ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue)

ISD's recent policy brief explores the increasingly diverse range of threats to the UK’s security, while providing a range of reccs on how the govt can work to combat these challenges. We talk about it and more in our Insights newsletter 👇 Sign up below. https://lnkd.in/dcy4MJXK

On April 22, the Home Office confirmed that the UK will proscribe the Terrorgram Collective, an online network of neo-fascist accelerationists who produce and share propaganda encouraging adherents to carry out terrorist attacks. The UK's first proscription of a online terrorist network will criminalise support or membership of the Terrorgram Collective. Such amorphous extremist ecosystems have traditionally challenged policy responses geared towards groups and organisations. The Terrorgram Collective has not published a major work since 2022, but their publications remain influential among accelerationists and other far-right extremists. Terrorgram adherents also continue to produce unbranded, widely-circulated imagery glorifying terrorism. For more background on the Terrorgram Collective and associated subcultures, see ISD’s explainers on Saints Culture and accelerationism as well as ISD research on accelerationist support for Hamas, glorification of mass shooters, and the legacy of the Christchurch attack. The challenge of post-organisational extremism: https://lnkd.in/exVKQWvN Saints Culture: https://lnkd.in/eykdvQcT Accelerationism: https://lnkd.in/evqHakn9 Accelerationist support for Hamas: https://lnkd.in/eu-YxhgT Glorification of mass shooters: https://lnkd.in/ezZnYjje The Legacy of the Christchurch attack: https://lnkd.in/dcSpPbPu

On April 22, the UK Home Office announced the proscription of the Terrorgram Collective, an online network of neo-fascist accelerationists. This move, which will criminalise support for or membership of Terrorgram, marks the first proscription of an online terrorist network in the UK's history. However, the decentralised nature of the network poses enforcement challenges.   When considering Terrorgram, it is important to distinguish between the small core of leaders who produce propaganda & guide the network, and a large number of online adherents. While the former may be easier to prosecute, the latter complicates enforcement efforts.   As a result, legal action will likely prioritise targeting the distribution of branded Terrorgram propaganda, clarifying thresholds for social media companies and creating a legal imperative for content removal. Yet, challenges persist in prosecuting individuals for possession or dissemination of unbranded materials.   The proscription aims to curb the spread of Terrorgram propaganda across platforms. However, its effectiveness may be limited by the network's reliance on platforms like Telegram, known for lax content enforcement. Read the full Dispatch 👇 https://lnkd.in/eyeK_n6J

Instead of channeling efforts to ban a singular platform [TikTok], US Congress should prioritize federal data privacy laws safeguarding online users & limiting platforms' and other data brokers' data collections/sales, ISD tells the Spanish outlet El Mundo. Read below. https://lnkd.in/dSGcAjRf

In the US, concerns around AI being exploited by bad actors are mounting. ISD's Jiore Craig spoke to the Boston Globe about the possibility of voters becoming inundated with conflicting information leading them "to disengage & not participate in our democracy.” https://lnkd.in/d2p-rp-N

In February, ISD briefed the European Commission body responsible for climate action - DG-CLIMA. As a result, three new pathways for responding to climate mis- and disinformation have been enshrined in a new policy framework. Read more below. https://lnkd.in/dt4dpqth

In our latest w/ CASM Technology, we look at possible platform manipulation on Wikipedia, testing out a method called semantic clustering on the ENG-language Wikipedia entry for the Russo-Ukrainian war, & 48 other pages about Ukraine that link directly to it. By clustering the editors of these pages on the basis of the meaning (the ‘semantic content’) of the edits made, we identified 176 total clusters. While useful in grouping different accounts making very similar edits, it didn't necessarily prove if the edits were legitimate. We did however identify clusters that contained a number of single-controller ‘sock-puppet’ accounts. This typically happened when an editor intended to make a consistent series of changes, and either used multiple accounts to do so to circumvent a ban or to camouflage their activity. One cluster, for example, is composed of 9 editors & 4 sock-puppets, with the 2 most prolific linked to a single user. All edits from the sock-puppets are to the ‘Russia–Ukraine relations’ page & consist of updating stats on the country comparison table, including army sizes for each. In the future, semantic clustering for detection could help identify accounts with highly similar edits for closer scrutiny. However, any automated analysis should be linked to Wikipedia's human-led investigations & sanctions regime, such as Wikipedia Administrators's CheckUsers). As manipulation tactics evolve, empowering Wikipedia's large volunteer community with effective tools will be of high importance in order to conserve the platform's integrity. Our full paper below 👇 https://lnkd.in/dh3gxejs

ISD's Elise Thomas is a guest on the Politico Tech podcast this month, discussing the "really concerning" shift in tactics she detected in the pro-CCP network ‘Spamouflage’: They're posing convincingly as Americans online & generating engagement. https://lnkd.in/dNbPWgUM

The challenge from extremism has shifted dramatically in recent years in the UK and internationally, yet policy responses have failed to keep up with this evolving threat environment. ISD's latest policy paper examines these profound shifts in the extremism threat landscape facing the UK, including the impacts of crises like the Israel-Gaza conflict, and considers their implications for a comprehensive rights-based policy strategy. In an overview of the threat landscape, we outline evolving extremist mobilisation by far-right and Islamist groups, hate targeting Jewish, Muslim, migrant and LGBTQ+ communities, as well as the intersection of these threats with hostile state actor activity. Our policy framework lays out the key components of a holistic government strategy rooted in a human rights framework, to prevent extremist violence, and protect against growing threats to democracy and pluralism. The full policy paper is now available on our website ⬇️ https://lnkd.in/d9wcs6mt

Those willing to engage in violence and intimidation "will become more emboldened and continue to act with impunity,” said ISD's Aoife Gallagher to the Irish Examiner after a group of masked people in Ireland defaced a politician's home with little pushback despite police presence. https://lnkd.in/d-9AbJ-6