DER SPIEGEL: Ms. Fischer, how does Russian society currently view the war being waged in Ukraine?

Fischer: It has become incredibly difficult for us to assess this because we have less and less information about what is happening in Russian society. Independent research has become impossible in Russia. The dictatorial state prevents it and intimidates people so that they, in public opinion polls for example, no longer express themselves truthfully. Russian sociologists are also arguing about the correct interpretation of the current situation.

DER SPIEGEL: What are they saying?

Fischer: There are two suppositions. One is that a totalitarian situation has been established in Russia, in which a large majority of the population actually supports the regime's policies. The other thesis is that the atomization of society is preventing many people from voicing their opposition to war. And that they are instead retreating into privacy and trying to avoid any contact with the state to the extent possible.

DER SPIEGEL: Which scenario do you consider to be more plausible?

Fischer: I think both sides have very good arguments. There are totalitarian tendencies. In contrast to the 1990s and the 2000s, the state is now trying to take control of society. This also applies to the private sphere, the upbringing of children and education. One example that has generated a lot of headlines recently is the new history textbook for school classes. The state is penetrating the education system and rewriting the curriculum. It wants to shape people from childhood on with its own propaganda.

DER SPIEGEL: If you scratch beneath the surface, do you still think it possible that a significant number of Russians doubt or reject the war?

Fischer: Russian society has indeed gone through a modernization process since the end of the Soviet Union. The country experienced an opening in addition to digitalization. Younger people have different strategies for obtaining information on the internet. Such a society can't easily be forced into a totalitarian yoke. But opportunism and intimidation are also deeply entrenched. That is why I don't expect any significant social resistance to the war.

DER SPIEGEL: The Russian state shut down independent media outlets after the full-scale invasion began, but it so far hasn't restricted access to the internet in the same way that China has.

Fischer: In contrast to Russia, the Chinese state has controlled the internet and communications from the very beginning. But in Russia, it was completely open; the regime would have to completely reverse course. That is risky.

DER SPIEGEL: Which would mean that Russia hasn't completely succumbed to totalitarianism. Some experts, though, see elements of fascism in today's Russia.

Fischer: Yes, this state and the regime are veering into fascism, if you look at the ideology, the propaganda, the symbolism. But totalitarianism is based on the mobilization of masses, and Russian society cannot be mobilized for this war. We saw that clearly in the reaction to the partial mobilization that Putin announced a year ago. There was a remarkably strong backlash to this dictatorial step. Hundreds of thousands of people left the country. Now, the regime is trying to keep further recruitment under the radar to the extent possible because of fears of how society will react. To me, that falls short of totalitarianism. It is emblematic of a regime that wants a totalitarian state but has thus far been unable to establish it.

DER SPIEGEL: We can see how Russian schools are being indoctrinated and how a cult of military is promoted even in institutions for young children. Could the generations that experienced significant political freedoms now be followed by a totalitarian generation?

Fischer: Russian sociologist Grigory Yudin once told me that Putin had a problem with the youth because the younger generation grew up in an entirely different atmosphere. It's a problem he is now trying to solve. And a new, totalitarian generation could grow out of this. We need to understand that this all-out war against Ukraine is massively changing and deforming society and the state in Russia. It is extremely dangerous for Ukraine, for other neighboring countries and for Europe as a whole.

DER SPIEGEL: In your new book, you write about the "chauvinist threat" emanating from Russia. What does that mean?

Fischer: I group three elements under chauvinism: the first is aggressive nationalism and imperialism, the second is sexism and the third is autocracy. These are the three pillars of Putin's regime. They are closely intertwined and have developed in parallel and mutually reinforced each other during the 23 years of Putin's rule in Russia. As such, the gap between Russia and Western societies, but between Russian and Ukrainian society since Euromaidan in 2014, has grown deeper.

DER SPIEGEL: Did this chauvinism propel Russia into war?

Fischer: It is a critical factor in explaining the invasion of Ukraine, which aims at the annihilation of the country. All three elements — nationalism, sexism, and autocracy — have a lot to do with violence. Violence has been unbounded and normalized in Russia. One example is the decriminalization of domestic violence a few years ago. Men who abuse their wives for the first time can no longer be held accountable unless the violence results in serious injury or death.

DER SPIEGEL: In your book, you quote a rape metaphor that Vladimir Putin applied to Ukraine shortly before the Russian invasion when explaining to French President Emmanuel Macron why Ukraine had to adhere to the Minsk agreements. At a press conference, he said: "Whether you like it or not, you're going to have to put up with it, beautiful."

Fischer: Yes, Putin intentionally uses such metaphors. We hear this over and over again from feminists in Russia: Putin is a rapist. Feminists, by the way, play an extremely important role in the Russian underground antiwar movement. Women were also in the majority among those arrested in the early days of the antiwar protests.

DER SPIEGEL: Why is that?

Fischer: The liberal opposition in Russia, like politics generally, is strongly male-dominated. Many of their leaders were already abroad or in prison when the full-scale invasion began. The women from civil society were still there. But perhaps the men also tended to stay away from the protests out of fear of being recruited into the army.

DER SPIEGEL: Russian society's experience of violence includes several wars that Putin has waged: in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and also combat operations in African countries.

Fischer: These wars have left their mark on society. Their effect is felt at the political level, the societal level, the private level. The continuum of violence, traumatization and retraumatization – even in perpetrator societies — is emphasized strongly, especially in feminist research. War cements patriarchal gender roles in a destructive way. The men who fought, murdered, raped and destroyed in Ukraine will come back with their own trauma of violence and will have no points of reference for coping with these traumas. It's different in Ukraine. There, the president's wife, Olena Zelenska, has taken on the patronage of a national strategy for dealing with the psychological consequences of war. Such a thing would be unimaginable in Russia. The Putin regime is building a cult of heroes, not a system for coping with combat trauma.

DER SPIEGEL: Putin has tied his fate to the war. Is an end to the fighting even conceivable as long as Putin is in power?

Fischer: It's true. Putin cannot end this war without victory, otherwise he will be putting himself and his regime in existential danger. As such, this war will continue for as long as the Russian side is able to do so. The European Union must be prepared for this reality. The chauvinist Russian regime is waging a hot war against Ukraine. But its policies are also directed against Europe's liberal democracies.

DER SPIEGEL: What scenarios do you see for Russia's future?

Fischer: Putin operates on the basis of perpetuity. He is trying to create events that will outlast him. In principle, I see three scenarios: The first is a continuation of the chauvinist regime under Putin himself or a successor. The second is a collapse of the regime. We got a glimpse of what that could look like during Yevgeny Prigozhin's mutiny. The third scenario, which I unfortunately consider the least likely, would be a democratic transition.