eurocommunist — and in particular the Italian Communist Party's — strategy of forming alliances to achieve majority support for change. Antonio Gramsci was their chief theoretical inspiration. John Mathews, an Australian who spent substantial time in Britain during the 1970s, was among those seeking to popularise Gramsci's ideas in the British Left at that time. He later became the principal ideologue among the Left proponents of the Prices and Incomes Accord in Australia in the 1980s. The post-Fordist ideas outlined by Martin Jacques in *Marxism Today* in the 1980s, meanwhile, were also taken up by John Mathews in the Australian context. Both Eric Hobsbawm in Britain and Bernie Taft in Australia had been young men in Germany in the 1930s, when the Nazis came to power. The political outlook of both, therefore, was indelibly affected by the terrible consequences of the Left's failure to form alliances in the years preceding that event. Both influenced the labour movement in their adoptive countries with the strategic lessons they drew from that experience.[17] Among the older, 'hard left' members in the ALP (such as Joan Coxsedge) the Soviet Union had to be defended, while for 'Baghdad' Bill Hartley, Libya and Iraq provided much comfort.

For other older, traditionalist Leftists such as Kevin Hardiman,[18] the past was a foreign country. They tended to hark back to the Australian legend of the 1890s, the writings of Lawson, the 'mateship', 'fairness' and 'egalitarianism' associated with the early twentieth century Australian 'social laboratory' as evidenced by the fact that a majority of Australians twice rejected conscription during World War One. Hugh Stretton and Michael Pusey's critiques of the Hawke and Keating governments' free-market economics have also been infused with a view that Australia in the past had been something of a social democratic model, although they — like 'Nugget' Coombs —

probably saw this model as arising out of the Chifley era more than the earlier 'social laboratory' period on which Hardiman and others tended to fondly look back.

The US Democratic Party provided Tony Blair and other modernisers in the British Labour Party with a model after Bill Clinton became president of the United States, in spite of its obvious blemishes. The international reference point for political comparisons and inspirations in the New South Wales Right is also, almost invariably, the US; examples of favourable references can readily be found in the words of that faction's leading figures, including Paul Keating. He declared in 1990 for instance that the US is 'one of the great countries ... the great societies', and that their 'leadership [had] pushed them on to become the great country they are'.[19]

The group inside the ALP which has most consistently looked to Britain for inspiration in modern times has been the Victorian Fabian Society, which is associated with (mostly the more progressive and more philosophical) elements of the Labor Unity faction in Victoria. Race Mathews, who was the principal figure in the reactivated Victorian Fabian Society from the 1960s, and who became a key assistant to Gough Whitlam, saw the Attlee government as a model of legislative reform. He has written that, because of the efforts of the Fabians:

> the British Labour Party was able to move forward ... to the mighty program of reformist legislation which Attlee's predominantly Fabian government enacted between 1945 and 1951 [whereas] No comparable program became available in Australia until the 1960s, when Whitlam set out systematically to rectify the omission.[20]

As part of the preparations for the rectification of that omission, Race Mathews forged very close links with the Fabian Society in Britain and also with the Socialist Union group, publishers of *Socialist Commentary*, to which he contributed an article on Australian politics in late 1962. In 1963 he sought the Victorian Fabian Society's formal affiliation with

the Fabian Society in England, and, when this was rejected, continued to seek 'to bind ourselves to the parent body in the closest practicable manner'.[21] In 1965 he wrote to the secretary of the British Fabian Society that 'the sudden upsurge of migration from Britain to Australia seems likely to include at least some Fabians, who we would be anxious to pick up on arrival'[22] and he requested publicity assistance to that end. Mathews also indicated that:

> ... we regularly import twenty-four copies of each new Fabian pamphlet, fairly regularly order five dozen or so of a particular title and on occasion take several hundred of something of very special interest,[23]

but nevertheless:

> we are a long way from satisfied with the circulation which we are able to give new Fabian ideas and arguments within the Australian Labor Movement ... [So] I would be grateful if your Committee would give the Society permission to publish in Fabian Newsletter such of your pamphlets and material ... as are deemed of interest to Australian Fabians.[24]

The Victorian Fabian Society helped organise the visits to Australia of Tony Crosland in 1963 and Lord Bowden, a minister of state for education in the Wilson government, in 1965. The Fabian Society in Britain in 1965 published a pamphlet by James Jupp entitled *Australian Labour and the World*, and the Young Fabians published in 1971, as part of a series of pamphlets, *Australian Labour: A Time of Challenge* by James (Jim) Kennan, an Australian then living in Britain who later became deputy premier of Victoria. Richard Krygier, the secretary of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, was aggrieved at Race Mathews' efforts to stop Crosland meeting with Santamaria on his 1963 visit, and told Crosland that:

> the Melbourne Fabian Society ... is very much unlike the corresponding group in Britain, judging from the fact that you are its President. I doubt very much if you would

> have been admitted to membership of the Melbourne
> group which is under the control of nuclear disarmers
> and a few fellow-travellers.[25]

This probably testifies more to Krygier's own anti-Communist preoccupations, however, than to real differences of substance between the British and Victorian Fabian Societies.

In the post-World War Two years, the Bevanites in Britain occasionally cited Australia's Chifley government in support of arguments for the Attlee government to be 'a bit more adventurous'.[26] Interest in Australia in the 1980s and early 1990s however was very much confined to the more pragmatic and 'modernising' sections of the British Labour Party, who saw the ALP's free-market policies, disciplined approach and electoral success as a desirable model for their own strategies.[27]

In Australia organised factional conflict was in evidence within the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) in the inter-war years in some states, and became pronounced in the years leading up to the party split of 1955, between the anti-Communist industrial groups on the one hand, and the rest of the party on the other. The split was most severe in Victoria (Vic.) and Queensland, whereas in New South Wales no formal break occurred. Since the split the Left has almost always been stronger in the Victorian ALP than in New South Wales and other States. Arguably this reflects a broader and longer-term situation in Victorian society, whose liberal political culture has been relatively tolerant of a strong left-wing ideological current (although Labor has actually formed state governments in Victoria far less frequently than the more pragmatic party in NSW).

When Anthony Crosland visited Australia in 1963 he sought to classify the various individuals he encountered into the factional scheme with which he was familiar at home. John Ducker, of the New South Wales Right, and Jupp, then active in the Victorian Participants faction,

were both grouped together as 'bright CDS [Campaign for Democratic Socialism] types'. Journalist Tom Fitzgerald on the other hand was labelled 'naive NS [*New Statesman*] Left'.[28] Following his return to Britain, Crosland made arrangements for Bill Rodgers, then an organiser of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism and seen by Crosland as 'a very key figure amongst the younger moderates in the Labour Party',[29] to send material to and stay in permanent and regular touch with some of the ALP's 'bright young moderates'[30] he had met in Melbourne and Sydney. Ducker, usually regarded as the central guiding figure in the NSW Right's post-war pre-eminence, says that:

> some of the [British Labour] people were heroes to me ... people like Anthony Crosland ... helped to form my basic attitudes and development. I mean *The Future of Socialism* was a significant work of revisionism.[31]

Table 4.1 presents my own classification of factions in and around the two parties.

There are huge variations between state branches of the ALP in their factional make-ups.[32] For instance, the organised Left in New South Wales, which was known as the 'Steering Committee' from about the time of the 1950s split until 1989, when it re-named itself as the Socialist Left, traditionally took a more pragmatic line on internal party questions than the Victorian Left, to the point where it supported the Federal Executive intervention in the Victorian ALP in 1970 to dilute the Left's power in that branch, in exchange for intervention to curb some of the excesses of the dominant Right in the New South Wales branch.

This support earned the New South Wales Left the enduring hatred of Bill Hartley and George Crawford and their Victorian Socialist Left comrades, who contemptuously referred to the Left in New South Wales as 'Her Majesty's Left'.[33] The embers of these tensions were rekindled in 1995 with the preselection battle over

Table 4.1: A classification of factions in the British and Australian labour parties

Year	Far left	Left	Centre	Right
BRITAIN				
1947–50		Keep Left		Socialist Vanguard Group
1951–54		Bevanites		
c.1951–60				Socialist Union
1960–64				Campaign for Democratic Socialism
1964–		Tribune		
1973–	Campaign for Labour Party Democracy			
1976–81				Manifesto
c.1979–			Labour Co-ordinating Committee	
1981–				Labour Solidarity
1982–	Socialist Campaign Group			
c.1976–86	Militant Tendency			
1986–	Labour Left Liaison			
(1989–)		(Democratic Left/*New Times*)		
1990s	Labour Briefing			
AUSTRALIA				
1955–				NSW Right
1955–89		Steering Committee (NSW)		
1961–70		Trade Unionists Defence Committee (Vic.)		
1965–94			Participants/ Independents (Vic.)	
1970–		Socialist Left (Vic.)		Centre/Labor Unity (Vic.)
1984–		Socialist Forum (Vic.)		
1984–			Centre Left	
1989–		Socialist Left (NSW)		
1991–	Pledge/ Labor Left (Vic.)			

Martin Ferguson's bid for entry to the Melbourne federal seat of Batman, following his earlier move from Sydney to Melbourne in 1990 to serve as ACTU president. It has even been claimed in the past that members of the New South Wales Left have been to the Right of those in the Victorian Right, and it continues to be argued that:

> Huge cultural differences divide the Left factions in the two States: the NSW Left is more industrially-based and therefore more pragmatic, while the Victorian Left has a stronger ideological element.[34]

In contrasting the political outlooks and approaches of two leading figures of the New South Wales and the Victorian Left respectively — Tom Uren and Brian Howe — Denis Glover has commented that:

> Uren's is a stance of moral rage rather than of mild, pragmatic and programmatic social democracy. This latter position is a hallmark of the Victorian ALP, from which Howe emerged. The cautious state interventionism of the Cain government and its co-opting of the union movement into the forums of economic and social debate illustrated its moderate but distinctly democratic-socialist, even mildly Euro-communist, approach to power …
>
> … the less coherent ideology of the Sydney left, symbolised by the likes of Tom Uren, owes a lot to the experientially-bred radicalism and instinctive class consciousness of the brawlers tough enough to take on the New South Wales Right close-in.[35]

In the Queensland ALP a more clear-cut ideological and strategic distinction has appeared to remain between a 'hard' and 'moderate' Left than has been the case in New South Wales and Victoria.

Given these vast differences, Table 4.1 and the detailed discussion which follows must of necessity be selective. Its analysis of the ALP focuses principally on Victoria and to some extent New South Wales. After brief comparative discussion of the Right and other non-Left factions in the

British and Australian labour parties, the analysis proceeds to a detailed comparative discussion of the Left in the two parties, focusing on the period from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, as it is here that my access to new sources and materials has been most extensive.

The Right

The Right of the British Labour Party organised from c.1947–50 as the Socialist Vanguard Group, publishers of the journal *Socialist Commentary*, which was one of the earliest propagators of the revisionist ideas taken up when Hugh Gaitskell became leader. This group was renamed the Socialist Union in c.1951 and continued to exist until c.1960, while *Socialist Commentary* continued to be published after this. In the early 1960s the Right began to reorganise, outside the parliamentary party at least, as the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS). According to Richard Crossman, this group:

> was born after the Labour Party's 1960 Scarborough conference decided in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament. It organized in the unions and constituencies with a view to reversing that decision ... [and] dissolved itself on the return of a Labour Government in 1964.[36]

The Right began organising within the British Parliamentary Labour Party itself from 1977, as the 'Manifesto Group'. This group was formed in a bid to counter the influence then exercised by the Tribune Group and the growing advance of the Left in the constituency parties. In particular it sought to emphasise the fight against inflation as the first priority of economic policy,[37] the obstacles to stimulating demand through increased public expenditure, and the general need for economic 'realism' and to support the Callaghan government's economic policies.[38] The constituency arm of the Manifesto Group was called the Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV).

In the party split of 1981, a large minority of Manifesto

Group MPs defected to form the new Social Democratic Party. The remaining members subsequently regrouped to form the 'Labour Solidarity' group, in which Roy Hattersley was the principal figure. Described as holding to a 'traditional revisionism',[39] Hattersley was in fact now more traditional than revisionist.[40]

Though the Labour Solidarity group continued to exist into the 1990s, it became mostly inactive and then was succeeded by an informal network called 'Labour First'.[41] Initially this change was due to the convincing defeat of its candidates by the (now predominantly 'soft' left) Tribune Group in the 1987 elections for the shadow cabinet. Subsequently, however, Solidarity's inactivity was simply due to the fact that the Tribune Group broadened so far that the Right of the Parliamentary Labour Party was essentially happy with its position and saw no need for organising in order to counter it, especially after Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson became members of the Tribune Group.

The 'Labour Solidarity' and 'Labour First' names under which the Right in the British Labour Party have organised since 1981 are similar to the 'Labor Unity' banner adopted by the Right in the ALP. Implicitly these namings suggest that for the Right, as distinct from the Left, the overall interests of the party are claimed to be more important than any sectional concerns.

The Labor Unity group in the ALP has portrayed itself to be more hard-headed and practical, more in touch with what it sees as the pragmatic mainstream of Labor voters than those which it has depicted as the unrepresentative 'extremists' of the Left. Labor Unity has seen itself as more inclined to compromise on principles in the interests of electoral pragmatism.

A former state secretary of the Victorian ALP, and Socialist Left member, Jenny Beacham has commented that:

> We're the optimists and they're the pessimists ... The Left is more optimistic about social change than the Labor Unity people. They ... are more cynical about broad com-

munity acceptance of progressive change, or are afraid of
testing the perceptions of the broad community.[42]

Graham Richardson admitted as much at the 1984 ALP
national conference, when, in the uranium policy debate,
he talked about 'the classic dilemma of the Labor Party –
to try and determine where it stands between being a
party of the vanguard and leading the people in direc-
tions they may not wish to go, or whether it seeks to be
representative of its voters'[43] who he assumed, implicitly,
to be conservative.

The rhetoric surrounding factional difference rarely
corresponds with the reality. Paul Keating, in a much-
quoted comment to a New South Wales ALP conference
in 1981, sought to refute the view that the New South
Wales Right were just pragmatists with no ideology. They
believed in running the mixed economy and in growth
and development, he argued, whereas:

> the Left believes in wider nature strips, more trees and
> let's go back to making wicker baskets in Balmain.[44]

Here Keating sought to claim the mainstream Labor —
and more particularly, the Chifley — government tradi-
tion of pursuing economic growth for the Right, and to
portray the Left as single-issue dilettantes at the margins
of serious politics. In reality, though, it was the Left who
consistently and unsuccessfully pushed for more expan-
sionary budgets and more comprehensive industry devel-
opment policies during the period Keating held sway over
economic policy as treasurer. It is interesting also to note
that it was the leading New South Wales Right figure,
Graham Richardson, who later moved to take over the
environment portfolio and to give environmental issues
much greater political prominence, in contrast to
Keating's earlier depiction of such issues as marginal.

More recently, a rising young figure on the ALP Right
has asserted that his right-wing Labor politics are driven
by 'a sense of social justice, but not in the way the Left has

hijacked the term. It's a sense of a fair go for everyone. I'm interested in equality of opportunity, a social democratic perspective, rather than the socialist commitment to equality of outcomes'.[45]

This dichotomy might have been valid for a Whitlamite Fabian against Bill Hartley's hard-line Socialist Left in the early 1970s, but it was in fact completely irrelevant to describing the free-market enthusiasms of the Right in the 1990s, which had taken the ALP so far to the right that not even the mainstream ALP Left could be said to be consciously pushing any longer for equality of opportunity, let alone equality of outcomes. On the contrary the Left was engaged in trying to just ever so slightly slow the frenzied pace of growth in inequality being generated by the dominant Right's deregulatory economic policies.

The ALP's New South Wales Right, as a political machine built up by disadvantaged urban Irish Catholics, is usually likened more to the 'Tammany Hall' style politics associated with the US Democratic Party in centres such as Chicago than to any British parallels. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, the Irish Catholics only became dominant in the New South Wales ALP after the 1917 split in the party over the conscription issue. Prior to this, British working-class migrants from Nonconformist religious backgrounds were numerically the most important. It is easy to see some likenesses with sections of the British Labour Party in more recent times, too. John Ducker was very much in the cultural tradition of Ernest Bevin — indeed, his early background in England before coming to Australia at age 18 included personal family links with Bevin:

> I was a callow lad. My father was an active member of the Transport and General Workers Union. Amongst his friends were people like Ernie Bevin, who in fact had a lot to do, as you know, with the formation of the Transport and General. So I had some exposure, and I guess my basic attitudes were pro-union, Labour Party, as the working person's party. A respect for British Labour, not only for its

basics of the right to work, to be treated decently and humanely, but also a sort of social awareness.[46]

Participants/Independents/Centre Left

Elements of the Labor Unity faction of the ALP, such as Gareth Evans, correspond in outlook to Gaitskell and the most 'modernising' sections of the British Labour Party, such as Blair. The Participants/Independents grouping, however, is the faction most uniformly analogous to Gaitskell and the British Labour Party 'modernisers', as James Jupp's membership of the Participants and simultaneously close contact with Crosland demonstrates.

The Australian faction which is most akin to those who defected from the British Labour Party to form the Social Democrats in 1981 is the ALP's Centre Left grouping, formed in 1984. Its middle-class professional and relatively non-union character compared to the more traditionalist bases of the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland Right,[47] its support for private enterprise and zeal for modernisation and efficiency, makes it very similar to the outlook of the four Oxbridge-educated leaders who formed the British SDP. The issues of greatest interest to the new SDP were mostly 'radical liberal' questions, such as economic modernisation, and the need for a bill of rights and for freedom of information.[48] The Centre Left had similar priorities.

The Centre Left faction decided to merge with non-aligned MPs to form a new Independent Alliance after the 1996 federal election defeat. Senior Federal MP Carmen Lawrence left the ranks of this grouping to join the Left after the 1998 federal election. The Centre Left's initial organisational strength in the smaller states has steadily weakened in recent years.

The British Left

In the British Labour Party, a Left faction in one form or another has existed since the 1920s.[49] Under the name of

the Independent Labour Party until 1932, and as the Socialist League from then until World War Two, the faction extended beyond parliament to include constituency party members. However, after World War Two, the party leadership's prohibition of such organised activity meant that the Left grouping became largely confined to MPs.

The first Left body in the British Labour Party in the post-war years was the 'Victory for Socialism' group, which was created in 1944.[50] Then the 'Keep Left' group of MPs was established in 1947, by Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo. Keep Left became the focus of Left activity in the British Labour Party because of its legitimacy as a specifically parliamentary grouping, although Victory for Socialism did remain in existence. The founding manifesto of Keep Left called for concerted national planning on economic questions and for a more distinctively socialist foreign policy by the Attlee government, favouring neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. From 1951 to 1954 it organised as the 'Bevanites', after its leading figure Aneurin Bevan. Harold Wilson was among its members although he would later move more towards Gaitskell. Bevan's book, *In Place of Fear*, spelt out the group's philosophy of democratic socialism. Officially disbanded following hostility from the party leadership, a secret Bevanite organisation persisted until 1956, but it was not until 1964 that a formal left-wing faction of Labour parliamentarians was re-established: the 'Tribune Group'. This new faction was to some extent heir to a broader loose-knit grouping which had existed since the 1940s around the *Tribune* newspaper.[51] It has always been a group whose membership is confined to MPs.

In June 1968 the Tribune Group launched a 'Socialist Charter' which called for more systematic government control of the economy, and planning based on a substantial degree of public ownership, and which opposed the Labour government's policy of imposing a wages freeze.[52] Under the Wilson and Callaghan governments in the mid-1970s, the Tribune Group pushed among other

things for selective import controls to be introduced to prevent further deindustrialisation.[53]

The general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union, Jack Jones, fell out with the parliamentary Left during the latter years of the Callaghan government after being attacked by Ian Mikardo for his continuing support of the government's incomes policy.[54]

After Tribune Group member Neil Kinnock became leader of the Labour Party in 1983 (in part because of the recent defection of many members of the Right to form the Social Democratic Party), the Tribune Group had to change from being the left flank of the parliamentary party to being the support base for the party leader. This new position of responsibility entailed unprecedented compromises for the group. The pressure of these — together with the editorial line in favour of Tony Benn which was simultaneously being taken by the *Tribune* newspaper from the early 1980s under the editorship of Chris Mullin — exacerbated divisions between the 'hard' and the 'soft' Left. Until the 1980s, the *Tribune* had always been closely aligned with the Tribune Group of MPs. In that decade, however, the two went down sharply divergent paths. In the years 1990–91 in particular, the ranks of the Tribune Group were swelled with Kinnock loyalists. As the group essentially turned into an extension of the leader's entourage, it ceased to have any distinctive political position, and thus for a time lapsed into inactivity, moving from weekly to monthly meetings and rarely attracting many members even at these.[55]

Patricia Hewitt was a senior adviser to Neil Kinnock for much of his term as Labour Party leader. In an interview I asked her about what I saw as some of the parallels:

> In Australia too we've had this ... division between soft and hard Left ... broadly defined, in Victoria ... that seems to parallel some of the changes that happened here under Kinnock as leader. I noticed actually that, back in 1983, that you contributed to a book — *Beyond Thatcher: The Real Alternative*[56] — and [the contributors to] that I think at that time would have been seen as a fairly

coherent Left group which included everyone from you [to] Tony Benn, all sorts of people. But during the 80s that ... grouping went very different ways and it does seem to have happened in both countries too.

She responded that:

One of Neil's huge achievements, like it or not, and I happened to like it, was that when he made his stand in 85 against Militant he absolutely drove a wedge between the soft left and the hard left and he forced people to take sides. Before then Neil, when he was elected leader, didn't really have a base. He didn't have a base in the shadow cabinet and on the National Executive Committee, although he himself was of the Left, for a lot of what he was trying to do then he was dependent on the votes of the Right and the Centre. And the softer left or Kin-nockite Left as it became known, had to be created.[57]

By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, which Kinnock aggressively supported, a number of 'soft left' MPs who felt uneasy about the Tribune Group's loss of direction gravitated to a secret 'Supper Club' of some 30 Labour parliamentarians. This informal group, which included Jo Richardson, Joan Ruddock, Chris Smith, John Prescott and Bryan Gould, afforded the MPs some space in which they could talk freely, and also helped to boost their own morale. The Supper Club's meetings continued regularly for a couple of years but petered out at the 1992 general election.[58]

After that election a large number of new Labour MPs joined the Tribune Group, and there were moves to revive it as an active entity. Michael Meacher MP said soon after the general election that 'Tribune should return to its role as the guardian of Labour's conscience and its ideology ... It must be free to criticise openly'.[59] Peter Hain MP likewise argued that the group must once again become 'constructively independent of the leadership, but not oppositionalist'.[60] Hain and others regularly had complained that whenever important decisions were about to

be made, the 'payroll vote' would appear en bloc and
stifle the Group's independence and radicalism.

The way Tony Benn saw it:

> The fake left or whatever you call the Tribunite Left ...
> became the sort of Kinnockite cab rank, waiting for
> office.[61]

One central concern was the way in which the Tribune
Group had been penetrated by many MPs who were not
really of the Left but who were ambitious and wanted to
get onto the crucial Tribune Group ticket for the shadow
cabinet. To prevent this the group resolved in 1990 not to
prepare a ticket in the future. Another concern was that
some key Tribune members had been co-opted onto
Kinnock's frontbench, and that their resultant loyalty to
the leadership made it impossible for the group to openly
discuss contentious questions.

Under Hain's subsequent secretaryship, the Tribune
Group began to meet regularly and livened up again.
However, trouble came when Hain and another Tribunite
MP, Roger Berry, distanced themselves from shadow chan-
cellor Gordon Brown's orthodox economic approach, and
called for more Keynesian policies, in a Tribune Group
pamphlet.[62] Brown publicly attacked this publication and
then orchestrated the removal of Hain as secretary of the
group, which thereupon reverted to being an 'establish-
ment' body. Since then Hain has led regular efforts to
bring about a reconciliation between the Tribune left and
the more 'hard' left 'Socialist Campaign Group' of MPs
(often referred to simply as the 'Campaign Group').[63]

In 1981, Tony Benn had been very narrowly defeated
in his battle with Denis Healey for the deputy leadership
of the Labour Party. The defeat came about largely
because of the abstention of the dominant Tribunite or
'soft' left. This, together with moves by the party leader-
ship to proscribe the Militant Tendency, caused the 'hard'
left to depart from the Tribune Group and to form the
Socialist Campaign Group. The Campaign Group also

had a 'Supporters Network' operating in the constituency parties. Benn says that:

> The difference between the 'Campaign Group' and the 'Tribune Group' was not really ideological purity or acclaim for it. The 'Tribune Group' was a Parliamentary Group. The 'Campaign Group' was ... more like a Labour representation committee. It tried to represent, in Parliament, movements outside.[64]

In 1988 three Campaign Group members — Jo Richardson, Margaret Beckett and Clare Short — broke away from the group after its injudicious decision to support another Tony Benn challenge — this time to the leadership of Neil Kinnock.

Another group has been the 'Labour Co-ordinating Committee' (LCC), an organisation of constituency party activists. It began in 1978 with a membership which substantially overlapped with the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, which supported Tony Benn, was associated with the Institute for Workers' Control and bore the clear imprint of the economic and industrial democracy policies put forward in the 1970s by Stuart Holland.[65] However the LCC was transformed from the early 1980s by the entry of many tertiary students from the tight-knit 'Clause Four' group in the National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS), which was actively engaged in fighting the Militant Tendency on campus.[66] This influx, together with differences over the strategic wisdom of Benn's campaign for the Deputy Leadership, caused a marked shift in the group's position — towards the right. The founders of the LCC departed after the student takeover, Stuart Holland complaining that it had turned into the 'NOLS over 25 group'.[67] Thereafter, the LCC acted in the constituency parties as a moderate, countervailing force to the Socialist Campaign Group. Over time the LCC evolved to become 'the "modernisers" pressure group'[68] in the party, its role being to 'think the unthinkable' and to act as a 'catalyst for change'.[69]

The LCC was the most highly organised of the British Labour Party factions, partly due to the circumstances in which many of its members joined. Its battle against Militant on campus was sanctioned by the party organisation, and hence it was allowed to organise to a greater extent than other groups. The LCC became essentially a centre left grouping, particularly keen on moving the party away from its old trade union identity. It has described itself variously as 'Labour's Democratic Left'[70] and as 'a constituency-based network of party members who believe in the modernisation of Labour into a radical and democratic socialist party for the 1990s'.[71] Rather immodestly, it has also characterised itself as 'Labour's intellectual cutting edge, never afraid to ruffle feathers or warn the leadership when they get it wrong'![72] The group publishes a newsletter, *Labour Activist*, has issued occasional pamphlets, and from 1993 published a quality quarterly journal called *Renewal*. One LCC pamphlet criticised some people's use of the term 'modernisation' as shorthand 'for dumping supposedly unpopular policies'. Rather than abandon the concept, however, the Labour Co-ordinating Committee sought to 'reclaim it ... for the left' and put forward its own notion of modernisation as 'the central organising principle' which Labour should follow.[73]

Indeed, the LCC argued that four of their key agenda items should become the Labour Party's priorities. These were: the 'modernisation' of the economy; a pluralistic state; a coherent social policy; and reform of the Labour Party's constitution along the lines of one member, one vote. The LCC did make clear though that it also favoured some traditional Labour goals. These included: appropriate government intervention in the economy, the continuance of full employment as a policy objective and 'use of the tax system to claw back some of the gains of universal benefits from those who do not need them', as distinct from the alternative approach of reducing the welfare state 'to the point of invisibility'.[74]

The softness of the Labour Co-ordinating Com-

mittee's left position tended to weaken its support base in the constituencies. By 1994 the LCC numbered less than 1,000 members and was described as 'more publicity than numbers'.[75] In elections to the constituency section of the Labour Party's National Executive Committee in 1994, two broadly 'soft left' candidates, Peter Hain and Chris Smith, failed to be elected, whereas the 'hard left' candidates, Dennis Skinner and Diane Abbott, succeeded. This outcome was attributed to the fact that:

> The 'soft Left' no longer exists in any meaningful way ... because there is no coherent ... network. The Campaign Group, in contrast, has maintained a network, notably through its paper *Campaign Group News*. There is clearly a soft Left tendency in the constituencies but it is currently disorganised and lacking any real programmatic edge. The most obvious indicator of this is the decline of the formerly crucial Labour Co-ordinating Committee, nowadays a small inward-looking group dominated by full-time apparatchiks close to the leadership.[76]

On the far left of the British Labour Party the Trotskyite group Militant Tendency entered and became an active and prominent group in the early 1980s. Another organisation, the Labour Left Liaison, has been described as a 'hard left umbrella group' for some small Trotskyite groups, black party activists in favour of setting up Black Sections, and women (specifically the Women's Action Committee). One of its main initial aims from 1986 was to stop what it termed the 'witch hunt' against the Militant Tendency.[77] The Labour Briefing group was a later point of congregation for various Trotskyist sects in the Labour Party, and it published a journal titled *Briefing: the Voice of Labour's Independent, Unrepentant Left*.

The strength which the Trotskyist Militant Tendency gained in the decision-making councils of the Labour Party in Britain during the early to mid-1980s, compared with the total non-influence at any time of fringe Trotskyist sects in the Australian Labor Party, could be explained in two ways.

One would characterise Militant Tendency as the political product of the particularly harsh economic and social restructuring, and mass unemployment, of Britain in the 1980s. However, most members of Militant were in fact tertiary students rather than victims of industrial decay, for all their rhetoric about forging a worker/student alliance. They may, however, have been marginally more working class than their Trotskyist predecessors, the 'Cliffites' and the 'Healeyites'.

A second, more likely, explanation (which James Jupp favours) places emphasis on the historic strength of Trotskyist organisation in the British Left, as against the more official-line (ie, initially Stalinist and later Eurocommunist) Communism which characterised the Australian Left. The crimes of Stalin were exposed earlier in Britain than Australia. As a result, trade union leaders began to crack down on Communists from the 1930s, and the Labour Party Left clearly distinguished itself from the Communist Party, in contrast to Australia, where unity tickets between ALP Left and Communist candidates were still being run in union elections in the 1960s. Trotskyist structures were available for the participation of those who left the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1956 following the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising. In Australia, however, no such structures were available until the later establishment of the (Healeyite) Socialist Labour League (SLL). If the 1956 defectors from the CPA went anywhere it was into the ALP. In Britain the SLL had had a continuous existence since the 1940s, especially in centres such as Liverpool. Moreover, Trotskyism had long had a foothold in the Labour League of Youth in Britain, which at one time was a mass movement, in contrast to the ALP's youth wing, which never has been. The league's successor body, the Labour Party Young Socialists, became a stronghold of the Militant Tendency in the 1980s, and the absence of a similarly large and autonomous youth organisation in the Australian Labor Party partly explains the ALP's relative immunity from Trotskyist infiltration.[78]

Entryism and 'Ethnic Branch Stacking'

Perhaps the closest analogy to the controversial entry of Militant Tendency into the British Labour Party in the early to mid-1980s is in the 'ethnic branch stacking' controversy which blighted the Australian Labor Party in Australia's four largest states through the 1990s. While the political character of these new recruits is very different, in both cases their importance was greatly magnified by the very low membership to which the parties had sunk prior to their entry. 'Stacking' occurs only when it can make an immediate or short-term impact, and such an impact can only be made when the party's membership is so low that it is vulnerable to entry by organised outside groups, be they Trotskyite political sects in Britain, or organisations of Australians from non-English-speaking backgrounds.[79]

In Britain, Militant Tendency's march through the Labour Party depended crucially on the small and diminishing number of members and activists that the party had from the late 1970s due to the deep disappointments with Labour's performance in office. Militant's highly disciplined activists were easily able to outmanoeuvre many of the Labour Party members and activists who did remain.[80]

There is no consecutive annual series of individual membership statistics for the ALP to precisely compare against those which do exist for the British Labour Party (and which are reproduced as appendices to the various editions of Henry Pelling's *Short History of the Labour Party*), but my own previous exploration of all the available primary source records[81] indicates that the Australian Labor Party's individual membership has always been much lower, both in absolute and proportional terms, than the British Labour Party's membership.[82] This in turn is due in large measure to the effects of compulsory voting, which makes it less necessary for the party to have foot-soldiers on call to get out the vote. Following its demoralising defeat at the October 1992 state election, however, the Victorian ALP slumped to as few as 8,000

members[83] out of a state population of more than three million. This was probably the lowest party membership level in that state in 30 years. In the following twenty months, however, membership doubled to 16,000. Of these approximately half were officially acknowledged to have been members of particular ethnic communities who were 'stacked' into the party in certain safe Labor electorates where a federal preselection contest was imminent,[84] a pattern which has continued since. Ninety-five per cent of these new recruits paid the minimum concessional rate for membership, which was supposed to be just for non-income-earners. The usual rate was only 40 per cent.[85] It is hard to believe that this discrepancy could be totally accounted for by all 95 per cent of the new recruits genuinely being non-income-earners. It is much more likely that it was because these new entrants had no great commitment to being party members and therefore wanted to pay the minimum amount possible, regardless of their true income status; or even to have the dues paid for them by the factional operative who was co-ordinating the 'stacking'.

The ethnic branches established by the ALP from the mid-1970s had been important in giving Melbourne's large Greek community, and later the Italians and other ethnic communities, a real role in the party. In comparison with the British Labour Party, which was still grappling with divisive debates in the late 1980s over the establishment of Black and Asian Sections, the ALP had been relatively open, and ready to reflect the multicultural character of the nation and the working class. But the 'ethnic branch stacking' of the early and mid-1990s detracted from this achievement, particularly in its manipulation, in some cases, of national tensions between particular ethnic groups.

It is true that a large number of the ALP's new 'ethnic' recruits of the 1990s are likely to have been in blue-collar jobs, and to this extent their entry would have helped to offset the predominance among the party membership of people in professional occupations.[86] The point has

rightly been made, too, that if the ALP's membership is to better reflect its electorate then, in some areas, many more people from working-class — and therefore many more from some ethnic — backgrounds *still* need to join up. And it is also true that while the immediate problem in the party has been 'ethnic branch stacking' the actual, underlying problem has been entrenched factional conflict, and the disintegration of ALP unity.[87]

Nevertheless there is concern that to achieve real increases in meaningful participation in the ALP by members from non-English-speaking communities, there needs to be a genuine mass membership drive run by the party as a whole, in all areas, quite different in spirit from the factionally driven recruitments which have recently taken place, in selected areas, in order to obtain parliamentary seats for a few individuals.

It is interesting to note that by July 1995 the Victorian ALP's membership was down again, to approximately 13,000. In light of the fact that most of the federal preselections and other purposes for which they had been signed up had not yet occurred, it can reasonably be assumed that the great bulk of the 4,000 'stackees' of 1992–94 were still present in the 1995 number. Yet even with all these members, the overall Victorian ALP membership level was still little more than it had been in preceding years, was less than it had been in 1980, and was much less than it had been when the ALP won the state election of 1982 and the federal election of 1983.

The same is true of the party factions. Despite the seemingly overwhelming stacking which had occurred in the Socialist Left, for instance, the numerical turnout in the faction's biennial elections in 1994 was still little more than it had been in previous years when the faction's activists were more plentiful. What these facts point is just how many *genuine* party members and activists were being lost to the party from disillusionment and other causes, and just how empty, and open to abuse, the ALP's ground-level structures had really become.

The lesson to be learned from the 'ethnic branch stacking' of the ALP is the same as the British Labour Party learned from its infiltration by Militant Tendency. And that is just how much effort needs to be put in, from the leadership down, to ensure the labour parties' memberships are sufficiently large and representative of their constituencies that they are guarded against distortions caused by the entry of organised outside groups.

Further revealations about branch stacking during 1998, including in an official Victorian ALP Panel of Review (the Dreyfus report), followed by several court cases in South Australia and incidents in New South Wales in 1999, increased pressure on the ALP nationally to fully face up to, and directly deal, with these disturbing practices.

Comparing the British and Australian Left

Various attempts at comparing the Left in the British and Australian Labour parties have been made previously. Cyril Wyndham, who identified with the Tribune Group in Britain and considered himself a Bevanite, when asked how the Left he encountered on his arrival in Australia in 1957 compared with that at home, declared that there was 'no comparison' in that there was 'really no ideology' in the ALP Left. Some of its most prominent figures 'had never read a book of socialist theory in their life', he maintains.[88] In 1959 Wyndham outlined some of the problems of the ALP:

> Next month the Federal Conference of the Party will meet in Canberra and I am hoping that something useful in the way of improving policy and organisation will emerge. But I doubt it very much as all the signs are that we are heading for another serious rift which will further weaken the Party … one has to live with the Party here to really appreciate the situation. There is hope, in fact a great deal of hope, that the Party could sweep back into power not only Federally but in most of the States, if … it got down to the real tasks of policy and organisation and stopped bickering one with the other.[89]

In 1964 as ALP federal secretary he wrote to the British Labour Party general secretary, Len Williams, that 'the results of the [1963] election here were extremely disappointing as you may well imagine, and the party is going through a phase similar to that in Great Britain from 1951 onwards'.[90] By this he meant that the ALP was suffering internal divisions much as the British Labour Party did between the Bevanites and Gaitskellites during the 1950s; although he did not regard the causes of those divisions as comparable, for in the British Labour Party it was a conflict over ideology whereas in the ALP it was a clash of personalities, between those who were for and those who were against Gough Whitlam.[91]

In 1981 Paul Keating, then an opposition frontbencher and president of the New South Wales ALP, in attacking his left-wing factional adversaries in the state (among whom Peter Baldwin was a central figure), claimed that:

> The Baldwinite extremists have taken over the Steering Committee. They are seeking to do to that body what the Bennites are doing to the Left of the British Labour Party.[92]

This was not an accurate comparison, as the so-called 'Baldwinites' were in fact a more moderate and pragmatic left-wing grouping than the Bennites.[93]

Greater similarities could be noted between the outlook of Tony Benn and the Campaign Group of British Labour MPs, and the Australian Labor Party's 'hard left' or 'left' figures of the past (for example, Bill Hartley or Jim Cairns) and more recent times (for example, the Victorian ALP's Pledge unions). Both Benn and Hartley can be criticised for failing to see or care about the electoral consequences of internal party disunity, and for focusing more on party constitutional issues — on forcing leaders to obey organisational decisions — rather than on broader policy or ideological questions. However, whereas Benn fits into a tradition of liberal dissenting radicalism, Hartley was more of an old-style Bolshevik or syndicalist. Benn, like Cairns,

came to be regarded as an eccentric or maverick. Both of their positions, however, and particularly that of Cairns, have changed quite frequently, making it difficult to pin them down for the purposes of comparison. In Jupp's eyes, Benn went from being a Left technocratic Fabian in the managerial elitist tradition of achieving change from the top through being a minister, to a more communitarian socialist position, in which phase he was similar to Cairns before Cairns moved into what Jupp calls 'weirder' things.[94]

The Left of the British Labour Party's Tribune Group is roughly parallel with the 'mainstream' Victorian Socialist Left. A 'soft left' position emerged and rose into leadership positions in both the British and Australian labour parties in the 1980s and early 1990s — for instance, Neil Kinnock and his frontbench in Britain; and the deputy prime minister Brian Howe, the ACTU president Martin Ferguson, and the former Victorian premier Joan Kirner in Australia.

The Left has always been a sizeable presence in the parliamentary caucuses and national conferences of the two labour parties, although the uniqueness of the strength which the Left gained in the British Labour Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and, in particular, the strength and proximity to leadership and power, which the 'hard' Left gained by comparison with Australia, must be emphasised.

The final fall of Soviet Communism in 1989 led in Britain to the formation of a new organisation, the 'Democratic Left' among former members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Its journal *New Times* continued the analysis which had been propagated in the pages of *Marxism Today* from the early 1980s. These 'New Realists' had moved from membership of the Communist Party to a very innovating political position which was seen by many Labour traditionalists as being even to the right of the Conservative Party. The decision of one CPGB member and former president of the National Union of Students in 1977–78, Sue Slipman, to later join the SDP rather than Labour was seen as epitomising the trend. The 'New Realists' in the 1980s actively promoted a

number of controversial directions for the Labour Party, including tactical voting.

Another important group inside the British Labour Party has been the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD), which was founded in 1973. Following the conflicts between the Labour Party and the first Wilson governments over the governments' failure to adhere to party policies — particularly on nationalisation and opposition to the European Common Market — the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy sought to make policy decisions of the annual conference binding upon the Parliamentary Labour Party.[95] To this initial aim CLPD soon added the goal of 'working for constitutional changes (such as the procedure for reselection of sitting MPs)'.[96] Later it successfully sought the widening of the franchise for election of the party leader, so as to give affiliated trade unions and constituency party members a vote, in addition to Labour MPs. The CLPD attracted from the outset the active support of a rising young backbencher named Neil Kinnock, who would later become the first leader to be elected on the newly widened franchise. Others it attracted included Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman, who would become shadow finance spokesperson under Tony Blair's leadership and secretary for social security in the first Blair government.

According to its secretary, the CLPD was a point of coalescence for various groups on the left of the party, and became the main left-wing event at Labour's annual conference from about the early 1980s, due to the Tribune Group's increasingly blurred left-wing identity.[97]

The activists in the CLPD hold a very different notion of what constitutes democracy than does Tony Blair. There is an inherent tension between the CLPD's commitment to (trade-union-derived) strict forms of party democracy through conference and delegate processes, and Blair's commitments to the precepts of parliamentary democracy and new *individual* 'one member one vote' (OMOV) voting rights within the party for its mass membership. The

reforms along those lines to British Labour which were initiated by Neil Kinnock, continued by John Smith and consummated by Tony Blair are likely to continue to be raised in the ALP in its continued rebuilding in opposition.

The stance of the CLPD is in some ways parallel to that of the tradionalists who resisted the Whitlam-led overhaul of the ALP structure from the mid-1960s.[98] The situation in the Australian Labor Party from 1983–96 was also very similar to that in the British Labour Party in the early and the late 1970s which gave rise to the CLPD.

Disillusionment with the Hawke and Keating governments' departure from party philosophies (manifested in severe membership decline — well beyond that which had resulted from independent social change[99]) led to a desire and campaign for democratisation. The first was initiated in November 1986, primarily by Federal MP Peter Milton, who was born and grew up in Britain (migrating to Australia in 1961 at age 33) and who clearly styled his own proposal for a 'Campaign for Labor Party Democracy'[100] on the British precedent. Although endorsed by the National Left, this Campaign never really took off, perhaps because the people who most agreed with it had just expended all their available energy in fighting and losing the battles against specific policy reversals such as over the sale of uranium to France. A second attempt at party democratisation in 1990 generated more momentum, but still nowhere near as much as the CLPD did in Britain in the 1980s, although the reform proposals of ALP national secretary Bob Hogg led eventually at least to expansion of the ALP national conference by a decision of the 1994 conference.

The push by the League of Rights and others in Australia in recent years for citizen-initiated referendums, and the widespread calls by Liberal Party branch members for themselves to have a greater say in policy formulation, mirror the feelings of powerlessness and disillusionment felt by many ALP members and voters about the limitations of parliamentary democracy. They also illustrate that

we are in a different environment from the days when the taunt of the '36 faceless men' was easily and successfully used as a scare tactic against anyone who dared to suggest that people other than MPs could have an input to how the country was run.

According to the official 'Objectives and Principles', it is still the case that:

> Policy within the Australian Labor Party is not made by directives from the leadership, but by resolutions originating from branches, affiliated unions and individual Party members.[101]

However, in practice, under the Hawke and Keating governments of 1983–96 the opposite was true. On many important issues, directives from the party leadership either directly contravened the national conference's policies or required that these policies be altered rather than having them repudiate the government, which had already embarked upon a contrary course. The fact that the national conference's delegates were elected through such indirect mechanisms made it easier for a majority of these delegates to capitulate without being held accountable to the rank-and-file members who had wanted to see the party's policies maintained.

The Victorian ALP Socialist Left

Very similar patterns to the fragmentation of the British Labour Party Left resulting from co-option of some segments into leadership positions, and divisions over strategy, are evident from an examination of the Socialist Left of the Victorian ALP since 1983.[102]

An 'Old Left' grouping dominated the Victorian ALP from the time of the departure of the Industrial 'Groupers' in the 1955 split until the Whitlam-led federal executive intervention in the branch in 1970. From 1961 this group had been formalised as the 'Trade Unionists Defence Committee'. The state secretary of the ALP, Bill

Hartley, was the pivotal political figure in this group, which centred on the Victorian Central Executive (VCE), later the Victorian ALP Administrative Committee.

The Socialist Left (SL) in Victoria was founded in 1970, following the federal intervention in the state branch. It rarely held the numbers in its own right but was the largest organised group in the Victorian ALP until 1993, apart from a brief period in the mid-1970s.

During the early 1980s, however, the Victorian Socialist Left became deeply divided. Initially the split was characterised as being between an 'old guard' of traditional socialists, and a rising 'new guard' which was more pragmatic and was eager to be part of Labor in government rather than be perennially oppositional.

Dean Jaensch argues that the old guard was more confrontationist in style, and more likely than the new guard to be against rather than for multiculturalism.[103] The specific resolution by the Socialist Left's new guard in 1986 to co-operate with Labor governments,[104] and more generally to concentrate more on economic issues, also marked a break from the foreign policy and intelligence service preoccupations of the old guard. The old guard was seen as authoritarian in its operations whereas most members of the new guard preferred more participatory and democratic modes of operation — although it would be difficult to sustain an argument that there is a clear-cut difference in this respect.

There is also an important generational distinction to be made between the younger, branch-based radical left in the Victorian ALP — which briefly called itself the 'Democratic Left' — and the older union-based 'hard' Left. Predictions by some that the younger radicals would eventually find more in common with the new guard than the old proved to be wrong when the two eventually fused in effect into one 'hard left' group.

Disunity easily becomes habitual; and a self-reinforcing culture of ever-intensifying fragmentation can develop. In the Victorian ALP Left from the mid-1980s there was a spiral of further sub-division, into progres-

sively smaller groups. The Socialist Left went from having the 'old' vs 'new' guards (or 'hard' vs 'soft' Left, or 'extreme' vs 'moderate' Left) to harbouring numerous personal fallings-out *within* the new guard or 'mainstream' left, formal divisions therein between the relatively marginalised Forum group and the dominant group, which successively restyled itself as the 'Leadership' and then the 'Core' group and a succession of eventual breakaways by disaffected sub-factions.

The Forum had come about when a number of influential former Communist Party of Australia members finally broke with that party in 1984 and formed a new organisation. Initially called the Committee for Socialist Renewal, it was then christened the Socialist Forum. Some of these former Communists also joined the ALP once they became eligible, and their new organisation attracted the participation of a number of active 'moderates' from the ALP's Socialist Left.

The Socialist Forum was a fusion of three quite distinct elements. First, there were the strategic-thinking former Communists, who were itching for a chance to be part of mainstream politics and to influence the new national Labor government, after decades of marginalisation. Secondly, there were moderate Left ALP politicians — including Caroline Hogg, a cabinet minister in the Victoran ALP government — who found it impossible to work any longer with Bill Hartley and his ilk. Thirdly, there was a group of tertiary students who were members of the Council of ALP Students (CALPS), later renamed — consciously following the British lead[105] — the National Organisation of Labor Students (NOLS). They were particularly receptive to any moves which demonised or attacked the hard left, due to their bitter experiences with some 'ultra-leftists' in the dying years of the Australian Union of Students.

In outlining their proposal for a new Australian socialist organisation prior to leaving the Communist Party of Australia in 1984, the founders of the Socialist

Forum had attacked the 'limiting assumptions of ultra-leftism and of the labour movement Right'. They sought to position themselves as a 'mass' rather than 'vanguard' entity, stating that the new organisation's 'aims would start from the needs, capacities and concerns of ordinary people, seeking to develop *from* them in progressive directions'.[106] They argued that:

> Such an organisation would distinguish itself from ultra-leftism, the language and methods of which ignore the actual political consciousness of ordinary people, thus confining socialism to the margins of Australian politics.[107]

The Socialist Forum's aspirations to act as a broad discussion group were quickly subsumed in a campaign by some within its ranks to stop Bill Hartley from gaining preselection to enter the Senate. This emphasis, and the group's unwillingness from the outset to allow certain tendencies to participate in its discussions, fuelled conspiracy theories that the former Communists were plotting to outflank the Socialist Left and form a new Centre Left faction in the Victorian ALP. Caroline Hogg in 1985 openly called upon the Socialist Left to split 'with dignity'.[108] In 1986 Tony Sheehan issued a paper attacking the 'vacillators' in the faction who opposed such a move and calling on the 'moderates' or 'new guard' to 'formalise our position as a Progressive Left faction within the Socialist Left'.[109] And at one of the first Socialist Forum seminars, one of the leaders of those who had broken from the Communist Party, Mark Taft, strongly emphasised the need for the Left to co-operate with 'centre' forces in order to achieve change, in a speech that was reported as a call for a new Centre Left faction in the Victorian ALP.[110]

However, in spite of years of constant disunity, it was not until 1991 that the formal split in the Socialist Left finally came. And when it did come, the break was initiated not by the 'soft left' over ideological incompatibility, but instead by the 'hard left' elements out of fear that their residual parliamentary representation (in the state

arena) was about to be extinguished. To avoid this fate the 'hard left' — bearing out the truth of the maxim that there are no permanent allies in the ALP, only permanent interests — made a deal with the Right to ensure a number of Legislative Council seats for their candidates — rather than for the Socialist Left's. They styled themselves as the 'Pledge' group, so named because they saw themselves as the only ones who were unequivocally pledged to fight privatisation, in contrast to the 'soft left' politicians who they regarded as being prepared to go along with the divestment of some public assets. The Pledge later renamed itself the 'Labor Left'.

In a sense the Pledge faction was similar to the British CLPD in seeking to make parliamentarians honour their 'pledge' to uphold the party platform policies: in other words to assert the dictates of formal party democracy over the tenets of parliamentary democracy.

Since 1990 the 'hard left' in Victoria had no representatives in federal parliament, though previously they had Cyril Primmer in the Senate. When Bill Hartley tried to take that position on Primmer's retirement he was blocked and Barney Cooney was chosen as a compromise candidate acceptable to most groups. The 'hard left' had also previously had Peter Milton as a federal member for the House of Representatives seat of La Trobe from 1980 to 1990, and, in addition, from 1983 to 1990, they had had John Saunderson as the member for Aston – both electorates in Melbourne's outer eastern suburbs.

The Pledge breakaway in 1991 must be partly interpreted in the light of their non-representation federally, and in the context of the constant and extreme policy reversals imposed by the Right and Centre Left (in many cases in which the 'soft left', however reluctantly, had acquiesced). It is unrealistic and artificial to completely separate these events for, in politics, settling old scores is commonplace.

The division between 'new' and 'old' strands of the Left was originally coined to distinguish 'sixties' radicals

from the traditional socialists who had been active in the post-war years and the 1950s. The term 'old' Left has also been deployed in intellectual debates to denote a certain school of historiography, to highlight the limitations of that school's treatment of race and gender questions, and also to mount a critique of its treatment of class.[111] As well as reflecting these tensions, the 'new' and 'old' guards of the ALP Left have significantly differed in their responses and orientations to labour governments. As the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' left implies, the former is seen as more prepared to yield or compromise on certain principles or policies, in order to maintain party unity or to protect labour governments' public standing. The positive view of this is that the 'soft left' is being responsive to social change and electoral realities. The negative view is that it is too quick to abandon its principles. Conversely, the positive view of those in the 'hard left' is that they stand true to their principles; the negative view is that they are inflexible in refusing to acknowledge political reality and the vast social changes which have taken place in modern times. Inside the Left the difference to some extent corresponds with a difference between 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' personal outlooks.

The 'New Realists' associated with *Marxism Today* and the Democratic Left in Britain, and the individuals linked with the Socialist Forum in Australia, accentuate the importance of Labor being in power, and they tend to see and emphasise many *positive* trends in contemporary society and politics. The modification and comparative democratisation of capitalism (for example, through wider shareholdings and flatter management structures), the potential for improved skills offered by new technology[112] and the opportunity for unions to pursue improvements in the social wage and cherished policies such as industrial democracy — which was provided, for instance, by the framework of the Australian Prices and Incomes Accord[113] — were uppermost in their minds. The progress made in the decades of Bob Hogg's generation's

political development, by feminism and on other social issues such as multiculturalism, the recognition of Aborigines as Australian citizens in 1967, the abolition of capital punishment and the ultimately successful campaign against the Vietnam war[114] underpin their basic sense that progressive forces have been making headway.

In contrast to this, the 'traditionalist' or 'conservative' elements of the Left tend to be pessimistic about recent trends. They focus, for example, on the fact that new technology has contributed to increases in unemployment, that the Accord caused unprecedented declines in real industrial wages and that inequality and monopoly control has been increasing under late capitalism.

Brian Howe implicitly criticised this tendency in 1986 when he wrote that:

> Socialism springs from optimism, not despair. The politics of pessimism disables the Left and opens the way to the conservatives who preach that change is impossible.[115]

Mark Taft similarly criticised the Hartleyite or 'hard' left as:

> extraordinarily conservative. They believe that to change something they must change everything, hence they do nothing.[116]

The position expounded by Eric Hobsbawm in Britain was close to that espoused by Bernie and Mark Taft and others associated with the Socialist Forum in Australia from the early 1980s. Hobsbawm's criticism in *The Forward March of Labour Halted?* of those who were so embittered by the 1974–79 British Labour government's lack of traditionalism that they did not care whether an extreme right-wing government took its place also corresponds closely with Socialist Forum and the mainstream Socialist Left's views of the Victorian-based Pledge unions in the dying days of the 1982–92 Victorian Labor government.

The ALP Left's internal divisions have often gyrated around personal animosities more than ideologies. Individuals aligned to the hard left have been known to deal

privately in favour of privatisation, for instance, to bolster their influence against personal rivals. The different organised sub-groupings have often not corresponded with the different policy positions. They have frequently become *personality* conflicts, differences deriving from past decisions taken about how to organise and caucus, and differences over the spoils of office.

Co-option of ALP Left

In spite of its growing and deep-seated divisions, the ALP Left had earlier managed to propound various alternatives to the Hawke and Keating governments' economic policies, particularly at the party's national conferences.

At the 1984 conference, Left delegate Martin Byrne made a detailed critique of the government's plans to allow the entry of foreign banks into Australia, and his speech was commented on as an unusually thoughtful economic contribution from the Left. At the 1986 conference, trade unionist delegates John Halfpenny from the Victorian Left and John McBean from the New South Wales Right successfully moved a resolution for re-regulation of the economy and the imposition of import quotas, although industry minister John Button immediately declared that the government would ignore the resolution. Left backbencher Andrew Theophanous issued a detailed paper and newsletter calling for 'The Re-industrialization of Australia'. In 1986 Left delegates including George Campbell also issued a publication titled *An Alternative Economic Path* which consisted of the speeches on economic issues they had given at the national conference of that year. In 1991 Left delegates unsuccessfully argued that fighting unemployment, not inflation, should be declared the number one priority of government economic policy.

In the first term of the Hawke government the Left was very marginalised, even though it represented about one-third of the caucus. And although one of its leading

figures, Brian Howe, scored very highly in the caucus
ballot for the ministry, he was allocated the most junior
portfolio of its 27 members — that of defence support.
Only one member of the Left was chosen for the
17–member cabinet — Stewart West; other Left ministers
who were given junior portfolios were Arthur Gietzelt
(veterans' affairs) and Tom Uren (territories and local
government). It was almost as if the government was
trying to humiliate the Left with the positions it took on
uranium, nuclear disarmament and East Timor in the suc-
ceeding months. In 1983, when Howe made a speech crit-
ical of US foreign policy in Central America, he was
rebuked by the prime minister and ordered to stay strictly
within the (very narrow) confines of his portfolio.[117]

Stewart West resigned from the cabinet in 1983 over its
decision to mine uranium (a decision which was later nar-
rowly ratified by the caucus). Therefore the Left stood
without *any* representation for some months. After the
1984 re-election of the Hawke government, however,
Howe was elevated to the social security portfolio and
joined West, who had by then returned to the cabinet.
After the government's second re-election in 1987 the
Left's Nick Bolkus, Peter Duncan, Gerry Hand, Margaret
Reynolds and Peter Staples were all added to the ministry.

The Left's growing participation in the ministry and
cabinet was paralleled by a moderation of its policy stance.
Brian Howe moved from sharp criticism of Keating and
Walsh's 'deficit fetish' in 1986, to being co-opted himself
into the expenditure cutting processes of cabinet the fol-
lowing year. Nick Bolkus also moved from criticism to
embracing of Bob Hawke after his own rise into the min-
istry. These changes prompted Michelle Grattan to char-
acterise the real difference in the Left as being between
the 'Left-ins' and the 'Left-outs'.[118] Some of the disillu-
sionment which emerged in the ranks of the Socialist Left
after the mid-1980s can certainly be traced to the moder-
ation of the national Left's resistance to the policy domi-
nance of the Right.

Implications of the Left's Ideological Shifts

The British Labour Left's position in the post-war years had represented a more sophisticated alternative to capitalism and communism than the ALP Left's essentially oppositional stance.[119]

It is significant that in Britain the *Tribune* was published by the Labour Party Left whereas the Australian *Tribune* was published by the Communist Party. In both labour parties, however, the division between Left and Right in these years did signify real ideological alternatives: between a Left committed to the class struggle and to fundamentally overhauling capitalism through an extensive program of nationalisation, and a Right trying to more cautiously civilise capitalism through parliamentary activity.

It is clear that the mainstream Left which remains inside both British and Australian labour parties now however is, in contrast to the past, essentially committed to much the same gradual, parliamentary approach towards achieving piecemeal social change as the Right traditionally has been. With the general move by both parties to the Right, the Left finds itself trying to uphold not so much class struggle nor social revolution, but just some of the traditional labourist policies such as full employment, public ownership, progressive taxation and some Keynesian intervention by the state to promote a measure of egalitarianism. These are the same policies which used to be championed by the Labor Right, although many of their number, and especially those of the new generation, have been shedding these in their enthusiasm for free-market liberalism.

The shift in ideological positions has disorientated many Left members. However, it also carries one very significant benefit. That is, it puts the Left in touch with — indeed, it can potentially set the Left up as the principal bearer of — mainstream public opinion on many key

issues. The evidence is abundantly clear – contrary to the slapdash assertion by Michael Thompson in a recent polemic[120] — that most British people and most Australians do *not* support privatisation, free trade, or the job losses and community disintegration caused by radical economic restructuring.[121] It is the Left which has most consistently opposed these policies. Therein lies the potential for the Left now to become a mainstream force rather than remain politically marginal.

It would be fascinating to probe in detail the factional allegiances of the various trade unions in each country and to see whether anything could be learned from this comparison about the characteristic political sociology of particular occupations — to follow through on the generalisation which Hobsbawm made that the typical working-class Communist cadre of the 1950s was a metalworker or similarly threatened 'labour aristocrat'.[122] On the face of it, there are no obvious parallels between the British and Australian labour parties in the current political alignments of particular unions. The largest left-wing union in Australia, the metalworkers, has for some years now (still in its traditional form as the Amalgamated Engineering Union) aligned with the Right in Britain; while the largest right-wing union in Australia, the shop assistants, stands with the moderate left in Britain.

In the late 1960s the traditionally 'moderate' nature of the British Labour Party's affiliated trade unions began to alter. Union power started to assert itself more than ever before in the party in the wake of the Wilson government's attempt to impose draconian legal sanctions against unions involved in 'unofficial' disputes in its industrial relations reform package, *In Place of Strife*. This occurred at the very time when union power was being significantly curtailed in the ALP by the reformist interventions of the Whitlam leadership. A swing to the Left by key British unions (most notably the Transport and General Workers Union and for a time the Amalgamated Engineering Union) amid the wage militancy and industrial

democracy movement of the 1960s meant that British unions came to resemble more closely the ideological colours of the ALP's affiliates than they had previously. The 'winter of discontent' in 1978–79 consolidated the unions' hostility to the party leadership. The lasting rancour engendered by the Labour governments' relations with the trade unions, and the tradition of British unions voting as a block at Labour's annual conference, has meant that since the late 1960s trade unions in the British Labour Party have if anything surpassed the ALP unions in steering the party to the Left, at least at the national level. In the same period the Australian unions have tended to become more evenly divided between Left and Right, effectively cancelling out each other's votes in party forums.

Divisions between progressively and conservatively inclined individuals have cut across traditional factional lines and have been evident within both parties' factions since at least the early 1980s. Underlying many specific policy debates, on privatisation for instance, have been fundamentally differing responses to the question of whether (and how far) old objectives do in fact need to be changed and brought 'up to date'.

A distinction between 'modernisers' and 'traditionalists' has been put forward in the 1990s as a way of interpreting the real — as opposed to the formal — internal alignments of the British Labour Party over issues such as electoral reform in the 1980s.[123] This was foreshadowed in Australia in the mid to late 1960s when, in discussing the ALP debates, and polarisations, over the reforms being promoted by Whitlam and Wyndham, Louise Overacker argued that formal ideological divisions had become less important in the party than a temperamental divide between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists'.[124]

During the 1980s, Paul Keating as treasurer openly criticised the Socialist Left for opposing financial deregulation and other 'reforms', declaring that the Left were now the 'true conservatives' of the ALP. Members of the

Left, accustomed to thinking of themselves as 'radicals' and proponents of reform, instinctively reacted against being cast as the 'conservatives' of the party. At the same time many of them felt ambivalent and uncomfortable about the extent to which their faction upheld 'traditional Labor values'. They feared being seen as nostalgic and unwilling to adapt to inevitable social change. They had strongly agreed with key aspects of Labor's reform and modernisation since the late 1960s — including greater rights for women, abandonment of the White Australia Policy, and endorsement of multiculturalism. The presentation of those very positive changes as a vital part of 'reform' and 'modernisation', made some of them reluctant to oppose other, very negative 'reforms' for fear of being labelled 'conservative'.

5

The records of labour in office

The Hawke and Keating Labor governments from 1983 to 1996 in Australia represent the longest consecutive period the ALP has ever had in office. Those thirteen years in government also amount to longer than any period of continuous government by the British Labour Party. This longevity is a considerable achievement in view of the fact that, in Australia, parliamentary terms last for a maximum of only three years rather than five as in Britain. There are some striking similarities between the Hawke and Keating governments in Australia from 1983–96, and the Wilson and Callaghan governments in office in Britain for most of the period 1964–79, in the kinds of structural economic problems they faced, the decisions to push for 'modernisation' which they made in response to these, and the conflicts that resulted with the rank and file party members, with unions and with their core working-class electorates as a result.

This chapter critically assesses the performance of the ALP governments of the 1980s and 1990s in some specific policy areas, with comparative reference to the British Labour Party at that time, the Whitlam government, and

*Figure 5.1: Periods of labour government in Britain
and Australia 1960–96/7*[2]

Britain
1960   **1997**

Wilson   Wilson   Callaghan

Australia
1960   **1996**

Whitlam   Hawke   Keating

Minority
Government

Majority
Government

the Wilson and Callaghan governments, and then proceeds
to a more general discussion, drawing on the respective
election manifestos and major policy speeches of those gov-
ernments; memoirs and diaries of, and interviews with,
some of their key players; primary source records of events
as they unfolded; and the more incisive secondary analyses
of those events which have been undertaken to date. It is
not intended to explore the minute details of each govern-
ment's policies in all areas here, a task which has been done
well elsewhere.[1] Rather, the intention is to survey a range of
policies as part of a broad comparison.

The main focus of this discussion will be economic
and social policies, and industrial relations, although it is
important firstly to briefly compare some other important
areas of policy.

Specific Policy Comparisons

In terms of foreign policy, the Hawke and Keating governments were regularly charged with taking an unprincipled position. The Hawke government from the outset ignored the Labor Party policy of rejecting Australian recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. The party policy had to be watered down at the 1984 national conference to reflect the government's position. In February 1985 the government failed to support the New Zealand Labour government's stance against the entry of nuclear-powered US ships and in 1985 Hawke also temporarily endorsed the United States' MX missile testing. In August 1990 the government decided to send troops to the Gulf War.

The Wilson and Callaghan governments faced similar accusations of breaching party principles in foreign policy. After the triumph of the March 1966 election, the gloss of the Wilson government soon began to fade over its moral and diplomatic support for the US war in Vietnam. In part because of the extent to which Wilson had altered Labour's image — but mostly because of its relative geographical remoteness from the conflict, and the fact that Vietnam did not loom anywhere near as large as a campaign issue — the Labour government in Britain was able to comfortably win an election in 1966 despite its refusal to send troops to support the United States' intervention in Vietnam; the Australian Labor Party was electorally devastated in the same year for adopting a similar position. However, the Wilson government did provide moral and diplomatic support for the US, whereas the ALP under Arthur Calwell was implacably opposed to the entire American involvement.

The difference between the two parties at this time was highlighted in January 1967 with the visit to Australia of two left-wing British Labour MPs, husband and wife Anne and (Australian-born) Russell Kerr. On the outer at home for abstaining on a parliamentary vote in favour of the

Wilson government's Vietnam policy, they were warmly received in Australia by Calwell, and joined him in marches against the war along with other leading ALP figures such as Jim Cairns.[3]

Upon its election the Whitlam government immediately made major and far-reaching shifts to Australia's foreign policy position. It recognised and established diplomatic relations with China, ended Australia's military involvement in Vietnam and ended conscription. Whitlam regarded his preceding Labor leaders as 'too British'[4] and in a speech he delivered in London in December 1974 summarised to his British audience Australia's new position in the world:

> Since my government was elected it has pursued a new course in its foreign affairs. We have sought a more distinctive and independent role for Australia, especially in our own region. We have established new friendships and contacts with other nations. While this has meant some reappraisal of our traditional arrangements ... our policies were a response to a growing spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance in Australian society. We have developed a keener sense of national independence. And I must say, in all frankness, it was high time we did ... we seek ... a more mature and contemporary relationship with Britain ... based on a growing sense of national pride and purpose ... It is against ... [a] background of economic and political change that Australia has looked afresh at her traditional relationship ... There are some things we have changed. Many of the things we have changed have been essentially symbolic, but no less important for that.[5]

Whitlam was critical of the Wilson government's failure to buck Washington and act against the Greek military government's 1974 coup against the president of Cyprus,[6] though Whitlam's government itself accepted Indonesia's 1975 takeover of the former Portugese colony of East Timor, contributing to the tragic sequence of events there in the decades thereafter.

In 1983 the Hawke government acceded to demands by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to declare the party's former national secretary, David Combe, persona non grata, because of his contact with a Soviet official. The government also significantly increased ASIO's budget. This was in marked contrast to the uneasy relationship which had existed between the Wilson government and the intelligence services in Britain, and the direct confrontations which occurred between the Whitlam government and ASIO. For all the criticism it attracted from the Left, the Wilson government evidently earned the active enmity of the British establishment. There have been persistent allegations of MI5 involvement in plots to unseat Wilson. Whitlam's attorney-general, Lionel Murphy, staged a celebrated raid on the headquarters of the ASIO due to suspicions that it was witholding information from him.[7] Like the allegations that MI5 conspired against Harold Wilson,[8] suggestions of CIA and ASIO complicity in the constitutional coup against the Whitlam government[9] have refused to go away.

The Hawke and Keating governments cut their budgetary allocations for overseas aid from 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1983–84 to 0.33 per cent in 1994–95, in contradiction both of the ALP platform and of United Nations targets for developed nations to devote 0.7 per cent of their GDP to overseas aid. The first Wilson governments were similarly criticised for their readiness to sacrifice spending on overseas aid for domestic economic self-interest.[10]

In 1983, the ALP caucus narrowly decided to allow the mining of uranium, under duress from a previous cabinet decision to enable a new uranium mine at Roxby Downs in South Australia to proceed, a decision which prompted the resignation from cabinet of the Left's only representative at the time, Stewart West. In 1984 the ALP national conference confirmed that policy enabled the Roxby Downs mine to proceed, prompting many resignations by party members and outrage among some of the party's

traditional working-class supporters.[11] In 1986, as part of
its relentless quest for budgetary cuts to gratify the hostile
world currency markets, the cabinet decided to lift the
ban on sales of uranium to France, a decision which was
in explicit breach of ALP policy and which prompted
further widespread outrage in the party and many more
resignations.[12] In its words the government consistently
opposed French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and virtu-
ally on the eve of the 1996 election (after 13 years in
office) proposed a high-level international 'Canberra
Commission' on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,[13]
but these gestures were not enough to repair the damage
to its anti-nuclear credentials done by its earlier deeds.
Like the Wilson government in Britain — which disap-
pointed CND activists who had become active in the
Labour Party in the 1960s — the Hawke government fun-
damentally alienated the anti-uranium and peace move-
ment activists who had held out high hopes for, and had
been closely associated with, the ALP when the govern-
ment was first elected.

In terms of education policy, under the Hawke gov-
ernment, the proportion of students staying on to com-
plete secondary schooling rose from well under half to
close to three-quarters between 1984 and 1996. The gov-
ernment and many observers credited its own policies for
this improvement. However, the fact that a broadly similar
trend occurred under British Conservative governments
in the same period suggests that the fear induced by high
youth unemployment in western countries from the early
1980s may have been at least a partial cause. The rise in
school retention rates led to heightened demand for uni-
versity places. The government declared that although it
was committed to an expansion of higher education, gov-
ernment could not be the sole source of funds for this
expansion. Senator Susan Ryan as education minister
from 1983–87 had resisted a push from the finance min-
ister, Peter Walsh, who argued that children of the wealthy
were having their education subsidised by low-income tax-

payers, for a reintroduction of tertiary fees. However, in the secret preparations of the budget for August 1986, against party policy, the Cabinet Expenditure Review Committee (on which Walsh was represented but Ryan was not) resolved to reintroduce a small 'administration charge' of $250 for all tertiary education students. In 1988 the government commissioned a report from a committee chaired by Neville Wran which advocated a tax on university graduates. The 1988 ALP national conference carried a resolution clearing the way for adoption of this new measure, in effect removing the ALP's previous platform commitment to 'maintain the provision of free tertiary education'. The government soon thereafter substantially increased the costs of tertiary education by broadening the 'administration charge' into the fully-fledged Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), requiring several thousand dollars per annum. The blow this represented to those who argued that maintenance of free higher education was essential to improving participation from people of lower socioeconomic backgrounds was softened somewhat by allowing students to pay the charges after graduation through their taxes once their income had reached a certain level. The spectacle of many well-qualified school leavers missing out on university places prompted the government to further expand options for higher education, with the formation in 1991 of Open Learning.

The government's claims to be concerned with educational equity had previously been dented by its very early retreat from Labor's policy of reducing government funding of the wealthiest non-government schools.[14] The Hawke government's restoration of charges for university entrance in 1988 reversed a central initative of the Whitlam government, which had abolished tertiary fees in 1974. The signs are that while numbers of tertiary enrolments may have risen after 1988, the proportion of students from lower socio-economic backgrounds among these enrolments actually shrank.[15]

Gough Whitlam had emphasised greatly in his speeches the pursuit of equality of opportunity, and took practical initiatives to expand access to higher education. The Wilson government had given equality of opportunity a similar priority in both word and deed. Harold Wilson said that it was wrong that 'our children do not get equal opportunities or our citizens equal chances to develop their qualities and energies ... [We] want ... a Britain that breaks down the barriers of colour and class — of occupation, skill, and age — which, by dividing our economic life between the power elite on the one hand and the technicians, scientists, and production men on the other, prevents this nation from realizing its full potential'.[16] His government acted to expand higher education opportunities by creating the Open University and also phased out grammar schools and reorganised state secondary education along comprehensive lines.

In terms of race relations, the Wilson government in the 1960s responded to the scare campaign run by conservative politician Enoch Powell against immigration in general and 'coloured' immigration in particular by retreating from the policies which it had espoused in opposition and by limiting entry with a preference for professional and skilled workers. This caused consternation among many of its supporters, who saw the move as pandering to racial prejudice. To its credit, the Hawke government did not yield to the similar attempts by Professor Geoffrey Blainey from 1984, and the Opposition (particularly under John Howard in 1988), to cut back immigration in general and that of Asians in particular.

One of the major initiatives of the Whitlam government had been to end formally the White Australia Policy and to embrace the concept of 'multiculturalism' to express and celebrate the diverse range of ethnic groups represented in the modern Australia due to the mass migration program undertaken since the war. Many migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds (particularly southern Europeans) flocked to support the Labor

Party under Whitlam in response to his initiatives and support.[17]

In another key area of race relations, however, unique to Australia, the Labor government performed less creditably. In October 1984, under pressure from mining companies, the Hawke government abandoned Labor's policy commitment to legislate for nationwide Aboriginal land rights; and removed Aborigines' right to veto mining on their traditional lands. The High Court decision in the Mabo case in 1992 forced the government to revisit this issue, and prime minister Keating then succeeded in enacting important legislation to restore Aboriginal native title.

In terms of health policy, the Hawke government successfully instituted a universal health cover system, Medicare, based on 85 per cent cash rebates for the cost of doctors' visits with many doctors choosing to 'bulk-bill' so that basic health care was in effect free of charge. In 1991 the government temporarily introduced charges for Medicare but these were quickly reversed. The health care system remained a mixture of public and private, unlike the British National Health Service.

In contrast to the Whitlam government, which undertook initiatives to enhance legal aid provision and access to the law as a high priority, it was twelve years into the life of the Hawke and Keating governments before any significant new measures were taken to address the problem of justice being inaccessible to all but the wealthy few. The Whitlam government had sought to create an Australian Legal Aid Office to provide legal services in the major cities to those who conventionally could not afford access to such services. These efforts attracted the fierce opposition of the legal profession and the non-Labor state governments.

The Hawke and Keating governments continued the work of earlier labour governments in Australia, and Britain, in liberalising laws relating to personal relationships, in protecting individual freedoms and rights and in countering discrimination. The Hawke government intro-

duced a Sex Discrimination Act in 1984 and the applica-
tion of this was later widened under Keating. Under the
Wilson governments in Britain there had been many pro-
gressive social reforms, including on abortion, homosexu-
ality, divorce and reduction of the voting age from age 21
to 18. The Whitlam government's reform agenda on these
issues was even more ambitious than that of Wilson.

Harold Wilson's name was mentioned by Sir John Kerr
in discussions with key players in the decisive days leading
up to his dismissal of the Whitlam government, although
who he actually mentioned it to is a matter of dispute.
Gough Whitlam writes that Kerr:

> says he told me [at a meeting on 7 October 1975] that, if
> I held an election and lost, I was still young enough to
> have a second term as Prime Minister, 'as Wilson did in
> England'. I would certainly have remembered such a
> remark; I would certainly have responded to it. It was
> never made ... Sir John is imagining that he put to me the
> argument he was to put to Mr. Hayden on 6 November
> and to the Speaker, Gordon Scholes, on 11 November.[18]

Although Wilson and Whitlam had previously frankly dis-
cussed the problem of their respective upper houses
obstructing their policies,[19] the Wilson government in
November 1975 made little response to the dismissal of its
kindred labour administration in Australia. The use by the
Australian governor-general of the Crown's reserve
powers to oust the Whitlam government might have been
expected to prompt concern at the highest levels of the
British Labour government. Indeed, given that a letter
from Gordon Scholes, the speaker of the Australian
House of Representatives to the Queen explicitly called
on her to 'act in order to restore Mr. Whitlam to office as
prime minister'[20], the British Labour prime minister was
in a constitutional position to advise her to do so.
However, he did not. Nor was any statement about the dis-
missal issued by the Labour Party's International Com-
mittee or National Executive Committee, according to the

list of foreign policy statements given in the Report of the Seventy-fifth Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1976. There is no reference whatsoever to the event in the international or other sections of the National Executive Committee minutes from November 1975 to April 1976, and a check of Parliamentary Labour Party minutes from 23 October 1975 up to 6 April 1976 also revealed no references. However, formal British Labour support for the ALP following the dismissal was conveyed to an ALP UK Society rally in London on 21 November 1975 by the party's international secretary, Jenny Little. There are records of at least one Constituency Labour Party in Britain (Paddington) condemning the dismissal and pledging support to the ALP.[21] And a Labour MP, Gwilym Roberts, tabled a motion in the House of Commons on the implications of the Australian constitutional crisis, conveying a message to prime minister Wilson to the effect that: 'You should be warned by events in Australia that unless you act quickly over the House of Lords, the Queen may soon be tapping on your shoulder, showing you the way out'.[22] In his view: 'If Mr. Wilson doesn't do the House of Lords, the House of Lords will do him'.[23]

Later attempts to reform the House of Lords were criticised within the Labour Party as possibly creating a situation of conflict between the two houses of parliament similar to that which precipitated the dismissal of a labour government in Australia.[24] Tony Benn wrote in his diary for 11 November 1975 that the dismissal: 'will have two effects. First of all, it will identify the undemocratic role of the Monarch ... Secondly, it will probably weaken the link between Australia and Britain.'[25]

Benn's own efforts for constitutional reform were given added impetus by the dismissal, and he was very much influenced by the event in shaping his proposals for a new British constitution.[26] The ALP expressed interest in a paper he had prepared for the Labour Party's Home Policy Committee on 'Reduced Powers of the Queen'[27] and Benn later became a vocal British supporter of the push for an

Australian republic launched under Paul Keating's prime ministership. These two men would have found little else in common, however. In Australia it is fair to say republicanism was a safer political issue to pursue than in Britain, so this was a rare overlap between the attitudes of Benn, a leading left-wing radical in the British Labour Party, and Keating, a key figure of the pragmatic Right in the ALP.

Another British Labour figure influenced by the Whitlam dismissal was Chris Mullin, a left-wing journalist who was editor of *Tribune* from 1982–84 and was elected as Labour MP for Sunderland South in 1987. Mullin wrote the political novel *A Very British Coup*[28] in 1982, in which a left-wing former steelworker, Harry Perkins, was elected as Labour prime minister of Britain before being brought down in an MI5–led coup. The book, which was made into a powerful television drama in 1989, explored the constraints on a radical labour government in the light of MI5's activities against Wilson and the allegations of CIA complicity in the removal of Whitlam.[29]

The Distinctiveness of the Whitlam Government

Gough Whitlam became prime minister of Australia in December 1972 and his government was re-elected in May 1974, lasting until its controversial dismissal by the governor-general in November 1975, after which it was resoundingly rejected at the polls. The breadth and the rapid pace of change under the three-year Whitlam government has no parallel in the Wilson (nor the later Callaghan) governments. Whitlam is remembered much more fondly among Australian Labor activists as a reforming prime minister than was Wilson in Britain, partly due to the manner of his dismissal. However, the pragmatists who became ascendant in the ALP in the Hawke years felt that the Whitlam government had tried to do too much. They interpreted the 1972–75 experience as a reason to proceed very cautiously when in govern-

ment in future, to conciliate rather than challenge the powers that be. Manning Clark has suggested that:

> The Labor Party needed to investigate the nature of power in Australia in the wake of the 1975 constitutional crisis ... Although the party traditionally believed that it would be able to achieve its reforms if it held a majority in Parliament, the events of 1975 had shown this was not necessarily true ... the concentration of power in Australia today was to be found in the Public Service, large corporations, the media and the army.[30]

This kind of advice went unheeded. Whereas the view among the dominant figures in British Labour following the Wilson and Callaghan governments was that their governments had not done enough, leading to a leftward lurch in policy after 1970 and especially after 1979, among their ALP counterparts the opposite was true. Indeed, the different courses of the two labour parties in the 1980s were partly due to generational factors. The generation which came to prominence in the British Labour Party in the 1980s had grown up knowing the disappointments of Labour in government in the 1960s and 1970s, and was inclined to take a more radical approach. In Australia, on the other hand, the generation which came to maturity in the 1980s had grown up knowing the futility of opposition throughout the 1950s and 1960s and most of the 1970s. The ALP had been in government nationally for only three out of the thirty-four years prior to 1983. The dominant figures in the Hawke and Keating years were accordingly concerned more with the mechanics of obtaining and holding on to power rather than with the larger purposes for which to use it.

The unique circumstances of the Whitlam government's dismissal also had a traumatic and disabling effect on the ALP's confidence to pursue reforms.[31] In the cabinet room in the early years of the Hawke government, the worst insult that could be directed at a minister with an ambitious spending proposal was that they were an 'unreconstructed

Whitlamite'.[32] Paul Keating in 1987 attacked the 'romantics who choose to regard the 1972 Whitlam program as a purist application of high-minded Labor principle'[33] and criticised the Whitlam government's economic 'policy failure'[34]. Whitlam responded in kind, calling Keating's comments 'smart-arsed', attacking his economic performance as treasurer, and criticising the Hawke government for not moving ahead with vital reforms including of the constitution and for Aboriginal land rights.[35]

The Whitlam government certainly was expansionary with public finances. Budget outlays more than doubled from $10 billion to $22 billion over its three budgets, and the budget deficit as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 1.6 to 4.7 per cent. In this it differed from the British Labour governments of its own era as much as from later Australian Labor governments.

There was a very short overlap between the third Wilson government and the Whitlam government (from 4 March 1974 to 11 November 1975), which to date has been the only time labour governments have coincided in Britain and Australia since 1949. An encounter between Jim Cairns and Denis Healey in Paris in May 1975, when both were in charge of the finances of their respective Labour governments, showed the differences in their response to economic crisis at that time. When I interviewed him, Cairns recalled that he:

> had breakfast with Healey in Paris ... A huge table in the [British] Embassy ... And he was telling me how we had to put the screws on and I had to get back and produce a budget that would deal with inflation, deal with the lethargy of the workers and all that and I thought ... we hadn't heard of this. We'd had 20 years of full employment. We'd had 20 years of Keynes more or less. And yet here was the home of Keynes with a bloke like Healey talking economic rationalism full stop.

Soon after he returned home from that trip Cairns was removed as treasurer over the 'Loans Affair' and other

matters, and Bill Hayden took up the reins of Treasury. In June 1975 Hayden brought down a much more contractionary budget, in line with the commitment Whitlam had developed after the 1974 election to fighting inflation as a far higher priority than previously.

In the tidal sea change of dominant economic ideas which took place between the first Wilson governments and Whitlam government, and the Hawke/Keating years, Callaghan and Healey were caught somewhere in the middle, as was Bill Hayden with his 1975 budget. In the 1960s Wilson could still positively associate public enterprise and intervention with greater, rather than less, efficiency — indeed he could still (and did) point to the Soviet Union as a model of efficient modernisation. By the 1980s the reverse notion had strongly taken hold and in 1989 the Soviet Union completely disintegrated.

The 1975 Hayden budget was 'too little too late' to repair the Whitlam government's reputation for being fiscally irresponsible; and a desire to shake off this reputation dominated the first eight years of the Hawke government. Historical reinterpretations of the Whitlam government were, however, central to the ongoing internal political debates over the direction of the Hawke and Keating governments. When Bill Hayden in 1985 sought to stake out some political territory for his new Centre Left faction, distinct from that of the New South Wales Right, he declared that:

> I am not one of those who have broken their necks rushing to disown the 1972–75 experience. It is fashionable to decry those three years as a time of Neronian indulgence for which a terrible electoral retribution was exacted. There is enough element of truth in this to make it an appealing alibi for those who seem to need it. But it cannot be denied that the Whitlam reforms brought comfort and progress and security to many Australians who must have despaired because previous governments had deserted them ... It was important for us — it still is important for us — that we be free and uninhibited by

administrations run by people whose imagination and vision about this country is as limited as that of the back-office book-keeper.[36]

When Keating ally John Dawkins sought to push forward a new alternative agenda in the dying days of Bob Hawke's leadership in 1991 he praised the 'cultural and social renaissance' of Australia in the Whitlam era and called for a marriage of 'the Whitlam dream' with modern economic policy: for 'Whitlamism with a calculator'.[37] This approach was taken up and consolidated during treasurer Paul Keating's reinvention of himself after he became prime minister (as discussed below).

Economic and Social Policies

Throughout the first phase of his government, however — indeed even before assuming office — Bob Hawke sought to lower expectations of what he could do. The revelation straight after the 1983 election that the budget deficit was running at $9.6 billion rather than $6 billion as the outgoing conservative government had publicly stated was seized upon as justification for delaying and abandoning Labor's spending promises and plans outlined in the platform which had been adopted by the 1982 ALP national conference.

The new treasurer, Paul Keating, had visited Britain as shadow minister for minerals and energy in 1979 and was heavily influenced by what the Callaghan government was doing in this policy field in his drafting of a proposal for a government-owned and strategically interventionist Australian Hydrocarbon Corporation.[38] After he became treasurer, however, any ideas of strategic government intervention in the economy were steadily ditched in favour of the deregulatory and free-market approach urged upon him by Treasury.

Hostile world financial markets forced a 10 per cent devaluation of the Australian dollar within two days of the Hawke government's election. In December 1983 the gov-

ernment decided to float the Australian dollar, making future economic decisions more directly subject to the volatile currency markets than ever before. The suscepti- bility of national economic decisions to the foreign exchange markets later reached its peak when the 1986 budget papers were recalled from the printers and a further $1.5 billion was slashed from the deficit, after the Australian dollar fell to barely 57c US. There is a close par- allel here with the sense of being under seige from inter- national economic forces which was felt by the British pound, and economic policy generally, in the early years of the first Wilson government,[39] and according to industry minister John Button there was a real prospect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention in Aus- tralia in 1986[40] just as had occurred in Britain during the currency crisis which gripped the Callaghan government in Britain ten years earlier.

In August 1984 the Hawke government deregulated the banks; and in September 1984 it invited foreign banks to begin operations in Australia. In the December 1984 elec- tion campaign Hawke committed himself to what became known as the 'trilogy' of budget promises. This 'trilogy' commitment — that budget revenue, expenditure and therefore the budget deficit would not increase as a pro- portion of GDP — further constrained the ALP's capacity to deliver on the kinds of expansionary policies envisaged in the platform upon which it had first been elected in 1983.[41]

When Labor came to office, unemployment was running at 10 per cent due in part to the Fraser govern- ment's strategy to fight inflation first. The number of jobs grew and the unemployment rate fell steadily in the eco- nomic boom of the 1980s, faster than Britain and other nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), aided by the Accord with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the govern- ment's preparedness to 'pump-prime' the economy, and a variety of specific initiatives. These included an initiative for direct job creation, the Community Employment Program,

which was allocated $300 million to fund 70,000 full-time jobs averaging six months each on 'labour intensive projects of social and economic benefit to the community'. There were also subsidised work/study traineeships for young people arising out of the Kirby Report.

The official unemployment rate fell below 6 per cent during 1989. The Hawke government in its first seven years was more successful than the Wilson, Whitlam and Callaghan governments in dealing with unemployment. However, following a shift to extremely tight monetary policy and fiscal contraction, unemployment in Australia rose sharply, to even higher levels than in Britain (and most other OECD nations) in the early to mid-1990s, as Figure 5.2 shows.[42]

The unemployment rate was still under 3 per cent when the Whitlam government and the first Wilson governments were elected, but had risen above 5 per cent by the time the governments were voted out of office. These governments were hit by the world economic shocks of the era. Unemployment was not an issue in the policy programs developed prior to their election; but it was reap-

Figure 5.2: *The annual unemployment rate in Britain and Australia, 1965–96*

pearing as a very serious issue indeed by the end of the Whitlam and Callaghan years.

The Hawke and Keating governments also had a better overall record in dealing with inflation than the immediately preceding Labor governments in Britain and Australia, as Figure 5.3 shows.[43]

The Hawke government was faced with a severe balance-of-payments deficit. The intractability of this became obvious in May 1986 with the release of the worst monthly current account figures on record, prompting Treasurer Keating to dramatically assert that Australia risked becoming a 'banana republic'.[44] The balance of payments pressures closely resembled those of the Wilson governments elected in 1964, 1966 and 1974. Britain, compared with Australia, is a big exporting nation with a high proportion of its exports being in manufacturing and as such it has almost invariably maintained a better current account balance than Australia, as Figure 5.4, covering the period 1960–96, makes clear.[45]

Upon its election the first Wilson Labour government had established a new Department of Economic Affairs to provide an alternative centre of economic advice to Trea-

Figure 5.3: The annual inflation rate in Britain and Australia, 1966–96

sury and in particular to provide longer-term planning for the British economy. In September 1965 it published the National Plan, aiming for a 25 per cent increase in national output by 1970. However, the National Plan was — as the conventional accounts put it — 'blown off course' by the severe (by previous British standards) balance of payments deficits the government soon confronted.

Within a fortnight of taking office, James Callaghan as Chancellor of the Exchequer was forced to impose a 15 per cent surcharge on imports to deal with the £800 million deficit in the balance of payments. The early years of the Wilson government were consumed with currency weaknesses, leading to interest rate rises and eventually, in November 1967, to a long-resisted devaluation of the pound. After its re-election in 1966 the government increasingly responded to the continuing economic pressures by reverting to orthodox economic prescriptions. Devaluation was accompanied by a letter of intent to the International Monetary Fund promising deflationary policies, and Roy Jenkins replaced Callaghan as Chancellor.

Figure 5.4: Current account balance as proportion of GDP in Britain and Australia, 1960–96

The second Wilson government came to office in 1974 amid Britain's descent into an even deeper balance of payments crisis than his first government had to contend with in the 1960s. After Callaghan became prime minister in 1976 the Labour government once again, and increasingly, reverted to contractionary and monetarist macroeconomic policies, leading to clashes with the party and the trade unions. The defining moment which demonstrated the extent of British Labour's capitulation to the new Friedmanite economic orthodoxy was at the 1976 Labour party conference when Callaghan directly attacked the idea that 'you could just spend your way out of a recession'.

In its economic policies, the Hawke Labor government of the 1980s was often criticised for being more like the Thatcher government than the British Labour opposition of its own era. Margaret Thatcher herself has endorsed this view in her memoirs, recording that:

> I had some famous personal rows with Bob Hawke ... [but] whatever differences of outlook we had on other matters, I found Mr. Keating refreshingly orthodox on finance — a far cry from the British Labour Party.[46]

To a significant extent, the record bears out the criticism that the Hawke government's economic policies were more Thatcherite than they were akin to those of British Labour. The policies for economic growth and industrial development advocated by the British Labour leadership in the 1980s[47] were those which only the minority Left faction was advocating in the Australian Labor Party, in stark opposition to the free-market direction of the party leadership.

Steep cuts in tariffs under the Hawke government contributed to job reductions, particularly in the vehicle industry and the textile, clothing and footwear industry. This was contrary to specific resolutions which had been moved by leading trade unionists and which were passed overwhelmingly by delegates to the 1986 ALP national conference, but which Bob Hawke and John Button (industry minister in the governments from 1983–93)

immediately made clear via the media that they would ignore in favour of a continued free-trade agenda.[48] The tariff cuts continued after the recession had hit. Bob Hawke's government, like the Wilson and Callaghan governments, was prepared to embrace economic modernisation even when it meant dislocation and hardship for some of its most loyal supporters. Just as the British Labour governments had closed 'uneconomic' coalmines in regions like Lancashire, so the Hawke government imposed tariff cuts which led to huge job losses in 'safe' Labor electorates like the northern suburbs of Melbourne.

The Steel Plan and Car Plan implemented by Senator Button won accolades in most quarters, but there was regular criticism of the government by the Left and the trade unions about the absence of a more comprehensive, strategic and interventionist policy for industry and in particular for stemming the tide of job losses from manufacturing.[49]

Although Bob Hawke and Paul Keating did not openly preach the philosophical virtues of monetarism as Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph did, in practice the Hawke government's policies were even more monetarist than those of the Thatcher government. The money supply was tightened to the point where housing loan interest rates rose as high as 17 per cent in Australia in June 1989, whereas bank lending rate peaked at 16 per cent in Britain in June 1990.[50]

From 1988–90 until the recession and a shift to somewhat more expansionary policies (and also later, in 1995), the Australian Labor governments proudly budgeted for surpluses. Labor cut public spending to a greater extent than both Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in America actually did[51], in spite of the rhetoric about smaller government which Thatcher and Reagan propounded. The number of public sector employees fell steadily under the Hawke and Keating governments.

The ideological gulf between the British and Australian labour parties in the 1980s was probably wider than

at any time in the two parties' history. This was high-
lighted by the fact that at the same time as Bob Hawke was
publicly linking arms with Rupert Murdoch in Australia,
and receiving the warm support of Murdoch's Australian
newspapers[52], the British labour movement was linking
arms on the picket lines at Wapping in East London in
bitter opposition to Murdoch's attempts to weaken the
printing unions' power.

Overall national living standards remained higher in
Australia than in Britain in the 1980s and into the 1990s,
according to the narrow measure of GDP per head[53] and
also according to broader measures of quality of life
applied by the United Nations[54]. There continues to be a
lower proportion of people living in poverty in Australia
than in Britain.[55] It was obvious to anyone who had been
to both Britain and Australia in the 1980s that there was a
much larger and more visible problem of homelessness
and poverty in Britain than in Australia. Nevertheless,
contrary to most people's expectations, persistent statis-
tical evidence has emerged that Australia's relatively
greater wealth has, over recent decades, become distrib-
uted less evenly than in Britain. International compar-
isons estimated that Australia's income distribution had
by the mid-to-late 1970s become significantly less equal
than Britain's and indeed was now one of the least equal
in the western world.

According to the World Bank, in Britain in 1979 the
highest 20 per cent of households obtained 39.7 per cent
of household incomes, whereas in Australia in 1975–76
they obtained 47.1 per cent. In the same years the bottom
20 per cent of British households received 7 per cent of
the nation's household incomes, while in Australia they
received just 5.4 per cent. While the gap between their
respective levels of income inequality had lessened some-
what by the late 1980s (ie, the Thatcher government's
policies had increased inequality in the intervening years
to a greater extent than the Fraser and Hawke govern-
ments had), Australia's position was at best marginally

more egalitarian than Britain. World Bank data for the year 1986 (which is the latest available in that particular series) shows that the top 20 per cent of British households received 39.8 per cent of the nation's household incomes, while in Australia in 1989 (the latest year available) they obtained 40.9 per cent. The same source shows that the bottom 20 per cent of British households received 7.1 per cent of the nation's household incomes in 1986, whereas in Australia in 1989 they obtained just 7.0 per cent.[56]

The recent tabulation of data from the international Luxembourg Income Study by a leading researcher in this area, Peter Saunders, shows that in Australia in 1989 the ratio of high to low incomes was 4.26, a higher degree of inequality than Britain in 1986, where the ratio was 3.8.[57] It is true that under the Australian Labor governments targeting of tax/transfer/social security payments helped ameliorate the rising market-driven income inequality and more efficiently boosted the share gained by the lowest income groups than in Britain.[58] However, evidence towards the end of the Hawke and Keating years still suggested that Australia had become very unequal,[59] and on some measures — such as the statistical gap between richest and poorest households by the mid 1990s[60] — was at least as unequal as Britain. The countervailing view put forward in a book by Peter Travers and Sue Richardson (which was frequently referred to by ALP government ministers) was that because Australia still had a relatively high degree of social mobility, with relatively low levels of inherited advantage or disadvantage, there was less of a tendency for differences in the distribution of income to spill over and affect other areas of life, such as social activities, happiness, health and a general sense of optimism.[61]

The first Wilson governments increased total social security expenditure substantially and brought in a range of new initiatives. But a large part of this increase was simply in line with ageing in the population and an increase in unemployment, and the value of some of the

innovations was offset by negative effects elsewhere.[62] The Callaghan government importantly increased the net amount of government expenditure on the support of children as part of its introduction of a new system of child benefit.[63] The introduction of the Family Allowance Supplement was one landmark and positive social policy reform under the Hawke government, for which the Left's Brian Howe was chiefly responsible.

However, when Bob Hawke (soon after being deposed from the prime ministership) conducted an interview with Neil Kinnock as part of an Australian television report on the 1992 British election, and asked about the visibly widespread youth homelessness in British cities, he must have been somewhat embarassed at the response. For Kinnock described the problem as 'utterly unnecessary' and 'entirely preventable' in that it was caused largely by the Thatcher government's policy decision to remove unemployment benefits from 16 and 17 year olds — which was a very similar decision to that taken by the Hawke government in 1988, to substitute a small token 'job search allowance' for the more substantial unemployment benefits previously received by unemployed Australians under the age of 18.[64]

Provision of superannuation was a central policy concern of the Hawke and Keating governments and a regular feature of their Accord dealings with the ACTU. However, unlike the Whitlam government, they sought to provide superannuation through privately run funds, including industry-based schemes involving unions, rather than as one central fund administered by the national government. This innovative approach led to better, more lasting outcomes than were achieved by the Whitlam government or the Wilson government in Britain in the late 1960s with the ambitious national superannuation scheme put forward by its then Secretary of State for Social Services, Richard Crossman.

The Hawke government undertook a comprehensive reform of taxation in 1985, including the introduction of

the fringe benefits and capital gains taxes. There were some regressive measures at the same time, including removal of supposed double taxation of company dividends. Tom Uren vividly recalls the lack of comprehension in the cabinet room of his arguments about the inequitable effects such changes to company tax would have:

> The only real understanding of my class position came from Ralph Willis ... He supported my view of how these tax changes would affect our people, including the negative attitudes they would have on the labour movement. It was clear how middle-class the ministry's attitude had become. It was a real tragedy that so many of our colleagues were so keen on free market forces and influenced by the *Australian Financial Review* rather than by Marx, William Morris or R.H. Tawney.[65]

However, the government, due to the strong opposition of the Left and the trade unions, ultimately declined to agree to treasurer Keating's concerted efforts to introduce a new broadly based consumption or value added tax. Later, in 1989, it moved to tax some foreign source income, and in 1994 it made administrative changes to enhance fairness and the appearance of fairness in the tax system. But in spite of these valuable reforms, and other efforts made by the government, there was considerable evidence that aspects of the tax system remained unfair and that very high income earners and wealth holders were failing to pay their share. The 1993 budget introduced indirect taxes despite Labor's winning the 1993 election substantially on its opposition to increased indirect taxes.

The 'privatisation' of government-owned utilities which came into vogue in Thatcher's Britain eventually made its way onto the Australian Labor government's agenda. When the sale of public assets was first mooted by the Coalition parties in the early and mid-1980s, Bob Hawke condemned the idea. He told the Labor Party faithful that:

> Our opponents this week stand for privatisation of our
> great national institutions ... their commitment to priva-
> tise ... the Commonwealth Bank, QANTAS and Telecom
> ... would sell off institutions which have been built up
> over generations. They should be left to serve our chil-
> dren as well as they have served our parents.[66]

Nevertheless, immediately after the 1987 federal election,
and despite the fact that no mention was made of the
issue in that election, Hawke fired the first shots in a cam-
paign to carry out this policy himself. Resistance from
unions, party members and bodies such as the Evatt Foun-
dation helped to block this push, but in 1990 — again
immediately *after* an election — the push was renewed. In
August 1990 Keating moved in cabinet to sell off part of
the Commonwealth Bank. By October 1990, following a
special national conference called to legitimise the funda-
mental change in policy, the government was able to pri-
vatise Australian Airlines and Qantas and break up the
monopoly position previously held by the government-
owned Telecom. Later, in the May 1995 budget the gov-
ernment divested itself of the remaining share of the
Commonwealth Bank in a secret arrangement between
the prime minister, treasurer and finance minister which
was only communicated to cabinet an hour before the
treasurer got on his feet to deliver the budget speech and
of which the caucus was given no prior warning.[67]

Industrial Relations

The tangible expression of Bob Hawke's theme of con-
sensus was the Prices and Incomes Accord with the union
movement whereby workers would moderate wage
demands in exchange for improved social provision. This
drew on Harold Wilson's similar efforts towards an
incomes policy between government and unions in order
to achieve broader national policy goals. A joint statement
of intent was signed between the government, the Trades
Union Congress and the main employer organisations in

the first month of the first Wilson government to plan economic growth, link wage rises to productivity gains and stabilise prices. Wilson emphasised the need for both sides of industry to move away from the old pattern of class conflict. In February 1965 a Prices and Incomes Board was established to act as a new mechanism for reviewing prices and incomes. In April 1965 a white paper on prices and incomes policy set out levels of between 3 and 3.5 per cent as normal for rises in annual incomes. In July 1966, legislation to give statutory powers to the Prices and Incomes Board was introduced, requiring prior notification of increases in prices and incomes.

Former Transport and General Workers Union secretary Frank Cousins resigned from the government over these plans to regulate wages, which he described as contradicting the party's basic philosophy. In July 1966 the Wilson government imposed a 'wage freeze', a statutory halt to any rise in incomes, profits or dividends for six months in order to reduce demand. In August 1966 the Prices and Incomes Bill was enacted, but in 1969 the Wilson government's endeavours to control unofficial strikes with a new white paper entitled *In Place of Strife* came badly unstuck, relations between the government and the unions disintegrated and the government was eventually forced into a humiliating retreat. In the period of Opposition from 1970 to 1974 a new 'Social Contract' was co-operatively drawn up between the British Labour Party and trade unions to repair relations and rebuild trust following the conflicts of the late 1960s.

The influence of this British experience on the development of the terms of the Accord by the ALP leadership and the ACTU in the lead-up to the 1983 election can be clearly traced. Ralph Willis, who entered the Australian parliament in 1972 after working as a research officer and advocate for the ACTU, was appalled by the poor relations and lack of communication between the Whitlam governments and the trade unions. He developed an interest in the efforts towards better relations which had been made

by the Labour Party and travelled to Britain in 1978 as the ALP's shadow minister for economic affairs to examine incomes policy and the state of the Social Contract under the Callaghan Labour government, as part of his work in preparing 'a credible anti-inflation policy' for the ALP opposition.

Willis had substantial and detailed discussions during this visit with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey (whom he remembers as 'an exceedingly gruff and colourful character'), the TUC secretary Len Murray and research officer David Lea, and he also met briefly with prime minister Callaghan. He concluded that the basic ideas and consultative arrangements in place in Britain were right, and he sought to replicate them in his proposals for the Accord and for a revitalised Australian Labor Advisory Council (ALAC) to enable regular meetings and contact between a future Australian labour government and the peak trade union leadership. However, Willis also believed that the Callaghan government became too ambitious in terms of the constraints it sought to impose upon the unions, specifically in trying to impose in 1978 a 5 per cent limit on wage rises. This proposed limit soon had to be rescinded and rises of more than 15 per cent were agreed to, the Social Contract fell apart in the industrial campaigns of the 1979 'winter of discontent', and soon Margaret Thatcher was elected. He thought that the Social Contract was too limited, incorporating only wages, and that a wider policy agreement would be needed to win support and involvement from Australian unions.[68] It was Willis above all others who was responsible for initiating what eventually emerged as the Accord.

Left-wing Australian unionists initially opposed the idea of an incomes policy when Bill Hayden proposed it at the 1979 ALP national conference, largely because of the recent failure of the British Labour government's attempts at enacting one, and the 'alienation and disturbance' of the traditional Labour vote that resulted from this failure.[69] But as the debate over the Accord unfolded in the next

four years the Left's position changed substantially. Very important in this change of direction was the reassessment of industrial and political strategy undertaken by the Metal Workers' Union, and in particular by its leading Communist official Laurie Carmichael, following job losses in the manufacturing industry after the Metal Workers' militant push for a big rise in wages and reduction in working hours in 1981–82 (and also a sea change in his own outlook following a visit to Sweden in early 1983[70]).

The blame attached to Carmichael and the Metal Workers for the recession of the early 1980s in Australia led them to a fundamental rethink which resulted in their turning away from the struggle for improvements in the industrial wage and instead pursuing gains in the 'social' wage and in skills training and industrial democracy, via the Accord and a new alliance with ACTU secretary Bill Kelty. They were interested in the fact that the British Labour government had initiated a major inquiry into industrial democracy which recommended direct and substantial workers' representation on company boards.[71] With the Communists' dramatic change of heart and their tradition of comparatively long-range strategic thinking, the relative strength of Communists in the Australian trade union movement now became a positive for the ALP. The change in strategy was spelt out explicitly in *Australia Reconstructed*, the substantial report of the high-level Australian trade union mission to Western Europe in 1986. This report noted that:

> For employees in the UK's manufacturing industry, post-tax real earnings increased by 19.9 per cent in the period 1979–86. Over the same period, employment fell by 25.7 per cent and aggregate output fell by 9 per cent (UK Monthly Digest of Figures). This real earnings growth is the highest in the western world over this period. Against the background of a shrinking manufacturing sector and dramatic declines in employment levels, such a high growth in wages must be considered a hollow victory for the British labour movement.[72]

Whereas the Social Contract disintegrated in Britain, for 13 years the Accord in Australia essentially held. The ostensible success of the Accord contrasts not only with the fiasco which incomes policy became by the end of the Callaghan governments, but also with the poor trade union relations which had existed under the Whitlam government. The Whitlam government made little effort to develop an effective working relationship with the ACTU, and the then ACTU president, Bob Hawke, was regularly at odds with the government. The Whitlam government had no policy on wages regulation to speak of, which was one of the main reasons it became especially vulnerable as inflation rocketed following the two world oil price shocks of 1973. It was even less able to contain wage rises than Wilson had been in the mid-to-late 1960s,[73] and indeed the Whitlam government in its early years established the public service to be a 'pacesetter' for wages and working conditions in the wider economy. Figure 5.5 shows the number of working days lost through industrial disputes in Britain and Australia from 1966–96.[74]

The industrial disputation which broke out under the Whitlam government in 1974–75 was similar to that which

Figure 5.5: Working days lost through industrial disputes in Britain (left) and Australia (right), 1966–96

occurred in Britain in 1979. Both were led by public sector unions' wage claims. The circumstances of the 'winter of discontent' in Britain — ie, a clash between the expectations and demands of public sector unions and the fiscal stringencies of government — had in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s tended to occur not at the national but at a *state* level (especially in the last years of the 1982–92 Victorian Labor government, which were marked by disputes between the government and health, teachers, and transport unions). This is because under the division of responsibilities in the Australian Constitution it is state governments which must run the hospitals, schools and public transport services in which the main public sector unions are located. This is one area where the federal system may assist Labor governments at the national level by insulating them somewhat from the direct pressures and conflicts involved in a relationship with trade unions. The only precedent for the Hawke and Keating governments' achievements in maintaining a sustained period of low industrial disputation is (as was noted in Chapter 1) the Attlee/Bevin government.

The central conundrum in comparing these governments is how to explain the clear contrast between the failure of the Social Contract and the success of the Accord. One likely explanation is that the long experience of centralised quasi-governmental wage determination, or arbitration, in Australia prepared the ground for the enforcement, and for individual unions' acceptance, of incomes policy to a greater extent than in Britain with its tradition of free collective bargaining, characterised by more decentralised negotiations over wages. The ACTU, since Hawke stamped his leadership upon it, has also had a greater degree of authority over its affiliates than has the TUC. Furthermore there is a more distant institutional relationship between the TUC and the British Labour Party than between the ACTU and the ALP. It was not until 1994, for instance, that a TUC general secretary spoke at any event at a Labour Party annual conference (and even then

it was only a fringe meeting rather than an official confer-
ence event). By contrast, in Australia Bob Hawke was simul-
taneously president of the ACTU and national president of
the ALP from 1973–78 and as such chaired the party's
national conferences and acted as its official spokesperson
(although it should be noted that such a dual role has not
been carried off by anyone else, before or since). To a
degree the reason for the success of the Accord must lie in
Hawke's background as ACTU president and the loyal links
that this led to with his successors in the ACTU once he
became prime minister. Lessons had also been learnt from
the Whitlam (and Callaghan) government years. Hawke
knew better than anyone the damage which he had been
able to inflict on the Whitlam government from his posi-
tion as ACTU president, and as a result he moved quickly
to co-opt his successors in the Australian trade union lead-
ership into the upper echelons of his own government's
policy-making so as to prevent any electorally damaging
conflicts.

There is also a perception by well-informed observers[75]
that the Accord involved much wider and more substan-
tial policy trade-offs by the government, including com-
mitments to job creation targets, than the Social Contract
in the 1970s or anything negotiated between the Labour
Party and TUC thereafter, and that hence it was a much
better deal for union members.

The first Social Contract entered into in the 1974–79
Labour government has been seen by some as a 'quick fix'
response to the tide of inflation which engulfed the gov-
ernment. There may also have been a stronger basis for
grievance in Britain in terms of the overall effects of the
government's incomes policy upon wages and prices. The
wide differentials which had developed between the
(lower) pay in the public sector and the (higher) pay in
the private sector in the build-up to the 'winter of discon-
tent' caused great bitterness.

The fact that Australia is a less hierarchically stratified
society, less rigidly class divided in *cultural* terms than

Britain (notwithstanding the statistical evidence that it now has greater inequality in terms of income distribution) perhaps made it more publicly tolerable for senior union officials (like Bill Kelty) and even Communist ones (like Laurie Carmichael) to be openly part of the running of the country in Australia than in Britain. In contrast to the outcry against union 'barons' and 'beer and sandwiches' industrial relations which was raised in Britain under the Wilson and Callaghan governments, and in any subsequent attempts by Labour to resurrect an incomes policy, in Australia the image of unions improved among swinging voters rather than deteriorated with the ascension of union leaders into tripartite arrangements.

The explanation may also partly lie in the remarkable transformation of the ACTU and its outlook under and after Hawke's presidency. The different success rates of the two incomes policies may be because the Australian trade union leadership itself became thoroughly 'modernised' in the 1980s — in the sense that it moved further from traditional trade union political economy, became more captured by the middle class and more removed from rank-and-file unionists' opinion than in Britain, rather than because the outcomes of the policies were markedly better for trade union members in Australia than in Britain.

The ACTU under Hawke's presidency changed from its traditional orientation and began to diverge from the outlook of its counterpart in Britain, and this trend accelerated in the 1980s, a trend which was not matched in Britain until John Monks became general secretary of the TUC in 1993. The tradition of international solidarity between British and Australian union movements which had been exhibited nearly a century earlier in the 1889 London dock strike was still alive, with generous support given by individual Australian trade unions and unionists to the 1984–85 British miners' strike, and to the Fleet Street printing workers striking against Rupert Murdoch's shift to the new production plant at Wapping.[76] However, the heavy defeats of the British unions in these disputes

reinforced views among the Australian union *leaders* partic-
ipating in the Accord that their British counterparts were
irrelevant and ineffectual. The high-level study mission to
Western Europe sponsored by the ACTU and the Aus-
tralian government's Trade Development Council in 1986
was dismissive of the efforts made under Neil Kinnock to
reach an agreement with the TUC. In the substantial
report of their mission, entitled *Australia Reconstructed* and
published in 1987, the mission members wrote that:

> The British Labour Party and the TUC published a docu-
> ment at the end of 1985 called 'A New Partnership — A
> New Britain' which makes an interesting comparison with
> the ALP-ACTU Accord. The authors of this document
> have misunderstood the nature of a consensus strategy in
> that it makes no concession to the need to obtain
> favourable aggregate wage outcomes.[77]

Figures inside the TUC did keep putting targets for aggre-
gate wage outcomes in the drafts of the document, but
these were deleted by the Labour Party because in the
political climate which had descended on Britain by the
mid-1980s the whole idea of intervention in wage deter-
mination had become anathema.[78] It has remained so
since. Asked directly during his July 1995 visit to Australia
whether he would in any way seek to emulate the ALP gov-
ernment's Accord, Tony Blair explicitly ruled it out:

> I'm an admirer of the Accord and what it's achieved here
> ... But the two situations are rather different and I don't
> think the actual wage structure and award system exists in
> Britain that could allow you simply to transpose what is
> here to what is in Britain ... your award system gives a
> quite different shine to the way that government and
> trade unions could work together.[79]

He emphasised that:

> The relationship between a Labour government in Britain
> and the trade union movement has got to learn some of
> the lessons from the past as well, and I think there was a

general feeling that the relationship in the 1970s was wrong, and shouldn't be repeated.[80]

According to John Monks, then the TUC's deputy general secretary and soon to become its general secretary, reports in Britain that the *Australia Reconstructed* report contained a sentence to the effect that 'we have nothing to learn from Britain':

> stirred a lot of complacency out of quite a few people [and] was my first acknowledgement really that the Australian trade union movement was stirring [*sic*] from a rather British type.[81]

I have been unable to locate such a sentence in *Australia Reconstructed* although elsewhere Kelty is on record as defending the short shrift given to Britain in that report, declaring in 1987 that:

> There's not much you can say about the British trade union movement. Its bargaining capacity is virtually non-existent. You don't need more than a paragraph.[82]

This was in the context of an article reporting on the ACTU's rejection of 'a return to British-style unionism' and decision 'to continue with their Swedish-inspired experiment', and it may have been this article itself which prompted Monks' and others' reactions.

When Arthur Scargill, who had led the British miners' strike, visited Australia in 1991 as a guest of Australian mining unions, his message that 'Accord agreements like the one between the ACTU and the Federal government were doomed to fail because they suppressed the trade union movement's job of defending workers' wages and conditions'[83] received little positive reception among the mainstream Australian trade union leadership.

However, later efforts to rebuild contacts between the two peak union councils led to co-operative exchanges, direct visits by both the ACTU secretary and president to the TUC to promote what the union leadership had been

doing in Australia,[84] and considerable interest among leading TUC figures in the Australian Accord[85] and a desire (unrequited) to promote its virtues to the 'New Labour' leadership — reversing the process by which Ralph Willis imported incomes policy to Australia nearly 20 years earlier.

While the Australian union leaders were comparatively mute about the decline of real wages under the Accord, compared with the furious resistance of British trade unions in the 'winter of discontent', many trade union activists and members were much less sanguine. There was a steadily growing feeling as the various versions of the Accord (from Mark I through to Mark VIII) were presented that it had degenerated from being a wide-ranging partnership on policy into a mere mechanism for wages control, with major initiatives on industrial democracy, for instance, upon which the government published a discussion paper in 1984, having disappeared off the agenda.

Strong criticism of the Accord years by the national leadership of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) following Labor's loss of office in 1996 gave voice to years of bottled-up resentment at ordinary workers' wage restraint at a time of corporate excess in the 1980s. The union's national assistant secretary, John Sutton, on releasing a new economic platform in 1997, attacked the ALP's years of economic rationalism, saying workers were deeply disillusioned with tariff reductions, deregulation, privatisation and labour market reform. 'This is about recognising the groundswell of anger that exists among working people and their families ... that politicians are completely out of touch with their needs', he said.[86]

Above all, however, the different results of the attempts to impose incomes policies in the two countries simply reflect the international changes in the industrial relations climate — from wage militancy in the 1970s to union/management co-operation in the 1980s as the reality of a new economic order with high levels of unem-

ployment sank in, and trade union strategy altered accordingly. Apart from the exceptional year of the miners' strike in 1984–85, in Britain under Thatcher and Major the rate of industrial disputation was similarly low — indeed even lower — than in Australia, and historically low levels of working days lost have continued in Australia under the Howard government. The greater success of the modernisation strategy in the ALP than in British Labour depended then to an extent on fortuitous timing.

The Australian Labor government itself shifted decisively away from the centralised wage-fixing approach towards more decentralised 'enterprise bargaining' from 1993, which was a move towards the traditionally very different British model of free collective bargaining.[87]

The ardour with which Keating and in particular his industrial relations minister Laurie Brereton pursued the new agenda greatly alienated many in the trade union movement and other critics of the greater inequality of wages and insecurity of working conditions which the new model opened up — particularly in comparison with the Australian labour movement's traditional, centralised arbitration-based approach to wage fixing, which was arguably one of the Australian labour movement's greatest historic achievements in that it significantly promoted equality of incomes and standardisation of working conditions among wage and salary earners.

General Comparisons

The ALP government from 1983–96 faced more amenable national conferences of the party than did British labour governments, and found it easier to 'manage' dissent within the party. Partly this was due to the Australian conferences being less frequent — they moved almost imperceptibly (and possibly unconstitutionally) from being held biennially to triennially in the life of the Hawke and Keating governments, in contrast to the immutably annual gatherings of the British Labour Party. Partly it was because

the ALP national conferences were less directly represen-
tative of rank-and-file opinion than their British counter-
parts. Partly it was due to the lesser publicity traditionally
attaching to Labour (and indeed all political parties') con-
ferences in Australia vis-a-vis Britain; and partly also
perhaps due to the less direct and sizeable trade union
influence upon the ALP's national conferences, which (as
was indicated in Chapter 1) are very small in comparison
with the mass annual conferences of the British Labour
Party and which have no formal direct representation from
the unions, in contrast to the 'big battalions' of delegates
from the major unions who have traditionally dominated
the British event. Specific ALP state conference resolu-
tions condemning the Hawke government were often
diluted into far more equivocal resolutions by the time
that they were adopted at the national conference.

In many ways the rhetoric and practices of Bob Hawke
echoed those of Harold Wilson much more than those of
Gough Whitlam. Several personal likenesses between
Hawke and Wilson have been colourfully identified by
someone who lived under both men's prime minister-
ships; writing in 1984 about his impressions of Bob Hawke
as prime minister, Andrew Milner recalls that:

> This man ... is oddly familiar, strangely reminiscent of
> another Labour leader who inspired my own youthful
> political idealism some 20 years ago ...
>   It is all there: the same empty rhetoric about progress
> and reconciliation; the same ability to 'handle' the media,
> so that charlatanry itself becomes an expertise ... the
> same hint of megalomania, which, turned sour, becomes
> paranoia, the same substitution of personal ambition for
> political principle, of 'charisma' for policy. I have trav-
> elled 12,000 miles and 20 years, and here, come to haunt
> me, is Harold Wilson, not yet dead, but reincarnated, a
> little leaner, a little fitter, with an exaggeratedly Aus-
> tralian, rather than a north of England accent, but with
> the same Oxford education, recognisably the same
> Harold Wilson.[88]

To Milner's list of traits that the two men have in common can be added several others: first, their Nonconformist family backgrounds; second, the fact that both rose with the support of the Left, but later moved decisively to the Right; third, that both had a penchant for portraying themselves as consensual figures, bringing cohesion where there was division.

Wilson in 1964 declared that 'Labour wants to bring the entire nation into a working partnership', saying that 'the great weakness of the Conservatives is their failure to try to represent the "nation" as distinct from "a small minority" '. Labour by contrast would seek to harness the 'broader national interest' and evoke 'the spirit of national partnership' once in government.[89] His 1974 election slogan was 'Let Us Work Together', while in 1983 Hawke used the slogan 'Bringing Australia Together' and promised to bring national reconciliation to a country suffering from the 'divisive' Fraser years. Also in line with Wilson's approach, Hawke explicitly attempted to position Labor as the 'natural party of government'.[90] A further feature in common is the allegations of nepotism which both men attracted in government — Wilson's resignation honours list rewarded prominent business associates, just as Hawke allegedly dispensed favours to his 'rich mates'.[91]

However, in his usage of a language of modernisation and change, Wilson was somewhat closer to Whitlam and Keating than Hawke. The ground for the moderate and pragmatic Wilson government narrowly elected in October 1964 and re-elected, with a much increased majority, in March 1966 before losing office at the general election of June 1970 had been prepared by the substantial debates over ideological revisions undertaken in and around the British Labour Party from the late 1950s. British Labour's 'modernisation' and the electoral success which this seemed to bring was often contrasted at that time with the situation in Australia,[92] where the ALP still seemed in the 1960s to lag behind social change and to be

reluctant to update its policies and move into a new age. The ALP's elderly leader, Calwell, seemed to personify the lacklustre traditionalism of the party's mainstream; while his then up-and-coming deputy, Whitlam, represented the curtailed ambitions of the rising and impatient minority.

Harold Wilson himself had closely associated Labour with the imagery of modernisation in his efforts to bring the party out of the electoral wilderness. In the report of the Labour Party committee he chaired to enquire into the 1955 election defeat, he wrote that the party's electoral organisation was 'at the penny-farthing stage in the jet-propelled era, and, at that, is getting rusty and deteriorating with age'.[93] In particular he sought a more efficient focus of the party's electoral resources upon marginal seats. On the campaign trail in the lead-up to the 1964 election Wilson's most widely quoted comment was when he talked of creating a New Britain, 'forged in the white heat' of a technological 'revolution'.[94] Under the Conservatives, he said, the country had lagged behind the exhilarating pace of scientific progress in the world since World War Two. 'We are living in the jet-age but we are governed by an Edwardian establishment mentality ... Their approach and methods are fifty years out of date'. By contrast Wilson's Labour Party wanted 'to streamline our institutions, modernise methods of government' and create 'a Britain, not conservative, nostalgic, backward-looking', 'frustrated by the vested interests and institutions of a dead past' but altered by educational expansion 'to reflect the scientific and technological realities of the new age', the 'dynamic, scientific age'.[95]

Wilson encouraged expectations of a new beginning under Labour after what he portrayed as 13 years of stagnation under the Conservatives. '1964 can mean ... A chance for change ... A chance to sweep away the grouse-moor conception of Tory leadership and refit Britain with a new image, a new confidence. A chance to change the face and future of Britain.'[96] The theme of modernisation was continued into the 1966 election campaign. Labour's

publications in that year included *Modernising Government, A Ministry of Modernisation* and *A Modern Building Industry*; and the party even sought to associate its plans to update public enterprise with the prevailing atmosphere of change and vitality, entitling its publication on improving the Post Office *The GPO Gets With It*.[97] Like Wilson, Gough Whitlam's campaigns for the prime ministership encouraged Australian voters to take the opportunity for change, to 'renovate, rejuvenate, reinvigorate and liberate ... to refresh, remould and renew'[98]; to make 'a choice between the past and the future'[99]. From the time he became leader in 1967 Whitlam had sought to streamline the ALP's antiquated federal structure.[100] The 'It's Time' slogan at the centre of the successful 1972 campaign imparted the message that now something new should be tried after 23 years of lethargic government under the Australian conservative parties.

But Wilson and Whitlam were different kinds of modernisers. Wilson perhaps placed greater emphasis on the inevitability of technological change, while Whitlam's vision for change had firmer social democratic philosophical underpinnings. Whitlam was personally quite scathing of the Wilson government's record, recalling that he told his colleagues at one of their cabinet meetings 'to hurry up and get going or they would be like Wilson and leave nothing'.[101] However, he is more generous to Wilson than he is to Hawke. When I asked him about comparisons between Hawke, whom Whitlam has described elsewhere as 'a prime minister without purpose and [who] never had any policies'[102], and Wilson, he replied that to make *any* comparison between Hawke and Wilson would be 'a bit harsh on Wilson'![103]

While as John Warhurst has rightly identified,[104] the discontinuities between the Whitlam governments and the Hawke and Keating governments have in some respects been exaggerated, and while there were elements of economic rationalism in Whitlam's approach (exhibited for instance in his 25 per cent across-the-board cut in

Figure 5.6: The ALP's standing in the opinion polls 1983–96

tariffs in 1973), he did have a much stronger commitment to a Keynesian and interventionist role for government than Keating would ever later exhibit. Although their argument has been hotly debated, Graham Maddox and Tim Battin have, to my mind, convincingly demonstrated that the Hawke government *did* mark a fundamental break from the past traditions of democratic socialist political economy in Australia, particularly from the economic policies of the Chifley government but also from many of the policies of the Whitlam government. They have also demonstrated that even the Keating government's more expansionary approach to tackling unemployment in its latter years was, in substance, still a mere shadow of the programs which were pursued in the post-war years.

Like the Wilson government in 1970 and the Callaghan government in 1979, the ALP experienced dangerous fall-offs within its base of electoral support after taking office in 1983, and particularly in the 1990 federal election and the next two years (see Figure 5.6[105]). The experience of the

Wilson and Callaghan governments culminated in a deep disillusionment among Labour's erstwhile working-class supporters. However, the ALP managed — with a partial return to labourist policies and the considerable aid of a poor performance and extremist policies on the part of its opposition — to contain and reverse similar sentiments sufficiently to unexpectedly retain government at the 1993 election, before reaping the full fury of the accumulated anger felt by 'the battlers' in 1996 after it breached its previous election promises by reverting to some unpopular tax measures, and after the Coalition opposition finally presented a safe and moderate alternative.

Over the 13 years of Labor in office there were a number of distinct policy phases. The first phase, 1983–90, was marked by the pursuit of consistently economic 'rationalist' policies with Hawke and Keating working together at the helm. The next phase, following the formal onset of the recession in November 1990 until Hawke was toppled by Keating as prime minister in December 1991, was one of indecisiveness of policy direction exacerbated by the all-consuming leadership struggle between the two men. The final phase, with Keating as prime minister from 1992–96, was marked by some important shifts in the Labor government's political direction.

The image of society which Paul Keating as prime minister worked with was essentially similar to Hawke's. His first major new policy initiative as prime minister in February 1992 was titled *One Nation* (in line with the oft-cited moderate 'One Nation' toryism in Britain) and was therefore continuous with Hawke's imagery of 'Bringing Australia Together'. From the moment he took the top job from Hawke in December 1991, however, Keating worked strenuously to transform himself from a free-market, modernising treasurer into a prime minister firmly in touch with Labor tradition. He was necessarily very anxious to convey the sense that there was now a substantial shift in political direction. As soon as he became leader he promised to introduce new policies. He later recalled that:

> We were fitted up with the policies and rhetoric of the 80s. We had to change that and change our position. Now that's what we succeeded in doing over the 15 months to the [1993] election [from December 1991]. Re-ordering the debate, saying that there was a role of government.[106]

Senator Graham Richardson similarly asserted that:

> *One Nation* set a direction and Keating stamped on the place in February of 1992 that there was now a change in thinking: that the government that had cut and cut and cut was now prepared to spend money, not just to get Australia going again, but it was a recognition that infrastructure spending had fallen behind and we had to do it. And that was a major change. And everything we've done since then follows that direction.[107]

The ALP issued a substantial new publication in 1992 (following the Coalition's adoption of *Fightback!*) entitled *Poles Apart*,[108] to emphasise the degree of policy difference that now existed between Labor and the Coalition parties. As Keating sought to restore some sense of ideological purpose to Labor in government after taking over the leadership in December 1991, he — and his speechwriter, Don Watson — began increasingly to refer to Labor's 'true believers'.

The term 'true believer' had been earlier used by the anti-totalitarian United States author Eric Hoffer to describe political fanaticism.[109] In Australia, the term 'true believers' came into political parlance from the title of an Australian Broadcasting Corporation television series first screened in 1988, which dramatised the political battles of the 1940s and 1950s.[110] The suggestion of that series' title was that, in contrast to the pragmatic present, the post-World War Two political era was a time when the players in Australian (and Labor) politics really were motivated by sincere convictions. In this sense it was in line with Daniel Bell's famous thesis that the 1950s marked *The End of Ideology* (referred to earlier, in Chapter 2) in the politics of the advanced industrial nations.

Subsequently, however, in its usage by Keating and other Labor politicians the term 'true believers' was invoked in order to claim *continuity* between the grand principles of Labor's past and the practices of the incumbent federal government: to imply that far from being extinct, true belief was alive and well. Paul Keating declared on the night of Labor's against-the-odds 1993 election win that 'this is a victory for the true believers': and the process of life imitating and embellishing art continued when the stirring theme music of the television series was played at the ALP's subsequent official victory celebration. Merchandise was even produced for ALP supporters including a T-shirt declaring that 'I am a True Believer'; and a 'True Believer' pen.

Interestingly, the theme music used in *The True Believers* is in fact the very English composition 'Jupiter, the Bringer of Jollity' from Gustav Holst's opus, 'The Planets'. It also sounds very similar to the music composed by Hubert Parry for William Blake's poem 'To Build a New Jerusalem', which has long been sung by delegates at the end of annual conferences of the British Labour Party, and which calls up a powerful emotional identification with socialism's original objection to the pollution of England's 'green and pleasant land' by the 'dark satanic mills' of the industrial revolution. Holst's 'Jupiter', composed in 1916 and drawing on traditional English folk melodies, was put to words in 1918 in the very patriotic English hymn 'I Vow to Thee My Country, all earthly things above'.[111] It is somewhat ironic that such an English tune became regularly used and associated with the nationalistic, Australian republic-centred agenda espoused by Paul Keating in the early to mid-1990s. The scriptwriter of *The True Believers,* Bob Ellis, in later writings for ALP politicians, continued to draw upon a strong influence of British labour movement emotions and rhetoric.[112] His input to the first budget address-in-reply of the new Labor opposition leader, Kim Beazley, in 1996, responding to the new Howard conservative government's

cuts to social programs, reprised a speech Neil Kinnock had made in 1983 warning British voters contemplating re-election of Thatcher 'not to be ordinary ... not to be young ... not to fall ill ... not to get old'.[113]

Through the use of these emotional devices, through newly philosophical speeches and rhetoric about social democracy, and by picking up some of the previously marginalised Whitlamite themes and policies on constitutional reform, Aboriginal land rights and, later, urban and regional development and access to justice, Paul Keating succeeded in restoring some sense of idealism in Labor ranks in the 15 months to the 1993 election.

The process of rehabilitating party traditions continued on the eve of the launch of the 1994 white paper on employment,[114] *Working Nation*, when Keating visited the same Melbourne factory where Chifley had, 46 years earlier, launched the first Holden car to be made in Australia. The symbolism of the location, and the more general attempt to claim a direct line of descent from the revered Chifley with this white paper, were obvious; as was the contrast with the early years of the Hawke government when there was comparatively little effort put into associating the present Labor government with past Labor governments. Hawke himself had often claimed a personal affinity with John Curtin,[115] but the credibility of this had been severely dented by a sharp critique from 'Nugget' Coombs in 1984, who disputed Bob Hawke's claim that Curtin was a 'consensus' prime minister in the same way that Hawke himself was. Coombs contrasted Curtin's approach to that of Hawke and his then treasurer Keating's 'pursuit of consensus by the adoption of the policies of the Opposition', declaring that:

> Curtin had an acute sense of the limits of public opinion. But they were limits which he worked on indefatigably to mould to the purposes of the Labour Party. All his energy, his competence, his eloquence and dedication were directed to extending the range of consensus about those purposes ... And the consensus was to be on the govern-

ment's terms. It was to yield no abandonment of basic principle.[116]

The retreat by ALP leaders from the previously uncompromising themes of reform, change and modernisation from 1992 marked a recognition that these themes were no longer tenable among Labor Party members and in the party's electoral heartlands. There was a limit to how far the ALP and its supporters could be pushed. People increasingly realised that the kind of change being pursued in the name of modernisation meant in reality the embrace of alien philosophies and the imposition of job loss and uncertainty which clearly ran contrary to their own interests.

The British Labour Party's own reference point has recently shifted from nostalgia for 'that golden age — the Labour governments of 1945–51' which Gareth Stedman-Jones criticised in the early 1980s,[117] to a rediscovery under Blair of the importance of the early liberal radicals and ethical socialists who pre-dated those with 'statist' preoccupations who became prominent from the 1930s. This is being reflected in the emerging new histories of the party.[118]

Conclusion

The British and Australian labour parties are essentially similar in their institutional forms and ideologies. There have over time been very close links between some of the trade unions on which the parties were originally based and between some of the parties' most important individuals. There has also been considerable cross-fertilisation between the British and Australian labour parties in their policy programs, and in the strategic reassessments which they — and elements within them — have undertaken. There are also important differences between the parties, deriving most notably from the more varied and open sociological setting in Australia, the deep and widespread constitutional, political and organisational effects of Australia's federal system and the less complex and less lively tradition of ideological dispute in and around the ALP.

There are many specific parallels between the two labour parties which are hidden by the usual tendency to compare and contrast them at particular moments, frozen in time, but which become visible in a broad and long-range historical perspective.

These include the interesting and shifting relationships which 'third' or 'other' parties have had to the various, diverse elements of the two labour parties' electoral constituencies since the 1970s. Similarities between the formal splits in the British and Australian labour parties which ocurred in 1981 and 1955 respectively are

invisible within a narrow chronological range of reference, but by looking at the fluid, uneasy coalitions of viewpoints which have existed within the two parties over a longer period, some interesting parallels between these events, and their consequences, also emerge.

The often subterranean factional activities of the two labour parties exhibit some consistent patterns in terms of the nature of the differences between their Left and Right factions, and the tensions within their Left factions, suggesting for instance that the differences between 'mass' and 'vanguard' orientations, and between 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' personal dispositions, may be more valuable explanatory distinctions than other categorisations. Comparison of the two labour parties' factions shows the recurring pressures which are exerted on ideological principle by the exigencies of power, the potent effects of patronage, and the tendencies for personal ambitions and personality conflicts to override alignments on more philosophical bases.

There are some striking and previously almost unremarked similarities between the Wilson and Callaghan governments in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Hawke and Keating governments in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, in the economic circumstances they faced, the policies they followed, and the political language they used, despite their being in office in very different different decades.

Criticising one labour party and holding up the other as a model have occurred regularly, but the identity of the party which is in favour and the one that is out of favour in these kinds of comparisons has regularly altered. Even at very specific times, there can be no simple summations about which of the British and Australian labour parties has been more to the Left or Right (leaving aside the question of whether these terms themselves are problematic, as was canvassed in Chapter 2). The Attlee government was more ambitiously left-wing than the Chifley government on economic policy, but less so in relation to

US foreign policy. The ALP in opposition in the 1960s under Calwell continued to be to the left of British Labour on foreign policy questions and the Whitlam government was more radical than the Wilson and Callaghan governments in general. Conversely, the Hawke and Keating governments did less than the Wilson governments had done to improve the relative educational opportunities of people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds; although they were more progressive and principled on immigration issues. The ALP governments of 1983–96 were to the right of the contemporary British Labour Party on economic issues, though arguably more to the left on industrial relations in that they co-operated closely with the trade unions over a long period.

The inherently mystifying, at times maddening concept of 'modernisation' has recurrently featured in, and actively influenced the histories of, both British and Australian labour parties since the 1960s.

The stratagem for the 'modernisation' of the British Labour Party commenced in 1959 with the election of Hugh Gaitskell as leader, whereas in the ALP it did not start in earnest until 1967 when Gough Whitlam was elected leader. However, though the ALP started later, its 'modernisation' was initially the more decisive. Gough Whitlam wrenched power in the party out of the hands of the unions and found the ALP a much larger and firmer constituency among non-manual workers in the early 1970s, whereas British Labour did not do so until Tony Blair's electoral triumph in 1997. The reaction in the ALP from the mid-1970s against the perceived *excesses* of the Whitlam government put the ALP in a very different political position to the British Labour Party from 1979 until the mid-1990s, due to a movement the opposite way in the British Labour Party, against the perceived *inadequacies* of the Wilson and Callaghan governments.

While there is no doubt that changes have been necessary for the British and Australian labour parties, too uncritical an attachment to 'modernisation', a tempera-

mental propensity by some to embrace change for change's sake, has been detrimental at times to the parties' general sense of ideological purpose, to the coherence of their core support bases, to their internal cohesion, and to the clarity of their policy direction and extent of achievement in office, causing a damaging backlash after periods of government.

The Blair government in Britain as it enters its third anniversary in office needs to carefully heed these lessons.

Many of those who were associated with 'modernisation' in the 1960s, in both labour parties, became critics of what could be termed its 'second wave', in the 1980s and 1990s. Some, such as Don Dunstan in Australia, not long before his death in 1999, have felt the need to speak up and point out that while social change may have made it necessary to reassess some of the parties' objectives and methods, the basic exploitation and inequality which the parties have traditionally opposed is still thriving, in new forms, and still needs to be confronted. While the British and Australian labour parties do want to change radically some aspects of our society, it is simply a matter of common sense that there are other aspects which they believe are worth conserving. While sweeping social changes have occurred, there is no less need today than there was yesterday for the principal things that earlier generations in the labour movement fought for and won — like comprehensive welfare coverage, award wage protection, a fairer and more equal relationship between employers and wage-earners, government intervention to protect the disadvantaged, and full employment through the generation of more jobs as a central policy goal. The future success of both parties will depend on thinking beyond the simple and flawed black and white dichotomy between 'modernisation' as something inherently good which they must embrace, and party 'tradition' as something inherently embarrassing for which they must apologise. A very delicate balance will need to be struck between those changes that are needed, and those characteristics which ought to be maintained.

The slogan 'modernisation' returned in the 1990s among the enthusiasts for Tony Blair's 'New Labour', seemingly without historical awareness of the past failures of similar 'modernisers' to actually deliver in government on the expectations which all their rhetoric aroused. If the British and Australian labour parties feel embarrassed or old fashioned about defending their gains of the past, this is to some extent a sign of the New Right's success in making their extreme free market ideology seem like the natural course of human evolution.

The moral, communitarian aspect of Tony Blair's rhetoric struck a chord in Britain, worn out from the ravages of Thatcherism. And it is likely to strike a similar chord in Australia if the ALP further picks up the theme of rebuilding communities rather than continuing to fragment them with relentless economic restructuring.

Kim Beazley has praised Tony Blair's focus on 'community values'.[1] There are valid reservations about the tendency of 'communitarian' thinking to stigmatise people outside conventional family structures. But communitarian ideas do offer an interesting alternative construct to the dominant neo-liberalism or economic 'rationalism' which has cast its shadow over the two labour parties since the mid-to-late 1970s, and from which the parties are not likely to fully emerge until they engage in their own distinctive, more rigorous thinking about alternative economic approaches, in particular about how to deal with the many contradictory aspects of 'globalisation' in a manner which advances the interests of their own constituencies, the people whose support they must hold if they are to govern effectively, or indeed to govern at all.

One of the reasons for the British Labour Party's long spell in opposition, and in particular its failure to improve the turnout by many working-class voters since the 1970s, was the fact that its governments drifted too far from the 'traditional' concerns of those voters for job security, because of overenthusiasm for economic 'modernisation'. Rebuilding and nurturing the confidence of party

members and activists, and potential members and activists, alienated by the overthrow of so many central policy commitments and core ideological principles in the 1980s and 1990s, is something which the ALP only began to do in the period 1996–98, and which it has unfortunately tended to reverse since then.

There is a clear contradiction between Tony Blair's proclaimed desire to rebuild community values and his simultaneous commitment to a freer market, given that the incursions of free-market forces are a primary reason for the break-up of old communities. If the tradition of ethical socialism is to be genuinely recovered, as he says it should, then the very radical implications of its critique of the market ought to be recognised too.

After the ALP's 1996 election defeat the new leader, Kim Beazley, when asked whether he saw himself as epitomising 'traditional' or 'modern' Labor replied, significantly, that: 'I'm a traditionalist'.[2] Beazley has rightly rejected as facile the calls by some to emulate Tony Blair's version of a 'Third Way' – most vocally made in newspaper columns by maverick MP Mark Latham, for whom the term 'Third Way' has become a mantra which apparently can mean whatever he says it means, but which is particularly about dismantling the continued provision of welfare support on a basis of need. Beazley recognises that the ALP has already had a Blair-style policy phase itself, particularly from 1983–90. Initially Beazley seemed to recognise that Labor's most pressing task in opposition was to continue to repair the damage of that period. The ALP under Beazley in its first phase of opposition in 1996–98 built on and consolidated the partial movement back to some of Labor's policy traditions which was taking place under prime minister Keating in the 1992–96 phase, placing emphasis on full employment as the paramount objective of economic policy, supporting greater public investment in health and education, and also, significantly, returning to a strong commitment to centralised wage-fixing. This approach was expressed in the new ALP

platform adopted in 1998 and it aided the ALP's recovery
of some support at the October 1998 Australian election.
A similar campaign in protest against the social costs of
the harsh economic restructuring and downsizing which
occurred under the Victorian Kennett Government from
1992–99 saw new Victorian ALP Leader Steve Bracks make
striking progress for Labor in the September 1999 State
election and return the party to government with the
support of independents.

However, since October 1998 Beazley and the ALP
nationally have disappointingly shifted towards rhetoric
which extols further 'modernisation' and which repudi-
ates many very good aspects of Labor policy tradition as
mere 'sentimentality'[3], rather than recognising them as
the essential ideological fuel which the party in fact needs
to keep on running. This shift has been propelled from
some surprising quarters, with some parliamentary
members of the Left embarking on their own disturbing
departures from Left policies[4], reviving a policy polarisa-
tion between them and others[5] who have remained rela-
tively firm on fundamental Labor approaches to
economics and industry development. Heightened influ-
ence, and an influx back into the ranks of ALP parlia-
mentarians and advisers, of individuals from the Right
wedded to the agenda of the 1980s has also propelled this
policy reversion. Rather than adopt more interventionist
and redistributive economic policies to consolidate and
further extend Labor's support, they prefer to promote
punitive and regressive social policies. They expend enor-
mous energy on tackling individuals' supposed barriers to
moving from 'welfare to work' but very little on tackling
the biggest and most obvious barrier, which is the absence
of enough jobs. They take the modest gains of traditional
Labor support for granted and pursue upwardly mobile
voters with 'aspirations' as if these constituencies are sep-
arate. The challenge for the ALP now is to enhance,
rather than erode the 1998 platform; to follow it through
rather than ignore it in drafting the party's forthcoming

election policies; and then to implement that platform if elected to government. The material and analysis assembled in this book indicate that the ALP will need to develop further, more thoroughly, more credibly and more innovatively in the direction it took from 1996–98 in its next phase, in the new century and new millenium, and not revert to the 1980s policies, if it is to hold support and rebuild it further.

If the historical events and analysis which have been evoked in this study are applied to the current contrasting situations of the two labour parties, then the British Labour Party's very long experience in opposition from 1979–97 should serve to remind the ALP of the importance of avoiding pitfalls such as excessive disunity, while the ALP's recent experience of government should remind the British Labour Party of what it knew in the 1970s: that being in government by itself is not enough — you have to fulfil the hopes of your core supporters, if you are to sustain them.

Appendix

Chronology of important events and links

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1788	Convict transportation commences		
1832	Reform Bill grants votes only to owners or occupiers of property worth £10 a year		
1834	Tolpuddle martyrs transported		
1838	The People's Charter is published, calling for universal adult male suffrage, abolition of property qualifications for MPs, payment of MPs, equal electoral districts and annual parliaments; starting a mass movement, Chartism, over the next decade		
1840s			Beginnings of British style craft unions and other labour movement institutions in Australian colonial cities
1844	Rochdale Co-operative Society founded		

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1848	Chartism defeated (but elements of the tradition survive for a considerable time)		
1850s		Gold rushes commence. Major population influx, and transplantation of Chartist ideas and trade union experiences from Britain to Australia, over next two decades. Migration of miners from Britain, esp. Northumberland, Durham and Scotland to Newcastle, NSW	
1852		William Guthrie Spence arrives in Australia, aged 6	
1854			Eureka Stockade rebellion at Ballarat features Chartist demands
1856			Eight hour day achieved by Melbourne stonemasons. Other craftsmen follow but rest of working class still lacks organisation
			All Victorian men get the vote for lower house elections
1858			All NSW men get the vote (and secret ballots and equal electoral districts) for lower house elections
1867	Votes are granted only to skilled urban working men		
1883		Tom Price arrives in Australia, aged 31	
1884	Some rural working men get the vote	William Morris Hughes arrives in Australia, aged 22	

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1884 cont.			
1885		George Lansbury arrives in Australia, aged 25 William Lane arrives in Brisbane, aged 24 Andrew Fisher arrives in Australia, aged 23	
1886		Joseph Cook arrives in Australia, aged 25 Chris Watson arrives in Australia from NZ, aged 19	
1887		George Lansbury returns to Britain	
1888		William Holman arrives in Australia, aged 16	
1889	London dock strike. Australian unionists and others render massive assistance	Henry Boote arrives in Australia, aged 24	
1880s–early 1890s	Class conflict and major strikes in both countries as economic boom turns to bust and employers mount a counter-offensive against union wage gains		
1890		Harry Champion arrives in Melbourne	
1891	The encyclical *Rerum Novarum* is issued by Pope Leo XIII		Labor Electoral Leagues formed in NSW and 35 Labor candidates elected to the NSW Legislative Assembly
1892		Champion returns to Britain	Labor-in-Politics Convention in Brisbane marks formation of Queensland Labor Party

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1892 cont.			Ten Labor members elected to Victorian parliament
			Ten Labor members elected to South Australian parliament
1893	Independent Labour Party formed		16 Labor members elected to Queensland parliament
1894		Champion comes again to Melbourne	
1897–98		Ben Tillett visits Australia	
1898		Sidney and Beatrice Webb visit Australia	
1899			Labor government elected in Queensland
			Labor Party formed in Western Australia
1900	Labour Party formed		
	Two Labour candidates (Keir Hardie and Richard Bell) elected to House of Commons		
1901			Federation of the six Australian colonies into one independent nation
			14 Labor candidates elected to House of Representatives and 8 to the Senate

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1902		Tom Mann arrives in Australia, aged 46	All women get the vote in Federal elections
1903			23 Labor members elected to House of Representatives and 14 to Senate
1904			Minority Federal Labor government under Watson
1906	29 Labour candidates elected to House of Commons	Ramsay and Margaret MacDonald visit Australia	27 Labor candidates elected to House of Representatives and 16 to Senate
1908	Liberal government enacts Old Age Pensions Act	Hardie visits Australia / Tillett visits Australia again	
1908–09			Minority Federal Labor government under Fisher
1910		Mann returns to Britain / Albert Monk arrives in Australia, aged 10	
1910–13			Majority Labor government under Fisher
1911	Liberal government enacts National Insurance Act	Fisher visits Britain; Vida Goldstein visits Britain; Holman visits Britain	
1914–15			Majority Labor government under Fisher
1915		Watson visits Britain	

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1915–16			Majority Labor government under Hughes
1915–21		Fisher High Commissioner to London	
1916	Conscription controversy	Hughes goes to London	Conscription crisis
1916–17			National Labor Party government under Hughes
1917–23			Nationalist government under Hughes
1918	'Almost' all men and all women except those under 30 and those without a certain measure of property, either their own or their husband's, get the vote Labour Party adopts new constitution including Clause Four		
1919–29		Migration of British, esp. Scottish, miners to Wonthaggi, Victoria	
1921			ALP adopts socialist objective
1923		Joe Chamberlain arrives in Western Australia	
1924	Minority Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald		Compulsory voting introduced

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1925		Seamen's strike 'across the Empire'	
1926		Harold Wilson (age 10) visits Australia	
1928	Women under 30 get the vote; ie virtual universal adult franchise at last		
1929–32			Majority Labor government under James Scullin
1929–31	Minority Labour government under MacDonald		
1931–35	National government under MacDonald		
1938		Ernest Bevin visits Australia; Hugh Dalton visits Australia	
1940–49/51	Labour in power 1940–45 (in coalition) 1945–51 (majority)		Labor in power 1941–43 (minority) 1943–49 (majority)
1942	Beveridge Report	'Doc' Evatt visits Britain; 'Nugget' Coombs visits Britain	
1944	Full Employment white paper	John Curtin visits Britain	
1947	Communist parties internationally return to opposing reformist parties	Netta Burns in Britain	
1947–49			
1950		John Ducker arrives in Australia, aged 18	
1951–52		Jim Cairns in Britain	
1950s	Social change, electoral defeats, growing ideological uncertainty		

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1952–55		Bob Hawke at Oxford	
1955	Hugh Gaitskell elected leader of Labour Party		
1955–58		Tony Blair (aged 2–5) in Adelaide	
1956	Tony Crosland's *The Future of Socialism* published		
1957		Cyril Isaac (later Wyndham) arrives in Australia, aged 27	
1957–63	Gaitskell tries but fails to delete Clause Four	Neal Blewett at Oxford	
1958–59		James Callaghan visits Australia	
1959		John Button working for British TUC and Crossman; Clem Attlee visits Australia	
1963	Gaitskell dies. Harold Wilson elected leader of Labour Party		
1964	Labour government elected under Wilson	Crosland visits Australia	
1966	Labour government re-elected with huge increase in majority		ALP suffers massive election defeat
1967			Gough Whitlam elected leader of ALP
1968–70		Gareth Evans at Oxford	
1970	Wilson government defeated		
1972			Whitlam government elected

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1972–75		Geoff Gallop, Peter Thomson and Tony Blair at Oxford	
1973–76		Kim Beazley at Oxford	
1974	Wilson government elected again, in February (as minority) and October (as majority)	Whitlam and Wilson meet in Britain as respective labour prime ministers	Whitlam government re-elected narrowly
1975			Whitlam government dismissed, then heavily defeated at election
1976	Wilson resigns. Callaghan elected leader of Labour Party, becomes prime minister. Government loses its overall majority		
1977		Stuart Holland visits Australia	
1978		Paul Keating visits Britain / Ralph Willis visits Britain	
1979	Callaghan government defeated; Margaret Thatcher elected prime minister		
1980	Michael Foot becomes leader of Labour Party	Bill Hayden visits Britain	
1980–81			
1983	Labour Party suffers massive electoral defeat; Neil Kinnock replaces Foot as leader	Bob Hawke visits Britain	ALP elected to government in landslide

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1984	Year-long miners' strike begins		ALP government re-elected with reduced majority
1987	Labour Party vote improves only moderately		Hawke government comfortably re-elected
1990		Tony Blair and Gordon Brown visit Australia	Hawke government narrowly re-elected on a much lower primary vote
1991		Bill Kelty visits British TUC; Arthur Scargill visits Australia	Keating replaces Hawke as leader and prime minister
1992	Labour Party loses fourth consecutive election; John Smith replaces Kinnock as leader		
1993		John Smith's chief of staff visits Australia	ALP wins surprise (and decisive) fifth election victory
1994	After Smith's sudden death, Tony Blair becomes leader		
1995		Blair visits Australia twice; John Prescott visits Australia	
1996			Keating ALP government heavily defeated; Kim Beazley elected leader

YEAR	BRITAIN	LINKS	AUSTRALIA
1997	Blair leads British Labour to election win	Beazley visits Britain	
1998			ALP wins back a net 19 seats on a slightly improved primary vote but fails to win government
1999			Beazley and senior shadow ministers signal a clear change of political direction away from the 1996–98 rebuilding and reconnecting phase

Endnotes

Introduction

1. J. Rentoul, *Tony Blair*, Warner, London, 1997, p 89.

2. See Tony Blair's foreword in P. FitzSimons, *Beazley: A Biography*, Harper Collins, Sydney, 1998, and pp 134, 287, 430–2.

3. R.J.L. Hawke, *The Hawke Memoirs*, William Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 1994, p 254.

4. Discussed in M. Jones, *Michael Foot*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1994, p 506.

5. Personal interview with Michael Foot, Labour leader from 1980–83.

6. This letter, from an L.J. Francis, is quoted in J. Pilger, 'The Lesson of Australia's Hard Labour', *New Statesman and Society*, 10 June 1994.

7. Pilger, ibid.

8. This was in his 1985 essay 'The Impasse of Social Democratic Politics'; reproduced in L. Panitch, *Working Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State*, Verso, London, 1986 at p 35.

9. *The Australian Labor Party: A Model for Others?* Fabian Society, London, 1989, extracts from which were published as 'The Australian Road to Socialism?', *New Socialist*, No. 64, December 1989/January 1990, pp 17–19.

10. Personal interview with John Burton, Constituency Agent to Tony Blair.

11. Personal interview with Neil Kinnock.

12. Information supplied privately.

13. Personal interview with Peter Mandelson. Mandelson is a senior minister in the Blair government, has been MP for Hartlepool since 1992 and was previously Labour Party director of campaigns and communications, 1985–90.

14. As reported in the *Herald Sun*, Melbourne, 5 December 1995.

15. *The Age*, 27 December 1995.

16. *The Guardian*, 4 September 1995.

17. For example, Race Mathews in his unpublished paper 'What is to Be Done?', typescript, Melbourne, n.d., c 1966 (although he would later revise his views of the comparative proficiency of British Labour in this period after reading the revelations in J. Morgan (ed.) *The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman*, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1981); and J. Jupp, 'Their Labour and Ours', in H. Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics: A Reader*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967.

18. See for instance P. Berry and G. Kitchener, *Can Unions Survive?*, Building Workers Industrial Union (ACT Branch), Dickson ACT, 1989, pp 21–26.

19. For instance, the Municipal Officers Association and the Australian Council Of Social Service sent delegations enquiring into water privatisation.

20. *The Capital Funding of Public Enterprise in Australia*, H.V. Evatt Research Centre, Sydney, March 1988, p 5.

21. F.F. Piven (ed.), *Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1992.

22. In addition to a number of books — H. Stretton, *Political Essays*, Georgian House, Melbourne, 1987; D. Jaensch, *The Hawke-Keating Hijack: The ALP in Transition*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989; G. Maddox, *The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition*, Penguin, Melbourne, 1989; C. Johnson, *The Labor Legacy: Curtin, Chifley, Whitlam, Hawke*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989; and P. Beilharz, *Transforming Labor: Labour Tradition and the Labor Decade*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 — there has been considerable journal literature on this question, notably featuring G. Maddox and T. Battin and various respondents in the *Australian Journal of Political Science* in 1991–92 and subsequently J. Warhurst, 'Transitional Hero: Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31, No. 2, July 1996, pp 243–52.

23. P. Kelly, *The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, p 661.

24. R. Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, Fontana, London, 1983, pp 208–9, 320.

25. ibid., p 245.

26. See R. Eckersley (ed.), *Measuring Progress: Is Life Getting Better?*, CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 1998.

Chapter 1: Similarities, links and differences between the parties to the 1960s

1. D. Rawson illuminates the historical distinctions between labour parties and other parties, and between major and minor labour parties, in 'The Life Span of Labour Parties', *Political Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp 313–33.

2. Rawson, p 317.

3. This process of transplantation is well encapsulated in (both the title and content of) the book *Under New Heavens: Cultural Transmission and the Making of Australia*, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1989, edited by N. Meaney.

4. Other countries that nominally have labour parties, which have been listed as full or consultative member parties of the Socialist International in the 1990s, include: Barbados, Brazil (Democratic Labour Party), Malta, Mauritius, Fiji, St Lucia, St Kitts-Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.

5. See B.E. Mansfield, 'The Socialism of William Morris: England and Australia', *Historical Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 27, November 1956, pp 271–90.

6. G. Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History*, Croom Helm, New York, second edition 1986, Parts 1–3.

7. Australian Labor Party, *Official Report of Proceedings of the Ninth Commonwealth Conference held at Trades Hall, Brisbane on Monday, October 10 1921 and following days*, Labor Call Print, Melbourne, 1921.

8. Jim Cairns studied under Cole for a year at Oxford in 1951, and Bill Hayden quoted his writings in his 1968 Victorian Fabian Society pamphlet, *The Contemporary Implications of Democratic Socialism*.

9. This is evident from an examination of his papers at Nuffield College, Oxford and from a remark he made to Jim Cairns, who recalls that in 1951 'When I asked him if he ever thought about coming to Australia, he said, 'No, no, I haven't ... I thought one day I might go to New Zealand and I suppose I'd have to go to Australia on the way": Personal interview with Jim Cairns.

10. On the Tolpuddle Martyrs and the many lesser-known protesters transported to the colonies, see G. Rudé, *Protest and Punishment:*

The Story of the Social and Political Protesters transported to Australia, 1788–1868, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978. E. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé have also undertaken a specific study of the agricultural labourers transported to the Australian colonies following the major 1830 rebellion in *Captain Swing: A Social History of the Great English Agricultural Uprising of 1830*, Norton, New York, 1968, Chapter 14.

11. R. Gollan, *The Coalminers of New South Wales: A History of the Union 1860–1960*, Melbourne University Press in association with the Australian National University, Melbourne, 1963, pp 17–18.

12. See J. Hagan, *Printers and Politics: A History of the Australian Printing Unions 1850–1950*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966.

13. See K. Buckley, *The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia, 1852–1920*, Department of Economic History, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1970, and T. Sheridan, *Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920–1972*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

14. Carpenters and Joiners records, University of Warwick Modern Records Centre (MRC), specifically (in MSS.78/OS/4/1/16 and 20) the run of issues of the *Fortnightly Return* (renamed *Fortnightly Return Sheet* as of 27 November 1856) from October 1834 to December 1910, a journal of the Friendly Society of Operative Stone Masons (OSM).

15. The MRC holds the Admissions books of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (ASC&J), 1895–1920, including the details of membership of overseas branches for this period. These amount to 26 very large volumes. Hagan in *The ACTU: A Short History on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary 1927–1977*, Reed, Sydney, 1977, reproduced the page of the 1901 book for the Brisbane branch to demonstrate how many had first joined in England and Scotland, and a glance at the 1896 book shows the same is true of the Sydney 2nd Newtown branch in 1896. There were some 19 ASC&J branches in Australia indicated in the Admissions book for this year.

16. Report from the Colonial Deputation appointed by ASW General Council concerning relations between the ASW in the British Isles and its overseas districts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, Warwick MRC, MSS.78/ASW/3/2/210, typescript document, n.d. c.1922.

17. See H.L. Harris, 'The Influence of Chartism in Australia', *Royal Australian Historical Society Journal*, Vol. 11, Part 6, 1926, esp. pp 366–78.

18. Whose lineage and links with the labour movement are chronicled by G. Blainey, *Odd Fellows: A History of IOOF Australia*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991.

19. See E. McKewen, 'Coalminers in Newcastle, New South Wales: A Labour Aristocracy?', in E. Fry (ed.), *Common Cause: Essays in Australian and New Zealand Labour History*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986, pp 77–92.

20. See P.F. Donovan, 'Australia and the Great London Dock Strike 1889', *Labour History*, No. 23, November 1972, pp 17–26.

21. The key text which aroused this interest was W. Pember Reeves, *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand*, first published 1902; new edition by Macmillan, Melbourne, 1969 (two volumes).

22. See the entries for Champion, Henry Hyde by G. Serle in B. Nairn (Gen. Ed.), *Australian Dictionary of Biography Volume 7 1891–1939*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp 603–5 and by A. Whitehead in J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds.), *Dictionary of Labour Biography*, Macmillan, London, Vol. 8, pp 24–32. The Webbs' experiences and responses are recorded in A.G. Austin (ed.), *The Webbs' Australian Diary*, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Melbourne, 1965. For Mann see G. Osborne's study, 'Tom Mann: His Australasian Experience 1902–1910', PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1972. The most comprehensive account of Tillett's visits is K.S. Inglis, 'Ben Tillett in Australia', a paper given to the University of Melbourne Historical Society Conference, 1951, a typescript copy of which was located among the Tillett/Mackay papers, MSS.74/6/2/60, University of Warwick MRC. D. Marquand briefly discusses the MacDonalds' visit and its output in *Ramsay MacDonald*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1977, p 100.

23. See J. Rickard, 'Closing Down the Social Laboratory: The Great War and British and Australian Attitudes to Wage Regulation', unpublished paper given to the Commonwealth Labour History Conference, University of Warwick, 1981; and 'The Anti-sweating movement in Great Britain and Victoria', *Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 73, October 1979, p 582. A lively correspondence between Margaret MacDonald and other readers with varying opinions of the Victorian Wages Boards was carried out in the pages of the *Labour Leader* in Britain during January 1908.

24. The originals survive among the Hardie papers in the National Library of Scotland.

25. K.O. Morgan, *Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1975, p 196.

26. ibid.

27. On her activities, see V. Coleman, *Adela Pankhurst: The Wayward Suffragette 1885–1961*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996.

28. Copies of these publications are held and were inspected at the Working Class Movement Library, Salford, England.

29. A copy of this pamphlet is held and was inspected in the Marx Memorial Library, London, Box C 19 (ii).

30. See J.M. Bomford, *That Dangerous and Persuasive Woman: A Life of Vida Goldstein*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993, Chapter 7.

31. See G.N. Connolly, 'Class, Birthplace, Loyalty: Australian Attitudes to the Boer War', *Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 71, October 1978, pp 228–9.

32. Price's background and career is discussed in J. Moss, *Sound of Trumpets: History of the Labour Movement in South Australia*, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1985, at pp 58, 210–3.

33. Letter from Jim Middleton, retiring general secretary of the British Labour Party, to D.L. McNamara, ALP federal secretary, 7 June 1944; in Australian Labor Party Federal Secretariat papers, National Library of Australia (NLA), MS 4985, Box 5, British and foreign correspondence, 1938–48.

34. See L.F. Crisp and B. Atkinson, *Australian Labour Party Federal Parliamentarians 1901–1981*, published by the compilers, Canberra, 1981.

35. Some recent ones would include former Victorian Labor government ministers Steve Crabb and Caroline Hogg, and the former deputy premier of South Australia, Frank Blevins.

36. As J. Rickard notes in *Class and Politics: New South Wales, Victoria and the Early Commonwealth*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1976, p 160.

37. Ayrshire is a region just to the southwest of Glasgow which was an important coalmining area in the 1870s and 1880s.

38. D.J. Murphy's entry for Fisher in the *Australian Dictionary of Biography Volume 7 1891–1939*, at p 502, describes Fisher's admiration for Hardie during their overlapping involvement in the Ayrshire Miner's Union in 1879. On the influence of Scottish immigrants more generally, see M.D. Prentis, 'Scots in Australian Politics', *The House Magazine*, Vol. 16, No. 5, 5 March 1997.

39. For instance, in the issues of 24 April, and 5 and 26 June 1908.

40. Minutes of the British Labour Party National Executive Committee (NEC) meetings, 7 October and 19 December 1910, 30 January, 7 February and 26 April 1911, and of 'The sub-committee appointed to arrange the details connected with the entertainment of the Hon. Andrew Fisher by the Party', 13 February, 9 March, 19 April, 17 and 25 May 1911, in Labour Party Archive, National Museum of Labour History (NMLH), Manchester. Correspondence in the current ALP National Secretariat papers, Centenary House, Canberra, Box no. 86/4/21, shows that in 1986 at the Keir Hardie Rally in Scotland celebrating the centenary of the Ayrshire Miners' Union three Australian federal Labor MPs participated in the occasion in memory of Fisher's involvement.

41. Mrs Keir Hardie's own copy of the humorous illustrated menu of this dinner is among the Hardie papers in the National Library of Scotland.

42. J.T. Lang, *I Remember*, Invincible Press, Sydney, 1956, pp 52, 56.

43. Entitled *Socialism at Work: How the Queensland Government Succeeded in Profitably Establishing State Ventures Where the Needs of the People Called for State Competition or State Monopoly*, Anthony J Cumming, Government Printer, Brisbane, n.d. c.1918, the book with Middleton's name written in the inside front cover and with a 'With Compliments' slip from Ryan attached to the title page still resides in the Labour Party library in the NMLH.

44. See A. Reeves, '"Damned Scotsmen": British Migrants and the Australian Coal Industry, 1919–49', in E. Fry (ed.), *Common Cause: Essays in Australian and New Zealand Labour History*, pp 93–106.

45. See B. Hirson and L. Vivian, *Strike Across the Empire: The Seaman's Strike of 1925 in Britain, South Africa and Australasia*, Clio Publications, London, 1992.

46 See Australian Labor Party, *Official Report of Proceedings of the Ninth Commonwealth Conference*, p 34.

47. ibid., pp 3–4 and P. Weller and B. Lloyd, *Federal Executive Minutes 1915–1955: Minutes of the Meetings of the Federal Executive of the Australian Labor Party*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1978, pp 50–1.

48. There is a substantial published record of the 1925 conference: *Report of First British Commonwealth Labour Conference held at the House of Commons, London, S.W. 1 July 27 to August 1, 1925*, The Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, London, 1925. There are comprehensive files on the later conferences (other than 1947) in the Trades Union Congress (TUC) records in the University of Warwick MRC, while the 1947 conference records and many other relevant materials are in the NMLH collections and the various microfilms of these.

49. Personal interview with James Jupp. Jupp is author, inter alia, of *The Radical Left in Britain 1931–1941*, Frank Cass, London, 1982. A British-born political scientist who migrated to Australia in 1956 and was active in the Victorian ALP from 1957–66, Jupp was associated with the 'participants' group in the party before returning to Britain to teach at York University from 1966–76. He returned to Australia in 1978, rejoined the ALP in the ACT and worked as an academic there, becoming Director, Centre for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs at the ANU. Jupp has a thorough comparative knowledge of the British and Australian labour parties and has been the most prolific writer on these comparisons and associated relevant issues to date. Accordingly his writings and comments from my interview with him will be quoted regularly.

50. J. Morgan in *Daily Herald*, 12–14 January 1936.

51. Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) records, Rhodes House Library,

Oxford, MSS Brit. Emp. S 365 Box 1, File 1, Item 7.

52. FCB records, Items 8–9.

53. FCB records, Item 10.

54. This address was published as a pamphlet by the Empire Parliamentary Association; at Item 15 in the FCB records. On 8 March 1937 Nash addressed the Engineers' Study Group on Economics, and on 13 June 1939 he again addressed a meeting of the Study Committees of the Empire Parliamentary Association, this time on the theme 'International and Inter-Empire Problems from a New Zealand Standpoint'. This was also published by the Empire Parliamentary Association; a copy is at Item 16 in the FCB records.

55. J.A. Lee, *Socialism in New Zealand*, T. Warner Laurie, London, 1938.

56. D.P.T. Jay, *The Socialist Case*, Faber and Faber, London, 1937, p 235.

57. E. Bevin, *Impressions of the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, 1938*: Item 20 in the FCB box.

58. *The Times*, 26 May 1942.

59. *Report of the Forty-third Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1942*, The Labour Party, London, 1943, p 97.

60. ALP Federal Secretariat papers, NLA, MS 4985 Box 148, British and Foreign Executives Circulars and Minutes, 1943 [*sic*], Gillies to McNamara, 26 August 1942.

61. British Labour Party press release, 14 September 1944; Trades Union Congress Records, University of Warwick MRC, MSS.292/937/10, material re the meeting of representatives of the British Labour Party National Executive Committee and representatives of the 'principal Dominion Labour Parties' held in London in September 1944.

62. Included with a telegram from Gillies to McNamara, 19 July 1944, ALP Federal Secretariat papers, NLA MS 4985 Box 5, British and Foreign Correspondence, 1938–1948.

63. P.M. Williams (ed.), *The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell 1945–1956*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1983; Entry for 1 February 1950; p 163.

64. ibid., pp 162–3. Gaitskell remembered the Australian Labor government's support in his later stance as leader of the British Labour Party in favour of staying with the Commonwealth rather than moving towards Europe, and he corresponded regularly with Arthur Calwell in their overlapping years as leaders of the British and Australian labour parties on this question: see P.M. Williams, *Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1979, p 721.

65. Manufacturing Grocers Employees Federation report, 20 December 1949; annotated copy among the unsorted and unfoliated folders of British Labour Party Commonwealth Department papers re Australia in NMLH.

66. Personal interview with Netta Burns. She recalls that 'I just happened to need a job in London and I'd been a secretary in Melbourne University and involved in students and politics and what I'd read about the British Labour Party was pretty exciting, particularly compared to the Australian Labor Party as I'd seen it [although] I hadn't seen a lot — I was only just 22 ... I just walked into the office and asked them if they could give me a job, and they said 'why do you want a job here?'. And I said 'I've come to see your bloodless revolution', so they went and saw Morgan Phillips, the Secretary, and he said "give her a job". So I stayed for nearly two years, working first in the general office then up in the Research Department headed by Michael Young.'

67. See C. Waters, *The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s*, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 1995.

68. R. Fitzgerald, *'Red Ted': The Life of E.G. Theodore*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1994, pp 278, 292–3, 459.

69. See H.C. Coombs, *Trial Balance: Issues of My Working Life*, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1983, pp 17, 24–34, 45, 48–9.

70. Burns interview.

71. ibid.

72. ibid.

73. See Mark Peel's study, *Good Times Hard Times: The Past and the Future in Elizabeth*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995.

74. On the La Trobe Valley see J. Zubrzycki, *Settlers of the Latrobe Valley: A Sociological Study of Immigrants in the Brown Coal Industry in Australia*, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1964, especially pp 188–93.

75. See also more generally the extensive discussion of the patterns of settlement of English, Scottish and other immigrants from the British Isles in J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People: An Encyclopaedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1988.

76. His report of the visit is in the NMLH at LP/CSC.58/44 i-iii, and was noted at a meeting of the NEC Commonwealth Sub-Committee held on 10 March 1959 at the House of Commons, the minutes of which are at LP/CSC.58/19.

77. ibid.

78. K. Harris, *Attlee*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1982, pp 555–6. There is some minor correspondence from Clem Attlee to his brother Tom among the Attlee papers in the Bodleian Library, Oxford referring to this Australian visit, including, in f 81, a letter dated 10 March 1959, comments such as 'Tasmania. The island is very attractive' and 'Canberra is growing up and promises to be quite a fine capital', but this correspondence contains little else of relevant interest.

79. J. Askew, *A Voyage to Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1857, p 156; reproduced in N. Ebbels, *The Australian Labor Movement 1850–1907: Extracts from Contemporary Documents*, Cheshire-Lansdowne in association with the Noel Ebbels Memorial Committee, Melbourne, 1965 edition, pp 37–8.

80. H. Kingsley, *The Recollections of Geoffrey Hamlyn*, first published 1859, reprinted by Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1954, p 63. On this issue, see G. Patmore's extensive survey of the literature in 'A Workingman's Paradise? Labour 1850–91', Chapter 3 of his *Australian Labour History*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991.

81. L. Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia*, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, pp 40–4 and see also Richard Rosecrance's detailed chapter on Australia in this book.

82. As discussed by S. Macintyre, *The Labour Experiment*, McPhee Gribble, Melbourne, 1989, pp 10–11.

83. See R. Broome, *Arriving*, Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates, Sydney, 1984, pp 125, 135–6, and the detailed evidence and literature he cites in the separately published endnotes to this history of migration to the State of Victoria.

84. D.H. Lawrence, *Kangaroo*, The corrected edition, Imprint Sydney, 1995, p 18. The novel was first published in 1923.

85. According to the interpretation of the British census data for that year by the eminent historian Eric Hobsbawm in his essay 'The Forward March of Labour Halted?', in M. Jacques and F. Mulhern (eds.), *The Forward March of Labour Halted?*, Verso, London, 1981, p 3.

86. Based on the tabulation of data in W. Vamplew, *Australians: Historical Statistics*, Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates, Sydney, 1987, p 148.

87. Approximately 6 per cent of the British population were Roman Catholics in 1900, rising to 8 per cent in 1950 according to the estimates of the Catholic population and the census data on the total British population presented in D. Butler and G. Butler *British Political Facts 1900–1994*, Macmillan, London, seventh edition 1994, pp 522, 323. The 'denominational strength' of Catholics in Australia was 22.7 per cent in 1901 and 20.9 per cent in 1947 according to the census data presented in I. McAllister, M. Mackerras and C. Brown Boldiston, *Australian Political Facts*, Macmillan, Melbourne, second edition 1997, p 350.

88. E. Lansbury, in *George Lansbury: My Father*, S. Low, Marston, London, 1934, recounts in detail the future British Labour Party leader's hopes and disappointments with Australia.

89. 'Freedom on the Wallaby', 1891; extracted in S. Murray-Smith

(ed.), *The Dictionary of Australian Quotations*, Mandarin, Melbourne, second edition, 1992, p 178.

90. These are the opening lines of Lawson's 'Faces in the Street'; composed in 1888; quoted in R. Hall, *The Collins Book of Australian Poetry*, Collins, Sydney, 1981, at p 50.

91. W. Lane, *The Workingman's Paradise: An Australian Labour Novel*, Dunlop, Brisbane, 1892.

92. J. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, Macmillan and Co., two volumes, London, 1921, pp 198, 282, 268.

93. R.T. Appleyard, *British Emigration to Australia*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1964, p 56.

94. The letters are in the University of Warwick MRC, MSS.292 TUC Records 1920–60, files concerning relations with Australian trade unions; and the TUC Library, London, File No. 993, papers re contact with Australian trade unions since 1960.

95. Personal interview with John Ducker. My questions are in italics.

96. The similar exploration, but opposite conclusions, the two nations took on arbitration in the 1890s are discussed and analysed in M. Bray and M. Rimmer, 'Voluntarism or Compulsion? Public Inquiries into Industrial Relations in New South Wales and Great Britain, 1890–4', in S. Macintyre and R. Mitchell (eds.), *Foundations of Arbitration: The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration 1890–1914*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989, pp 50–73.

97. See L. Churchward, 'The American Influence on the Australian Labour Movement', *Historical Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 19, November 1952, pp 258–63.

98. A. Fisher, Speech on 31 July, 1914 by then leader of the opposition, soon to become prime minister; quoted in Murray-Smith, *The Dictionary of Australian Quotations*, p 95. J. Hirst in 'Who Tugged the Forelock? The ALP and Empire', *Quadrant*, November 1995, pp 10–16 cites this inter alia to demonstrate the long-running strength of Australian Labor's British loyalties. B. Anderson however in a biographical paper on Andrew Fisher delivered to the Scots Australian Studies Association at the University of Melbourne, 13 June 1992, claimed that Fisher's words are often quoted out of context to give the impression that he was a solid Empire Man when in fact they were qualified, and pointed out that Fisher had opposed sending troops to the Boer War, was a very strong advocate of federation and greater Comonwealth government powers, and of transcontinental transport linkages.

99. M. Clarke, 'An Australian Paean', 1876; quoted in B. Wannan (ed.), *A Marcus Clarke Reader*, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1963.

100. R. Markey, *The Making of the Labor Party in New South Wales 1880–1900*, New South Wales University Press, Sydney, 1988, p xi.

101. Letter from Amy Dalay (Auckland) to Dame Millicent Fawcett, 28 December 1892, Item 2/1/186 of the correspondence in the papers of Fawcett, who was president of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies in England from 1897 to 1918. This in turn is Item M 50 in the Women's Suffrage Collection, part of the Miscellaneous Collections of the Archives Department of the Manchester Central Library, which was microfilmed (Reels 2081–2082) as part of the Miscellaneous series of the Australian Joint Copying Project (AJCP).

102. R. McKibbin, C. Matthew and J. Kay, 'The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party', in R. McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp 66–100.

103. The sources of the data for Figure 1.1 are the official election results (primary votes as a proportion of total votes for the House of Commons and House of Representatives), as reported in Butler and Butler, *British Political Facts*, and McAllister et al., *Australian Political Facts*.

104. V.I. Lenin, 'In Australia', 1913; reproduced and discussed by R. Kuhn, 'Lenin on the ALP: The Career of 600 Words', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1989, pp 29–49.

105. See V. Burgmann, 'Premature Labour: the Maritime Strike and the Parliamentary Strategy', in J. Hagan and A. Wells, (eds.) *The Maritime Strike: A Centennial Retrospective: Essays in Honour of E.C. Fry*, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Sydney, 1992, especially pp 91–2.

106. Analysed by P. Love, *Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Populism 1890–1950*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1984.

107. A. Metin, *Socialism Without Doctrine*, Translated by Russel Ward, Alternative Publishers, Sydney, 1977 (first published in French in 1910).

108. Quoted in B. Pimlott, *Hugh Dalton*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985 p 251.

109. J. Cairns, typescript text of address to the Rationalists Society, Warburton, Victoria, January 1954, p 1; kindly lent to the author. Cairns spent a year at Oxford although he was unable then to locate the sources needed to pursue his initial intended topic. After returning to Australia he became a Labor MP from 1955–77 and was for a time deputy prime minister and treasurer in the Whitlam government.

110. J.B. Chifley, 'The Light on the Hill', 12 June 1949; in A.W. Stargardt, *Things Worth Fighting For: Speeches by Joseph Benedict Chifley*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1952.

111. This and the broader characteristics of intellectuals' interactions

within Australian society are well discussed and analysed by various contributors to B. Head and J. Walter (eds.), *Intellectual Movements and Australian Society*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988.

112. See S. Merrifield, 'Victorian Labor College', *Recorder*, No. 86, April, 1977, pp 9–12.

113. The Victorian Labor College wrote to the NCLC for permission to use the materials from its postal courses department and adopt its methods, according to J.P.M. Millar, *The Labour College Movement*, NCLC Publishing Society, London, 1980, p 224.

114. S. Merrifield, 'Left Book Club', *Recorder*, Vol. 2, No. 5, January 1967, pp 6–11.

115. Frank Farrell discusses this in *International Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia 1919–1939*, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1981, pp xiii–xiv.

116. See J. Jupp, *Australian Party Politics*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, second edition 1968, p 65.

117. See Jupp, 'Their Labour and Ours', p 240.

118. See V.G. Childe, *How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers' Representation in Australia*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, second edition 1964 (first published 1923).

119. Jupp, *Australian Party Politics*, pp 65, 220.

120. On the peculiar characteristics of Australia's welfare state, see F. Castles, *The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand 1890–1980*, Allen and Unwin in association with Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, New Zealand, 1985.

121. As Race Mathews suggests in *Australia's First Fabians: Middle-class Radicals, Labour Activists and the Early Labour Movement*, Cambidge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p 29.

122. According to B.R. Mitchell's data in his *European Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–1975*, Macmillan, London, second revised edition 1981, p 179, and *International Historical Statistics: The Americas and Australasia*, Macmillan, London, 1983, p 165.

123. As Ross McKibbin points out in his essay 'The Economic Policy of the Second Labour Government, 1929–1931' in his *The Ideologies of Class*, p 207 where he also points to literature emphasising the comparative mildness of the English depression by broader international standards.

124. The source for Figure 1.3 is the ILO *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, International Labour Office, Geneva, various years.

125. Since the 1966 census, for instance, around 85 per cent of Australians have been classified as living in urban centres, a similar

proportion to Britain, according to W.G. Coppell, *Australia in Figures: A Handbook of Economic, Political and Social Statistics,* Penguin Books in association with Queensland University Press, Victoria, 1974, pp 36–37; and W.G. Coppell, *Australia in Facts and Figures,* Penguin, Victoria, 1999, p 44. The data are drawn from the official Australian censuses and UN demographic yearbooks.

126. Jupp interview.

127. The data and argument are presented by Appleyard in his *British Emigration to Australia,* p 76.

128. As Jupp suggests in 'Their Labour and Ours', in Mayer (ed.) *Australian Politics: A Reader,* pp 240–2.

129. See R.T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties,* Mercury Books, London, second edition, 1963, p 316.

130. C.R. Attlee, *As It Happened,* Heinemann, London, 1954, p 156.

131. *The Governance of Britain,* Weidenfeld and Nicholson and Michael Joseph, London, 1976, p 28.

Chapter 2: Ideological revision since the 1960s

1. Bevan was speaking in 1956; as quoted in D. O'Connell, 'Post-Mortem Rituals and Party Reform, Australian Labor Debates, 1963–1981', PhD thesis, Australian National University Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, 1990, p 60.

2. See J. Jupp, 'Socialist "Rethinking" in Britain and Australia', *Australian Journal of Politics and History,* Vol. 4, No. 2, November 1958, p 194.

3. See Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought,* pp 210–2.

4. Whose ideas are well summarised in Foote, Chapter 9.

5. C.A.R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism,* Jonathan Cape, London, 1956, pp 62–8.

6. C.A.R. Crosland, *The Conservative Enemy: A Programme of Radical Reform for the 1960s,* Jonathan Cape, London, 1962, pp 150–1.

7. Fabian Tract 300, Fabian Society, London, 1956.

8. Whether all these options were in fact canvassed at this famous meeting in Hampstead on 11 October 1959 is a matter of some dispute among those who were present: see R. Jenkins, *A Life at the Centre,* Macmillan, London, 1991, pp 128–9.

9. *Report of the Fifty-eighth Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1959,* p 112; as quoted in Foote, p 225.

10. ibid.

11. *Labour's Aims*, Labour Party, London, March 1960.

12. ibid.

13. ibid.

14. Emphasis added.

15. Emphasis added.

16. Emphasis added.

17. This narrative discussion of the development of the ALP's formal aims has drawn on J. Reeves and G. Evans, 'The Evolution of the Socialist Objective 1890–1980', in G. Evans and J. Reeves (eds.), *Labor Essays 1980*, Drummond, Melbourne, 1982, pp 155–63; and J. Reeves and G. Evans, 'The Further Evolution of the Socialist Objective: 1981', in G. Evans and J. Reeves (eds.), *Labor Essays 1982: Socialist Principles and Parliamentary Government*, Drummond, Melbourne, 1982, p 187.

18. Personal interview with Cyril Wyndham (formerly Isaac).

19. ibid.

20. This information has been supplied by several reliable sources who do not wish to be named.

21. The request for a copy of this publication was made in a letter from Wyndham to Hatch on 23 June 1958. NMLH, Labour Party archive, Commonwealth Department papers re Australia, folder marked 1955–60.

22. Wyndham to Hatch, 15 April 1959.

23. Wyndham interview.

24. C.S. Wyndham, 'Australian Labor Party Re-Organisation — II: Finance and the Future: Memorandum by the State Secretary', Australian Labor Party (Victorian Branch) records, State Library of Victoria, MS 10508, Item 172, p 9. The annotations pencilled in the copy of Morgan Phillips' pamphlet among the ALP Federal Secretariat papers in the National Library of Australia would have been made by Wyndham.

25. 'Document 7: Australian Labor Party Re-Organisation: Recommendations of the General Secretary', circulated at the 1965 ALP Commonwealth Conference and quoted in L. Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society 1945–67*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, p 108.

26. Mathews to Crosland, 15 May 1963; British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES), C.A.R. Crosland papers, File no. 8/3.

27. *News Weekly*, Melbourne, 10 July 1963; another report featured in the issue of 3 July 1963.

28. Crosland, *The Conservative Enemy*, p 128.

29. ibid.

30. C.A.R. Crosland's Bill Thomas Memorial Lecture, 24 June 1963; from the edited text of that lecture published in *The Bulletin*, 24 August 1963 as 'Can Labor Ever Win? Some Advice for Arthur Calwell', p 27.

31. ibid., p 28.

32. ibid.

33. P. Samuel to H.R. Krygier, Secretary of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, c.1 July 1963; BLPES, Crosland papers, File no. 8/3.

34. Bill Thomas Memorial Lecture, *The Bulletin*, p 27.

35. ibid.

36. ibid.

37. Crosland to Krygier, 16 July 1963.

38. Telephone interview with Gough Whitlam. Whitlam was leader of the ALP 1967–77 and prime minister of Australia 1972–75.

39. D. Burchell, 'After Social Democracy', *Australian Left Review*, No. 143, September 1992, p 26.

40. R. Mathews, *Australia's First Fabians*, p 233.

41. Crosland to Samuel, 16 July 1963.

42. Wyndham to Williams, 20 September 1965; ALP Federal Secretariat papers, NLA, Box 39.

43. Typescript document headed '... Extracts from the Report of the 65th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1966 ... forwarded ... by the Hon. A.A. Calwell, M.H.R.', 11 April 1967, p 1; ALP Federal Secretariat papers, NLA, Box 86.

44. ibid., p 2. Emphasis added.

45. Mathews, 'What Is to Be Done?', c.1966.

46. Reeves and Evans, in Evans and Reeves, 1980.

47. Wyndham interview.

48. See D. and M. Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, Kogan Page, London, 1982.

49. Described in C. Hughes and P. Wintour, *Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party*, Fourth Estate, London, 1990 and M.J. Smith and J. Spear (eds.), *The Changing Labour Party*, Routledge, London, 1992.

50. Thompson edited the key text *Out of Apathy*, Stevens and Son, London, 1960.

51. Williams and Thompson issued *May Day Manifesto 1968*, May Day Manifesto Committee 1967 with Penguin, Harmondsworth, expanded edition 1968.

52. Who with Robin Blackburn edited the important collection *Towards Socialism*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1966.

53. R. Williams (ed.), *May Day Manifesto 1968*, pp 44–5.

54. Typed transcript of an interview with Laurie Carmichael located in AMWU Victorian offices, c1977, p 12.

55. ibid., p 13.

56. ibid.

57. ibid.

58. Telephone interview with Max Ogden.

59. For example, see Connell's *Socialism and Labor: An Australian Strategy*, Labor Praxis Publications, Sydney, 1978, pp 12, 13.

60. Edited by G. Crough, T. Wheelwright and T. Wilshire (Wilshire was the national research officer for the Metalworkers Union), and published by Penguin, Melbourne.

61. Fabian Society papers, Nuffield College, Oxford, Section J Box 14/7 f 50.

62. Personal interview with Gareth Evans.

63. As he describes in his memoir *As It Happened*, Text, Melbourne, 1998, pp 104–12.

64. ibid., pp 62–3.

65. ibid., p 63.

66. Personal interview with Neal Blewett. Emphasis added. After returning to Australia Blewett worked as a political science academic in South Australia before being elected for the House of Representatives seat of Bonython in 1977, where he served until 1994, was a senior minister in the Hawke government (holding the health portfolio from 1983–90) and Keating government (holding the social security portfolio from 1991–93) before being appointed Australian High Commissioner to London in 1994.

67. *Australian Labor Party National Committee of Inquiry Discussion Papers*, Australian Political Studies Association Monograph No. 23, 1979; and *National Committee of Inquiry: Report and Recommendations to the National Executive March 1979*, Australian Labor Party, Canberra, 1979.

68. See J. Brett, 'The Bureaucratisation of Writing: Why So Few Academics are Public Intellectuals', *Meanjin*, Vol. 50, No. 4, Summer 1991, pp 513–22.

69. See for instance M. Pusey, *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.

70. R. Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter Revolution, 1931–1983*, HarperCollins, London, 1994, p 283.

71. K. Gott (ed.), *Reshaping Australian Industry: Tariffs and Socialists*, Victorian Fabian Society Pamphlet Number 37, Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne, 1982.

72. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) *4 Corners* television program, 21 September 1998.

73. Wyndham interview.

74. Cain's assessment of *The Hawke Memoirs*, *The Sunday Age*, 21 August 1994.

75. *The Talk Show*, Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) television program, 23 May 1994; a line of argument he expanded upon eloquently in his Whitlam Lecture, 21 April 1998, typescript, 14 pages, an edited version of which was published as 'We Intervene or We Sink' in *Australian Options*, No. 14, September 1998, pp 4–13.

76. The comments are reproduced by B. Jones in D. Kerr (ed.) *Reinventing Socialism*, Pluto Press Australia in association with the Australian Fabian Society, Sydney, 1992, p 23. Similar sentiments have also been expressed by Race Mathews in *Labor Star*, No. 174, August 1991 and James Jupp in 'The English-Speaking Labour Movements', *Labor Forum*, Autumn 1992.

77. D. Burchell, 'Thoroughly Modern Labor', *Australian Left Review*, No. 109, February/March 1989, p 31.

78. ibid. Burchell was drawing here on a Stuart Hall article, 'Blue Election, Election Blues', which appeared in *Marxism Today* in July 1987.

79. This apt phrase is Geoffrey Foote's, in his *The Labour Party's Political Thought*, p 3.

80. Their perspectives are expressed in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds.) *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*, Lawrence and Wishart in association with *Marxism Today*, London, 1989; the *New Times* newspaper which succeeded *Marxism Today*; and S. Wilks (ed.) *Talking About Tomorrow: a New Radical Politics*, Pluto Press in association with *New Times*, London, 1993.

81. 'Speech by Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, Leader of the Labour Party, to the 1994 Labour Party Conference', typescript, Blackpool, 4 October 1994.

82. *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, Fabian Pamphlet 588, Fabian Society London, 1998. See also Blair's *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country*, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1997.

83. ibid., pp 22–3.

84. G. Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1977, p 82.

85. 'The Right Honourable Tony Blair MP Speech to British Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 3 October 1995', typescript, pp 10, 11, 12, 13, 19.

86. P. Hewitt, 'Labour Changes its Tune on Issue of State Ownership', *The Sunday Age*, Melbourne, 16 September 1990.

87. M. White, 'Blair to Face Close Fight on Clause Four', *The Guardian*, 6 October 1994.

88. J. Straw, *Policy and Ideology*, Blackburn Constituency Labour Party, Blackburn, 1993, p 36.

89. From the television series, *Future of Socialism*, screened in February 1994. Typescript copy of Kinnock's proposed new draft of Clause IV kindly supplied to the author.

90. Referred to in D. Macintyre, 'Boy King Not for Turning', *The Independent*, 3 October 1994.

91. The margin was 50.9 per cent for and 49.1 per cent against.

92. *Midnight Special* re Labour, Channel 4 television program, 5 October 1994, Emphasis added. Jordan also said that Clause IV 'was more about Stalinism than Socialism'.

93. Bell's comments were made at a union's industrial strategy fringe meeting at the 1994 Labour Party Annual Conference, Blackpool, 5 October 1994.

94. S. Pollard, 'To Be Fair, Clause IV Must Change', *The Independent*, 21 November 1994.

95. Livingstone's comments were made on 6 October 1994 to a meeting of Labour Left Liaison held in Blackpool during the Labour Party Annual Conference, which I attended as an observer.

96. 'Statement on Clause Four by 32 Members of the European Parliamentary Labour Party', typescript, n.d. c.November 1994.

97. T. Blair, *Socialism*, Fabian Pamphlet 565, London, n.d. c.1994.

98. Emphasis added.

99. P. Anderson, 'Blair Clause Isolates Hard Left', *New Statesman and Society*, 17 March 1995, pp 7–8.

100. Blair speech to British Labour Party Annual Conference, Brighton, 1995, pp 25–6.

101. ibid., pp 2, 15, 24.

102. ibid., p 16.

103. ibid., p 17.

104. ibid., p 14.

105. ibid., p 16.

106. ibid., p 15.

107. ibid., p 24.

108. ibid., p 14.

109. Blair speech to British Labour Party Annual Conference, Brighton, 1995, p 11.

110. ibid., p 20.

111. ibid., p 8.

112. A.K. Murdoch, 'Future Tense', Interview with Richard Eckersley, *The Age*, 17 November 1995.

113. *The New Traditionalism: A Special ANOP Study of Young Australia*, ANOP, Canberra, July 1984, p 5.

114. R. Eckersley, *Casualties of Change: The Predicament of Youth in Australia: A Report on the Social and Psychological Problems Faced by Young People in Australia*, Commission for the Future, Melbourne, 1988, *passim*.

115. 'Future Tense' article.

116. Eckersley, *Casualties of Change*, p 39.

117. ibid., p 41.

118. ibid., p 38.

119. H. Mackay, *Contemporary Social Issues*, The Mackay Report, Sydney, September 1986.

120. 'Stan's My Man', a speech given to the Football Writers Association in honour of Sir Stanley Matthews' 80th birthday, 15 January 1995; edited version published in *New Statesman and Society*, 20 January 1995, p 19.

121. *New Statesman and Society*, 29 October 1993.

122. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.

123. Vintage, London, 1993.

124. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.

125. Gray published a collection, *Beyond the New Right*, in 1993. His intellectual journey over this period and its political significance is discussed in F. Mount 'Free Market Fails to Deliver the Goods', extracted from *The Times Literary Supplement* in *The Australian*, 26 January 1993; and P. Anderson, 'Consensus Failure', *New Statesman and Society*, 2 February 1996.

126. Williams, *Keywords*, p 291.

127. 1994 conference speech, p 17.

128. Elder to Gray, 13 October 1993, Australian Labor Party National Secretariat, Centenary House, Canberra, British Labour Party file 1994.

129. ibid.

130. *Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal: The Report of the Commission on Social Justice*, Vintage, London, 1994, p 172. The source of the information on the Australian scheme cited by the Commission on Social Justice was the *Jobs, Education and Training (JET) Facts Sheet*, Family Programs Division, Department of Social Security, Canberra, 1993.

131. *Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal,* p 139. The Australian source cited was H. Tracey, *Financing of Higher Education in Transition,* Department of Education and Training, Canberra, 1992.

132. *Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal,* p 282.

133. For example M. Stewart, *Keynes in the 1990s: A Return to Economic Sanity,* Penguin, London, 1993; and T. Battin, *Abandoning Keynes: Australia's Capital Mistake,* Macmillan, London, 1997.

134. W. Hutton, *The State We're In,* Vintage revised edition, London, 1996.

Chapter 3: The changing social bases of the two parties

1. For Britain, see B. Hindess, *The Decline of Working Class Politics,* Paladin, London, 1971 and P. Seyd and P. Whiteley, *Labor's Grass Roots: The Politics of Party Membership,* Clarendon Books, Oxford, 1992, pp 33–4; for Australia, see my own book: A. Scott, *Fading Loyalties: The Australian Labor Party and the Working Class,* Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 1991. See also I. Ward, 'A "New Look" ALP? The Middle-classing of the Victorian ALP 1961–1982', PhD thesis, Monash University, 1987.

2. These tensions in the British Labour Party are most thoroughly analysed in L. Minkin, *The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party,* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1991, although this monumental study predates the removal of weighted union votes in parliamentary preselections which occurred in 1993 under John Smith and the reduction of the trade union block vote at British Labour's Annual Conference to 50 per cent which occurred subsequently, under Tony Blair.

3. *The Age,* 9 May 1988.

4. Seyd and Whiteley, p 53.

5. The sources of the data for Figures 3.1–3.3 are the official election results (primary votes as a proportion of total votes for the House of Commons and House of Representatives) as reported in *British Political Facts*; D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997,* Macmillan, London, 1997; *Australian Political Facts*; and the Australian Electoral Commission's *Electoral Newsfile,* No. 78, December 1998.

6. P. Dunleavy, H. Margett and S. Weir, *Replaying the 1992 General Election: How Britain Would Have Voted Under Alternative Electoral Systems,* LSE Public Policy Group, London School of Economics, 1992.

7. *The Guardian,* 19 May 1993.

8. *Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems, 1993,* Labour Party, London, 1993.

9.   Reported in *Sunday Times* article reproduced in *The Australian*, 6 October 1997.

10. D. Butler, *The Canberra Model: Essays on Australian Government*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1973, pp 94–5.

11. Personal interview with David Butler.

12. K. Swaddle and A. Heath, 'Official and Reported Turnout in the British General Election of 1987', in D. Denver and G. Hands (eds.), *Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1992, p 39.

13. ibid., p 38.

14. The report, by Helen Wilkinson, was titled *No Turning Back: Generations and the Genderquake*, and an abridged version appears in the Demos collection edited by Geoff Mulgan, titled *Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty-First Century*, Fontana, London, 1997.

15. This particular finding was reported in *The Guardian*, 29 September 1994.

16. H. Wilkinson and G. Mulgan, 'Freedom's Children and the Rise of Generational Politics', in Mulgan (ed.), *Life After Politics*, p 220.

17. In his book *Ayes to the Left*, at p 61.

18. The continuation of this pattern was confirmed in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1992*, MacMillan, London, 1992, pp 345–7.

19. J. Curtice and M. Steed, 'The Results Analysed', in Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997*, p 299.

20. The then shadow home secretary (later home secretary in the Blair government) Jack Straw, for instance, circulated a discussion paper in Labour Party circles in 1994 on the problem of disenfranchised citizens in Britain, entitled 'The Missing Millions'.

21. J. Smith and I. McLean, 'The Poll Tax and the Electoral Register', in A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice *Labour's Last Chance? The 1992 Election and Beyond*, Dartmouth, Cambridge, 1994, pp 229–53.

22. *The 7.30 Report*, ABC television program, 7 April 1992.

23. Personal interview with Patricia Hewitt. Hewitt was born in Australia (daughter of Sir Lennox Hewitt), went to Britain in the early 1970s, was general secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties 1974–83, an adviser to Neil Kinnock 1983–89, and was elected Labour MP for Leicester West in 1997.

24. See, for example, the comments (by Michelle Grattan) that 'Labor in the 1980s, nationally and in the states, held a marked superiority over its opponents as a campaigning machine. Its use of research, its marginal seats strategy, and its ability to give a special twist to advertising not only assisted it to win elections

where it was obviously on top, but helped save it from defeat on several occasions — 1987 and 1990 federally, 1988 in Victoria and 1989 in Western Australia', in F. Gruen and M. Grattan, *Managing Government: Labor's Achievements and Failures*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993, p 77.

25. Personal interview with Gary Gray.

26. ibid.

27. Jupp interview.

28. The US Democrats Abroad is a sizeable organisation with branches in other countries besides Britain. A speaker from the organisation addressed the Labour International reception held at the British Labour Party's 1994 Annual Conference.

29. Personal interview with Rupert Posner, the Chairperson of the ALP UK Society in London in 1994.

30. Reported in *The Sunday Age*, 5 November 1995.

31. *Labor Herald*, June 1999.

32. 'The British Elections and Lessons for Australia', typescript document, n.d., c. May 1992, among Gary Gray's personal files of overseas parties' campaign material, ALP National Secretariat, Centenary House, Canberra. Emphasis in original.

33. ibid.

34. P. Ellingsen, 'UK Labor Quietly Backing Libs ... ', *The Age*, 10 February 1996; quoting Dr Blewett's comments to a seminar at the Menzies Centre for Australian Studies in London. The substance of these claims is confirmed in Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997*, p 65.

35. S. Dabkowski, 'Blair Takes Lessons from Howard in His Bid to Beat Tories', *The Sunday Age*, 15 March 1997.

36. ibid.

37. ibid.

38. Those who went included several of Kim Beazley's advisers, representatives of the ALP National Secretariat and of the then Victorian ALP Leader.

39. Reported in *The Guardian*, 13 and 14 June 1983, and quoted in P. Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, Methuen, London, 1983, pp 213–4.

40. 67 per cent of British people owned their own homes in Britain in 1996 according to Central Statistical Office, *Social Trends 28*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1998, Table 10.3; almost as high as Australia where the rate was 69.9 per cent in 1996, according to *Australian Social Trends 1998*, Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue No. 4102.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1998, p 145.

41. Reported for example in *The Age*, 4 June 1987.

42. Australian Stock Exchange Limited, *Australian Shareownership Survey 1991*, Sydney, n.d., p 9.

43. Australian Stock Exchange Limited, *Australian Shareownership Survey 1997*, Sydney, n.d., p 6.

44. Australian Stock Exchange Limited, *October 1998 Australian Share-ownership Update*, electronic file, slides 1, 3.

45. *Britain 1997: An Official Handbook*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office in association with Central Office of Information, London, 1996, p 187.

46. *1998 Year Book Australia*, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1998, Table 6.11.

47. Jupp interview.

48. Jupp, 'Their Labour and Ours', p 231.

49. A. Mughan, 'The "Hip Pocket Nerve" and Electoral Volatility in Australia and Great Britain', *Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 2, November 1987.

50. R.R. Alford, *Party and Society*, pp 348–51.

51. There is of course controversy over the methodology of these various surveys — see for instance Murray Goot's chapter 'Class Voting, Issue Voting and Electoral Volatility', in J. Brett, J. Gillespie and M. Goot (eds.), *Developments in Australian Politics*, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1994, pp 153–181 — but they have been chosen as providing the best available basis for a comparative discussion.

52. A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, 'Can Labour Win?', in Heath, Jowell and Curtice, *Labour's Last Chance?*, p 283. Emphasis in original.

53. ibid.

54. The sources for Tables 3.1–3.3 in this chapter are as follows: (1) the comparative opinion poll data in R.R. Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies*, Greenwood Press, Westport Connecticut, 1973 (first published 1963) for the years 1961–62; (2) For Britain, the data from the British Election Studies (BES) in I. Crewe, N. Day and A. Fox (eds.), *The British Electorate 1963–1992: A Compendium of Data from the British Election Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995 for the years 1966–92, the BBC/NOP exit poll as reproduced in Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997*, for 1997 and G. Evans and P. Norris (eds.), *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective*, Sage, London, 1999; (3) For Australia, the data for 1967 and 1979 in D. Aitkin, *Stability and Change in Australian Politics*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, second edition 1982,

and data from the Australian Election Studies (commenced 1987 but also including data on recalled vote from the 1984 election) both in unpublished form and as reported in I. McAllister and J. Warhurst (eds.), *Australia Votes: The 1987 Federal Election,* Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988, I. McAllister, *Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia,* Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992, P. Renfrow, 'The Gender Gap in the 1993 Election', *Australian Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 29 1994, pp 118–33, and C. Bean, M. Simms, S. Bennett and J. Warhurst (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 Federal Election,* Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997.

55. Reported in *The Age,* 11 August 1992.

56. Ironically, the British Labour Party also borrowed *back* the Enough is Enough slogan in its 1997 campaign against the British Tories: Butler and Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997,* p 65.

57. 'Don't introduce a new tax if you want to win an election', Thatcher told Andrew Peacock in September 1989; quoted by Kelly, *The End of Certainty,* p 518.

58. Reported in *The Weekend Australian,* 10–11 August 1996.

59. Murdoch has often contrasted Australia where he hailed from with the 'establishment' and the 'class dominated society' he and his tabloids had run up against in Britain. See the biography by W. Shawcross, *Rupert Murdoch: Ringmaster of the Information Circus,* Chatto and Windus, London, 1992, pp 66, 146–7, 454–60, 511.

60. Gould was 'shocked by the pervasiveness of the class structure' he encountered as a student at Oxford in the early 1960s and frequently continued to lament the comparatively entrenched nature of class in British society and politics during his Labour Party career there. See his memoir, *Goodbye To All That,* Macmillan, London, 1995, pp 34–7, 280–1.

61. A good photograph of members of the ALP UK society rallying from Temple tube station in London against the Whitlam government's dismissal in November 1975, is held in the ALP UK Society papers in the NMLH, Manchester.

62. S. Knight, *The Selling of the Australian Mind: From First Fleet to Third Mercedes,* Mandarin, Melbourne, 1991, pp 176, 179–80.

63. *Human Development Report 1997,* Table 31.

64. *Human Development Report 1998,* Table 31.

65. For instance, by M. Hamilton and M. Hirszowicz in *Class and Inequality: Comparative Perspectives,* Harvester Wheatsheaf, England, 1993 which cites data showing Australia to be more 'open' (i.e. mobile) than England.

66. M. Sawer and M. Simms, *A Woman's Place: Women and Politics in Australia,* Allen and Unwin, Sydney, second edition 1993, pp 36–7.

67. Hewitt interview.

68. Sawer and Simms, pp 38–40.

69. Hewitt interview.

70. Renfrow, 'The Gender Gap in the 1993 Election', p 122.

71. The 1967 figure of 11 for Australia is from Aitkin, p 327, although McAllister and others (e.g. Renfrow) put it at nine.

72. Reported in *The Australian*, 23 March 1998.

73. The photograph of Wilson with the Beatles at Buckingham Palace, from the *Daily Mail* of 19 March 1964, is reproduced in M. Foot, *Harold Wilson: A Pictorial Biography*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1964.

74. McAllister and Bean, in Bean et al. (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution*, p 182.

75. ibid., p 181.

76. The data which demonstrates this is presented in S. Saggar, 'Party Strategy and Ethnic Politics in the 1997 General Election Campaign', *Politics Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4, April 1998.

77. J. Jupp, 'Creating Multicultural Societies: Australia, Britain, Sweden, and Canada', *International Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3, Summer 1997, p 512.

78. McAllister and Bean, in Bean et al., p 181.

79. N. Economou, 'An Overstated Electoral Importance? A Note on 'Ethnic' Voting and Federal Electoral Outcomes', *People and Place*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1994, pp 45–51.

80. K. Betts, 'Class and the 1996 Australian Election', *People and Place*, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp 38–45. The study, conducted for Monash's Centre for Population and Urban Research was prominently reported in *The Age*, 4 January 1997.

81. The electorate of Fowler has the highest proportion of people born overseas or with overseas born parents, the highest proportion of people from non English-speaking backgrounds and the highest proportion of tradespersons and labourers according to A. Kopras, *Electorate Rankings: Census 1996*, Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services Background Paper No. 14 1997–98, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1998, Tables 23b, 22b and 44b. The primary vote swing against the ALP there in 1996 was 7.7 per cent compared with 6.1 nationally.

82. Kopras, *Electorate Rankings: Census 1996*, Tables 23b and 44b.

83. The proportion of people either born or with parents born overseas in the electorate of Oxley, on the boundaries which Pauline Hanson won it in 1996, was, at 22 per cent, significantly lower than the Australian average of 30 per cent, and the proportion of persons born in non English-speaking countries was, at 7 per cent, little more than half the Australian average of 13 per cent,

according to the data in A. Kopras, *Comparisons of 1991 Census Characteristics: Commonwealth Electoral Divisions (1994 Boundaries)*, Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper No. 34 1994/95, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1995, Tables 23b and 22b. The seat was subsequently redistributed, making it more multicultural, and Hanson did not re-contest it in 1998.

84. J. Brett, *The Age*, 11 October 1996. See also her 'Representing the Unrepresented: One Nation and the Formation of the Labor Party', in R. Manne (ed.), *Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia*, Bookman, Melbourne, 1998, pp 26–37.

85. Comprehensively discussed in D. Smith, *North and South: Britain's Economic, Social and Political Divide*, Penguin, London, second edition 1994.

86. See *OECD Employment Outlook*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, July 1989, p 107 and *Employment Outlook*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, July 1992, pp 19–21.

87. *OECD Employment Outlook*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, July 1990, p 89.

88. Clearly illustrated in the Australian Bureau of Statistics *Social Atlas* series for each capital city prepared from 1996 census data.

89. See for example Professor T. Burke's comments in *The Age*, 23 December 1993 based on his *Melbourne: A Social Atlas*, prepared from 1991 census data.

90. The data were presented in R. Gregory, 'Macroeconomic Policy and the Growth of Ghettos and Urban Poverty in Australia', an address to the National Press Club, Canberra, on 26 April 1995.

91. Markey goes so far as to contend that the New South Wales ALP was originally in essence a radical country party; Markey, *The Making of the Labor Party in New South Wales 1880–1900, passim*.

92. See for instance the excellent map in T. Austin (ed.), *The Times Guide to The House of Commons May 1997*, Times Books, London, 1998.

93. For example the Australian Electoral Commission, *Federal Election 96 Results Map*, Australian Surveying and Land Information Group, Canberra, 1996.

94. See, for instance, M. Forbes 'Gain of Four Seats Brings Victoria Back to ALP Fold', *The Sunday Age*, 14 March 1993; and T. Colebatch, 'Coalition Suffered Voters' State Ire', *The Age*, 15 March 1993.

95. N. Economou and B. Costar, 'Victoria: Against the Slide?', in Bean et al (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution*, p 109.

96. The issues and some of the key literature in this large and ongoing debate are discussed and presented in Denver and Hands (eds.), *Issues and Controversies in British Electoral Behaviour*, pp 301–21.

97. Discussion with David Butler, and Simon Henning, a doctoral candidate at Nuffield College, Oxford examining the widening gaps between regional voting patterns in British elections in the period from 1964 to 1987.

98. See, for example, M. Denholm, 'Labor's Weak Link: Beazley Orders Inquiry into SA's Disappointing Result', *The Advertiser*, 5 October 1998.

99. 'Report by the National Consultative Review Committee to the ALP National Executive', typescript document, August 1996, p 4.

100. *Lateline*, ABC television program, 23 October 1997.

101. As Rod Cameron accurately summarised them, on *PM*, ABC radio program, 15 October 1997.

102. See R. Davis and R. Stimson, 'Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe: Explaining the Geography of the One Nation Party Vote at the Queensland Election', *People and Place*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1998, pp 69–82.

103. R. McGregor, 'The Great Divide', *The Weekend Australian*, 4–5 July 1998, reporting on the findings of Murray Goot, which are set out in detail in Goot's Chapter, 'Hanson's Heartland: Who's for One Nation and Why', in R. Manne (ed.), *Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia*, pp 51–74.

Chapter 4: Factions and their meanings

1. B.A. Santamaria, *Santamaria: A Memoir*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp 113–4.

2. See article in *The Age*, 22 January 1981.

3. Benn diaries typescript, entry for 20 January 1981, kindly supplied to the author. These entries also show that Hayden met with left-wing British Labour MP Eric Heffer among others during this visit.

4. Benn has recorded the fact that a discussion with Hayden took place but not further details, Foot had no records nor recollection of a meeting, Shirley Williams did not respond to requests for an interview, and Bill Hayden himself rebuffed repeated requests to be interviewed.

5. E. Heffer, 'An Australian Lesson for Labour', *The Times*, 9 February 1981.

6. It should be noted that an older generation of Roman Catholics, including Calwell, were also hostile to State Aid.

7. Wyndham interview.

8. The growth of masonic lodges in Britain in the inter-war years in fact came largely from the growing commercial, professional and service *middle* classes – as Ross McKibbin discusses in his *Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp 89–91.

9. See Blair's speech 'The Radical Coalition', reaching out to the legacy of Lloyd George, Keynes and Beveridge, reproduced in his *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country*.

10. In characterising the conflict between Whitlam and Cairns, Bob Connell identified four distinct groups in the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party in the late 1960s. They were: traditional socialists — 'people who regard social evils as inherent in a capitalist economy, and see Labor as a means to a major transformation of society'; new radicals — 'little interested in socialism, accept the welfare state, but think Labor should take a strong radical stand on 'conscience' issues such as aid to Asia, White Australia, capital punishment and civil liberties'; traditional moderates — 'influenced by Catholic social thought, against thorough-going socialism, deeply hostile to Communists, believe in moderate social-welfare reforms'; new technocrats — 'limited interest in socialism or civil liberties; see government as a tool for social engineering; interested in urban planning, efficiency in government, social welfare, science policy, efficient election techniques'. R.W. Connell, 'Whitlam Versus Cairns', in H. Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics: a Second Reader*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969, p 370.

11. J. Kane in *Exploding the Myths: the Political Memoirs of Jack Kane*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1989 at pp 177–9 makes the claim, and Jim Cairns in various interviews has tended to corroborate it.

12. Wyndham interview.

13. As any number of B.A. Santamaria's columns in *The Weekend Australian* newspaper through the 1990s (until his death in 1998), attacking financial deregulation and monetarism, regularly demonstrated.

14. Interview with Don Dunstan, *The Talk Show*, SBS television, 23 May 1994.

15. An exception is the journal *Socialist Objective* associated with the leadership of the Socialist Left faction in the Victorian ALP, which has been regularly published since 1981.

16. See for instance L. Weiss and J. Mathews, *Structure, Strategy and Public Policy: Lessons From the Italian Textile Industry for Australia*, Industrial Relations Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 1991.

17. Following the strong showing of the Communist Party at the 1976 Italian elections, Eric Hobsbawm put together a book, *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview by Eric Hobsbawm with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party*, Translated by J. Cammett and V. DeGrazia, The Journeyman Press, London, 1977.

18. A long-time activist on the left of the Victorian ALP, who served as president of the Victorian ALP in 1977–80.

19. This was in Keating's address to the National Press Club on 7 December 1990; quoted in M. Gordon, *Paul Keating: A Question of Leadership*, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1993, p 5.

20. R. Mathews, *Australia's First Fabians*, p 29.

21. Race Mathews to Crosland, 15 May 1963; Crosland papers, BLPES.

22. Race Mathews to Tom Ponsonby, Fabian Society papers, Nuffield College, Oxford, A 22/3 f 23, 18 June 1965.

23. Race Mathews to Ponsonby, Fabian Society papers, Nuffield College, Oxford, A 22/3 f 25, 14 September 1965.

24. ibid.

25. Krygier to Crosland; Crosland papers, BLPES, File 8/3.

26. Michael Foot interview.

27. Mandelson interview; reflected also in Tony Blair's regular Australian visits.

28. The impressions are recorded in handwritten annotations to Crosland's itinerary for his visit of 23–27 June 1963. Crosland papers, BLPES, File 8/3.

29. ibid.

30. Crosland to Krygier, 16 July, 1963.

31. Ducker interview.

32. As is clearly shown in the varying chapters of A. Parkin and J. Warhurst (eds.), *Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983.

33. M. Millett, 'Party that Harbours Grudges', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 August 1995.

34. S. Gree, 'What Made Martin Run', *The Age*, 12 August 1995.

35. D. Glover, 'Varieties of Leftism: Taft and Uren', *Quadrant*, Vol. 39, No. 4, April 1995, p 31.

36. R. Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Three: Secretary of State for Social Services 1968–70*, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1977, p 372n.

37. 'Keep on Course: A Statement on Economic Policy' issued by The

Manifesto Group of the Parliamentary Labour Party 27th October 1976', in the Manifesto Group papers, NMLH, which amount to one large box of papers sporadically covering the period c.1975–92.

38. Various economic policy documents from the period 1978–79 in the Manifesto Group papers.

39. Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought*, p 258.

40. Hattersley sets out his position in *Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism*, Penguin, London, 1987.

41. Personal interview with David Blunkett, Chair of the Labour Party 1993–94, MP for Sheffield, Brightside in South Yorkshire since 1987, education and employment secretary after election of the Blair Government, and a central figure in the pragmatic left of the British Labour Party since the early 1980s.

42. Quoted in R. Dixon, 'How Labor's Factions Work', *The Age*, 9 February 1989.

43. Australian Labor Party 36th Biennial National Conference, Canberra, 10 July 1984.

44 M. Grattan, 'Right, Left Clash at ALP council', *The Age*, 7 December 1981.

45. M. Magazanik profiling Steve (now Senator) Conroy, 'The Right-thinking Master of Machinery', *The Age*, 12 December 1994.

46. Ducker interview.

47. Discussed in L. Tanner, 'What Does the Centre Left Stand For', originally a typescript discussion paper, published as 'Centre Left? Centre-Right?' in *Socialist Objective*, Vol. 6, No. 1, c.1986, pp 3–4.

48. See profile of Shirley Williams *New Statesman and Society*, 16 September 1994 and her book *Politics is for People*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981; and David Owen's *Face the Future*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981. The 'Limehouse Declaration' issued on 26 January 1981 by the 'Gang of Four' defectors from Labour is reproduced in P. Zentner, *Social Democracy in Britain: Must Labour Lose?* John Martin, London, 1982, pp 151–2.

49. The following discussion of the British Labour Party Left, in addition to the interviews cited, draws on two texts in particular: P. Seyd, *The Rise and Fall of the Labour Left*, Macmillan, London, 1987, and L. Minkin, *The Labour Party Conference: A Study in the Politics of Intra-Party Democracy*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, second edition 1980.

50. Minkin, *The Labour Party Conference*, p 35.

51. J. Brand, 'Faction as its Own Reward: Groups in the British Parliament 1945 to 1986', *Parliamentary Affairs: A Journal of Compara-*

tive Politics, Vol. 42 No. 2, April 1989, pp 149–50.

52. Copy in Anne Kerr's papers, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull.

53. Parliamentary Labour Party minutes, NMLH; especially 10 December 1975.

54. Personal interview with Vladimir Derer, Secretary of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy since its inception and a long-time activist in, and perceptive analyst, of the British Labour Left; London.

55. Personal interviews with Blunkett, and with Chris Smith. The member for Islington South and Finsbury in inner north London since 1983, Smith was at the time of interview the British Labour Party's shadow minister for the environment. Soon after he was promoted to be shadow heritage secretary and he became culture, media and sport secretary after election of the Blair government in 1997. Previously he had been the Tribune Group's Chairperson 1988–89 and was a member of *Tribune* newspaper's Board of Directors 1990–93.

56. The publication was edited by J. Lansman and A. Meale, published by Junction Books, London, 1983 and was avowedly to stop the Right from using the disastrous 1983 election result for Labour as a reason to drop Left policies.

57. Hewitt interview.

58. Blunkett, Smith interviews.

59. P. Wintour, 'Left Tries to Breathe New Life into Tribune', *The Guardian*, 12 May 1992.

60. ibid.

61   Personal interview with Tony Benn. Benn has been MP for Chesterfield since 1984 and prior to this was MP for Bristol South East 1950–60 and 1963–83, a Minister in the Wilson and Callaghan governments, an important chronicler of British political history with his series of published diaries and a central and controversial figure in the 'hard left' of the British Labour Party particularly since the early 1980s.

62. The pamphlet was titled *Labour and the Economy: The Case for Demand Management*, Tribune Group of Labour MPs, London, 1993.

63. P. Anderson, 'Arise Ye Starvelings from Your Slumbers', *New Statesman and Society*, 22 July 1994, p 26. Peter Hain is author of *Ayes to the Left: A Future for Socialism*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1995.

64. Benn interview.

65. Derer interview, and substantial documentary records of the LCC, and British Labour Party factions more generally, contained in the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) papers, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull.

66. Among them was Mike Gapes, who went on to become the International Officer of the Labour Party in 1988 and entered Parliament as the Member for Ilford South in 1992. Another early LCC member was (Australian born) Anita Pollack, who was one of the activists who helped to deselect Reg Prentice, the Labour MP for Newham North East in 1975 and Wilson government minister who fell out of favour with the Left. She became the Member of the European Parliament for the constituency of London South West.

67. Derer interview.

68. So described in *The Guardian*, 1–2 October 1994.

69. Smith interview.

70. 'Introducing the Labour Co-ordinating Committee: Labour's Democratic Left' [brochure], Labour Co-ordinating Committee, London, n.d., c.1993–94.

71. *Modernising Britain: A Discussion Document For Labour*, Labour Co-ordinating Committee, London, 1993, p 16.

72. 'Introducing the Labour Co-ordinating Committee' brochure.

73. *Modernising Britain*, pp 2, 1.

74. *Modernising Britain*, p 11. Another LCC pamphlet is *Beyond Defeat: Labour's Road to Renewal*, Labour Co-ordinating Committee, London, June 1992.

75. Smith interview.

76. T. Fisher, 'Softly Softly Left', letter to *New Statesman and Society*, 21 October 1994.

77. E. Shaw, *Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party: The Politics of Managerial Control in the Labour Party, 1951–1987*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, pp 289, 365n.

78. Jupp interview.

79. There has also in Britain been occasions on which 'ethnic branch stacking' itself has been an issue. According to James Jupp, for instance, 'stacking' by Roman Catholics has been alleged in parts of London. More recently, applications by some 600 Asians in 1994 to join the British Labour Party in Gerald Kaufman's electorate of Manchester, Gorton, were blocked out of fears that the influx was occurring as part of a plan to deselect the sitting Member. Legal action was subsequently taken to challenge the Constituency Party's refusal to allow these membership applications (*The Guardian*, 22 September 1994). The ALP had also expe-

rienced alleged 'stacking' by Catholic supporters of the industrial groups and by their non-Catholic opponents in the 1950s.

80. M. Crick, *Militant,* Faber and Faber, London, 1984, p 207.

81. Scott, *Fading Loyalties,* pp 26–30.

82. Ian Ward in 'The Changing Organisational Nature of Australia's Political Parties', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* Vol. 29, No. 2, July 1991 at p 156 interprets L.F. Crisp's statement (in *The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901–1951,* Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1978 at p 90) that the ALP's membership in 1939 was '370,000' to refer to individual branch members but it is much more likely that Crisp's figure was either entirely or overwhelmingly made up of the members of unions affiliated to the ALP. The actual individual branch membership level would only have been a small fraction of this figure.

83. According to the party's then leader, Joan Kirner, in *The Age,* 5 October 1992.

84. According to the party's state secretary, John Lenders, in *Labor Star,* No. 199, June 1994.

85. These figures are in a typescript paper by the former Victorian ALP state secretary, Jenny Beacham and two colleagues titled 'The Big Stack: Trading in Human Beings — the Labor Way: An Open Letter to SL Members', Melbourne, n.d. (c.July 1994).

86. The need for which I myself argued in *Fading Loyalties,* especially at pp 43–4.

87. As Jupp importantly reminded us, in an interview on the ABC Radio National program, *Background Briefing,* 8 May 1994.

88. Wyndham interview.

89. Wyndham to Hatch, 15 April 1959.

90. Wyndham to Williams, 22 January 1964. NLA MS 4985, ALP Federal Secretariat papers, Box 39, International correspondence 1963–1969, folder marked 'General-British Labour Party' ranging from 1963 to December 1965.

91. Wyndham interview.

92. Speech to NSW ALP State Council, 6 December, 1981; reported by M. Steketee, 'Keating Fears a UK-type Split in NSW Labor', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 7 December 1981.

93. For the full factional context of Keating's attack, and for a more accurate analysis of Peter Baldwin and the New South Wales Left in this period see M. Wilkinson, *The Fixer: The Untold Story of Graham Richardson.* Heinemann, Melbourne, 1996.

94. Jupp interview.

95. CLPD papers, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull, DX/22/1, 'Statement of Aims, June 1973'. The 20+ year history of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy in Britain is accessible in detail in this collection. There is also a considerable personal archive of the CLPD's prolific output, which includes its regular *Bulletin* since 1981 and its *Newsletter* since the mid 1970s, which was inspected in Vladimir Derer's home in North London.

96. CLPD papers, Brynmor Jones Library, 'Statement of Aims, June 1973', Part 2(a) of the group's 'Constitution'.

97. Derer interview.

98. See especially F.E. Chamberlain, *A Selection of Talks and Articles by F.E. Chamberlain on Australian Labor Party Principles*, Australian Labor Party, Perth, 1965, in which Chamberlain defends the role of the so-called '36 faceless men' of the ALP's then Federal Conference.

99. See Chapter 4 of my *Fading Loyalties*.

100. Outlined in 'Labor Democracy Campaign', typescript document signed by Peter Milton, Jim McKiernan and Robert Tickner, and circulated to Victorian Socialist Left Executive members on 18 November 1986.

101. *Constitution and 1998 ALP Platform*, Australian Labor Party, National Secretariat, Canberra, 1998, p 2.

102. The following analysis of the Victorian Socialist Left in this period draws on my own first-hand observation of many of the events as they occurred, and my resultant proximity to sources.

103. Jaensch, *The Hawke-Keating Hijack*, p 143. The latter point was certainly corroborated by Hartley and Crawford's position against Vietnamese immigration – see report of weekend SL meeting in *The Age*, 20 May 1985.

104. Carried at a General Meeting on 4 May, 1986; reported in *The Age*, 5 May 1986.

105. Based on my own discussions with a number of CALPS and NOLS office-bearers in the mid-1980s, when the renaming occurred.

106. M. Ogden, L. Ebbels, L. Birmingham, J. Frazer, B. Taft, R. Wilson, L. Rubinstein, P. Herington, M. Robertson and M. Taft, 'An Australian Socialist Organisation', *The Prospects Discussion: Views and Proposals*, Communist Party of Australia, Red Pen Publications, Sydney, 1984, p 14. Although Laurie Carmichael elected to personally stay in the Communist Party of Australia, he can nevertheless be regarded as one of the leading proponents of the political and strategic line associated with the Socialist Forum.

107. ibid., p 13.

108. Reported in *The Age*, 9 March 1985.

109. T. Sheehan, 'A Progressive Left?', unpublished paper, 18 April 1986.

110. P. Robinson, 'SL Called on to Disband in Favour of New Group', *The Age*, 24 February 1986; and clarifying Letter to the Editor from Mark Taft published on 27 February 1986.

111. Connell and Irving's *Class Structure in Australian History* (first edition 1980, second edition 1992) for instance represented a far more sophisticated treatment of class than the earlier work of 'Old Left' labour historians Robin Gollan and Ian Turner.

112. For example, see Max Ogden's paper, 'Industrial Democracy and New Management Techniques in the Australian Metal Industry', published in *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, No. 20, October 1986, pp 37–43, in which he also attacks as 'conservative' and sectional the elements of the Left who were more sceptical about the Accord.

113. See John Mathews' writings, for example his book *Age of Democracy: The Politics of Post-Fordism*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989.

114. See Hogg's semi-autobiographical comments in the personal Post-script to his 'Review and Recommendations on the Reform of the Party's Organisation', unpublished ALP National Secretariat Draft Report, second edition, December 1990, pp 57–60.

115. B. Howe, 'Beyond Social Democracy: Socialism and the ALP', in D. McKnight (ed.), *Moving Left. The Future of Socialism in Australia*, Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 1986.

116. Reported in *The Sun*, Melbourne, 24 February 1986.

117. Reported in *The Age*, 27 July 1983.

118. *The Age*, 14 July 1990.

119. See Jupp, 'Socialist 'Rethinking' in Britain and Australia', pp 193–207.

120. In *Labor Without Class: The Gentrification of the ALP*, Pluto Press Australia in association with the Lloyd Ross Forum, Labor Council of New South Wales, 1999 at pages 93–4 Thompson makes the amazing statement 'that 'economic rationalism' is not a dirty word among the contemporary working class...Witness their acceptance of the Hawke government's program of tariff reform'. Unfortunately this wildly inaccurate statement is typical of his whole book, which contains no new research and which is based on twisting the work of other people to support Thompson's per-

sonal prejudices in favour of a combination of neo-liberal eco-
nomic, and conservative social, policies which, if followed, would
only further drain the ALP's support base.

121. For Britain, see the poll findings on the prevalence of social values
contrary to 'Thatcherism' discussed at pp 112–5 of R.M.
Worcester, *British Public Opinion: A Guide to the History and Method-
ology of Political Opinion Polling*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. In
Australia, opinion polls regularly demonstrate this, for instance
those reported in the following newspaper articles: 'Free Marke-
teers Fail to Gain Popular Support', *The Age*, 23 August, 1991;
'60% Reject Power Sales: Poll', *The Age*, 17 August, 1995; 'Public
Not So Free with Attitudes to Open Trade', *The Australian*, 28 June
1999.

122. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*,
Pelican, Suffolk, 1969, p 290.

123. See, for instance, A. Dickins and S. Weir, 'Divided We Stand', *New
Statesman and Society*, 7 January 1994, pp 16–17.

124. Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society 1945–67*,
pp 40–3.

Chapter 5: The records of labour in office

1.   Such as in Britain by R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.),
The Wilson Governments, Cassell, London, 1993 and M. Artis and D.
Cobham (eds.), *Labour's Economic Policies, 1974–79*, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1991; and in Australia by A. Patience
and B. Head in their two books *From Whitlam to Fraser: Reform and
Reaction in Australian Politics*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne,
1979 and *From Fraser to Hawke*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne,
1989.

2.   In 1997 Tony Blair was elected prime minister of Britain with a
record majority of seats for Labour and in all likelihood will lead
a majority Labour government until at least 2001.

3.   There is a photograph of Arthur Calwell at a march against the
Vietnam War with visiting left-wing British Labour MPs Russell
and Anne Kerr, 1967 among the papers of Anne Kerr at Brynmor
Jones Library, Hull University, File DMK/1/69 covering her visit
to Australia in January 1967.

4.   Whitlam interview.

5.   *Australia and Europe: Principal Speeches during the Visit of the Prime
Minister of Australia to Europe, 14 December 1974 to 21 January 1975*,
Australian Government Publishing Service for the Department of

Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 1975, pp 22, 23–4.

6.   See E.G. Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government 1972–1975*, Viking, Melbourne, 1985, pp 127–8.

7.   See M. Sexton, *Illusions of Power: The Fate of a Reform Government*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1979, pp 78–80. In Australia's case, the ALP antagonism to the security services was long-standing: due to their involvement against Doc Evatt in the Petrov affair.

8.   See P. Wright, *Spycatcher*, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1987. See also D. Leigh, *The Wilson Plot: the Intelligence Services and the Discrediting of a Prime Minister*, Heinemann, London, 1988 and S. Dorril and R. Ramsay, *Smear: Wilson and the Secret State*, Grafton, London, 1991, both of which discuss in some detail the parallel circumstances of the dismissal of the Whitlam government.

9.   See B. McKinlay, 'Conspiracy Against Whitlam Government', *The Age*, 16 February 1988.

10. J. White, 'Rich Countries and Poor', in T. Burgess et al, *Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance*, Penguin, England, 1968, pp 63–4.

11. As clearly stated by leading Left backbencher at the time, Gerry Hand; *The Age*, 7 December 1984.

12. See news reports in *The Canberra Times*, 1 September 1986; *The Weekend Australian*, 6–7 September, 1986; and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 September 1986.

13. *The Age*, 22 January 1996.

14. See D. Smart and J. Dudley, 'Education Policy', in C. Jennett and R.G. Stewart (eds.), *Hawke and Australian Public Policy: Consensus and Restructuring*, Macmillan Education Australia, Melbourne, 1990, pp 207–9.

15. See various reports of statistical evidence to this effect collated by B. Birrell and I. Dobson of Monash University and regularly published in the journal *People and Place*.

16. 'The New Britain', A speech made on Sunday, 19 January 1964; reproduced in H. Wilson, *The New Britain: Labour's Plan Outlined by Harold Wilson: Selected Speeches 1964*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964, pp 11, 13.

17. Recent confirmation of this long-lasting trend is given by I. McAllister and C. Bean 'Long-term Electoral Trends and the 1996 Election', in Bean et al, *The Politics of Retribution*, pp 180–1.

18. E.G. Whitlam, *The Truth of the Matter*, Penguin, Melbourne, 1979, p 95, responding to the claims in Kerr's earlier book, *Matters for Judgement*.

19. In a telephone conversation on 23 August 1974, according to a transcript cited by P. Ziegler, *Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rivaulx*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1993, p 417.

20. The text of this letter was published in *The Times,* 15 November 1975.

21. Letter from V.E. Carpenter, Secretary, Paddington Constituency Labour Party to John Russell, Chairman, ALP UK Society, 19 November 1975. ALP UK Society papers, NMLH.

22. Reported in *The Guardian,* 12 November 1975.

23. ibid.

24. Minutes of the Labour Party Home Policy Committee, 26 January 1977, Labour Party archive, NMLH.

25. T. Benn, *Against the Tide: Diaries 1973–76,* Arrow Books, London, 1990, p 459.

26. Benn interview. Benn outlines his proposals for constitutional reform in T. Benn and A. Hood, *Common Sense: A New Constitution for Britain,* Hutchinson, London, 1993.

27. Ken Bennett, assistant national secretary of the ALP in a letter to Jenny Little, British Labour Party international secretary, dated 8 March 1976, urgently requested a copy of the document. ALP Federal Secretariat papers, NLA, MS 4985 Box 212.

28. Published by Arrow Books, London.

29. As Mullin acknowledged in an interview published in *The Age,* 2 November 1989.

30. Quoted in *The Age,* 30 January 1988.

31. See Maddox, *The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition,* pp 159–60.

32. According to the education minister from 1983–87, Senator Susan Ryan in *Labor in Power,* ABC television series, 1993, Episode 5. This series, which screened in Australia in 1993 and in Britain in 1994 offers unique insights to the inner workings and battles of the Hawke and Keating governments up to 1993, and has lately been supplemented by N. Blewett, *A Cabinet Diary,* Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 1999, which specifically covers the period 1992–93.

33. P. Keating, Address to the Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne, 11 November 1987, typescript, p 2.

34. ibid., p 4.

35. Reported in *The Age,* 7 December, 1987.

36. B. Hayden, 'Millenarian Hopes, Ballot Box Imperatives, Keeping the Faith', unpublished Chifley Memorial Lecture, delivered at the University of Melbourne on 6 August 1985, typescript, p 6.

37. Australia Day address, 26 January 1991; reported in *The Age,* 28 January 1991.

38. L. Oakes, *The Laurie Oakes Report: Labor's 1979 Conference Adelaide:*

Analysis of the Major Decisions and Debates of the 33rd National Confer-ence of the Australian Labor Party 16–20 July 1979, Objective Publi-cations, ACT, 1979, pp 34–6.

39. See H. Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964–1970: a Personal Record*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1971, *passim*.

40. This significant revelation was reported by Maximilian Walsh in *The Age*, 19 February 1988.

41. J. Langmore and J. Quiggin, *Work for All: Full Employment in the Nineties*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1994, pp 66–8.

42. The source for Figure 3.2 is *OECD Economic Outlook*, various years, Annex Table 22, standardised unemployment rates.

43. The source for Figure 3.3 is *OECD Economic Outlook Historical Sta-tistics 1960–1990*, OECD, Paris, 1992 and subsequent issues of *OECD Economic Outlook*, Annex Table 16.

44. On John Laws Radio 2GB talk program, 14 May 1986.

45. The sources for Figure 3.4 are Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Balance of Payments, Australia*, Catalogue No. 5302.0, various years; Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product*, Catalogue no. 5206.0, various years; International Monetary Fund *International Financial Statistics* for the period 1960–78; and *OECD Economic Outlook*, various years, Annex Table 51 for the period 1979–96.

46. M. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, Harper Collins, London, 1993, pp 504–5.

47. Pursued in the Labour Party's 1985 Jobs and Industry campaign and comprehensively outlined in N. Kinnock, *Making Our Way: Investing in Britain's Future*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

48. See reports in *The Age* and *The Sun*, 9 July 1986.

49. The industrial left's alternative agenda was outlined in *Policy for Industry Development and More Jobs*, Metal Trades Federation of Unions, Sydney, 1984; and P. Ewer, W. Higgins, and A. Stevens, *Unions and the Future of Australian Manufacturing*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

50. *Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin December 1996*, McMillan Printing Group, Sydney, 1996, Tables F.4 and F.11.

51. This is made clear in *OECD Economic Outlook* June 1998, Annex Table 30, General government financial balances, Surplus or Deficit as a percentage of nominal GDP for the UK, Australia and the US inter alia for the years 1979 to 1996.

52. For example, the election eve editorial in Murdoch's *The Aus-tralian* newspaper of 30 November 1984, 'Labor Deserves to be Re-elected'.

53. See the regular issues of the OECD *Main Economic Indicators*.

54. In its annual *Human Development Report.*

55. See *Human Development Report 1999,* Oxford University Press for the United Nations Development Program, New York, 1999, Table 5.

56. The sources of these data are the *World Development Report 1989,* Oxford University Press for the World Bank, New York, 1989, p 22 and *World Development Report: Knowledge for Development,* Oxford University Press for the World Bank, New York, 1999, Table 5.

57. P. Saunders, 'The Economic Dimensions of Inequality in Australia', Address to the Eighth National Conference of the Australian Population Association, Adelaide, 3–6 December 1996, typescript, pp 8–9.

58. See the report of the comparative study by Dr Jane Falkingham of the London School of Economics and Professor Ann Harding of Australia's National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, reported in M. Gunn, 'Our Welfare More Efficient', *Australian,* 7 June 1996.

59. *Income Distribution in Australia: Recent Trends and Research,* Economic Planning and Advisory Council report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995.

60. *Human Development Report 1999,* Table 5.

61. P. Travers and S. Richardson, *Living Decently: Material Well-being in Australia,* Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1993.

62. See A. B. Atkinson 'Inequality and Social Security', in P. Townsend and N. Bosanquet (eds.), *Labour and Inequality: Sixteen Fabian Essays,* Fabian Society, London, 1972, pp 24–5.

63. See R. Lister, 'Family Policy', in N. Bosanquet and P. Townsend (eds.), *Labour and Equality: A Fabian Study of Labour in Power, 1974–79,* Heinemann, London, 1980, pp 190–2.

64. This policy measure by the Hawke government is discussed in D. Gibson, 'Social Policy', in Jennett and Stewart (eds.), *Hawke and Australian Public Policy,* p 195. Kinnock's comments were made on *60 minutes,* screened on Australia's Nine Network on 5 April, 1992.

65. T. Uren, *Straight Left,* Random House Australia, Sydney, 1994, p 377.

66. R.J.L. Hawke, typescript extracts from T.J. Ryan Memorial Lecture delivered on 24 September 1985.

67. See reports in *The Age,* 10 May 1995.

68. This information comes from telephone interviews with Ralph Willis. Willis was minister for employment and industrial relations in the early years of the Hawke government and held several other senior economic portfolios throughout Labor's time in office 1983–96, culminating in a term as treasurer from 1993–96.

69. Jim Roulston, Victorian president of the then Amalgamated Metal Workers' and Shipwrights' Union and national junior vice-president of the ALP made these comments at the ALP's national conference in 1979; L. Oakes, *Labor's 1979 Conference Adelaide,* p 21.

70. Max Ogden interview. Ogden was a close associate of Carmichael at that time and subsequently.

71. The Bullock Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy was appointed in August 1975 by Wilson and reported in January 1977. Its recommendations were mostly not proceeded with by the Callaghan government due to oppposition from employers. Other radical proposals for industrial democracy set out in British Labour's 1974 manifesto were pursued by Tony Benn as Secretary of State for Industry from March 1974 to June 1975 but receded after he was shifted out of that portfolio by Wilson.

72. Department of Trade, *Australia Reconstructed: ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe: A Report by the Mission Members to the ACTU and the TDC,* Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987, p 172.

73. Average adult male weekly earnings rose by 47.5 per cent in Britain from 1964–70, but average male weekly earnings jumped even more sharply, by 68.2 per cent, in Australia in 1972–75, according to the official national statistics reported respectively in *British Political Facts,* p 359 and *Australian Political Facts,* p 517.

74. The source for Figure 3.5 is the ILO *Yearbook of Labour Statistics,* International Labour Office, Geneva, various years.

75. Including Roy Green, an Australian economist and industrial relations academic who worked as a policy officer for the British Labour Party from the early to mid-1980s, mainly on industrial relations issues; and John Edmonds, general secretary of the General Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB) Union in Britain, both of whom I personally interviewed.

76. A delegation of the print workers involved in the British dispute also later visited Australia as the guest of Australian print unions.

77. *Australia Reconstructed* report, p 172.

78. Personal interview with Bill Callaghan, head of Economic and Social Affairs Department at the Trades Union Congress.

79. *Sunday* television program screened on the Nine Network, Australia, 16 July 1995.

80. ibid.

81. Personal interview with John Monks, TUC general secretary.

82. Quoted in R. Archer 'Britain's Trade Unions: a Lesson from Australia', *The Financial Times,* 8 April 1987.

83. *The Age*, 27 March 1991.

84. Kelty and Edmonds comments on *The World Today*, ABC radio program, 12 April 1991 following a visit by Kelty to the TUC; personal interviews with Martin Ferguson, ACTU president from 1990–96, David Lea, assistant general secretary of the TUC, and Michael Walsh, head of the TUC International Department; Monks, Edmonds interviews.

85. J. Monks, 'A British View', in M. Crosby and M. Easson (eds.) *What Should Unions Do?*, Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 1992, p 93; Bill Callaghan interview and a paper titled 'The Accord and the Australian Trade Union Movement' which he prepared for the TUC General Council of 21 February 1996, after visiting Australia in 1995–96.

86. *The Age*, 26 March 1997.

87. As was explicitly acknowledged and explored in a paper specially commissioned by the ALP government, from University of Cambridge economists W. Brown and G. Zappala: 'The British Experience of Enterprise Bargaining', published in the Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) Background Paper No. 33, *Enterprise Bargaining Systems: International Case Studies*, Australian Government Publishing Services, Canberra, August 1993.

88. A. Milner, *The Road to St. Kilda Pier: George Orwell and the Politics of the Australian Left*, Stained Wattle Press, Sydney, 1984, p 24. The comparison is obviously subjective and somewhat overdrawn — for instance in suggesting that Oxford was equally important an educational influence upon Hawke in his comparatively short period there, as a graduate, as the more substantial and formative intellectual influence it had been for Harold Wilson.

89. 'The New Britain' speech, pp 10, 13, 15.

90. Wilson's moves in this direction are discussed by Tom Forester in *The Labour Party and the Working Class*, Heinemann, London, 1976, p 26; and see Hawke's own comments in *The Hawke Memoirs*, p 168.

91. It is possible to push the personal parallels between the two men further. For instance, both had uncles who were prominent Western Australian politicians. Hawke's uncle was WA Labor premier from 1953–59. Harold Wilson's uncle, Harold Seddon (after whom Harold Wilson was named and who he visited in Australia as a boy in a visit which made a big political impression on him) entered the WA Legislative Council in 1922 having defected from the ALP in the 1917 split over conscription and was later appointed as a pro-Liberal Party president of the Legislative Council. See B. Pimlott, *Harold Wilson*, Harper Collins, London, 1993, pp 4, 19–20.

92. For instance by Jupp, in his earlier cited 1967 article 'Their Labour and Ours'.

93. Report of the 54th annual conference of the Labour Party, Labour Party, London, 1955, p 65.

94. Speech to 64th annual conference of the Labour Party, Scarborough, 1963; reproduced in B. MacArthur (ed.), *The Penguin Book of Twentieth-Century Speeches*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1993, p 336.

95. The New Britain' speech, pp 9, 10, 12, 15, 21.

96. ibid., p 10.

97. The italicised titles were Nos. 12, 10, 13 and 19 in the *Talking Points* series of publications for 1966.

98. E.G. Whitlam, Australian Labor Party election policy speech, Sydney, 1 October 1969; in I. McAllister, and R. Moore (eds.), *Party Strategy and Change: Australian Electoral Speeches since 1946*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, p 93.

99. E.G. Whitlam, Australian Labor Party election policy speech, Blacktown, 13 November 1972, in McAllister and Moore (eds.), p 111.

100. See in particular his 11 page leaflet 'Australian Labor Party: A National Party With A National Purpose', Issued by the Leader of the Opposition, Parliament House, Canberra, for the information of Labor members and supporters; copy in F.J. Riley and Ephemera Collection, State Library of Victoria.

101. Whitlam interview.

102. Comments on ABC radio *AM* program, 1 September 1992, reported in *The Australian*, 2 September 1992.

103. Whitlam interview.

104. In his earlier cited *Australian Journal of Political Science* article 'Transitional Hero: Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party'.

105. The source for Figure 5.6 is the series of Morgan Gallup Poll findings on party voting intentions regularly published by the Roy Morgan Research Centre, Melbourne and Sydney.

106. *Labor in Power*, ABC television series, 1993, Episode 5.

107. ibid.

108. *Poles Apart on Australia's Future: It's Your Choice*, Australian Labor Party, Canberra, 1992.

109. E. Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements*, Harper Perennial, New York, 1989 (first published 1951).

110. The series was scripted by Bob Ellis and particularly played up the heroic role of Labor figures such as Curtin and Evatt.

111. The words were written by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Britain's Ambas-

sador to Washington from 1912–18, on the completion of his diplomatic service for England and in anticipation of his return.

112. He describes for instance witnessing the powerful oratory of Michael Foot in a mining village during the October 1974 British election campaign and later being moved to tears at the Birmingham Town Hall as Labour Party members sang 'Jerusalem'; in his *Goodbye Jerusalem: Night Thoughts of a Labor Outsider,* Random House, Sydney, revised second edition 1997, pp 493–6.

113. Neil Kinnock's speech was made, before he became leader of the British Labour Party, on 7 June 1983, and is reproduced in MacArthur (ed.), *The Penguin Book of Twentieth-Century Speeches,* pp 429–31. Beazley delivered similar lines at the start of his speech in the House of Representatives on 22 August 1996. Ellis acknowledges Kinnock as the source in *Goodbye Jerusalem,* p 315.

114. On 2 May 1994 to be precise. The white paper was launched on 4 May.

115. In a speech to journalists on 7 December 1990 Keating stated that Australia had never had a great leader, overlooking Hawke's hero John Curtin, which triggered fierce discussion between them in the context of their building struggle for the party leadership.

116. H.C. Coombs, 'John Curtin — A Consensus Prime Minister?', John Curtin Memorial Address, Australian National University, 14 November 1984, typescript, p 16.

117. G. Stedman-Jones, 'Why Is the Labour Party in a Mess?', *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working-Class History,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p 239.

118. Notably in the significantly revised edition of the standard one volume treatment of the British Labour Party by H. Pelling and new joint author A.J. Reid, *A Short History of the Labour Party,* Macmillan, London, eleventh edition 1996. See also D. Weinbren's review essay, 'New Labour, New History', *Labour History Review,* Vol. 63, No. 2, 1998, pp 197–201.

Conclusion

1. *Herald Sun,* Melbourne, 6 September, 1996.

2. *The Age,* 23 March, 1996.

3. For example, his speech to The University of Melbourne Centre for Public Policy, 14 April 1999.

4. See my critique of Lindsay Tanner's book *Open Australia,* Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 1999: 'What Kind of Open Australia?', AMWU Victorian State Office, Melbourne, March 1999.

5. Such as Victorian Labor Senator Kim Carr, AMWU National Secretary Doug Cameron and the CFMEU's John Sutton.

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