

SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL UNITY

A Challenge for Africa

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CHAPTER TWO

CONSTITUTIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN ETHIOPIA: HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY PROCESSES

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We live in an era of constitution making...How the constitution is made, as well as what it says. Process becomes equally important as the content of the final document for the legitimacy of the new constitution.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

The state of Ethiopia claims to trace its history back more than 3000 years, but the modern state was not

consolidated until the mid-19th Century.¹ At the time, an imperial system was established based upon the principles of royal absolutism, with the monarch as the sole sovereign. There was no written constitution at the beginning of the modern era, and this remained so for seventy-five years. It was not until 1930 that Ethiopia inaugurated its first written constitution, but since then the original constitution has been revised and ultimately discarded. It was followed by a Marxist-Leninist constitution, which in turn was discarded and succeeded a decade ago by what is ostensibly a liberal democratic constitution.

The case of modern Ethiopia represents an ideal case by which to examine the critical questions of: "What are constitutions supposed to do?" "Does constitution-making equate to constitutionalism?" Ethiopia is not a new state, but it is a new democracy, albeit imperfectly formed. Throughout the modern era its leaders have been confronted with the need to address issues relating to cultural pluralism and demands for self determination among the country's disparate ethnic/nationality groups. By examining the attempts by various modern Ethiopian regimes to come to grips with these problems, we can identify yet another example of how various new regimes in the modern era have either failed or succeeded in their efforts to deal with tensions growing from cultural pluralism and the demand for self-determination.

Not until the drafting of Ethiopia's aborted 1974 constitution did the concept of "citizen" for most of the population become relevant. Up to that time, all but the aristocracy and nobility were no more than mere "subjects" in the system of imperial rule.² However, beginning with the ending of World War I, yearnings among subject peoples in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the world for expanded rights became more and more common. This trend particularly expanded after World War II. Moreover, what started as a demand for freedom from oppression and exploitation rapidly emerged into a cry for "democracy" and "human rights".

Adam Przeworski has asserted,

New democracies have to address simultaneously the civil, political, and social requirements of citizenship. They cannot follow the long experience of Western Europe, where the rule of law, the system of political rights, and the rights to social welfare and education were faced as successive challenges. Yet the current circumstances of regime transitions and economic crisis put all these prerequisites of citizenship under pressure in many countries.³

New constitutions must be drafted, and they must be crafted in such a way as to protect minorities from tyranny in whatever form it takes. The questions become, "In order to be effective, can constitutions be imported and grafted onto a society, or must they be organic creations emanating from within particular societies through the process of a negotiated constitutionalism?" More often than not, new states or states seeking to modernize themselves face simultaneously multiple challenges relating to demands for self-determination that may even include a presumed right to secede from a given state. On the other hand, they might be confronted by multiple challenges from ethnic/nationality groups that demand their full citizenship rights. Such a guarantee is absolutely necessary if democracy is to take hold in what were previously non-democracies. If this is not the case, the process of constitution-making will fall short of yielding a democracy in which all citizens perceive themselves to have equal citizenship rights.

Constitutions do not necessarily represent a so-called "silver bullet", an ultimate "panacea". However, constitutions are deemed necessary by constitutionalists because humankind has proven to need checks on the possibility of groups oppressing one another.⁴ In traditional societies such constitutions could have been informal, but in the modern era there

is a tendency to codify laws, rules and regulations governing relations between and among groups and individuals. Walter Murphy has suggested:

Constitutionalists tend to be more pessimistic about human nature, fearing that people are sufficiently clever to oppress without hurting themselves. Constitutional theorists do not deny the importance of institutional and cultural checks but see those as insufficient. They are constantly concerned with the human penchant to act selfishly and abuse power. They want institutional restraints on substantive matters to prevent lapses into an authoritarian or even totalitarian system with populist trappings.⁵

While constitutions can be real and effective, they can also be shams. They can be blueprints that spell out the rights and responsibilities of both the citizen and the state. They can be instruments of repression and oppression, or they can represent the keys to true liberation. Constitutions may not always guarantee that all citizenship rights are always protected, but if effectively interpreted and implemented they can guarantee that such rights will be protected under the rule of law.⁶

As far as modern Ethiopia is concerned, what has been the record of constitutional development? What were the purposes of the major constitutional efforts in that country? Why, until now at least, have these efforts failed? These questions will be addressed in the remainder of the chapter. First, there is brief discussion of the monarchy prior to the written constitutional era along with a discussion of how the imperial constitution was made and revised over time, and why it failed. Second, the case study addresses the Marxist-Leninist constitution, how it was made and why it failed. Third, the evolution of the current federal constitution is discussed and critically analyzed.

II. From Divine to Secular Constitutional Monarchy

Beginning in the 13th Century until the early 20th Century the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the chief legitimator of monarchical rule. However, the rights and obligations of the Crown and its subjects were not spelled out in a written secular constitution. Instead, there was developed by monks of the Church an elaborate set of codes rooted in an Ethiopian national epic. The *Kebrā Nagast* (The Glory of Kings) was written to document for the first time the mythical origins of the royal house. This document was written by six Tigrean clerics and completed in the early 14th Century.⁷

The basic argument of the *Kebrā Nagast* was that the Ethiopian people, not the Jews, are the "chosen people" and that only Ethiopian monarchs, who could trace their lineage to the House of David through King Solomon of the Israelites, had the right to rule not only the people of Ethiopia but the entire world.⁸ The major parts of the text were devoted to the recounting of the story of the Queen of Sheba, Makeda, and the wise Hebrew king, Solomon. As legend has it, the Queen of the Ethiopians had heard of the good and wise king of the Hebrews and went to Jerusalem to learn from his wisdom. Makeda was extremely impressed with the teachings of Solomon and agreed to adopt his religion and to bring it to her own people. Shortly before she was to leave Jerusalem, the legend states that the Queen agreed to dine with the King, and during the course of the evening, Solomon seduced Makeda and left her with his seed. After she returned home, the Queen is said to have given birth to a son, Ebna Hekimor, Menelik I, who being a direct descendent of the House of David, eventually became the King of Kings in Ethiopia.⁹

Once he attained adulthood, Menelik is said to have traveled to Jerusalem to visit his father. On this visit, he was crowned

King of Ethiopia by Solomon and given the name David II. More important, however, is the fact that legend has it that just prior to his departure for home, Menelik stole the Ark of the Covenant in which the Ten Commandments were stored.

In the process of telling the origins of the divine origins of the Ethiopian monarchy, the *Kebra Nagast* discredits Solomon and the Jews for having rejected Christ. Following this rejection, the light of God is said to have left Israel and began to shine his graces on Ethiopia and the Ethiopian people. The combination of being the direct descendent of the House of David, and in possession of the Ark of the Covenant, is claimed to have firmly established the right of Ethiopian monarchs to rule. Any person who claimed this right had to have it affirmed by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

At about the same time that the *Kebra Nagast* was penned, monks in the Church wrote a document, the *Fetha Nagast* (The Law of Kings), which was designed to spell out clearly the duties and obligation of the subjects of the Crown as well as those of the Crown to the people. The codes articulated in this document, according to legend, were supposed to have flowed directly from God to the people, through the King.¹⁰ These codes were adapted from the codified rules of the Coptic Church. Among other things, the *Fetha Nagast* established the fact that anyone who claimed to be legitimate heir to the Ethiopian throne had to adhere to Orthodox Christianity. The document also established that the King of the Ethiopians was also the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

The main point here is that documents like the *Kebra Nagast* and the *Fetha Nagast* from the 13th Century until the early 20th Century were the precursors to the formal written Ethiopian national constitutions of the modern era. To be sure, many of the peoples who historically inhabited the area we now know as Ethiopia had their own traditional institutions that articulated the rights and obligations of rulers and subjects. For example, the Oromo people claim to have traditionally adhered to a form of democracy called the *Gada*.¹¹ The

Somalis had similar rules in their system of *Heer*.¹² However, Ethiopia did not have a formal, written constitution until the Constitution of 1931, and even then, this constitution was based upon the principles of royal absolutism.

Ras (Duke) Tafari Makonnen assumed the Ethiopian throne as Haile Selassie I, King of Kings, in 1930, and instituted governmental and social reforms in order to begin the process of modernization in the country. Arguably the most significant of such reforms was the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy in 1931. By introducing a secular constitution, the Emperor was clearly attempting to strengthen his position in relation to the leadership of the Church and the traditional nobility. In the process, the traditional codes governing the rights and obligations of the monarchy and its subjects were superseded by this new formal secular constitution.

A. *The Constitution of 1931*

The Constitution of 1931, taking into consideration the difference in social contexts, was adapted from the Japanese Constitution of 1889.¹³ The constitution was not elaborate, and contained many of the elements that were imbedded in the traditional codes governing the relationship between Crown and subjects. For example, the first chapter, consisting of five articles, proclaimed Ethiopia a constitutional monarchy, headed by a monarch who traced his ancestry to King Solomon of Jerusalem and the Ethiopian Queen, Makeda. The Emperor was said to be divinely ordained, and anyone who wished to lay claim to the throne had to be able to prove that they were the direct descendents of this Solomonic line. This requirement was already enshrined in the *Kebra Nagast*, but what was significant about its inclusion in the new constitution was that the Church was formally removed from its traditional role of legitimizing any claims to the throne. Moreover, this marked the beginning of the secularization of national politics in Ethiopia.

The Constitution of 1931 went on to outline a process of bureaucratic secularization and centralization. Rules were laid out calling for more professionalized national and regional administrations, including the judiciary and budgetary institutions. Perhaps most significant for its implications for the future development of democracy in Ethiopia, the constitution for the first time mandated the creation of quasi-representative legislative institutions at the national level: The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Senators were appointed by the emperor from among the nobility and local chiefs. Representatives to the Chamber were in turn chosen by the nobility and chiefs. It was expected that sometime in the future, the representatives to the Chamber would be popularly elected, but this was not required by the new constitution. In either case, the Senate and the Chamber were not autonomous institutions, and could only make recommendations to the Crown. They could not make self-enforcing laws.¹⁴

John Markakis has perceptively argued that rather than demonstrating a real commitment to democratic reform when he allowed the Senate and the Chamber to be created, the emperor, "...was really attempting to rein-in and co-opt important members of the traditional nobility, and to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime among the new-educated classes" whom he saw as potentially crucial allies in his efforts to consolidate the Crown's absolutist position.¹⁵ For example, historically the nobility had been required to spend specified amounts of time at the royal court. The effect of the new constitution for Senators was to make them dependent upon the Crown for their legitimacy. They depended upon the emperor for their appointments, and they were now deprived of the opportunity of perhaps building their own bases of power in the provinces that could eventually lead them to challenge the Crown as had been the case in the past.

Needless to say, these reforms were not generally popular among the nobility, but they did not vigorously resist because they retained a good deal of their traditional rights and privi-

leges. For example, the nobility were still able to demand a proportion of the agricultural produce from peasants who occupied land that was in the noble person's domain of responsibility. Moreover, the emperor used the possibility of the appointment of noblemen to political and administrative positions as effective forms of patronage. If a nobleman proved loyal, and effectively represented the Crown in his area, he could expect a steady flow of patronage from the emperor.¹⁶

Despite the outward appearances of a modicum of democracy, the 1931 Constitution was clear about the absolutist position of the emperor. Twelve of the fifty-five articles in the document pertained to the powers and prerogatives of the Crown. Furthermore, other articles related to the "discretion" of the emperor. Theoretically, however, the emperor was not above the law, but since he in fact made the laws, he could construct them to favor whatever objectives he might decide to support.¹⁷

The rights accorded average citizens by the Constitution were few. If they were accused of a crime, all citizens had the right to be tried in a bona fide court. There were limited rights of privacy in correspondence and in the person's home. Citizens could own private property, and they had the right to, if they felt they needed to, petition the government.¹⁸ Despite these "guarantees", all citizenship rights could be suspended by either the emperor himself or by any of his agents. In disputes between a citizen and another citizen or between the citizen and a government institution, the emperor was the court of last appeal.

B. The Constitution of 1955

Ethiopian politics were profoundly affected by World War II and its aftermath. The emperor had been driven into exile when beginning in 1935 the Italian Fascists occupied the country for just over five years. During this period both

the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the traditional aristocracy were severely weakened. In fact, in the process of resisting the Italian occupation, virtually a whole generation of young Ethiopian intellectuals was wiped out. When the emperor was restored to the throne by the British in 1941, he used their military and administrative assistance to bolster his own authority against what was left of the Church leadership and the traditional aristocracy. At the same time, the world had also been profoundly changed by the War. Ethiopia found itself needing to establish itself as a legitimate player in the world community of states. Moreover, it was surrounded by African colonies which were rapidly gaining their independence and left by the departing colonialists with varying forms of democratic institutions. This trend led to pressures for reform on the Imperial Crown from younger Ethiopians.

The realities of the situation Haile Selassie found himself in by the early 1950's led him to begin the process of constitutional reform. It was clear that the resulting Constitution of 1955 was meant to appeal to those forces in Ethiopian society who were calling for the opening up of the political and social systems. This new constitution was very different from the earlier one. Rather than sticking to the notion of a constitutional monarchy, an effort was made to construct a constitution that was reflective in many ways of the United States Constitution.¹⁹

Like the U. S. Constitution, Ethiopia's 1955 Constitution outlines the separation of powers among the three branches of national government: the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Moreover, twenty-eight articles in the document dealt with the rights and duties of citizens. For example, it specified freedom of speech and assembly, due process, and religious freedom.²⁰ However, as with the previous constitution, the emperor could suspend any citizenship rights.

Two notable features of the new constitution were the way in which it spelled out the relationship between the

Crown and the other branches of government, and its provision for a popularly elected national assembly with more than advisory responsibilities. Also, for the first time, the structure and functions of such executive institutions as the Crown Council, Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister's Office were detailed in a coherent way. The Council of Ministers was comprised of the prime minister, the heads of all ministries, and ministers without portfolio. The Council of Ministers was assigned the responsibilities of advising the emperor on policy matters and of coordinating all inter-ministerial activities. Bills were drafted and then studied by the Council of Ministers and then the emperor was given by it a recommended course of action. He in turn made a decision and presented the bill to the Crown Council.²¹

The Crown Council, representing the more traditional elements in society, consisted of the chief cleric in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the *Abuna*, the president of the Senate, and notables appointed by the emperor. It was required that the emperor consult with this body, but he alone made policy decisions.²² Once the Council had made its intervention, the bill was then passed on to the legislature. It is important to note that even with these new provisions neither the Crown Council nor the Council of Ministers had any actual direct policy making authority. Furthermore, initially, the legislature was nothing more than a "rubber stamp" for endorsing what the emperor had decided.²³

The Council of Ministers was comprised of elites with more modernistic orientations than the Crown Council. For this reason, the emperor appeared to have been concerned with its potential powers. Therefore, he was careful not to become too influenced by this "new nobility". Because of their expert knowledge of matters they were required to deal with on a regular basis, Ministers could actually have indirect influence over policy. Realizing that he might not always be completely in charge of making policy, the emperor created his own private cabinet in 1959.²⁴ Again, Haile Selassie

seemed to have been influenced in his creation of his cabinet by the way the cabinet of the American chief executive was organized and operated.

The cabinet's primary responsibility was to provide the emperor with independent and alternative policy perspectives. However, almost as soon as it was created, the cabinet's unconditional loyalty to the emperor proved to be suspect. In late 1960, one of the members of the emperor's cabinet was involved in a coup plot against him.²⁵

As had the 1931 Constitution before it, the Constitution of 1955 placed no formal constraints on the emperor's power and authority. He could create on his own new governmental institutions, and appoint and dismiss any government official. Even though he allowed some law making powers to the legislature, the emperor retained the power and authority to make laws independently through executive decrees. Rather than a real system of checks and balances, the emperor relative to the other branches of government was all powerful. He could choose if he wished to dissolve the legislature, and he could also dismiss judges if he deemed that to be necessary. Significantly, the new constitution gave the emperor direct control over the administrative and financial matters of the Church.

When it was originally announced, the Constitution of 1955 won Haile Selassie widespread praise both at home and abroad, mostly because it seemed to extend and clarify the rights of citizens and because it resulted in the creation of a popularly elected legislature. Whereas the 1931 constitution did not provide for an actual lawmaking function on the part of the Senate or Chamber of Deputies, the new constitution gave both houses the authority to propose and to veto laws proposed by the executive branch of government.²⁶ Perhaps the most significant new authority assigned to the legislature related to the budgetary function. It could now approve or reject all budgetary items including tax proposals and appro-

priations. It could, if deemed necessary, also require that ministers appear before the legislature for questioning.

Between 1955 and 1966 parliamentarians went through a learning process through which they came to understand what their roles in government were and how they could in fact exercise the newfound authority and independence they had gained. This was a popularly elected assembly, and the emperor was not in any position to directly control who was or was not elected. At the same time, political parties were not allowed, and candidates for the legislature ran campaigns based on their personal popular appeals. The fact that candidates had to meet certain property ownership qualifications resulted in a class bias in the body toward the educated elite. The cost of campaigning also influenced who chose to run or not run for national public office.²⁷

In 1957 there were 210 parliamentary seats. By the time of the next election, 194 incumbents, almost 80 percent, were not returned to office or chose not to stand. The size of the national parliament was increased in 1963 by forty members, bringing the total number of seats to 250. There were three further elections before the imperial system was overthrown and each of these elections yielded trends similar to that of 1963 with high turnover. In the election of 1973 the turnover rate was 60 percent. In part, this was the result of the growing popular interest in such burning issues as land reform and increased taxation. Also, this was no doubt evidence of the growing sophistication among the electorate about the role of elections and the power that they had as citizens to choose their representatives. Between 1957 and 1973 there were five national elections, and voter turnout was consistently at 60 percent. In the election of 1973 alone, the turnout rate was 70 percent.²⁸

Because of fact that the Chamber of Deputies could amend and even veto proposals made by the government, by 1966 it was evident that it had become more than a rubber stamp for the government. In that year, after a bitter struggle

between the Ministry of Finance and the lower house, a revised tax bill was finally forwarded to the Emperor for his signature.

Ironically, it was the constitutional reforms of 1955 that appeared to have contributed most to a sharpening of the contradictions between the feudalistic values held by the traditional elites and the bourgeois-democratic values held by the new classes. Between 1965 and 1974, young intellectuals and students began to question the legitimacy of feudalism and royal absolutism. What came to be characterized as the "student movement" emerged in February 1965, crystallizing in a demonstration before the Parliament. While Parliament was discussing a land reform bill, the rallying cry of the students was, "Land to the Tiller."²⁹ Such demonstrations became common from this moment on and, in 1969, students openly distributed pamphlets attacking the Emperor directly. They called for radical social, economic, and political reforms. Nevertheless, there appeared not to have been an overwhelmingly leftist orientation among them. In these demonstrations, the contradictions inherent in the remnants of the old order were clearly identifiable; all that was left was for precipitating ingredients to be added to this inherently explosive situation.

In an effort to blunt growing discontent in several sectors of society, the regime again made a desperate attempt to reform national political institutions. In August 1974, yet another national constitution was proposed. This version called for the abolition of royal absolutism, the introduction of parliamentary democracy, and the relegation of the Emperor to only a titular status. It was also proposed that there would be a separation of powers among the branches of government, universal suffrage, guaranteed civil rights, and a complete separation of church and state.

Even as the terms of the new constitution were being debated in Parliament, various groups throughout the country were becoming more and more politically emboldened. In

many areas of the rural south, even tenants and peasants had begun to express their concerns publicly. In some areas, they began to appropriate land and other property claimed by local landlords as well as that of agents of the Crown itself. In early September 1974, a military coup brought an end to Ethiopia's modern imperial regime.

III. From Ethiopian Nationalism to Scientific Socialism

The coup makers who overthrew the system of imperial rule were not guided by an elaborate ideology. Instead, they claimed that they were mainly motivated by a sense of patriotism. Initially, the new regime adopted as its motto *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia First); however, within three years, it had shorn itself of this African nationalist ideology, and began to pursue a variant of "scientific socialism."

From the very beginning, the regime, or the *Derg* (committee) as it came to be known, was confronted with popular discontent, as several ethnic groups made demands for equal citizenship rights and/or self determination. For instance, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and other nationalist movements in that region had been waging a civil war against Ethiopia for more than a decade, and the *Derg* initially tried to squash this movement militarily. However, it was unsuccessful and the conflict merely intensified. In an effort to find a political solution to the Eritrean and other claims of the right to self determination, the *Derg*, in 1975, proclaimed its Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR), and its commitment to creating a political system and government based upon the principles of "scientific socialism." The document asserted the right to self-determination of all nationalities within Ethiopia, including Eritreans.

In spite of enormous efforts over its first decade of rule to create conditions for its widespread acceptance, the *Derg*,

by 1976, was confronted with persistent civil unrest throughout the country. In response, its tendency was to react with violence against those who challenged it. This led to international exposure of the gross human rights problems in the country. For instance, in the U. S. Presidential campaign in 1976, presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, pledged to cut off military aid to several countries, including Ethiopia, who were guilty of gross human rights violations. This was exactly what he did when he assumed office in 1977. By November 1976, the *Derg* was desperate, and had already begun to turn to the Eastern Bloc for military, economic and political assistance. Relations between the U. S. and Ethiopia were completely severed in late April, and the Soviet Union stepped in to fill the void.

In addition to military and economic aid, the Soviets and their allies attempted to encourage the *Derg* to create institutions to assist it in pursuing its scientific socialist development strategy. By 1984, the Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE) had been created, with a mandate to be the vanguard of the revolution. This action came at a time when Ethiopia was in the midst of a catastrophic drought and famine. But, despite the widespread social problems the country faced, the *Derg* forged ahead with its socialist policies, and also with its preparations for the inauguration of a Marxist-Leninist constitution. It diverted resources that would have been used for famine relief and poverty alleviation to military purposes, and relied heavily upon the international community for humanitarian assistance.

In its role, as the vanguard of the revolution, one of the WPE's primary tasks was to lay the foundation for a socialist constitution. In March of 1986, a 343-member Constitutional Commission was formed to draft this document. The Commission had its origins in the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, which had been established in 1983 in an effort to find solutions to political and social tensions that grew from Ethiopia's extreme ethnic diversity.

After about six months of deliberations, the commission issued a 120-article draft document. A million copies of this draft were printed and distributed throughout the country. Between July and August, the draft was discussed at about 25,000 locations. Where popular interest was evident, it centered on issues such as taxes, the role of religion, marriage, the organization and conduct of elections, and citizenship rights and obligations. Few questions were raised about the document's failure to directly address the nationalities problem and the right to self-determination. According to official reports, however, more than a half million people suggested revisions. In August, the drafting committee reconvened for the purpose of considering some proposed amendments. It accepted some ninety-five amendments, but for the most part, the changes that were made were only cosmetic.³⁰

The referendum to ratify the constitution took place on February 1, 1987, and the results were announced three weeks later. The government reported that 96 percent of the country's 14 million eligible voters actually voted. Eighty-one percent were said to have endorsed the constitution, while 18 percent opposed it. Significantly, this was Ethiopia's first national election based on the principles of universal suffrage. However, the freeness and fairness of the election could arguably have been questioned because of heavy security in certain areas and the obvious presence of WPE cadres at certain polling places throughout the country.³¹

The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was officially proclaimed on February 22, 1987.³² The constitution resembled a hybrid of the Soviet and Romanian constitutions. Even though there was created an executive body of 24, the Council of State, with the primary responsibility of running the day to day operations of the state, even more importantly, there was a requirement for a strong presidency. Interestingly, the authors of the new constitution chose not to endorse an approach to dealing directly with the issue of self-determination. The rights of nationality groups were

deemed not as important as those of citizens belonging to mass organizations (e.g. workers and peasants associations, women's associations, student associations, etc.). In other words, individuals were expected to owe their primary loyalty to these types of mass organizations, rather than to their ethnic kin.

Part One of the constitution clearly spells out the regime's definition of the appropriate social order. The state is declared to be "a state of working peasants in which the intelligentsia, the revolutionary army, artisans and other democratic sections of society participate."³³ This section also outlines the manner in which popular participation is to take place and how the people would exercise their powers through the election of representatives to the national legislature body, the *Shengo*, and to more local governmental bodies.

The structure and operations of the 835-member National *Shengo*, the supreme organ of state power, were detailed in Part Three of the Constitution. Those elected to office had to first be nominated by local cells of the WPE, mass organizations, military units, and selected other bodies. Each electoral district averaged seventy-five thousand people in rural areas and fifteen thousand in urban areas. A term of office was five years.

The National *Shengo* was responsible for electing the president, and vice president of the country, and the vice presidents of the Council of State. The prime minister, deputy prime ministers, other members of the Council of Ministers, and other officers in standing commissions were to be elected on recommendation from the president by the National *Shengo*. As suggested above, the President of the PDRE was granted sweeping powers. Like the emperor, he could appoint and dismiss governmental officers at any level, govern by decree, and in effect, despite the trappings of separation of power into the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the President could operate above the law. Rather than operating as an autonomous legislature,

the *Shengo* often found itself in the position of merely ratifying decisions that had already been made by the President.³⁴

Citizens' rights, freedoms and duties were covered in Part Two of the constitution. The people were said to have guaranteed rights to work and leisure; free education; free health care; individual human rights and the protection of private property; due process; trial by a court; free legal counsel if needed; the right to vote; freedom of assembly and expression; and religious freedoms. This latter freedom was a clear departure from the previous two previous formal constitutions in that the Orthodox Religion was deemed not to be the state religion.

The new government and constitution were officially inaugurated on September 10, 1987, and, within a week, the PDRE turned its attention to dealing directly with the burning issues relating to group rights and self-determination. It did so by issuing a proclamation calling for the administrative reorganization of the country, creating 24 administrative regions and five "autonomous regions".³⁵ This was an obvious attempt to diffuse widespread discontent among various nationality groups, particularly in Eritrea, Tigray, the Ogaden, and some areas inhabited by the Oromo. It was clear that rather than forthrightly addressing its ethnic or nationality problems, the regime was attempting to repartition the country so as to minimize the importance of large and relatively homogeneous regions, and to strengthen its ability to control politics as well as the economy. The port city of Assab in the province of Eritrea, and the regional commercial center Dire Dawa in the Ogaden, for example, were granted autonomous status, thus allowing the regime to retain the economic cores of those respective provinces.

The reforms called for the creation of popularly elected provincial legislative assemblies and executive officers. Regional governments were to have at least partial control over policies and programs in such sectors as culture, health, education, taxation, and local economic development. More-

over, despite the alleged significance of these reforms by the national government, Eritrea, where a war of national liberation was intensifying at the time, remained a special case. The central government controlled the port of Assab, and the province was divided into three sub-regions, one of which, Sahel, was totally in rebel hands.

Even though the administrative reorganization of the country was intended to lend legitimacy to the Marxist regime and its programs, this did not stem the tide of opposition. The reaction of the armed opposition nationalist movements fighting the regime was swift and negative.³⁶ Groups such as the OLF, TPLF, EPLF and the Afar Liberation Front saw nothing new in the reforms, and in fact stepped up their criticisms and resistance against the regime. By the end of 1987, administrative reforms were a reality only on paper. The beginning of 1988 saw the TPLF and EPLF record significant battlefield victories against the Ethiopian forces, and their capturing and holding territory.

These negative developments had a profound effect on the morale of the Ethiopian military and in May 1989 there was an abortive coup against the regime. This came at the same time that the Soviets had declared their intention to end their military and economic support of the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian army had expanded to more than six hundred thousand at the time, and following the failed coup it began to implode as whole units of troops defected, taking their arms and weapons with them, and joining opposition forces. Over the next two years, the TPLF and its recently created umbrella organization, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was able to capture all of Tigray Province, and large segments of Wollo, Gondar, and Shoa provinces. In Eritrea, the EPLF came to control all but the urban centers of Asmara, Massawa, and Assab. By late 1990, the entire country was in turmoil, and on May 21, 1991, the Marxist regime finally fell to the forces of the EPRDF, and its leadership was either captured or went into exile.³⁷

IV. Ethnic Federalism and the Quest for Self-determination

When it first came to power, the EPRDF regime saw itself as being confronted with the same challenge of effectively addressing the self-determination issue that had stymied both the Imperial and Marxist regimes. It tried to present the public image that it had the political will to effectively address many of Ethiopia's past problems, including the nationalities question. Its leaders moved quickly to fill the power vacuum caused by the collapse of the Marxist regime, and within a few weeks it had established a transitional government. A national conference for this purpose was convened in July 1991—an attempt on the part of the EPRDF to secure widespread acceptance. The conference resulted in the signing of a transitional charter by representatives of some thirty-one political movements, the creation of the Council of Representatives with eighty-seven members, and the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The EPRDF had the largest single bloc in the Council, with 32 seats, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), until its withdrawal from the government in late June 1992, was the second largest, with twelve seats.

The Charter declared that the transitional period was to last no more than two and a half years. The Council was charged with constituting a commission to draw up a draft constitution. The draft constitution in 1994 was first submitted for public discussion and then voted into effect by a constituent assembly.

Perhaps the two most important provisions of the transitional charter were articles II and XIII. Article II asserted the right of all Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination, the preservation of the national identities of each group, and the right of each nationality to govern its own affairs within the context of a federated Ethiopia. Article XIII stated that

“there shall be a law establishing local and regional councils defined on the basis of nationality.” These provisions represented a dramatic departure from the policies of previous regimes on the claims of various groups to the right of self-determination. The new policy quickly prompted protests among Ethiopian nationalists, both at home and abroad, who violently opposed the possible break-up of the unitary state of Ethiopia.

Despite this, the EPRDF regime demonstrated its resoluteness in following through on the administrative reorganization of the country along ethno-regional lines. It did this at first through a series of proclamations over a period of years, and eventually the right of states to self-determination was enshrined in the Constitution of 1994. For example, Proclamation #7 fleshed out the provisions in the Charter dealing with the creation of a federal system of states based upon ethno-linguistic criteria. Proclamation #26 of 1992 and Proclamation #33 of that same year sketched the outlines of a revenue sharing scheme involving central, state and local governments. The states would have administrative autonomy, but they would receive substantial fiscal support from the center.

Proclamation #41 of 1993 defined the powers and duties of central and regional executive bodies during the transitional period. Even as the constitution was in the final stages of being drafted, the EPRDF issued a major policy statement outlining its political views and policy objectives in regional reforms. It declared its intentions to implement a plan to devolve power from the center to states and local governments. This was billed as a form of *devolved federalism* without extensive sub-national control over technical policies, laws, regulations and taxes.³⁸ This contrasts with federalism resulting from bargaining and negotiations among states that seek to voluntarily join in some type of federal arrangement. Ideally, in a federal system each state surrenders a certain amount of its sovereignty, power and author-

ity to the center for the good of the collective.³⁹ Ethiopian federalism has been imposed from the top. The Constitution states that states may prepare their own constitutions, decide their own official language, develop their own administrative systems, establish separate police forces, and collect certain taxes. However, the initiative for such an arrangement came more from the center than from the constituent states.

Article #39 of the constitution, *The Rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples*, declares that, “Every nation, nationality and people shall have the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession.” This action can be taken when at least two thirds (2/3rds) of the legislature of the nation, nationality or people concerned vote to do so, and the action is ratified in a statewide referendum three years later. Before this happens, however, there are constitutional provisions for review by the Constitutional Court and the House of the Federation, a national political and deliberative body with 108 elected representatives from all states. Article #39 also gives nations, nationalities or peoples the right to speak, write, promote and develop their own languages.

Article #52 articulates the powers and duties of states. Among their powers are the rights to prepare and implement development plans, to promulgate and implement state constitutions and to levy taxes and duties not reserved for the federal government. They may also organize and direct their own police forces.

The Constitution further proclaims the establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, consisting of nine states. Four of these states, the Southern Peoples’ State, Benshangul/Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, rather than being purely ethnically based are in fact heterogeneous. The only relatively homogenous states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, and Somali states. However, the regime consistently refers to its approach as “ethnic federalism.”

How did the leaders of the EPRDF arrive at the decision to pursue federalism as a governance strategy? At a very fundamental level this was a political decision, intended to keep the EPRDF in the position of being the dominant player in the reconstruction of Ethiopia. The leaders of the EPRDF initially in the transitional period had created a broad political pact. However, by the end of 1993, the governing coalition had considerably narrowed, when the EPRDF-dominated government in April of that year ousted five political groups, calling themselves the Southern Coalition, from the Council of Representatives for endorsing a resolution adopted at a conference of opposition groups meeting in Paris, calling for the dissolution of the Council. Thus, the membership of the Council was reduced to the representatives of the EPRDF and ethnically based parties it had created.⁴⁰ Organized opposition inside the country by this time was generally repressed. Major ethnically based parties were completely shut out of the pact that formed the TGE or were forced out over the first two years of the transition.

National, state and local elections have occurred since the early 1990s, but only recently in national elections have opposition parties presented credible challenges to the EPRDF regime. Between 1992 and 2004, opposition parties either opted voluntarily not to participate or were kept out by forces loyal to the EPRDF. But, in the build up to the parliamentary elections of 2005, more than sixty political parties were registered, and two, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), proved quite competitive against the incumbent regime. Whereas in 2000, opposition parties were only able to garner 12 parliamentary seats, in the 2005 election opposition parties won almost two hundred seats out of the total of 547.⁴¹

The objectives of the EPRDF in implementing its federal strategy seemed noble enough. The regime claimed that it wanted to reduce the ethnic tensions and conflicts that had

dominated the modern history of Ethiopia; to forthrightly tackle social and economic problems in such a way that all ethnic groups were treated as equals; to build a democratic society; and to construct effective, efficient and uncorrupt systems of governance.⁴² In order to do this, there would have to be a new social compact for the polity. However, rather than such a compact being negotiated among elites representing the major groups in society, or rather than this compact emerging in an organic manner, it was imposed from the top.

Even though Ethiopia's recent experiment with federalism has been hailed by some as novel and successful, the approach does not have the benefit of a popular consensus or even widespread support in large segments of the population. There are many in the public at large who contend that by definition a development strategy involving ethnic federalism is fatally flawed.⁴³ This is the predominant view of citizens who feel that such a strategy will ultimately result in the demise of a unitary Ethiopian state. Some scholars question this approach because they claim it is likely to lead to more rather than less ethnically based conflict.⁴⁴

Despite such concerns, the EPRDF government has forged ahead with its plans, justifying this approach based on the fact that its first priority is the removal of social inequalities based upon ethnicity. One of the government's chief ideologues in 1995, citing the historic failure of previous Ethiopian governments to effectively address the problem of ethnic disharmony stated, "We must find a solution which is beneficial to the Ethiopian people today, therefore, history will not provide the answer."⁴⁵

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Ethiopia's strategy of ethnic federalism, the process of constructing it will not be easy. In spite of the fact that international donors tend to accentuate the positives in this approach, there are hardly any examples of states that have followed the path of ethnic federalism and succeeded. In fact, the most successful cases

to date have been only Canada and Switzerland. Other states such as Malaysia, Singapore, India and Nigeria have only limitedly succeeded and are still wrought with regular intervals of violent ethnic conflict. In order for Ethiopia to succeed, it will have to be blessed with committed and enlightened leadership from all walks of life, particularly government, and effective federal institutions. Moreover, whatever federalism is implemented, it will have to be crafted so as to take into account the unique features of a multi-ethnic Ethiopia.

The experiment currently underway is indeed hybrid federalism with many features that are characteristically Ethiopian. In structural terms, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia resembles federal states in most parts of the world. As mentioned above, it consists of nine regional states, based, and two charter cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In addition, Ethiopia is made up of 66 administrative zones (provinces), 550 *woredas* (districts) and 6 special districts. Each of the four levels of government has more or less the same structures, with executive, legislative and judicial branches. The regional state bureaucracy carries out the day-to-day operations of government.

Regional state powers include the implementation of state constitutions as well as social (e.g. language policy, education policy) and economic development policies and plans; the policing function; the administration of land and natural resources according to Federal law; taxation in such areas as personal income (except for federal state and international employees); certain producer and manufacture taxes; and certain joint taxes with the federal government.

Although most taxing powers rest with the federal government, most of the expenditure obligations of government in this federal system are the responsibility of regional states. The central government has rather narrow responsibilities. It is responsible for collecting most taxes, including import and export taxes, setting national economic and social policies, establishing national standards in areas such as commerce

and trade, finance, and transportation. Also, like central governments in all federal states, it is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, insuring national defense, monetary policy, and setting policy relating to inter-regional state transportation and commerce.

However, Ethiopian federalism is not a pure type, but a hybrid that resembles a form of "centralized federalism".⁴⁶ This system is in part deconcentrated—operating through regionalized agents of the central state—and in part devolved, with regional states having corporate power of their own. In spite of the fact that the constitution gives a great deal of power and administrative authority to regional states, the overwhelming amount of political power in this system rests with the central government. Because of this, in practice, Ethiopia operates more like a unitary state, with regional states closely following the policy lead of the center, rather than asserting their policy independence. The most important and powerful figure in the country is the Prime Minister, the leader of the ruling EPRDF. There is also a figurehead or titular president whose role is mainly ceremonial. Moreover, through constitutional means, the EPRDF government has systematically neutralized political opposition, and placed political elite and party cadre who support it in positions of power and authority at the regional level.

At the same time, the central government has set up a devolved system of administration, ostensibly in an effort to bring government closer to the people and to create an environment conducive to peoples' empowerment. However, as has been found elsewhere, devolution can often enhance the control of the center rather than reducing it, especially when regional states do not have sufficient taxing powers or other means of generating their own revenue.⁴⁷

In poor and deeply divided countries, such as Ethiopia, administrative devolution would under the best of circumstances be risky business. Poverty and weak, uncoordinated administrative institutions have generally proven to be

anathema to the successful implementation of devolved federalism. Such an approach has the tendency to limit population movement between and among regional states; could lead to demands for secession from the federal state; limit the ability of the central government to take an effective lead in the development of the country; and could inhibit the development of an open and free market that integrates all parts of the country.

V. Conclusion

Ever since the earliest days of the modern state of Ethiopia, political leaders have been faced with the challenge of coming up with approaches to governance that might ameliorate the potential for ethnic conflict while at the same time addressing claims of ethnic self-determination. Beginning with the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie I, the imperial state attempted to enhance royal absolutism and undercut demands for self-determination by projecting the image of a multi-ethnic unitary state. But, this approach failed and the myth of a constitutional monarchy was shattered in large measure because the emperor had failed to effectively address the self-determination issue. The imperial system was replaced by a Marxist-Leninist regime that tried to downplay the political importance of ethnic or nationality groupings by creating a constitutional arrangement that emphasized the importance of mass organization as opposed to ethnicity as an organizational principle. The death knell for this approach was sounded when ethnic opponents of the regime rejected it and overthrew the Marxist government.

For the past seventeen years, the incumbent regime has been attempting to take a more direct and strategic approach to dealing with the challenge of ethnic self-determination. It has attempted to do this by introducing and implementing a constitution that ostensibly calls for a federal system

centered on ethnic identities. In many ways, this experiment is only nominally ethnically based. Moreover, it is only in a structural sense federal. Not all states are ethnically homogeneous and to the extent that federalism exists, it is a highly centralized system of governance that was imposed from the top as opposed to being the result of a deal being struck by ethno-regional elites to form a federal system. All of this notwithstanding, the government has been involved in a process of administrative devolution. This process has now entered a second phase. In the first phase, power and authority in regional administrative matters had been devolved to the regional state level. In the latest phase, over the past three years, more decision-making authority has been devolved to some *woredas*. However, the limitations on the process are profound, not the least of which is the lack of sufficient material and administrative capacity to effectively implement well crafted policies and programs. Furthermore, as a result of the emphasis on the ethnic basis of the government's federal agenda, in many parts of the country, ethnic tensions have been exacerbated rather than diffused.

Politically, Ethiopia does possess democratic forms and institutions. Multi-party elections have been regularly held. Also, there is evidence that gradually people at the *woreda* level and below are becoming more involved in making political and administrative decisions that affect their daily lives. However, poverty and inequality continue, particularly in those areas that have always been depressed. In short, despite significant constitutional efforts, democracy has yet to be consolidated in Ethiopia, and a democratic culture is not clearly in sight.

While the EPRDF regime's most recent attempt to deal with the issue of self-determination by constitutional means has been more successful than that of previous regimes, it has not been absolutely successful. By objective standards, then, it would be reasonable to say that ethnic federalism, at least just over a decade into the process, seems far from bearing

the fruit that it was intended to bear. The federal government has so far not been able to instill a widespread sense of trust in the general population, and its economic and political problems make this even more problematic. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his regime continue to exhort the country to respect the history and culture of all groups equally, and to make the notion of Ethiopian ethnic federalism a model for other countries to emulate.⁴⁸ Indeed, it could be that in order for this process to work, it will need time. What it will also need is for political leaders to reduce central control over politics and to accord the general population a fuller measure of human rights than has heretofore been the case.

Notes

1. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.
2. For a discussion of the distinction between "citizen" and "subject" see, Mahmood Mamdani. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Mamdani, focusing on colonial Africa, distinguishes between the "native" and "non-native in that setting. Citizens are governed by the laws and culture of the metropolitan colonizing country and the "native" is subject to customary law. In the case of Ethiopia, the distinction was between the aristocracy and nobility and recently incorporated subjects who did not fit into that category.
3. See, Adam Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p36.
4. See, Claude Ake. *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. Dakar, Senegal: CODESREA, 2000, pp 9-17.
5. See, Walter F. Murphy, "Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy," in Douglas Greenberg, *et.al*, eds. *Constitutionalism*

- and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World*", New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 3-4.
6. See, Cass R. Sunstein. *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
 7. See, A. H. M. Jones and Elizabeth Monroe. *A History of Ethiopia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955, and Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, pp 47-48. There is some disagreement as to the origins of the legend, but the chief author of the Ethiopic version of the document claims to have translated it from Arabic. The text, however, contains quotations and illustrations from the Old and New Testaments, the Koran and elsewhere.
 8. See, E. A. Wallis Budge. *A History of Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia*. Oosterhout, Netherlands: Anthropological Publications, 1966, pp 220-27.
 9. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, p 48.
 10. See, Richard Greenfield. *Ethiopia: A New Political History*. New York: Praeger, 1965, p 240.
 11. See, Asmarom Legesse. *Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society*. New York: Free Press, 1973.
 12. See, Lewis, I. M. *Blood and Bones: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994.
 13. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, pp 68-69.
 14. See, John Markakis. *Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, pp 271-72, 280-81.
 15. Ibid, p 273.
 16. See Marina Ottaway, "Social Class and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian Revolution", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14 (September 1976), p 471.
 17. See, Peter Schwab. *Decision-making in Ethiopia; A Study of the Political Process*. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1972.

18. See the text of the Constitution of 1931 in Peter Schwab. *Ethiopia and Haile Selassie*. New York: Facts on File, 1972, pp 12-14.
19. In fact, Ethiopian drafters were advised by three U. S. constitutional scholars. See, John Spencer. *Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and U.S. Policy*. Algonac, MI: Reference Publications, 1977, pp 256-60.
20. See Peter Schwab. *Haile Selassie I*. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, 1979, pp 85-86.
21. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*. p 85.
22. This is not to say that the Council had no discretionary powers, constitutionally it did. But, Clapham found that at no time did the Council exercise such powers. See, Christopher Clapham. *Haile Selassie's Government*, New York: Praeger, 1969, p 120.
23. See, Christopher Clapham. *Haile Selassie's Government*, pp 123-4.
24. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, p 85.
25. Ibid, p 86.
26. See, Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, p 87.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid, p 88.
29. See Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia: A New Political History* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 456; and, Randi R. Balsvik, *Haile Selassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1977* (East Lansing, MI: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1985).
30. See, Edmond J. Keller, p 239-40.
31. See, James Brooke, "Ethiopia Officially Joining the Ranks of Communist Nations," *The New York Times*, (February 23, 1987).
32. At the time, there were only five other Sub-Saharan countries that claimed such a title. See, Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds. *Afromarxist Regimes: Ideology and Policy*. Boulder, CO: Reinner, 1987.

33. *The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: n.p., 1987.
34. See, Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, p 241.
35. See, "Ensuring the Rights of Nationalities," Addis Ababa: Committee for the Founding of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (September 1987).
36. Edmond J. Keller. *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, p242.
37. See, Edmond J. Keller, "Remaking the Ethiopian State", in I. W. Zartman, ed. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
38. John M. Cohen, "Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia," Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion Paper No. 519 (October 1995), pp 10.
39. William, Riker. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little Brown, 1964, p 12.
40. Edmond J. Keller, "Remaking the Ethiopian State", p 137.
41. See, "Ethiopia: Poll body to probe complaints in 135 constitutencies", *IRIN*, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47753&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA.
42. John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson. *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press, 1999, p 131, and, Kjetil Tronvoll and Oyvind Aadland, "The Process of Democratization in Ethiopia: An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance", *Human Rights Report No. 5*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1995, pp 47-53.
43. See for example, Worku Abbera, "Tribalism Rules in Ethiopia," *New African* (September 1993), p 20, and, Paul Brietzke, "Ethiopia's 'Leap into the Dark': Federalism and Self-determination in the New Constitution," *Journal of African Law*, (1995), Vol. 40, pp 19-38.
44. See for example, Walle Engedayehu, "Ethiopia: Democracy and the Politics of Ethnicity," *Africa Today*, 2nd Quarter (1993), pp. 29-52.

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45. Quoted in, Kjetil Tronvoll and Oyvind Aadland, "The Process of Democratization in Ethiopia: An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance", p. 47.
46. William, Riker. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*, p 7.
47. Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 101.
48. *Ethiopian Herald*, "Forum discusses decentralization affirmative actions," August 6. 2002.