

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt		X		
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL		X		
15	D/PAO		X		
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO				
20	VC/NIC		X		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Remarks

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27 FEB 85  
Date

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**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**WASHINGTON**

**February 25, 1985**

<b>Executive Registry</b>	
<b>85-</b>	<b>880</b>

**SECRET**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT**  
**THE SECRETARY OF STATE**  
**THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY**  
**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE**  
**THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE**  
**THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT**  
**AND BUDGET**  
**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE**  
**THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR**  
**POLICY DEVELOPMENT**  
**THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC ADVISERS**  
**THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**  
**THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY**

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**LOGGED**

**28 FEB 1985**

**SUBJECT: United States Policy toward the New Zealand Government with respect to the Port Access Issue (S)**

The President has approved the attached statement of U.S. policy and objectives with respect to the New Zealand port access issue. A separate memorandum on the decisions the President has made with respect to military and other relationships with New Zealand is being provided to the Departments and Agencies affected. (S)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

*Robert C. McFarlane*  
**Robert C. McFarlane**

**Attachment**

**SECRET**

**Declassify on: OADR**

**SECRET**

**SECRET**SECRETU.S. Relations with New Zealand

Policy and Objectives. U.S. policy toward New Zealand is the same as that toward any ally, that is, mutual respect and a mutual sharing of the benefits, burdens, and risks of the alliance. Our objectives include a full military relationship which includes close cooperation on international and regional security matters, a close intelligence relationship, and unfettered access of ships to each other's ports. Our objectives also include the fostering of an understanding in New Zealand of the role that both conventional and nuclear weapons play in U.S. global strategy. (C)

The recent decision by the New Zealand Labour Government, on February 4, 1985, not to permit a U.S. destroyer to visit New Zealand unless the United States declares that it carries no nuclear weapons, represents a direct challenge to our longstanding global policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. ships and planes. This decision:

- effectively denies access to New Zealand by U.S. ships and planes;
- creates problems for us in other, strategically important areas;
- increases Soviet incentives to promote disunity among our allies and to wait out further successes by other anti-nuclear groups around the world, rather than to negotiate genuine arms reductions;
- changes the operational character of New Zealand's military participation within the ANZUS alliance. (S)

For these reasons, the United States is compelled to take a course of action that demonstrates to the government of New Zealand that it cannot enjoy the benefits of a good ally without fulfilling the commensurate responsibilities. Therefore, with great regret, the decision has been taken to curtail our military and other ANZUS-connected relationships with New Zealand, until the government of New Zealand changes its policy. In the meantime, the people of New Zealand are still our friends, and the door remains open to the return of an old ally. Over the long term, the fundamental objective of the United States remains to resolve this situation in a way which strengthens ANZUS and our other alliances around the world. (S)

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The ANZUS Alliance. The Departments of State and Defense are directed to present their recommendations as to what the U.S. position toward the ANZUS Alliance should be in the wake of the New Zealand Government's action. (S)

Economic. It is important that we not undertake--or be perceived to be undertaking--any economic sanctions against New Zealand as a result of their ship visit policy. On the other hand, New Zealand knows that it cannot expect to continue to receive special preferential treatment and consideration in the economic area which it might have enjoyed as a closer ally. (S)

Public Diplomacy. The Interagency Group is directed to develop a public diplomacy program to promote the U.S. point of view in New Zealand and Australia. (S)

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