

Czech-NATO Relations: A Dynamic Process

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Introduction

After 1989, Europe entered a period of complex and multidimensional transformation. This period has been marked by a structural shift: on the one hand, the regulatory institutions of the Cold War disintegrated in the East; on the other, the completion of the single market and the establishment of the EU deepened integration in the West. Therefore, one could say, while the geopolitical changes have pulled Europe eastwards, its institutional centre of gravity has shifted westwards. Bridging the gap between the geopolitical and institutional realities has been the key task for post-Cold War Europe.

From the very beginning we realized that for us this task would have two mutually dependent aspects: the domestic one and the international. In the domestic sphere, Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic) successfully managed to transform its political and economic system. Solid foundations of civil society were laid. Today, the political scene of the Czech Republic seems to be stable; the overwhelming majority of the population support democracy and a market economy and, according to public opinion polls, the curve of the feel-good factor has been rising.*¹ Securing our newly-acquired freedom in the international sphere has been the core of the second aspect.

Our general aim was clearly defined: to integrate the country into reliably working western economic, political and security institutions. As a part of the former Czechoslovak federation we became a member of the Council of Europe (February 1991) and signed the Europe Agreement with the EU (December 1991), we became a member in the NACC (December 1991), we have been

actively working within the PfP programme. The Czech Republic became an Associate Partner of WEU (May 1994) and joined the OECD club (December 1995). Our application for EU membership was submitted in early 1996. So far it might seem that our "return to Europe" has been a one way pass. But it has not been.

The Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský, in his dialogue with President V. Havel, rejected this generally accepted 'one-way' interpretation of the slogan "return to Europe":

... as a unit, Europe ceased to exist the moment we put the frontiers between the military blocs before the thousand year old bonds which were derived from our common tradition.

In reaction, Bělohradský put forward the conception of an "eccentric Europe". The development of this situation was caused by the shift of the European geostrategic centre of gravity outside the Continent as the consequence of the Cold War bipolarity. This implies a "return to Europe" not only be in an East to West direction but also concentric, from the East and the West! Thus, as he continued:

We all have been returning to Europe, learning to be European ... having problems getting used to the fact that Europe is whole again and that she must be responsible for her unity, even in military terms.*²

A certain post-Cold War crisis of European integration, NATO's search for a new *raison d'etre* in general and for a coherent approach to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, and, indeed, the inability of Europe to cope effectively with the new type of crises in the post-bipolar situation, all these support Bělohradský's view.

In this essay, I will begin by briefly discussing three aspects of our search for security in Europe: the development of the Czech position, the development of NATO's position and the development of the Russian position. Following this, I will describe the situation in which the Czech Republic finds itself today.

The Czech Search for Security: from Collective Security to Collective Defence*³

After 1989 the new Czechoslovak foreign-policy elites were among the strongest proponents of building a new pan-European security structure in which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was to play a key role. The crisis in the Gulf, the Soviet veto over CSCE involvement in Moscow's dispute with the Baltic Republics at the end of 1990 (which was followed by military intervention in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991), the crisis in Yugoslavia and the country's veto over a proposed CSCE conference on it, and, last but not least, the escalation of a general instability in the former-Soviet territories. On the one hand, all these events shattered the idea of a pan-European collective security system based on the Helsinki process and, on the other, they emphasized the surviving value and importance of the traditional military dimension of security. As a result, membership of NATO started being presented as an alternative to the vision of a pan-European collective security system.

One could identify the first signs of the coming shift in our strategy as early as June 1991. It was during the international *Prague Assembly on a European Confederation* when President Havel simultaneously refused to connect security matters with the French project of a European confederation and stressed NATO as the possible core of future European security architecture.*⁴

The definitive break with the idea of pan-European collective security, which was prevalent in the first years after the velvet revolution, came with the split of Czechoslovakia. In the first official foreign-policy document - the *Conception of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic* (which was presented before Parliament by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in April 1993), it was made clear that the strategic goal of the Czech Republic would be membership of the EU, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Therefore, "we [the Czech Republic] will block any further institutionalization of the Visegrád group as well as

any effort to create parallel integrative structures other than the EC and NATO ... full-fledged membership of NATO is the long-term and immutable aim" of the country.*⁵ Since then, membership in NATO has been presented as the sine qua non of the future of Czech security.

Development of NATO's Position: from Dialogue via Partnership to Cooperation

The post-1989 challenge which the Alliance has faced is multidimensional. The question of how to cope with the conditions of the "new strategic environment" has many facets: the overwhelmingly static, linear military organization versus the diffused, sub-limited threats of the post-bipolar world implying 'out of area' operations, the calls for a widening of NATO versus preservation of its political, organizational and operational cohesion (all this even more complicated by the sensitive relations with Russia), the dilemma of integration versus re-nationalization of defence of the Alliance's members and so on.

The complex process of the Alliance's redefinition started in December 1989 by identifying the decline of the division of Europe and its consequences for NATO: "Looking to the future we recognize the outlines of the political architecture of Europe made whole and free, in the emergence of which we are determined to play a full part", stated the NAC communique on 14-15 December. The same document declared the promotion of economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe (besides securing a CFE agreement) as another of NATO's new roles.*⁶

The first concrete proposals towards the newly emerging democracies in the East came at the summit in London in July 1990. The leaders of the NATO countries stated that: "The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries in the East" by extending to them the hand of friendship. The Alliance invited the WTO countries to "establish regular diplomatic relations with NATO", (which Czechoslovakia did immediately on 31 July).*⁷

The pace of NATO's "reaching-out to the East" did not

correspond with the growing expectations of the Central Europeans, especially given the context of the changed atmosphere in 1991. The provisions outlined in *The North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation*, which was adopted by the foreign ministers of the former WTO countries, the NATO states and the three Baltic states on 20 December 1991 meant further positive steps.*⁸ In a plan for cooperation, which was issued at the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the following areas of "cooperative activity" were outlined: political and security matters, defence planning and conversion, policy planning consultation, economic and scientific issues, exchange and dissemination of information.*⁹ Nevertheless, the Central Europeans increasing demands for security guarantees were not even hinted at.

During 1993, as the pressure grew from Central Europe to enlarge NATO eastwards, Russia's stance on this matter became increasingly ambiguous. While the Russian President Boris Yeltsin reacted calmly to the possibility of NATO enlargement as late as August 1993, on 30 September he wrote a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, Germany and Britain warning against any eastward expansion of the Alliance. Then another sharp reaction to speculation about NATO enlargement came from Moscow in the form of an analysis by the director of the Outer Intelligence Service (former KGB) and the current Foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeni Primakov. According to the document, an expansion of NATO (which was expected by the Russians to happen at the January 1994 NATO summit), would "bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its colossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of Russia", as Primakov put it at a press conference on 25 November 1993. This would force Moscow into "fundamental" military countermeasures and heighten the anti-Western sentiments of Russians.*¹⁰

Yeltsin repeated Moscow's warning during his visit to Brussels in December. The NATO Secretary-General M. Wornier assured him, that a new security architecture in Europe would not be "against or without, but with Russia". But Wornier also stressed

that NATO leaders would declare their intention to expand the Alliance at the January summit regardless of Russia's objections.*¹¹

The *Partnership for Peace* Programme (PfP) which was adopted at the January summit in Brussels, prepared conditions for qualitatively new relations between NATO and countries seeking membership in the Alliance: For the first time in a NATO document it was declared that "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach out to the democratic states to our East." States participating in the Partnership were invited to send "permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons". The PfP *Framework Document* declared that "each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme." This clause was especially welcomed in the Czech Republic as an indication of the possibility of a multi-speed, approach to the Alliance.*¹²

Nevertheless, the Programme offered only consultations "with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security". Thus, instead of the most sought after security guarantees of Article V of the Washington Treaty, *de facto* only the provisions of the Article IV of the Washington Treaty were offered to the new partners of NATO.*¹³

After his meeting with the US special envoy Madeleine Albright immediately after the PfP was published, the Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec said: "We are fully convinced this project opens for us the possibility of becoming a member of the alliance". The Czechs came forward quickly with a concrete offer to sacrifice their balanced budget projected for 1994 by accepting a 1 percent deficit in order to finance the local cost of their participation in the programme. This rhetorical gesture (which was never later realized) was very positively perceived, especially in contrast to Poland's much less enthusiastic reaction.*¹⁴ Be that as it may, with the PfP, NATO - Central European relations definitively left their rhetorical phase and turned to practical matters.

The Public Perception of NATO in the Czech Republic

The Czech efforts to gain NATO membership may generate an impression that the Czechs feel gravely endangered. The real situation however is quite to the contrary. According to public opinion polls the Czechs fear international and everyday crime much more than some sort of military threat.*¹⁵ Even Czech politicians are not able to formulate anything other than metaphysical arguments for NATO enlargement: for Defence Minister V. Holáň NATO membership "is above all a political matter. It presupposes the respect for shared values ...". Similarly, in many other official statements one cannot find any arguments other than those stressing the more or less symbolical meaning of NATO membership for the Czech political elites.*¹⁶

The public perception of NATO has gone through a certain development. While the percentage of those supporting our would-be membership in NATO has not changed since 1993 (in November 1993 as well as in November 1995 42% of respondents supported the country's efforts to become a NATO member), the number of those opposing this has grown (in 1993 it was 26%, in 1994 28%, in early 1995 31% and in November 1995 39% of respondents did not support Czech efforts to become a NATO member).*¹⁷ The November 1995 results were probably influenced by the debate over the possibility of deploying of nuclear weapons on Czech territory if the Czech Republic were to become a NATO member. This debate was stimulated by the publication of the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. In spite of the fact that the Study states clearly that "there are no prior conditions for stationing troops or nuclear weapons" on the territory of new members,*¹⁸ Czech politicians in a rather redundant debate, unconditionally supported the possibility of accepting NATO nuclear weapons on Czech territory.*¹⁹

The Possibility of Explicit NATO Enlargement

The Study on NATO Enlargement (published in Brussels, on

28 September 1995) has probably been the most important shift in NATO's position vis-a-vis its eastern neighbours since the PfP Programme was announced in January 1995. The Study clarifies the "why and how" of enlargement while still leaving aside the question "when". In its 36 pages it explains the goals and principles of enlargement, the conditions the candidate countries must fulfil and stresses the continuing role and importance of the NACC and PfP. And, as the then Secretary General W. Claes put it, at the same time it is a good "conceptual basis" for "the Alliance itself."²⁰ One cannot also overlook a marked effort of the Alliance to "sell" its would-be enlargement to Russia: not only could one read between the lines of the Study's text a permanent effort to avoid any questions or formulations that might irritate Moscow (this is also evident in comparing the final draft of the Study with its much bolder first draft from the Spring of 1995), but for the first time a NATO document has appeared simultaneously in Russian. The absence of specific military commitments should be viewed in the same way. Nevertheless, on leaving NATO Headquarters after the presentation of the Study, Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin considered that "NATO has made a little effort" [to take into account Russian objections], ... "Russia is still against the idea" and "this problem" has not been included "in the framework of a global security policy in Europe" as Moscow would prefer.²¹

Development of Russia's (Op)position: a Turbulent Certainty

The Russian opposition vis-a-vis NATO's eastward enlargement is *de facto* a continuation of the Soviet strategy, which was formulated in the so called Kvitsinski Doctrine.

In spring 1991 the Soviets were renegotiating the bilateral treaties with their former satellites. Moscow pressed to incorporate into these treaties a clause, which would have bound the parties in the treaty, as the then Soviet Deputy Minister Yulii Kvitsinski put it during *The Prague Conference on the Future of European Security*

in April 1991, not to participate "in the alliances directed against either of the parties, and non-provision of their territories, communications and infrastructures for use by third parties for the purpose of aggression." The bilateral treaties with the former Soviet satellites were to have been a basis on which "a new structure of security, cooperation and good-neighborly relations in the region" should have been built.*²²

Apart from the fact that an almost identical clause was incorporated in the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the potential for an open interpretation of the provisions proposed by the Soviets made it unacceptable for Czechoslovakia. This Soviet stratagem was probably a response to the Visegrád Declaration of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (February 1991), which was interpreted by Moscow as a first step by these countries towards NATO membership.*²³

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia took over the Union's negative attitude to the possibility of NATO's eastward enlargement. But in September 1993 a surprising shift in attitude occurred: during his visit to Poland, President Yeltsin claimed that "Russia perceives the Polish efforts to integrate in NATO with understanding". This was widely interpreted as a "green light" from Moscow.*²⁴ But only several weeks later Moscow changed its mind. This shift was fully reflected and meticulously formulated in the already mentioned document issued by the Outer Intelligence Service in November 1993. The document was Moscow's reaction to speculations about the possibility of NATO enlargement which were growing in the context of the forthcoming NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. In the document, one can find most of the arguments and guidelines that Russia has been using as the basis of its foreign policy up to now.

First, NATO enlargement would, according to the document, disturb the geostrategic balance in Europe and would put Russia in an extremely disadvantageous geopolitical position. This would "probably" make it necessary to reevaluate all the defence concepts and operational plans, to restructure and to reallocate military forces, and to create new infrastructures. This would also increase

in military circles, and the growth of anti-western feeling, consequently endangering the economic and democratic reforms in Russia.

Second, the document stated that NATO enlargement would undermine multilateral obligations into which Russia entered along with NATO countries. The document explicitly mentioned the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) (the revaluation of which Yeltsin proposed back in September 1993). Later, Russia threatened the possibility of refusing to ratify the START II treaty.

Third, as an alternative, Russia proposed the synchronization of NATO enlargement with its functional transformation to a political institution (which would be in fact a sort of demilitarization of the Alliance), and with the strengthening of the relationship between NATO and Russia. The result of this alternative process would be a pan-European collective security system, "something between NATO on one hand and the CSCE and UN on the other". One can also find this concept implicit in the Russia's current proposals for a *Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century!*¹⁵

The Current Situation

(1) The Czech Republic

To review all the activities which have been conducted within the PfP programme is far beyond the scope of this essay. A truly multidimensional cooperation has developed, concerning transparency in national defence planning and budgeting, democratic control of defence forces and the development of cooperative military relations with NATO in the field of joint planning, training and exercises.*²⁶

There has been an important shift in Prague's foreign policy in the Central European region. While up until mid-1995 the Czech politicians had almost unanimously claimed that the Czech Republic was the most suitable country in Central Europe to be the first to enter the Western structures, in July 1995 Prague opened a diplomatic charm offensive towards Poland. During his visit to

Warsaw Czech Defence Minister Holán declared that "should Poland be the first country admitted to NATO this would be advantageous for Prague". The Czech Republic also offered Warsaw closer cooperation in standardizing of their military forces and a common and coordinated approach to NATO. A common Central Europe air defence project was also discussed.*²⁷

In the meantime, good performance by the Czech Republic's battalion in UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia opened the way to the current Czech participation in the IFOR in the framework of the operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. Today, the Czech battalion is deployed in the British sector in Bosnia and fully integrated into the NATO chain of command. This fact has immensely stimulated and deepened the cooperation between Prague and Brussels right at the moment when NATO - Central European relations have entered another phase.

(2) NATO

Despite the relative success of the PfP Programme it did not fulfil the ultimate aim of some of its participants - i.e. full-fledged membership of the Alliance. To allay the pressures from Central Europe, at a NATO ministerial meeting in December 1994 it was decided "to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership" both for NATO proper and for "interested Partners".*²⁸ The already discussed *Study on NATO Enlargement* (published in September 1995) was the result of this "process of examination".

The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1995 decided to expand the scope of the PfP and declared that "in 1996 the enlargement process will consist of three elements": (1) "intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations" with Partners interested in NATO membership, "building on the foundations of the enlargement study"; (2) strengthening ties "between the Alliance and all of the Partners"; (3) "the Alliance will consider what internal adaptations and other measures are necessary to ensure that enlargement preserves the effectiveness

of the Alliance".*²⁹ These formulations clearly indicate a real beginning of the process of enlargement.

In January 1996 the PfP countries were formally invited to participate in the dialogue. The parameters of the dialogue proposed by the Alliance stressed the importance of a two way approach to the dialogue: the interested partners themselves were asked to partially set the agenda of the consultations in the form of "discussion papers" which would be submitted to the Alliance. They were also asked to comment on the content of the *Study on NATO Enlargement*. The dialogue will be basically bilateral (16+1 format) on various levels.*³⁰

At the same time the Alliance will conduct its own reviews, both internally and of the potential candidates (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the strongest contenders today). The interim conclusions of the discussions will be submitted at the NAC ministerial meeting in spring 1996, and the whole review process will be concluded by the December 1996 NAC meeting.

Despite the optimism of the Central Europeans who expect that in 1996 the question "who and when" will be answered (President Havel declared this in September 1995),*³¹ this does not seem probable. Given the divergences within the Alliance and within the respective NATO countries, and given the financial situation of the Central European countries, and the problems they will have in achieving compatibility with NATO (material compatibility, civil-military relations, strategic culture etc.), it is hard to believe that NATO will commit itself by setting a firm timetable. There are many more questions: what would happen to those not named in the first wave of candidates? Ukraine and the Baltic Republic are especially concerned about this possibility which could, in their view, relegate them to an inferior status as a buffer zone at best, or, at worst, push them into Russia's arms. And, indeed, the situation in Russia still recalls Churchill's description as: a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".

The process of NATO enlargement goes on anyway. The Czech Republic submitted her first *Discussion Paper* in May 1996. It already deals with a number of very detailed questions concerning

the future membership: the scope of Czech forces assigned to the integrated structures, military infrastructure on the territory of the Czech Republic, and standardization are discussed in the document in an unprecedented depth. Furthermore, over the last year NATO provided PfP countries with over 700 of its 800 technical standardization agreements.

In July NATO offered those PfP countries which had already signed security agreements (delimiting and regulating the handling of sensitive information) with NATO its classified defense planning questionnaire. The release of the defence planning questionnaire represents just another step in the process of assimilation for prospective new members. By this, NATO's annual assessment of each Alliance's country military assets and combat readiness was extended to interested partners potential NATO members.*³²

(3) Russia

Although the position of Russia may seem to be immutable, one can detect certain nuances. First, while Moscow generally opposes NATO expansion, since at least 1994 Russian politicians have been allowing for a certain margin of compromise: the former Foreign Minister Kozyrev stressed in November 1994 that Russia is against "hasty and mass" expansion of NATO (does this mean that Russia is not against evolutionary enlargement?)*³³ In the same month Vladimir Lukin, the Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament) stated that "we are not against the Czech Republic entering NATO but we are against NATO's structures being expanded and being drawn near our borders".*³⁴

Instead, Moscow proposed an all-European collective security structure based on the OSCE (formerly the CSCE until the end of 1994) and supported by a structure of bilateral treaties. Moreover to assure the Central Europeans the Russians offered joint - i.e. Western and Russian - guarantees.*³⁵ Thus, the recent proposals for a compromise in the question of NATO enlargement announced by the new Russian Foreign Minister Primakov (to accept NATO enlargement under the condition that there would be no shift of

NATO's structures eastward as well as the proposed alternative way of giving the Central Europeans security assurances by way of joint Western-Russian joint guarantees*³⁶) are just further variations on older concepts. One could expect that there will be a certain compromise found, especially given the fact that NATO, in the context of the contemporary security situation in Europe, does not intend to build new and costly military structures on the territories of its future members. Thus, a variation of the Norwegian option - i.e. no foreign troops and no nuclear weapons - could be expected. The result of the recent presidential elections did not change or even modify this position.

On the other hand, good relations with Russia are critical for maintaining stability and security in Europe. Although Russia's contemporary conventional potential is not overly impressive, the country is still equipped with a substantial amount of nuclear weaponry and related technological know-how. Thus, the cultivation of Russia-NATO relations will continue to be a top priority. One could even say that there will either be European security with Russia, or defence without Russia.

Conclusion

This essay was not aimed at painting a comprehensive picture of the questions which form both the inner and outer context of the Czech efforts to find a security anchor since 1989. Rather, it has tried to draw attention to the most important moments in the overall process as seen from the Czech Republic's standpoint. Discussion of the complex and important impact of the position of Ukraine and the Baltic Republics of the former USSR, as well as the intricacies of the inter-Alliance debates (both among the member states and within the respective member states), and, last but not least, the impact of the situation in extra-European regions, especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East had to be left aside. One could also argue that too much space was given to Russia at the expense of other aspects of European security; yet this fact only reflects the author's perception of Russia's

importance. So what can be said in conclusion?

We can safely wrap up our brief discourse by stressing the undisputable fact that there were very few moments in the history of Europe when a new European system could be formed not as a result of war and the victors' imposition of peace conditions on the vanquished, but through positive negotiations and agreement. The events in the late 1980s created an exceptional situation, in the context of which Europe has had a historic chance to seek a positive consensus, to extend the Western "security community" (to use Prague born political scientist Karl Deutch's term) eastward and to establish a space of security, stability and cooperation excluding war and violence. Both East and West have had problems facing up to the new and unexpected situation, and both East and West have had problems with their "return to Europe". But looking back over the last few years it seems that, although mistakes have not been avoided, the positive aspects and achievements of the post-Cold War transition outweigh the negative ones.

Notes

- 1 Cf. *MF Dnes* (daily, Prague), 18 September 1995, p. 2.
- 2 *Lidové noviny* (daily, Prague), 14 September 1993. pp. 8-9.
- 3 For detailed account of the development see: Šedivý, J., 'From Dreaming to Realism - Czechoslovak Security Policy since 1989', *Perspectives*, No. 4, (Prague winter 1994 / 1995), ss. 61-71.
- 4 *FMZV, Dokumenty 1991* (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Prague, Documents 1991), pp. 424,445.
- 5 *FMZV, Dokumenty 1993*, pp. 322-323.
- 6 *Texts of Final Communiqués*, vol. IV, 1986 - 1990, NATO office of Information and Press, Brussels, pp. 122-124.
- 7 *Ibid*, pp. 41-44.
- 8 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, 20 December 1991', M-NACC-1(91)1 II(rev), NATO press Service.
- 9 'Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation' (issued at the NACC meeting, Brussels, 10 March 1992), M-NACC-

- 1(92)21, NATO Press Service.
- 10 Cf. *Perspektivy rasširenia NATO i intěresy Rossii*. (Perspectives of NATO enlargement and Russia's interests), Moscow, 1993., International Herald Tribune, 26 November 1993.
- 11 *International Herald Tribune*, 10 December 1993.
- 12 'Partnership for Peace' (issued at the NAC summit meeting, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994), M-l(94)2, NATO Press Service.
- 13 Cf. Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened". *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures*, NATO Information Service, Brussels 1989, p. 376.
- 14 *The International Herald Tribune*, 10 January 1994.
- 15 Cf. *MFDnes*, 24 February 1994., *MFDnes* 14 July 1995.
- 16 Cf. Šedivý, J., 'Známe atlantické hodnoty?', *Mezinárodní politika* No. 12, Prague 1995. pp. 10-12.
- 17 *MFDnes*, 10 July 1995, *MFDnes*, 30 November 1995.
- 18 *Atlantic News*, No. 2753, vol. 29, Brussels 30 September 1995, p. 2.
- 19 Cf. *MFDnes*, 29 September 1995.
- 20 *Atlantic News*, No. 2753, vol. 29, Brussels 30 September 1995, p.1.
- 21 *Ibid*, p. 2.
- 22 Sherwen N. (ed.), *The Prague Conference on the Future of European Security*, (Brussels, 1991), pp. 63-69.
- 23 Cf. Sharp J. O. M., 'Security Options for Central Europe in the 1990s', In Crawford B. (ed.) *The Future of European Security*, (Center for German and European Studies, Berkeley, 1992), p. 61.
- 24 *Lidové noviny*, 14 November, 27 November 1993.
- 25 'Moscow hints it may breach troop cuts treaty', *The Financial Times*, 7. 10.1993.
- 25 Cf. *Memorandum on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe of the last Century*, distributed at the OSCE Seminar on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for

- the 21st Century, Vienna, 18-19 September 1995.
- 26 For more details see: *NATO Handbook, Partnership and Cooperation*, (NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels 1995).
- 27 Cf. *MFDnes*, 28 July 1995., *Lidové Noviny* 28 July 1995., *MFDnes* 18 September 1995.
- 28 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 1 December 1994, *Atlantic News*, No. 2676 (Annex), 3 December 1995, p. 2.
- 29 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 5 December 1995, Final Communiqué M-NAC-2(95)118, Brussels, 5 December 1995, p. 5.
- 30 Despatch from the Czech Embassy Brussels, 12 February 1996, No. 1222/96.
- 31 *MFDnes*, 5 September 1995.
- 32 *Defence News*, 8-14 July 1996.
- 33 *MFDnes*, 4 November 1994.
- 34 *Lidové Noviny*, 23 November 1994.
- 35 *MFDnes*, 2 December 1994.
- 36 Cf. *MFDnes*, 12 March 1996, *Lidové Noviny*, 16 March 1996.

